Ottomani a Damasco

8/3/2019 Ottomani a Damasco

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AS'AD PASHA AL-'AZM AND OTTOMAN RULE INDAMASCUS (1743-58)

By SHIMON HAMIRT HE remarkableise of the 'Azms1froman inconspicuousamilyof landedcampaignerst Ma'arrat l-Nu'man to a dynastyofgovernorshat ruledin Syriafor most of the eighteenthcenturyowesits originto the processofdisintegration f the OttomanEmpireandits institutions. Thisprocess,whichhadgainedmomentum t the end of the periodof the Kopriiliiviziers,affectedthe Arabic-speakingrovinces n the eighteenthcentury n manyways: thedecayof the Janissary orps urned heircontingentsposted n theseprovincesinto a majorsourceof turbulences; the declineof the feudalSipahi organiza-tion was followedby an increase n the powerof the local mercenaryandirregularorces; the introduction f fiefs to whoseholders axes werefarmedoutfor ife (malikdne)nsteadof fora periodofoneyear(iltizdm), aveextensivepowersto officials n these provinces; the looseningof controlallowedtheBeduinof theSyriandesert,aswellas othernomadic lementsntheperipheries,to make considerable ainsat the expenseof the settledareas; and, finally,the decay and corruptionn Istanbulloweredthe standardsof the officialsappointedin the provinces; thus adding to the generaldeteriorationofadministrative,ecurity,and economic onditionshere.3A change in the establishedpatterns of Ottomangovernment n theseprovinces-which was only to be expectedin view of this process-actuallytook placein Syriawith the establishment f the firstwalT f the 'Azmfamily

1 At that time pronounced, and sometimes written, 'Adm (similarly: Zahir--Pahir). Besidethe transliteration system used for Arabic names and terms, this article also uses the modernTurkish spelling for Turkish names and terms. Since the article deals with Arabic-speakingprovinces, the Arabic forms of names and terms existing in both languages are usually preferred(thus waldyah is used instead of vilayet). Geographical place-names, titles, and the like whichare in common usage in the English language appear in their anglicized forms.

2 The origin of the family is a controversial matter to this day: one view maintains that the'Azms were originally Beduin of the Banu 'Azim tribe in northern Hijaz who joined the Ottomanservice; the other has it that they were the descendants of a Turkish family from the vicinityof Konya. See 'Abd al-Qadir al-'Azm, al-Usrah al-'Azmiyah, Damascus, 1951; MuhammadKurd 'All, Khitat al-Shdm (6 vols., Damascus, 1925-7), II, 279; Mehmet Siireyya, Sicill-iOsmani (4 vols., Istanbul, A.H. 1038), I, 362. There is no doubt, however, that to eighteenthcentury local annalists and European observers the 'Azms were known as a family of Arab(= Beduin) origin. Mikha'il Burayk, Ta'rikh al-Shdm, 1720-1782, MS, Tiibingen, Universitits-bibliothek, 9786 (the work was published by Qustantin al-Bisha, Harissa, 1930), p. 14a; 'Abdal-Rahman al-Fasi, Ta'rzkh, MS quoted in 'Isa Iskandar al-Ma'lif, ' Qasr As'ad Bishi al-'Azmfi Dimashq', al-Mashriq, xxIv, 1926, 5-6; France, Archives Nationales, Affaires ltrangeres,BI, 1118 (Tripoli), report by Yon dated 10 October 1746; 1032 (Seyde), ' Bulletin' enclosedin a report by Clairambault, dated 16 July 1763. It may very well be that the latter view is amistaken conclusion based on the family's long residence in the province of Konya.3 The political history and institutions of the Arabic-speaking provinces of the OttomanEmpire have not yet been sufficiently investigated. For a general background see H. A. R. Gibband Harold Bowen, Islamic society and the West (Vol. I, 2 parts, London, 1950, 1957), par-ticularly Pt. 1, 200-34; Albert Hourani, 'The changing face of the Fertile Crescent in thexvInth century', Studia Islamica, viii, 1957, 89-122.VOL. XXVI. PART 1 1


