Anzio Cassino Campaign

8/11/2019 Anzio Cassino Campaign

1/28

Anzio/Cassino

Campaign Jan - June 1944

by

MSG James

H Kirtland

MSG

David

A

Faiel lo

Msa

Mahdi Mahmud-Bey

MSG Bobby L. Brown

SO Josef

H Hawrat

Group 14

3

May

1991


2/28

i i

outl ine

Thesis:

The recent

ai r campaign

in the

Persian

Gulf shares many

aspects with the

bo oing of

the Abbey of Monte

Cassino

I

General background

infor a t ion

A Just War

Theory application

B

Comparison

of leaders

I I

Archaeological/religious signif icance

of

areas

A

Abbey

of

Monte

Cassino

B Persian Gulf

region

I I I

Support for campaigns

A

Anzio/Cassino

campaign

B

Persian

Gulf

campaign

IV Air

Force bo oing

campaigns

A

Anzio/Caasino campaign

B Persian Gulf caapaign


3/28

Kirtland

1

The

Anzio/Cassino Campaign

Jan Jun

1944

I t is

but

a

rare

moment when

th i s planet

is

without

some

form

of

conf l ic t .

Whenever

there are

two

dis t inc t expressions

of

thought

there

is

a

chance

of disagreement.

Too often

the

disagreement leads to war.

The

values and

bel iefs of

the leaders

of

the f ighting factions deter . ine

the

manner by which the

war

is

fought.

n one

side

are

those who will in i t i a te any means

no

matter

how

heinous to accomplish their intended end. n the

other

side are those who

take

into account

moral r ight

and who

adhere to

a

Just War Tradit ion.

The

recent

ai r

campaign in the

Persian Gulf shares aany aspects

with

the

bombing

of

the

Abbey

of

Monte

Cassino

and i t ref lec ts the

same general moral r ights

and

wrongs.

The

methods employed

by

the

Germans

in

World

War

I I

and by

the I raq i s in the Persian

Gulf were

extreme. These

methods

are

direct reflections

of

the

leaders who employed

them. Adolf

Hitler

and

Saddam

Hussein

share

many

s imi lar i t ies .

Both were

born of peasant parents . Both

knew

deprivation from

infancy.

Both grew

up

with dis t inc t prejudices against those who

surrounded them. Both used weapons of t e r ror , as

opposed

to

weapons

of t ac t ica l iaportance. Hitler

believed

in

a

. a s te r

race

and

t r ied

vehemently to destroy

those

he considered weaker.

Saddam

Hussein

demonstrated

his

lack of

remorse

during

the

war between

Iran and Iraq by using chemical weapons against his

countrymen.

One may

argue

that both

were

men

se t

on self-aggrandizement.

Or one may argue that both deeply believed that their

respective


4/28

Kirtland 2

countries

and l i fes ty les were meant to be the example for

the

world.

Whatever the argument, both

leaders

attempted to

overpower

weaker nations through force. Both leaders invited

war.

European

and Mideast

history

abound in

confl ict . Even today,

almost 5

years

la te r , many s t i l l

believe

that ,

Nazism

was an

ultimate

threat to everything

decent in our

l ives ,

an

ideology

so

murderous,

so

degrading,

that

i t s

victory

would

have been

increasingly

awful. An

evil

so

bad, that the

only recourse

was

to

fight i t

(Walzer

86). Blitzkrieg,

expansionism,

and

the

sys te .a t ic

exter . inat ion

of

millions

of people

were

hallmarks of

th is great

evi l .

Hussein's regime has proven no less evi l . Throughout his

reign, there have

been countless reports

of tor tures , executions,

and other

such

at roc i t ies . For many years, Amnesty

International

has been receiving

widespread

reports of tor ture ,

many

of which

concerned minors (Hiller

Hylroie

250).

And

now,

as

did Hitler ,

Hussein too, made

an

attempt

a t expansionism

by launching a

bl i tzkr ieg

invasion into

Kuwait.

He too, demonstrated

an

evil

that

had to

be

fought

and defeated.

In 1920, an

international

co ission,

.eet ing in

The Hague,

concluded that , Aerial bombardment, destined to ter ror ize the

civi l ian population, or to

destroy

or

daaage

private

property

which has no mili tary

character, or

to wound non-combatants,

is

prohibited

(Walzer 94). Hitler and

Hussein

were gUilty of

violating

this

measure. Hitler

used

the

V weapons -

V-l 's and

V-2's. These were essential ly

flying bombs. Plagued

by

an

unreliable guidance sys te . , the .e boabs .eldom hi t their targets .


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Kirtland

3

They did

cause

larqe a.ounts of

random

destruction and a larqe

nu-oer of

casual t ies . These boabs turned out

to

be a

demoralizinq agent in Germany's

war with Great

Britain (Siaon

&

Schuster 663). Hit le r ' s indiscriminate 'venqeance

weapons'

took

8,938 c iv i l ian l ives and l e f t

nearly

25,000 seriously injured

in

their blind wake (Jablonski 100).

Hussein also

had his

weapon of terror . Comaonly referred to

as Scud,

th i s

missile is highly inaccurate,

but,

l ike the

V-bomb

brought fear

a anq

the innocent. These errant

missiles

also caused a lo t of da

ge,

but fortunately took only a

few

l ives . Of

course, fortune

and

luck

were

not

the

only

powers

which

rendered the

Scud

vi r tua l ly

worthless. For

the

f i r s t time

in

the

history of warfare, the United States launched the

anti-missi le missi le , the Patr io t (Brown 22). Almost

70

Scud

missi les

were

f ired dur1nq

the

brief war, many of

thea shot

down

by Patr10t

.1ss1les (11 Pa.o Tl

, 6 Apr 91) .