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in Damascus, at the beginning of 1725. This development was a threefolddeparture: the 'Azms were a local family, while until then walis had usuallybeen transferredfrom one part of the Empire to another in order to preventthe origination of local and dynastic loyalties; the 'Azms were allowed longtenures of office while formerly wdlis had generally been replaced every year,a practice that had rendered them unwilling or unable to devote themselvesto the welfare of their provinces; and members of the 'Azm family were alsooften appointed to the adjacent waldyahsof Sidon and Tripoli, thus reducingthe pressureof local rivalries on the wali of Damascus and providing him withloyal support. This support was of great importance, for in his capacity asgovernor of Damascus the wdalwas responsiblenot only for maintaining orderin a province extending from al-'Arishto the outskirts of Aleppo and inhabitedby a heterogeneous and insubordinate population, but also for the mostimportant annual caravan to the Hijaz-the pilgrims' convoy from Syria(.Hajjal-ShdmT). The walis of Sidon and Tripoli shared these responsibilitiesby controllingthe Druze, Maronites,and Mutawalis of the Lebanesemountainsand by serving under the wali of Damascus as his CerdeBasbugus, or com-manders of the Jardah detachments which supplied and defended the Hajjalong the second half of its way back to Damascus. Thus the consolidationof the three walayahsunder the loyal 'Azms,although evidently not a deliberatereform, constituted one of the most important attempts made in Syria beforethe penetration of Western influences to regenerate the decaying Ottomanadministrationand regaincomplete control over these territories. The examina-tion of the various phases and aspects of the period of the 'Azms 1is, therefore,an integral part of the historical study of the inhitdt,the general decline of theArabic-speakingcountries under the Mamluksand the Ottomans.Of the many members of the 'Azm family who served as governors inSyria,2As'ad Pasha managedto hold the Damascus officefor the longest period,longer than any other wali in these provinces before or after him. Althoughhe failed to establish his control over the whole waldyahof Damascus, As'adis rememberedby the historiographersof Syria as one of the most successfulwalis in Damascus itself. It is, therefore, to As'ad's rule in Damascus that onemust turn in order to discover the basic features of Ottoman government inSyria during the period of the 'Azms.

I. AS'AD'S RISE TO POWER: THE MAKING OF A SYRIAN WALlThe story of As'ad's step-by-step rise to the highest office in Syria illustratessome of the fundamental aspects of Ottoman rule of these provinces. The

1 See Shimon Shamir, The 'Azm walis of Syria, 1724-1785 (unpublished Ph.D. thesis,Princeton, 1960). The reconstruction of the historical events was made in that study on thebasis of contemporary Arabic, Hebrew, Ottoman, and European sources.2 The most prominent were Isma'il b. Ibrihim (1725-30), Sulayman b. Ibrahim (1734-8,1741-3), As'ad b. Isma'il (1743-57), Muhammad b. Mustafa (1771-2, 1773-83), and 'Abdullahb. Muhammad (intermittently up to 1807). Members of the 'Azm family play a leading role inSyrian politics to this day.

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AS'AD PASHA AL-'AZM AND OTTOMAN RULE IN DAMASCUS (1743-58)central government's concepts of provincial administration, the scale of valuesthat governed its policies, its attitude towards Arabic-speakingMuslimra'cyd,the extent of its decay in the eighteenth century, and other questions are allreflected, directly or indirectly, in the circumstances of As'ad's success aswell as in those of his ultimate fall.From contemporary Syrian and Ottoman chronicles, it appears that As'adwas born about 1705 in Ma'arrat al-Nu'man and that he was probably theoldest of Isma'il Pasha's four sons. He was little more than twenty years oldwhen his father began to train him for office in the government of the Syrianprovinces. He established As'ad as the mutasarrifof Hama, one of the richestsancaks in the waldyahof Damascus, and began to take him along on the annual.Hajj. As'ad was thus acquainted with the complex problems involved inthe performanceof the two main tasks of the government of Damascus: theWildyah,or administrationof the province, and Imdratal-Hajj, or command ofthe Holy Pilgrimage.Sulayman Pasha, As'ad's paternal uncle and the second of the 'Azms tobecome wdal of Damascus, contributed further to As'ad's advancement. Inthe summer of 1732, when Sulayman, then wall of Tripoli, had to depart withthe Jardah to meet the returning .Hajj, he called As'ad from Hama to serveas mutasallim,deputy governor, in Tripoliduringhis absence. Since only a fewmonths earlier Sulayman had cruelly suppressed a revolt of the local Ashrdf,the maintenance of orderin his waldyahwas not an easy task. As'ad, however,managed not only to preserve order but also to gain some popularity for hisuncle by spreading and publicly celebrating the news of Sulayman's dis-tinguished success in the defence of the .Hajj. Sulayman, who upon his returnwas appointed wali of Damascus, maintained his nephew in the Hama postand continued to associate him in the management of the .Hajj. As'ad rose tothe rank of beylerbeyi, pasha of two tugs, and finally, after considerableeffortson his part, he managed to obtain the central government's confirmation ofhis establishment for life in that area: ' . . . he spent a fortune to make it[Hama] his malikdne, having procured the patronage of the powerful vizierBekir Pasha, the formerwali of Jidda ...'.2 By the end of the 30's As'ad wasalready the mutasarrif of two sancaks, Hama and Homns,both granted tohim as malikdne.