As one

can see,

both leaders

exercised blatant disregard for

l1fe 1n

the i r respective caapa1gns. Hitler

and Hussein had to

be

stopped. The Un1ted

s ta tes

answered the cal l in both instances.

o

war is without i t s at roci t ies .

No

war is ever o ~ l e t e l y

cleanly fouqht. The United States

is

not without

gui l t .

e

have, throuqhout

our short his tory,

resorted

to means

against

which the

Just

War Theory applies. However,

the

United

s ta tes

never

co

i t t ed crimes

in such

.aqnitude

as did Hitler and

Hussein.

Blatantly

disreqardinq the Widely accepted Laws of War

is not the nature of the United States or the Araed

Forces.

Much

thought

is put

into u.s. tarqet

select ion. Is

th i s

bombinq a mili tary necessity? What

are

the chances

of


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Kirtland 4

non-combatant casualt ies?

What

is the probabil i ty of success?

What

will be the pUblic opinion?

What

methods will

we

use?

Host wars

are described in ul t imate terms while they

are

being

fought (walzer 85).

The bo.oing

of the

Abbey a t Honte

Cassino

was,

and

s t i l l i s ,

widely considered a mil i ta ry a is take .

Granted,

the Abbey

probably

posed

.ore of

a psychological

threat

than a

t ac t ica l

one.

The

decis ion to bo.o

did

not co

easy.

Of

vi ta l

importance in the planning

was

the considerat ion of rel igious

impact,

public opinion,

and the aethod

of bombing (Hapgood 259).

The same

type of thought process

seemed

to prevail

in the

planning of

the

ai r caapaign in

the Persian

Gulf.

Religion

and

cul tural

heritage

are important

facets

of

l i fe .

Even

Hitler

showed

signs of rel igious bel ief

when

he

ended

his

orders to open hos t i l i t i e s

against

the Soviet Union with the

phrase,

May

the Lord God help us a l l in the batt le (Boldt 41).

The

custo.ary

law of war

and

Hague Convention Mo

IV,

enti t led ,

Respecting

the

Laws

and

Custo

of War

on

Land,

outline rules

governing types

of targets and

weaponry

tha t

can

be

used in

bat t le .

These rules

s ta te

that mil i ta ry forces

must t ry

to spare such targets

as schools, churches,

and

hospitals . These

rules also

s ta te that

we

can never destroy enemy property unless

mili tary

necessity

dic ta tes . Unfortunately,

these

rules only

becaae in ternat ional law

af ter

World

War I I .

Whether

they

would

have been followed by ei ther side in the

war,

had they been

passed

before

the outbreak

of

hos t i l i t i e s , y never be

known.

What is known i8

tha t

during World War I I ,

both sides

destroyed

many his toric , rel igious and cul tural

ar t i fac ts

(Wallace

120).


7/28

Kirtland 5

In

1944, German

Field Marshal Albert Kesselring stated

that

he never real ized

what

i t

was l ike to wage war in a museum

unti l he caae to I ta ly (Wallace 120). e was

referring

to I ta ly

being

a

storehouse

of rel igious and histor ical t reasures.

Here, in

ent ire c i t i e s

l ike Ro

, Florence, and Venice,

and in a thousand cathedrals and churches and

8Onasteries, was

embodied

the

progress

of

huaanity from

ancient Rome through the r i se of Christ iani ty

to

the

Renaissance. This was

the

civi l iza t ion the Mazis

sought

to

wipe out; and the Allies did not propose

del ibera te ly

to destroy

i t s

ar t i fac ts .

(Hapgood 30)

One such t reasure was the Abbey

of

Monte Cassino, a Benedictine

Monastery founded in 529 A.D. This towering work of

a r t

held

.any

t reasures.

Within i t s walls

were

tbousands

of parcbaents,

.anuscripts and

printed books.

The

.anastery also housed

numerous pieces

of sculpture

and paintings (Wallace 139). The

abbey

was not the only piece

of history destroyed during the

war.

Also

lost

wer& the Church of

Monteoliveto

in Naples and

the

bridge of Santo Trini ta in Florence (Wallace 121).

I tal ian

authori t ies , as well as forces from the

opposing

armies, took great st r ides in t rying to protect

I t a ly s a r t i s t i c

riches. The German

aray

helped t ransport many works of ar t to

safety. However, IIWlny ar t i fac ts were confiscated by Oer

n

authori t ies to be used as gi f t s and in

other

manners.

Many . walked off with prized objects , large and

s - . l l ,

but

the champion looter

was

the

No. 1 Nazi

hi .ae l f . Adolf

Hitler was deter . ined

to

a

ss the . o s t

magnificent ar t collection

in the

world for

display in


8/28

Kirtland 6

his

hometown

of

Linz, Austria. After the Germans took

over in 1943, I ta ly

becaae

his happy hunting ground.

(Wallace

127)

The a l l ies

establ ished the Subco

ission for

Monu.ents, Fine

Arts

and Archives (KrAA), which

briefed

b o ~ e r

crews

and infantry

commanders on monu.ents tbat should

be spared

i f possible.