During these years in Hama and HomnsAs'ad had made a name for himselfas a competent and popular ruler, distinguished for his horsemanshipand hisenthusiasm for construction works: his stables were said to hold hundredsof fine mounts and the list of public works he built in Hama included a publicbath, water reservoirs, and a large government building. His actions againstthe Turkomanand Beduin bands which regularly raided this area, threateningtrafficbetween the capital and Damascus, were particularlynoted.1 See Aff. gtr., BI, 1116 (Tripoli), 'Relation de la punition des rebelles de Tripoli de Syriearriv6e la nuit des 28 au 29 f6vrier 1732 ', enclosed in a report by Martin dated 9 March 1732.2 Abu al-Mawahib Ibn Miri, Ta'rzkh,MS quoted in Kurd 'Ali, in, 292.

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A three-yearbreakin Sulayman'srule in Damascus (July 1738-August 1741)apparently did not affect As'ad's position in Syria for he is reported by con-temporary chroniclers to have served in 1741 as CerdeBa?buguto 'All Pasha,then wall of Damascus, even though at that time this post was usually givenonly to walis. Upon Sulayman's return to Damascus As'ad was promotedand given his first waldyah-that of Sidon. As'ad assumedthis officein Novem-ber 1741, replacing his brother Ibrahim Pasha whose abuses and inefficiencyhad brought the administration of that waldyahto the brink of bankruptcy.In contrast to his brother,As'ad was highly praisedfor his policies in Sidon.On 30 January 1742, the French consul referred to him in his dispatch as'Essaad-nouveau Pacha qui a la reputation d'un tres galant homme etdont le Gouvernementest tres applaudi dans ce pays ci.. .'.1 In the course ofa single year in officeAs'ad settled all the debts left by Ibrahim, re-establishedgood relations with the French Nation, against which many of Ibrahim'sabuses had been directed, and mediated peace between the Druze emir and hisbrothers, thus bringing to an end a conflict which had been aggravated byIbrahim's intrigues and his meddling in the internal affairs of the Druze. Toa great extent those achievements can be attributed to As'ad's resolutenessand to his bold disregard of local custom: he did not shrink from raising ageneral uproar among the Muslim populace by firing the guns of the citadelto salute the French consul, or from shocking the inhabitants of Sidon byinviting, and actually bringing, the Druze emir into town, an unprecedentedaction which had far-reaching consequences.2 Nevertheless As'ad was notcontent with his post in Sidon and in March 1742 he was allowed to returnto his estates in Hama, much to the regret of the population of Sidon.As'ad was not long to remain in Hama. In August 1743, the news ofSulayman Pasha's death in the campaign against Zahiral-'Umar, the powerfulruler of Galilee,3reached Damascus. Violent conflicts erupted in this townbetween the turbulent elements which had been checked by Sulayman's firmrule. Membersof the 'Azm family and their followers were being arrested anddeprived of their property by their opponents in Damascus. Characteristically,the central government was not so much concernedabout the setback in Galileeor about the disturbances in Damascus, as about their possible deleteriouseffect on the smooth organization of the .Hajj, which affected not only theprestigeof the Ottomangovernmentbut also the lives and propertyof thousands

1 Aff. ?tr., BI, 1026 (Seyde), report by Arassy dated 30 January 1742.2 It should be remembered that the walayah of Sidon had been created in 1660 with thepurpose of controlling the Druze of Lebanon; Sidon also constituted the most important Frenchechelleon the Syrian coast. See F. Charles-Roux, Les echellesde Syrie et de Palestine au XVIIIesiecle, Paris, 1928, and Paul Masson, Histoire du commerceransais dans le Levant au xVIIIe siecle,Paris, 1911. As'ad's policy enabled the French to establish closer relations with the Druze. Thus,on 22 December 1741, a meeting was arranged between the Druze emir and the French consul,in which the former promised to protect the Catholic missions and French trade in his area;Aff. ]tr., BI, loc. cit.3 The best study of this remarkable ruler is Uriel Heydt (Heyd), Ddhir al-'Umar, Shallf.tha-Galflba-me'dhha-yd het,Jerusalem, 1942. A detailed list of contemporary sources is included.

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AS'AD PASHA AL-'AZM AND OTTOMAN RULE IN DAMASCUS (1743-58)of pilgrims. The situation seemed particularly alarming since hardly enoughtime was left for the completion of the Dawrah, the annual expedition to thesouthern sancakswhich was essential for collecting the revenues that financedthe .Hajj. The solution was found in the appointment of As'ad to the governor-ship of Damascus, granting him the rank of vizier, or pasha of three tius.The circumstances of this appointment are given by the Ottoman chroniclein the followingterms:' Because notice was taken of the fact that As'ad Pasha, the mutasarrifof Hama and one of the noble mirmirans,who possessed perfect knowledgeand understanding for subtle matters and who had been accustomed toperformthe services of Imnrat al-Hajj since his youth, when he had spentconsiderabletime at it during the incumbency of his father, the late Isma'ilPasha, and his above-mentioned deceaseduncle [SulaymanPasha], deservedand was qualified for this most difficult post, both by right of inheritance[italics mine] and his own merits, he was granted the rank and the troopsof a vizier, raised and exalted in station, and appointed to Imdrat al-.Hajjand the waldyahof Damascus with the sancaksof Jerusalem and Nablus '.1He was also authorized to make use of the mirl revenues allocated for theHajj and of the provisions, camels, and money preparedby Sulayman for thispurpose.As'ad Pasha made his entry into Damascus in September 1743, riding inprocessionwith the notables, officers,and Janissaries. Ten days passed beforehe was able to set out for the Dawrah: by that time it would normally be re-entering Damascus.2 He was back in Damascus within thirty days, and afteranother ten days of intensive work he managed to depart with the caravan ontime.

'It was a great Hajj, in every way ', and it made a name for As'ad. The.Hajjsthat followed were even more successful and there were many of them.The Porte, impressed by the organization and management of the convoy,by the security arrangements, and by the fortresses and cisterns which As'adwas building along the route, confirmed him in this office fourteen times, anunprecedented achievement for a wdli in Damascus. Expensive presents,usually given only to victorious grand viziers, were sent to As'ad by SultanMahmud I, who in this manner indicated the high esteem in which he heldthe wdla.4

1 Huseyn $akir, Mustafa Sami, and Mehmet Subhi, Tarih, Istanbul, A.H. 1198, 223.2 The Dawrah was usually begun at the end of Rajab or the beginning of Sha'ban and com-pleted in one month. The .Hajjusually left around the middle of Shawwal and returned at thebeginning of Safar.3 This is the concluding sentence of Muhammad al-Maqqar Ibn Jum'ah, al-B&dsdt wa '1-qudah,ed. Salah al-Din al-Munajjidin WulatDimaAhqf al-'ahd al-'UthmAnf,Damascus, 1949, 69.4 The historical account of this chapter is based on the following sources (in addition tothose previously mentioned): Ahmad b. Budayr al-Budayri, Hawadith Dimashq al-yawmiyah,[A.H.] 1154-1176, MS, Damascus, al-Zahiriyah, 'amm 3737 (this work was published by Ahmad'Izzat 'Abd al-Karim, Cairo, 1959), pp. 8b-12b; Rislan b. Yahya al-Qari, al-Wuzard'allddhina7akamufi Dimashq, ed. al-Munajjid, op. cit., 79; Haydar Alimad al-ShihabI, al-Ghuraral-&isadn

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Summing up, the elements which played the principalrole in As'ad's rise topower were: the active aid of his family, experience, competence, wealth,connexions in Istanbul, opportunity, and the newly-introduced 'right ofinheritance '. Although the same factors can be found operatingon the coursesof many Ottoman careers two characteristicpoints should be noted in As'ad'scase. First, he was appointed to govern the very province where his familywas established, where he owned his vast properties and had acquired hispolitical and administrative experience. Furthermore, it was thanks to thisfamily that he was able to put to good advantage most of the other factors.The Ottoman government not only refrained from checking the dynasticambitions of the 'Azms but, in appointing As'ad, actually recognized theirright of succession. This introduced into the system of government an elementof stability which held a promise of recovery for the province and of whichearlier governors had been unable to avail themselves.Second, As'ad's careerand the careers of other membersof his family makeit clear that as far as the central government was concerned the personalqualificationsof its officialswere generally of primary importanceonly when itsdirect interests were at stake. For the problems of the provinces themselvesthe Porte had little concern and it allowed money and connexions to influenceand decide the appointments for these posts.This basic contradiction between the trends toward stabilization andimprovement that originated from the establishment of the 'Azms in thegovernment of Syria, on the one hand, and the destructive effects of the centralgovernment's indifference and corruption on the other, set the context ofAs'ad's government in Damascus during the following fourteen years.

II. THE CONSOLIDATION OF AS'AD'S RULE IN DAMASCUS: THE STRUGGLEFOR POWER IN A PROVINCIALCAPITALAs'ad soon found that his duties as Amir al-.Hajjwere much easier thanthose as w&al f Damascus. While the .Hajjmeant facing only the desert and itshostile Beduin, in Damascus As'ad confronted a host of turbulent elementsthat were engaged in a constant struggle for power.The forces which had political and military significance can be roughlydivided into two groups: alien military units and armedlocal forces. Althoughthe main conflict was usually between some force belongingto the formergroupand some other force belonging to the latter, the forces in either group rarely

united to present a common front. Thus additional rivalries and conflictsenlivened the principal ones.The two main forces which belonged to the first group were the wSll'sfi akhbdrabna' al-zamdn, ed. A. Rustum and F. A. Bustarn in Lubnan ft 'ahd al-Umard' al-Shihadbyzn,Beirut, 1933, ii, 29-30 (for that period this source is often erroneous); Ibrahimal-Kaylani, 'AbqarfydtShdmzyahfi al-tukm wa 'l-siyasah wa 'l-iddrah, Damascus, 1946, 8-9;Siireyya, I, 333; Aff. 1tr., BI, 1116 (Tripoli), report by Le Maire dated 30 July 1732; 1026(Seyde), reports by Arassy dated 10 November 1741, 7 March 1742.