However,

both

sides contributed to the destruction of many of

these

ar t i facts . For

e x a ~ l e

the

al l ies destroyed ny in thei r

bo-oing

raids

over I ta l ian c i t ie s .

The Ger.-ns blew up

aany

his tor ic bridges

to

prevent the al l ies f ro .

crossing

them

(Wallace

120).

Iraq is

no less a storehouse of religious and his tor ical

t reasures than was

I ta ly .

Prom the Ineyclopedla A .

~ i e a n a

we

learn

that The so i l of

Iraq

holds

t races,

and often

the

vis ible

remains of the buildings

and ar t i f ac t s of every age, which give

i t an outstanding s ta tus

in

arebeology and

ancient

ar t (388).

From

the

ew

Ineyelop.di . Britannica,

we

read,

I raq 's

history

reaches back to

the

very origins of

civi l izat ion,

for i t was here

in the fer t i le valley of the Tigris and

luphrates

r ivers that the

world's

f i r s t

urban, l i t e ra te c iv i l iza t ion was

born

(377).

The jo r i ty of the population of

Iraq is

Musli. (about

95 ' ) . Every

. a jo r population

area bouses several

aosques.

Conaidered

moat

holy, these religious center

a

house

.any

ar t i facts

of religious

and

cul tural i ~ o r t a n c e

Allied mili tary

s t ra teg is ts understood

the iaportance of

this cul tural

heritage.

Tbey understood that the war was not against

the

people

of

Iraq

so

auch as i t was against

the forces of a i l i t a ry

aggression.

They based targets for destruction on

s tra tegic

l ~ o r t a n c e those


9/28

Kirtland 7

that possibly

had a

long-tera

impact on the

country s

ab i l i ty to

conduct war Dugan

28).

Hussein probably understood our boabing st ra tegy. I t is

known

that

he ~ v e many items

of

equipment, to include ai rcraf t

to populated areas

and

around s ignif icant ly ~ o r t n t histor ical

and

rel igious

buildings

and shrines.

His

. a t ives

may

have

been

two fold. Firs t

to protect his personnel and equipment,

real izing that i t

was

our

policy

to not bomb

civi l ians

or

other

non-ai l i tary ent i t ies . Second, Hussein y have been trying to

lure

our o ~ s

to these areas in order to

sway

world opinion

to

his side

and

subsequently

disbanding

the

al l ied

coali t ion.

In

either

case,

the al l ied mili tary

s t ra tegis ts

basical ly refused

to

violate

the just

principles of

war

during the Persian

Gulf

cr i s i s . This, however, was not necessarily the case during a l l

phases of World

War

I I .

Despite

the

rel igious and

histor ical

signif icance, the

Allied

forces f ighting in

the

Cassino arena

believed

that the

ul t i . a t e fate

of the Abbey

of

Monte Cassino would be

destruct ion.

The

abbey

lay between the two warring

factions. Although

both

sides

declared i t safe f ro . attack, i t received destruct ive

a r t i l l e ry f i re a l . as t dai ly . The

bat t lel ines

were a t a

stalemate.

In

l a te January, 1944,

newspapers in

the

United

s ta tes and Hngland began reporting that Honte Cassino was

blocking the

advance of

the

a l l ies

in I ta ly

and

was costing the

l ives

of .any al l ied soldiers Hapgood 175). Public opinion

started to sway in favor

of

o ~ i n g

the

abbey. On 9 January

1944, tbe Hew

York

Tl published

a dispatch

with the headline

reading, in part , that the ene.y was using religious s i tes for


10/28

Kirtland 8

observation posts .

The author C.

L. Sulzberger

named Monte

Cassino as one of those s i t e s Hapgood 175).

New Y o ~ k

Times'

writer

Anne

O'Hare declared in

her

o l u ~ of

9

February,

1944,

that the

Germans

are

established

on

the hi l l .

The

Times

of

London

headlined, Monastery

Used as

Observation Post

Hapgood

176). Almost a l l the

Allied sold iers

in the area were convinced

that the

Oer

ns were watching

the .

f ro . the abbey.

The co

on

soldier despised

the

abbey and fe l t

i t

was costing them l ives .

Newspapers expres.ed these opinion. in nuaerous

ar t ic les

and

based thea on interviews

and

quotes

f ro . the

sold iers

f ighting

on

the

slopes

of

Monte

cassino

Hapgood

177).

Though hesi tant

a t

f i r s t ,

the Allied

leadership

decided

to bo-o

the ~ n a t e r y

bowing

to public opinion and concern

for

the ir

soldiers .

The

f ighting

men

who witne ed the

bombing

had

aixed

eaotions.

They wanted the abbey

de.troyed, yet expre

ed

sadness

over

i t s destruction.

The

Allied leadership jus t i f ied i t s

destruction

ba.ed on the bel ief

tha t the

Oer

ns occupied i t

for

t ac t ica l

purposes,

thus

endangering

the

l ives

of Allied soldiers .

The

How

York T180' reported on

February

16, 1944, tha t ,

short ly af te r the bombing, President Roosevelt considered the

occasion i ~ o r t a n t enough to .ake

public a

s ta te .ent of policy

that said

rel igious

and his toric

s t ruc tures

could

not be spared

when the

l ives

of

Aaerican

sold iers

were

the

al ternat ive .

The

saae edi t ion of the New

York

T

,

quoted

three

o ~ n Catholic

priests

about

the ir feel ings over the bo-oing.

The Most

Reverend

Michael J .