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AS'AD PASHA AL-'AZM AND OTTOMAN RULE IN DAMASCUS (1743-58)mercenaries and the Kaptkul Janissaries.l The wdlV'sarmy, which at thattime rarely exceeded 1,500 men, consisted of Magharibah-North African footsoldiers of poor quality, Levendsand Ddlis 2-cavalry on the level of irregulars,mostly of Kurdish and Turkoman origin, and Tiifengcis-riflemen of variousoriginswho performedboth military and police duties. These units formed thesole force which was subject exclusively to the wdlT. The Kapqkulortas inDamascus were units of the Imperial Janissary army, took ordersfromIstanbul,and were regularly rotated. At that time their number in Damascus averaged600. Their main task was to guard the citadel but often they also co-operatedwith the wdli in controlling the walayah and protecting the Hajj.The principal force in the second group and the main adversary of theKaptkul was the organization of the Yerliya, or 'local Janissaries'. Theyapparently consisted of the descendants of some of the first Janissary con-tingents stationed in the citadel of Damascus or of auxiliary forces set up toassist them. The Yerliya, now numberinga few thousand men, occupied someof the largest quarters of Damascus, notably the Maydan. Their task was toguard the fortresses along the route of the Hajj and to support the w&li n hiscampaigns. Unlike the Kaptkul, they consisted of cavalry units.3 The Sipahisof the province of Damascus were usually subordinated to the command of

1 An apocopated form of Kapzlkulu. In the provinces the main task of these Janissaries wasto guard the fortresses, hence the term N6bet,is. See Ismail Hakki Uzun9arili, Osmanls devletitefkildttndan Kapukulu ocaklars (2 vols., Ankara, 19434), i, 325-30; A. Djevad, ltat militaireOttoman, Paris and Istanbul, i, 1882, 164-71. For Ottoman terms mentioned in this articlesee Mehmet Zeki Pakalm, Osmanl tarih deyimleri ve terimleris6zliigi, 3 vols., Istanbul, 1946-56.2 Levend(the Arabic form being ldwand): from the Italian levantino ' a sailor of the fleet',or from the Persian lawand ' free, volunteer, adventurer'. Dali (the Arabic form of the TurkishDeli): from the Arabic dalil ' guide ', or from the Turkish deli 'mad, brave '. Both Levendsand Dalis used to serve under local governors. In Syria the former units consisted mostly ofKurdish cavalry (at that time loosely connected with the Imperial Levends); the latter consistedof Kurdish, Turkoman, and other horsemen, who were usually natives of Syria and stronglyaffiliated with local tariqahs. See Gibb and Bowen, i, Pt. 1, pp. 99, 192, n. 9, 193, n. 3, 229, n. 1;Uriel Heyd, Ottomandocumentson Palestine, 1552-1615, Oxford, 1960, p. 161, n. 1; Jean Deny,' Persan lavand dans l'usage Osmanli', Akten des vierundzwanzigsten nternationalen Orientalisten-Kongresses,Miinchen, 1957, ed. H. Franke, Wiesbaden, 1959, 408-9; i. H. Uzun9arli], 'Deli',Encyclopaedia of Islam, new edition, ii, 201-2.

3 The Yerliya body in Damascus apparently parallels the Yerlikulu organization foundin many other provinces. See Uzun9ar?ili, i, 3-4, 330. The Yerliya organization is, perhaps, alater development of units of' fortress soldiers' (Hisar eris or Mustahfizes)existing in Damascusin the sixteenth century. See Heyd, Documents,pp. 73, n. 3, 77, 104, n. 2, 112, 190. It is difficultto establish to-day the exact relations between the original Yerliya body and the KaptkuluJanissaries; but the fact that in Damascene sources the term 'Janissaries' is used exclusivelyfor the Yerliya may indicate that the early Yerliya units did not differ much from the Janissariesproper. The enmity between the Yerliya and the Kaptkul goes back to some time in the seven-teenth century, when the Kaptkul were restored to Damascus, taking over the citadel and otherkey posts and privileges which had for a long time been in the hands of the Yerliya. See Muham-mad al-Muhibbi, Khulasat al-atharfi a'yan al-qarn al-hadi 'ashar (4 vols., Cairo, 1868), iv, 311,448; Muhammad Khalil al-Mur&di,Silk al-durarfi a'yan al-qarnal-thdni 'ashar (4 vols., Bfilaq,A.H. 1301), ii, 61. Numerous contemporary sources refer to Yerliya units participating in paradesand campaigns as cavalry, e.g. al-Budayri, p. 53a; Ijasan Ibn al-Siddiq, Ghard'ibal-bada'i'wa-'aja'ib al-waqd'i', MS, Tiibingen, Universitiitsbibliothek, 9832, p. 12a.

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SHIMON SIIAMIRthe Yerliya and shared their position in the political struggle in Damascus.The third local force consisted of the Ashrdf, the alleged descendants of theProphet. Although they lacked the military organizationof the former bodiesthey could muster considerableforces to threaten their opponents or even theauthority of the wdl1.lThe political situation in Damascus was further complicated by the factthat in addition to these forces, which were all represented on the provincialwdtwn(by the wdl; or his mutasallim,the Agha of the Kaptkul, the Agha ofthe Yerliya, the Alay Bey, and the Naqib al-Ashrdf respectively), the diwdnalso included other officialswhose powersand direct appointment by the centralgovernment made them largely independent of the wdli's authority and whooften were ambitious enough to play a part of their own in local politics. Theseofficials were the defterdar -who administered the financial accounts of thewalayah-the qddi, and the mufti. Of these three the defterdar,by the natureof his post and the length of his tenure, was the most likely to challenge thewdlS's rule. It may also well be that from the very beginning the Ottomanshad established this post in Damascus as a counterweight to the wdlW'sowers.Although officially these functionaries were entitled to no more than a smallretinue of armed men they could enlist support among the various armedbands and forces existing in Damascus (usually affiliated with some Sufiorder, guild, non-Muslim community, quarter in the town, etc.), or evenally themselves with one or another of the principal forces mentioned above.This armed support, combined with their administrative and financial powers,represented a political force with which they made their bid for power.As'ad's appointment to Damascus coincided with the emergence of oneof the most seriouschallengesthat was ever thus to arise to the wdli's authority.It had been allowed to reach dangerous proportions as a result of a series ofevents in the early 1740's, among which the most important were the elimina-tion of the Kapzkul forces from Damascus in 1740 and the wars with Zahiral-'Umar in the last years of Sulayman. The story of As'ad's strugglewith thisopposition, which can be reconstructed from local chronicles, constitutes,therefore, a most revealing chapter in the political history of the province.

It appears that as As'ad was taking his first steps in his new office, entirelypreoccupied by the requirementsof the .Hajj,Damascus was practically takenover by a coalition under the leadershipof Sayyid Fathi (Fathallah) b. Muham-mad Ibn al-Falaqinsi the defterdar. This coalition included on the one handthe defterdarhimself with his powerful allies in Istanbul, his administration,and his adherents from among the notables and the 'ulamd' of Damascus,1 Yet their power did not reach that of the Ashrdf in Aleppo, where the main axis of conflictwas between them and the Janissaries. See H. L. Bodman, Political factions in Aleppo, 1760-1826 (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Princeton, 1955), ch. iii-v.2 For the diwdn of Damascus see Shamir, 219 ff.3 For the early history of the post of the defterdar n Damascus see Heyd, Documents,42.

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AS'AD PASHA AL-'AZM AND OTTOMAN RULE IN DAMASCUS (1743-58)and on the other, the most aggressive aghas of the Yerliya, closely allied withthe guilds (and consequently with the S.fi tariqahs)and supported by urbanbands, Druze and others, who controlled several quarters in Damascus and itsenvirons. They were evidently also linked with the Greek Orthodox proctor,Ibn Tuma, and other troublesome Orthodox leaders.First to be struck were Sulayman's men. Immediately upon learning thenews of Sulayman'sdeath, the now leaderlessDdlts wereattacked by the Yerliyaand many of them were killed. At the same time the defterdararrested Sulay-man's most powerful executives: his faithful waktl al-kharj,1Ibn Dayri, hishazinedar,his silahdar,his cousin MuhammadBey, and others.Oncein control of Damascus itself, al-Falaqinsi sought to extend his influenceover the political affairs of the entire waldyah. His first intervention provedquite successful: he concluded peace with Zahir al-'Umar in As'ad's nameand received from him expensive presents for himself and for As'ad.The state of affairs in Damascus deteriorated during As'ad's absence withthe Dawrah. One of the defterdar'sarmed men made his way into the Mosqueof the Umayyads and assaulted the Naqib al-Ashrlf, Sayyid 'All Efendi, and'Ali al-Muradi, an 'dlim of a prominent Damascene family who was reveredby the populacefor fearlessly championingtheir cause in the face of oppression.'All al-Muradiwas also shot when entering his home. Although neither of thetwo was killed, the incident developed into a test in the struggle for power inDamascus. For if this assault on the traditional leadership of the Muslimpopulace went unpunished, the people would infer that al-Falaqinsi's group,after having overcome their opponents in the government and administrationof the waldyah, had subdued the masses as well and were enjoying completeimmunity to the law.The notables of Damascus immediately held a dlwdn and a fatwd wasissued demanding the arrest and execution of the assailant. The latter hadmeanwhile taken refuge at the house of Mustafa Agha b. Khudari Qorbaci,the powerful leader of the Maydan quarter where most of the Yerliya hadtheir houses and where he could not be reached by the law. The notablesassembled again, this time in the mahkamah n the presence of several kaptzcs,baltaczs,and the emin-i siirre2 who had apparently just arrived from Istanbulfor the Hajj. A petition to Istanbul describing the oppressive conduct of thedefterdarwas drawn up, but it never reached its destination. The signatories,recalling a previous petition which, instead of bringing about the punishmentof the defterdarhad been turned over to him, causing his vengeance to betaken upon its senders, decided to take no action without As'ad Pasha. Thefrustrated Ashrdf marched on al-Falaqinsi's house, but did not accomplishanything beyond setting the town in a turmoil.