Curley,

Archbisbop

of Baltiaore, s ta ted,

Every

Catholic

throughout the

world, I

sure,

will understand.

Archbishop Joseph Francis Runnel of

New

Orleans bla.ed the


11/28

Kirtland 9

bombing on

the

disregard

of the

German forces for

the

sacredness

of

th is monument

of

re l ig ion.

And f inal ly , the

Most

Reverend

Gerald

P.

O'Hara

from

Atlanta was

quoted

as

saying,

Ho

words are

strong

enough

to deplore the fact tha t the

Germans

are using the

Abbey

of

Monte

Cassino

as an observation

post . On

11 February

1944,

an a r t i c le f ro .

the

Del

oine. Register said, catholic

boys

are dying because we

are

leaving i t

~ n a s t e r y alone

(Hapgood

178).

Bri t ish General Sir Harold Alexander

knew

the psychological

fear the monastery gave

the al l ied

soldiers .

He

was in

favor of

the bo.oing. He

writes:

Was the

destruct ion of

the

monastery

a a i l i t a ry

necessity? Was

i t

. o ra l ly

wrong

to destroy

i t?

The

answer

to

the f i r s t question i s 'ye '

I t

wa.

necessary aore for the effect i t would have on the

~ r l e of the at tackers than for purely t e r i a l

reasons. The answer

to the second question

i s th is :

when soldiers are

f ighting for

a jus t

cause and

are

prepared to

suffer death

and

aut i la t ion in the process,

bricks

and

aor tar , no

. a t t e r

how venerable,

cannot be

allowed to weigh against hu.an l ives . (Wallace

142)

The bottoa l ine

up

front

t e l l s

us that no t t e r how aoral ly

wrong the

o ~ i n g of the abbey was, the opinion

that

i t

was a

necessity to do so prevailed.

The

ai r caapaign of the Persian Gulf

war was no

less

traumatic

than the ai r c a ~ a i g n . of

World wax

I I . By and large,

the public

supported

President Bush in

his

decision

to

confront

Iraq.

In

i t s January

21

edit ion, H wswe.k reported tha t

62


12/28

Kirtland

10

percent of the u.s. pUblic now supports

the

use of force

i f

Iraq

refuses to withdraw from Kuwait. The ar t ic le went on to

s ta te

that , by 67 votes in the House and 5 votes in

the

Senate,

Congress granted Bush the authori ty

to

use force in the Persian

Gulf (Lacayo 32).

uch l ike

the

Vietnam era,

protests erupted

tbroughout

the

United Stat But .any

of the angri ly

expr d.pa.sions

turned

to compassion

once the

war

began.

A Newsweek poll taken af ter the f i r . t wave of at tacks

showed nearly a 5 to 1

rgin

of

support for a i l i t a ry

action.

Throughout

the country, the

news

of

war

fostered a rare sen.e of co

unity

and a mood of somber

ref lect ion.

(Adl.r 36)

Even

af ter

news broke out that

the

al l ied

ai r

c ~ i g n led

to the

bombing of a

bunker

harboring

hundred.

of

civi l ians,

public

support

grew.

Aaericans regret ted the civi l ian deaths,

but

they did

not waiver in their support

for the

war and especial ly

the bombing c ~ i g n

which

appears to be

saving

the

l ives

of u.s. t roop.

on the g ound.

In

the

la te . t

'ewsweek

poll , 84

percent wanted

the

war to continue

unti l Saddam's govern nt

is

r e ~ v d f ro .

power.

(Watson

18 .

Popular .upport backed the ~ r i c n fight ing forces in World War

I I , and

now

i t

was backing th in

the

Per. ian Oulf.

Why c o ~ r e

the 1944 ai r

c ~ i g n

against the

Monte C sino

Abbey with the recent ai r ca.pai9n against Iraq? The

similar i t ies

and contrasts combine

to ke

a profound statement


13/28

Kirtland 11

about

the evolution of modern mil i tary ai r power. Firs t , a

comparison

provides perspective.

World

War

II

lasted

320 weeks.

The to ta l

Cassino campaign ( inclusive of four

major bat t les

lasted

23

weeks.

The

actual bo.oing of

the Abbey

las ted

two

days.

The

Persian Gulf ai r c a ~ a i n lasted

only 46

days.

The

ground offensive

took

part during the

l a s t 100

hours

of

the

c a ~ a i g n To give you an idea of the comparative len9ths

of

the

campaigns,

refer to

figures

1

and

2

a t

appendix A Figure 1

coapares, usin9nullber

of

days, the lengths of World War I I , the

Cassino

Cagpaign, and the Persian Gulf

War. The

days

depicted

for

World war II

represent

the

to ta l

war,

and

not

jus t

the

days

of

u.s. involve.ent.

The days represent ing the Persian Gulf war

represent the

t i ae

f ro . the f i r s t

a i r

boabardaent to the

end of

the

fight ing. Figure

2

s ~ y c o ~ a r e

the

use

of

a i r

versus

ground war during

the

Ca.sino

caapaign and

the Persian

Gulf

war.

Again,

the decision to bo.o the abbey

was

based on i t s

alleged Ger

n use as an observation post , gun post ,

and

for t ress .

LTG

Mark

W

Clark, Co.-ander,

Fifth

Army,

had

the

authori ty to

order

the

bo.oing. But

Clark

was opposed to the

bombing

for three

reasons:

Firs t ,

he respected

the

his torica l

and

rel igious value of

the

~ n a t e r y

Second,

he

was

not

convinced that Ger

n forces occupied the abbey. And th ird ,

he

believed the Ger

n s

could

and

would

use

the rubble as defensive

positions (Bll is

169).