1 ' Agent of expenditure', see Gibb and Bowen, I, Pt. 1, p. 329, n. 9; Pakalm, II, 586.2 The official who used to arrive every year carrying the sirre, the Sultan's presents to theHijaz. See ~akir, Sami, and Subhi, Tarih, 69; Stanford J. Shaw, Thefinancial and administrativeorganization and developmentof OttomanEgypt, 1517-1798, Princeton, 1962, 257 ff.

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SHIMON SHAMIRWhen As'ad returned, he in turn did nothing to check the defterdar. Therewas, therefore, nothing to stop al-Falaqinsi from inflicting a blow on theprestige and wealth of As'ad's own family in Damascus. After As'ad had leftwith the .Hajj,al-Falaqinsi offered his full co-operation to the kapwczwho hadarrived to confiscate Sulayman's property for the Imperial treasury. Sulay-man's widows and servants were threatened and tortured into disclosing thewhereabouts of his hidden treasuresand dispossessedeven of their own clothing.Thousands of 'purses' 1 were found and taken away while other properties,including rich wheat stores, were liquidated by al-Falaqinsi who profited

highly thereby.In March 1744, when As'ad had returned, he was confronted with a faitaccompli. The kaptczcalmly produced a firman giving him a free hand in anymeasuresrequiredto carryout his functions in Damascus. Contraryto expecta-tions, As'ad did not turn in fury upon al-Falaqinsi or the kaptcz. He merelybought the rest of Sulayman's property for 20,000 piastres and appeared tohave forgotten the whole affair.As'ad evidently understood that the struggle with al-Falaqinsi would haveto be decided in Istanbul and that a premature attempt on his part to breakthe defterdar's trength in Damascus could only bring his own careerto an end.He applied pressure against al-Falaqinsi in Istanbul, counting on the enmitybetween al-Falaqinsi and Hasan Pasha, the grand vizier himself. As'ad'sactivities in this direction were evidently well concealed in Damascus, for thearrival of a kaptcz,in August, to recall al-Falaqinsi to Istanbul, was met withsurprise in the town. Only after al-Falaqinsi's departure did the a'ydn (theprovincial notables) sign another petition against him, but even now theyfeared him too much to dare to send it. Their apprehensionswere eventuallyborne out, for three months later the defterdar eturned jubilant to Damascus.It turned out that in Istanbul he had indeed been sentenced to death for hisabuses, but managed to escape punishment by distributing large sums ofmoney and mainly through the help of Beiir I, the powerful k,zlar agasz,who is said to have appointedand dismissedtwelve grandviziers in his lifetime.In Damascus As'ad was considered defeated. 'Fathi al-Daftari was theSultan [or the supreme authority] in Damascus, his word carried weight anddecided matters.'2 His faction held the city in its oppressive grip, and As'addid not interfere. Their insolence reached a point where they would enter theprisons and release whomsoever they wished. They ignored the wali to thepoint of not rising to their feet when he entered. When orders arrived fromIstanbul to banish Ibn Tuma for his abuses against the Catholics,the gatheringof the Yerliya outside his saray was enough to persuade As'ad to postponethe execution of those orders. In the town the people ridiculedAs'ad, referring

1A 'purse ' (kis) equalled 500 piastres (qurdsh). For its purchasing value see below.2 Al-Budayri, p. lOb.

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AS'AD PASHA AL-'AZM AND OTTOMAN RULE IN DAMASCUS (1743-58)to him as a woman. Sa'dlyah kadsnna'imah ma'a al-na'imrn1was the popularsaying.Yet for As'ad the worst part of the struggle was over. In Istanbul Be?ir Ihad died and a long-awaited firman authorizing the governor of Damascusto use all the means at his disposal to enforce obedience had reached him.He was only awaiting the right moment to strike.At the end of February 1746, as his army was disbanding after returningfrom the Hijaz, he mustered his Ddlis for action. The Yerliya mobilized theirown forces, but still belittled As'ad's preparations. Not until mid-March,whenAs'ad's D&lis took the citadel in a surprise attack, did the Yerliya seriouslyprepareto do battle. The Dalis, led by Ibn Dayri and covered by cannon firefrom the citadel, marched on Suq Saruja, the stronghold of the fiercest com-manders in the camp of As'ad's opponents: Ahmad Agha Kaltakgl and'Abdullahb. Hamzah. After heated combat the quarterwas occupied, pillaged,and fired. Kaltakgl and Ibn Hamzah fled to the mountains.The battle in the Maydan, As'ad's next objective, was much shorter.Ibn Khudari Qorbaci,Kamal Khalil, and other leaders escaped after a briefresistance, leaving the quarter to be plundered by the wdli's men.