This

th i rd

reason

beca

fact for,

As

soon as the

bombing

stopped, the

Ger

ns,

who

had pro.ised to

s tay out

of the Abbey unless the

Allies

bombed

i t ,

moved into

the

ruins to

se t

up

gun

eaplace nts (Jablonski 29).

NG

H.I.S.

Tuker, English co

nder

of

the

4th

Indian Division, strongly


14/28

Kirtland 12

believed a

frontal

attack on the aonastery should

not be

a t t e ~ t e d

And,

once

the

tac t ica l

necessity of

attacking

the

aonastery was

decided,

he

favored bo.oing f ro the ai r

Hapgood

167).

LTG

Bernard Freyberg, co.-ander of

the

Hew

Zealand

Corps,

insis ted

upon the destruction of the

abbey

Hap900d 168).

General .Sir

Harold Alexander, co.mander

of the Allied

forces,

supported Freyberg. All

these

viewpoints swayed

Clark to .ake

the final decis ion to bomb the abbey. Since Alexander was

Clark uperior,

the

ul t iaa te

bla .e for

the destruction

of

the

abbey would

f a l l o n Alexander

Hapgood 185).

Part

of

the

decis ion

to

bo.o

the

abbey

rested

with

the

fact

that the

cassino

caapaign was not king

pr09ress.

The

to ta l

c a ~ a i n

entai led

four aajor bat t les

The

9round

attack on Honte

Cassino started on 12

January

1944. The f i r s t bat t le

lasted

unti l

9 February. The

second bat t le ran f ro

15 - 18 February.

The air st r ikes on the

abbey

took

place

on 16

and

17

February.

After

the

abbey s

to ta l d.s t ruct ion, a third 9round attack began.

This

thi rd attack also fai led

to

produce asurable

resul t s I t

was about th i s t l ae that

the

Allied co nders began having

second thoughts about

the

bo.oing. I t was in i t i a l ly hoped

that

the bombing would end the

s ta le

te But in actual i ty ,

i t

did

not add to the war

effor t

The fourth bat t le was begun by the

Allies on 11 Hay

and

f inal ly succeeded with a

break

through the

l ines

on 5 June

1944

(El l i s

169).

To

actually

bo.o

the .anastery

W S

a di f f icul t decision.

The

ai r

s t r ike occurred 35 days af ter

the f i r s t

bat t le

began.

One

reason for this delay was the concern over the consequences

of

destroying th i s

ancient shrine. What would the

world

think?


15/28

Kirtland

13

Another reason for the delay

was

that the 8-17 Flying

Portress

and daylight precision bombing were not ful ly proven as the

best available

air-power technology. Throughout

the

war,

LTG

Ira C. Eaker,

co-.ander

of

the

Mediterranean Allied Air Force,

had

been

an advocate of daylight precision bolabing.

He

ini t ia ted

this concept while stat ioned

in

8ngland. HoweveE,

due

to his

t ransfer

to

the

I tal ian

front , he could never

pEove the

value of

this

o ~ i n

in raids oveE

GeE

ny

pEioE

to

the o ~ i n of the

abbey (HapC)ood

200).

On

14 FebEuaEy,

Baker

flew oveE the abbey on an

obseEvation

f l ight

and

was

la ter

quoted

as

saying, We

clear ly

identif ied

German

soldieEs

and

theiE

radio

mast

Hapgood 201). This

stateaent froa

a

.an

of

Baker's

s ta ture

probably contributed to

the

eventual

decision to destEoy the abbey.

The in i t ia l bombing was

carried out by

144 8-17s in an

early

.orning

raid

Hapgood 216). Even

though the destruct ion

was

near

coaplete, a second scheduled wave of 86 aediua boabers struck the

abbey that afternoon Hapgood 220). The following day, the

a l l i e s carried out another

boabing

raid using 59 fiC)hter

bombers

Hapgood 238).

One

should

note that

the

so-cal led precision

bombing of World War

II

was

far below that of the bo.oing

caapaign of Iraq in respect

to

accuracy. This precision

boabinC) nearly

kil led Clark, who

was 17

ai les

away f ro

the abbey

during

the boabing Hapgood 220).

~ h

weEe

also 24 Allied

soldiers

wounded f ro 12 boab. which landed on the

Indian

division,

located

300 yards f ro the abbey. ~ h i s

Indian

division

had

slowly

worked

i t s

way

toward the abbey, unaware that the

aonastery was about

to

be

boabed.

The off icer in charge of the


16/28

Kirtland 14

Indian Division, Brigadier

o. de

T.

Lovett,

wrote,

Al.ost

before the ground ceased to

shake,

the telephones

were

r inging.

At that

.a .ent

I was called and told that

the bo.oers

would be

over in 15

. inutea

(Hapgood 221).

The 2nd Bomber Group had the

ais8ion

to attack the abbey.

MAJ Bradford

B. Bvans served

as the

alsslon group

co-.ander.

Before

the

bollblnC) run, he recelved

an

IntelliCJence briefing.

He

was told

that the

~ n s t r y _ust

be destroyed.

The only

occupants

were

Geraan

forces

(Hapgood 215).

During

the f i r s t day, 453-1/2

tons

of

boabs (66-1/2 tons of

which were

incendiary)

were

dropped.

On the

second

day

of

bombing, warplanes dropped

3

tons. The destruction was to ta l .

But,

i t turned out that

the

only

casual t ies

were

civi l ians

who

had taken refuge

a t

the aonastery. One es t l

te put

the to ta l

deaths a t

115.

Another estimate told of several hundred civi l ian

deaths (Hapgood 228-238) .

The bo.oing de

world headlines.

Allegations that the

_onastery

had been used as a for t ress continued to

f i l l the

newspapers (Hapgood 229).

On

16 February, 1944, the

Hew

York Ti

ran an ar t ic le

ent i t led Monastery

Is Wrecked .

The

author,

C.

L.

Sulzberger, wrote, The German soldiers who

had violated a l l civi l ized

codes

by ~ l o y i n

the

sanctuary

for

a i l i ta ry purposes . e t their day

of

wrath. On 20 February, 1944,

the

s . e

newspaper

ran an ar t ic le

accusing

the

Ger-.ns of forcing

2,000 civi l lans

to

stay

in the abbey

whlle i t was bollbed. The

cowardly Ger

ns

who

did this

were said

to

have

f led

when the

f i r s t bombs fel l (Roper 1). While

the

ar t ic le

did

not

s ta te the

purpose

of

th i s incident, the

reader

is l e f t

to

conclude

that i t


17/28

Kirtland

15

was

to .ake

the

Allies

look bad. On 29

March, 1944,

Newsweek ran

an ar t ic le ent i t led

Death of

an

Abbey.

This

ar t ic le

describes

German desecration and

looting. Since auch

of th i s has the ring

of propaganda, i t is di f f icul t

to

know what to discount or what

to believe.

At th i s point ,

there are

two conclusions to

draw.

Fi rs t

i t

is apparent that

ai r

power was not

yet

ready to be

the . a jo r

means of war. The

n u ~ r

of sor t ies

used

and the

large

tonnage

of bollbs dropped did l i t t l e to aid in

the advance

of the

Allies.

Next,

there is the possibi l i ty that the o ~ i n g

was carried out

i l legal ly:

that

Is

the

decision

to

o ~

was

.ade

by

the

wrong

person. Clark .ade the decision to

bo.o but

did

not give

the

order. The authori ty to boab rested with Gen Henry

M

Wilson,

commander

of the Allied Forces in the

edi t . r ranean. But

the

actual go-ahead

was

signaled

by

.aker.

Kaker

cla i

d he had

received the

order

f ro .

Wilson. But there is

no

evidence to

support

this .

I t see d that Baker had a hidden agenda. He

strongly desired

to

prove the worth

of

the

8-17 o ~ r and his

notion

of precision

daylight

b o ~ i n

I f the Ger.ans

were actual ly using

the

.anastery as a

for t i f icat ion and observation post, then why is not one German

soldier known

to

have been kil led? AlSO why did

i t

take

almost

four

aore .anths

to end the Cassino

c a ~ a i g n ? The

obvious

answer

Is

that the

Ger

ns

were not using the abbey for

mili tary

ac t iv i t i . s before

the

boabinCJ. So why bollb i t ? On. possibi l i ty

was

the

way in which

the dia

cover.d

the c a ~ a i g n

Th

.edia

played to the tune of the

soldlers .

~ h e so ld l . r .

perceived

the

abbey to be a for tress , so the

dia

called i t a fortress. The


18/28

Kirtland 16

media of the

t im.

strongly supported

the

American

effor t

in the

war, and quite

possibly, the

media thus was able to influence the

decision

of

the military leaders.

The .edia of today have brought wars fought on foreign land

closer to

home than ever

before. A resul t of this i . -ediate

press is the necessity for our

leaders

to be

wary

of

statements

de

without

deliberation.

Short ly before he

was relieved

from

duty, Air

Force

Chief of

Staff , G M

Michael

J . Dugan,

sta ted that

ai r

power was the solution to

defeating

Iraq. Dugan advised a

quick ai r

attack in that land war would cost too .any l ives . The

type of

power

struggle

that

surfaced

between

the

ai r

proponents,

such

as Baker, and

the

ground o ~ o n n t s of

the Cassino

campaign,

seemed to

surface during

the early stages

of

the

Persian

Gulf

campaign. Bach service

had

i t s

solut ion to

the confrontation

awaiting the. . M'wsWl.k on 2

January

1991 quoted an

unnaaed

Air

Force

off icer

as saying, The

Ar.y won't

l e t the Air Porce win

th is

one, . special ly

with an Aray aan

in

overal l

co

nd (Lane

35). Gen Colin Powell,

Chairman of

the

Joint

Chiefs

of Staff ,

proposed

that the only

sure course to

victory

was

on

the ground.

This part icular thought

came

from

the

N'wswe.k of

7

January

1991

(Barry

18). This

sa

ar t ic le pointed

out

that Powell was trying

to protect the Army

from

the

co.ing 20 bUdget cuts ,

and

that the

coming war was a

great chance to

show

off the Aray's

new M A

bat t le tank. This

edit ion

of Newswe.k also noted that Bush's

greatest fear was that ,

by

s tar t ing

with

a

ground war, he

would

face enorgous pressure for a proapt caasef i re .

On the

other

hand,

star t ing with an ai r war would

cost

fewer A8erican l ives

and increase

the

likelihood

of being able to fight to complete


19/28

Kirtland 17

victory.

The

ul t i . a t e decis ion to prosecute an

ai r war

rested

with

the commander-in-chief. On 17

January

1991, the headlines

of

the

11 Palo Ti echoed in large print , U.S. UNLEASHES AIR W R ON

IRAQ. Dugan, who . ay

have

been

f ired

for going public with his

case for

a

ssive

ai r

campaign,

appeared

to

be

vindicated. Bush

s

d to

have followed Dugan's

plan. D.sert

Shield

was now

Desert Stor . , and the wisdom of relying heavily on ai r power

would

now be tested.

Was

this decision to

wage

an

ai r war

the ~ r choice?

This

decision

was

far

from

r i sk-f ree . Modern

ai r

power

had

not

l ived

up

to

i t s

claims

on

recent occasions. In 1986, nine F-111

f ighter boabers attacked Mua r Qadhafi 's

Libyan

headquarters

with laser-guided

o ~ s

These so-called

technologically

advanced

ai rcraf t

scored

no

direc t hi ts , with only

two

bo.os

landing in the target area. In 1989, during the invasion of

Pana

,

the

r-117

Stealth f ighters

missed

targets and Incurred

the i re of Defense Secretary Cheney (Budiansky, 10 Sep 90, 36).

The attack on Iraq s tar ted on 17

January

1991 with ship

launched To

hawk 8iss i les

sent

toward

Baghdad.

F-117's,

F-1SB'I, and F-111's soon followed with reports of t r ndous

success

(11

Paso

Ti

s ,

17 Jan

91).

The

F-117's were

able to

evade Iraqi radar while Navy BA6B's and

Air

rorce

SP -I l l s

tricked

i t .

The

To

hawks

a ls . i l es and Stealth

fighters

hl t

co.-and-and-control

fac i l i t ies , and

Navy rI 18 . struck

Iraqi

aiss i le

s i t e s . Escorted

by

F-15 f ighters ,

F-4G Wild Weasels took

out Iraqi surface- to-air SAH) s i tes (Duffy

25).

Ever

since precision

bo.oing

was f i r s t

used, i t s

opponents


20/28

Kirtland

18

have called i t a

contradiction

in terms. There were

l i t e ra l ly

thousands

of innocent c iv i l ians

kil led in

World ar II as a

resul t of th is type bombing. In 1942, the a l l i e s dropped

3,000

tons

of

bo.os

on Dresden, Ger.any, ki l l ing

as

many as 135,000

civi l ians. This

doe. not

appear

very .o ra l . In the

Persian Gulf

war,

the a l l ies

dropped

more than 3,000

tons of bo.os

in the

f i r s t 36 hour. , ki l l ing, by

Iraqi

claims, only 23 civi l ians .

Technology

see.a

to have prevailed

here

(Budiansky

31) . In

World

ar I I , a 8-17 needed 4,500 sor t ies

and

9,000 bombs to insure a

ta rge t s

destruct ion. During Desert

s to r . ,

a Stealth f ighter ,

. a re

often

than

not,

needed

one

sor t ie

and one

bo.o

to

destroy

a

target Dugan 27) .

For 44

days,

the a l l i e s pounded

Iraq in

the largest

a i r

attack the world has ever witnessed. The precision was

remarkable. Bven though done

in

a way

as

to not praise the

mili tary, but in a manner in which to co.plain about how the

a i l i t a ry handled the press, Newsweek,

in

an

11

February

1991

a r t i c le , described one of Gen Hor

n

Schwarzkopf's press

briefings. The a r t i c le said tha t the general dazzled the

press

for 23 . inutes with

cockpit

tapes of

incredibly

accurate

ai r

st r ikes. This is t ruly

a test iaony to the advance technology the

United

s t a t

held over

Iraq. However,

one .hould note that

the

advance technology - - our r t bo-os

- -

only

represented a small

percentage of the overall ar nt used. Precision-guided

bombs, the

icon

of

Pentagon

briefings and the a i l i t a ry s

preferred i

ge of the

Persian Gulf

war, made

up barely

7 percent of the u.s . tonnage dropped on I raqi targets (Gellman

12) . I t is not surpris ing tha t the . edia was unable to exploit


21/28

Kirtland 19

th is fact

during the campaign.

The

media

during World

War

I I

being extremely pro-mili tary,

probably

influenced the decis ion

to

bomb the Abbey of

Honte

Cassino.

The

media

during the Gulf Crisis

appeared to

be

~

concerned with s t l .u la t ing pUblic

opinion

against

the mili tary

than

report ing the news. This f r iendly press of World War II was

~ able to influence

events then

than

was the

press

during

the

Gulf cr i s i s .

This

fact

was

probably advantageous to the a l l ied

.1 l i t a ry force. facing Iraq.

y

c o ~ a r i n g

the two

c ~ a i g n s

one

should

be able to see

that

al l ied

leaders in

both

wars

atteapted to

avoid

an

unjust

war. There also . ee .e to be

co.-on ground in

the zealous

support

of air

power

by Baker and

Dugan

They saw a i r

power

as

a means

to

shorten

what

otherwise

could

be a long ground war.

Unfortunately,

the technology of today

did not

exis t

during World

War

I I .

I f i t had, possibly thousands of

l ives

could

have been

spared. A second look a t figure 2 ke. a

self-explanatory

statement

about

ai r power.

Against

a technological ly infer ior

force, ai r

power

can be decis ive Lane

35). The

graph also shows

tha t

ai r

power Is

not yet the

to ta l

solution to winning war.

Even in Iraq, the United s ta tes fe l t the f inal blow would have to

come

from

ground forces.

Target

select ion during World

War II

was

often led by

dis infor .a t ion.

e

did

not possess the hi- tech in te l l igence

apparatus then that we

do

now But even then, target select ion

was

agonized

over. Harry

S.

Tru

n

did not

order the bombing

of

Nagasaki

and Hiroshima without

auch

. edi ta t ion.

He

aet iculously

weighed the resul t against the ans

of

attack.


22/28

Kirtland 2

How .any

l ives

would

the bomb

save

by

king

an

invasion

(of

Japan)

unnecessary? How much chance was

there for

peace

without an invasion

or a bomb? With

reluctance, he

(Tru.an) had to

agree that he

could

think of no al ternat ive and found

h i u e l f

in

accord.

Kur:Zllan 312)

Neither

was

the

at tack on the Abbey

of

Monte Cassino

an overnight

decision.

And, however

wrong, the decision to

bo.-b was thought

to

be

a

necessary evi l . e have

proven

by our

actions in the

Gulf war that the United states t ruly believes in the

Just

War

Theory.

Our

targets

were

. i l i t a r y

in

nature,

according

to

the

most

advanced intel l igence

gathering

methods

known to .an. Our

strategy

was

. a ra l .

Overall, i t was a

clean

war on our part .

Very few al l ied

l ives

were

los t .

America can hold her

head high.

America and her

a l l ies once

again recognized an eVil, faced i t

and defeated

i t .

~ h e r e are

lessons learned in

ever:y

c r i s i s .

With each bat t le

the

tact ics

of future warfare

changes. With

each

success,

public

support grows. In his

u.s.

lews and o ~ l Report

edi tor ial

of

Mar:ch

11, 1991,

Morti

r

8. Zucker

n writes:

As

for

America, Desert storm has been a healing and

unifying experience.

After

World

War

I I we could do

anything.

After

Vietnaa,

we could do nothing. Today,

the renewed patriot ism and pride in the moral basis of

our

authori ty augur well for

our

capacity to deal

with

probl abroad, and hopefully a t ho (76)

The advance technology

of

our weapon syste , coupled with the

demonstrated precise thods of

ar

nt del ivery,

have changed


23/28

Kirtland

2

the

face

of warfare. Potent ial adversaries will have

to rethink

the ir ~ i l i t r y stand

before

ent icing the United s ta tes

to

enter

into conf l ic t

against

them.

The media

also had

a lesson to learn. The

. edia

was a

winner

during World war I I , accentuating the posi t ive. The

.edia was a loser dUElng

DeseEt

stoEa.

Yes,

the pictures and

f i l a

footaC)- brouCJht

ho.e

the rea l i ty

of

war in a l l i t s glory.

But, the reportinC) was neCjative. Many TV and media

grandees

must be

hopinCj the ~ e r i c n public wil l soon

forget

the ir

hand

wringinCj,

skepticism,

. o ra l torpor and

downriCjht

misjudgment (Zuckerman

76).

The media

8isjudged the

ab i l i ty of our

high-tech

equipment.

They

said

the Persian Gulf caapaign would be another Vietnam

with thousands of dead and Aaerica

a t

war with i t se l f

(Zucker

n 76). Unless

the

at t i tude

of

the aedia chanCjes, they

will find the-aelves

widening

the gap between the.eelves and the

mili tary,

even

takinCj

the chance of

al ienat ing

the elves from

the ir public . ACjainst

the

mil i tary , they will lose.

America witnessed that a i r

super ior i ty , although

not an end

in i t se l f , is what enabled the coal i t ion ground forces

to

conduct

their operations without

undue interference

by the enemy (Dugan

29) . The objective of war

is

to win: SWiftly, decisively, and

with . l n i . u . 108s of l i f e

and equipaaent.

Advance

technoloCjy

brought th i s objective into the realm of rea l i ty

during

the

Persian Gulf c ~ i g n The only constants of war are

death,

tragedy, devastat ion, and waste (Jablonski v i i i ) .

These

cannot

be avoided.

However,

thanks

to Advance

technolo9Y, our leaders

can bet ter

orchestrate future bat t les . This technology will


24/28

Kirtland

further

enhance

the pinpoint accuracy

of

targeting.

I t will

lessen

the

need for

face to face combat. I t

will continue

to

reduce

the number of al l ied casual t ies as the world

witnessed

in

the

gulf .

I t

will further xeduce the nu oer

of non co.oatant

deaths. I t will

help

avoid

needle destruct ion of cul tural and

rel igious

shrines

and ar t i f ac t s

And as t i ~ o r t n t l y

advance

technology

will enable the United

states

to

adhere

to Just

War

Theory.


25/28

Kirtland

23

PPENDIX A

Figure 1

Relat ive

length of

the

World

War I I

the Monte Cassino Campaign,

and the

Pers ian

Gulf War. each square equals one day)


26/28

161

140

Kirtland 24

PPENDIX A

(days)

120

100

80

60

46

40

20

2

(Figure

2

Monte

Cass ino

e rs i an

Gulf War

This graph

shows

t he r e l a t i v e l eng th o f the

ground and a i r

campaigns

a t

Monte Cassino

and

the

e rs i an

Gulf War.

(ground

war

i s

shown

in

green;

a i r

war

i s

shown

in

red)


27/28

Kirt land 25

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Anzio Cassino Campaign

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