As'adimmediatelyordered he mashdyikhal-.hrdt,the sheikhsof the quarters,to seize the insurgents that were still left. The mashdyikhobeyed the order,apprehendedthe men and turned them over to As'ad to be executed in frontof the saray with other captured insurgents. Five beys and aghas of the houseof Hasan al-Turkuman,whose followers constituted a quarterof all the Yerliyatroops, were killed. All in all a hundred Yerliya men lost their lives in theseengagements.Thus Damascus was rid of its most turbulent elements and order wasrestored. As'ad's prestige rose suddenly and presents and congratulationsarrived from Istanbul. The wali, however, was not content to rest on hislaurels, but sought immediately to fill the vacuum created by the drasticenfeeblement of the Yerliya. He decided to recall the Kaptkul and on hisrequest the nineteenth orta was sent to Damascus. As'ad restored them toeven higher status than they had had before their expulsion in 1740, whilehis own position was considerably strengthened by their presence. In orderto preservetheir alien character and isolate them from the populace, he warnedtheir Agha not to accept into his units anyone from among the natives of thewaldyah.2

Now that al-Falaqinsi had lost his protectors in Istanbul and his forcesin Damascus, a petition signed by every person of importance in Damascus1 An interesting Turkish-Arabic combination which may be translated 'Lady Sa'adiyahis sleeping'.2 Another Kapskul orta, the seventy-second, arrived in Damascus in a pompous parade inMay 1751. In 1750 the total number of Kapskul in the citadel of Damascus was 722. See Djevad,op. cit. The problem of preserving the Turkish character of the Janissary contingents in Damascuswas not new-cf. Heyd, Documents,pp. 68-9 and n. 1.

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was finally sent to Istanbul. As'ad's demands were also supported in thecapital by IHasanPasha, the grandvizier, and by Khalil al-Siddiqi, the influentialDamascene molld who had helped As'ad's father in 1725. As'ad's letter guaran-teeing a payment of 500,000 piastres to be derived from the imminent con-fiscation of al-Falaqinsi's property may have been the factor that finally wonSultan Mahmud's consent.In July 1746, as al-Falaqinsi was paying a formal visit to the saray, As'adsuddenly produced a firman ordering the execution of his guest. He wasbeheaded on the spot. His confiscated property was sent to Istanbul togetherwith his head. Several of his men, among them the aghas who had servedas his hazinedars,shared his fate.,Thus, by allowing As'ad a long tenure of office, the Porte had enabledhim to crush his opponents in Damascus within three years and to re-establishhis authority in the town on stable foundations. This meant a major successfor As'ad and for the Wildyah n general; but the administrationof the provincecould profit from it only if it meant that peace and security had been restoredin Damascus. Unfortunately for its residents they were not, and this for tworeasons. First, As'ad'svictory over the oppositionin Damascus was not followedby similar victories in the outlying areas of the waldyah. True, As'ad did moveagainst his more distant opponents immediately after crushing al-Falaqinsi,but in 1747 a humiliating defeat at the hands of Mulhim, the powerful Druzeemir, discouraged him from any further attempts. This enabled As'ad'sremainingenemiesin Damascusto make commoncausewith the unsubordinatedelements of the province and to continue to threaten the capital. Second,the defeat of As'ad's rivals in Damascus did not put an end to the violentconflicts between the various competing armed elements there-to accomplishthat, as it turned out, was more than As'ad could manage. Furthermore, byestablishing his rule on the support of his mercenaries and the Kaptkul, As'adhad strengthened the alien forces in Damascus and these increasedtheir abusesagainst the local population. Theresoon arose a local force to fight this oppres-sion, reintroducinga major pattern of conflicts on to the Damascus scene justas in preceding years.2 These developments are reflected at length in thechronicles of Damascus, which give the following account.The defeated aghas easily found refuge in territories hostile to the wdalof Damascus. Ibn Hamzah was given shelter by Sheikh Zahir al-'Umar inthe south, the expelled Druze by the Beduin of Kulayb in the east, and Kaltak9iby the Druze of Shahin Talhu.qin the west, who were the most aggressive.With his men and his Druze allies, Kaltakgl often fell upon caravans on the

1 The defterdarwas replaced by Muhammad Efendi b. Farrikh, who held his post for thirtyyears; the Agha of the Yerliya was replaced by Darwish Agha b. 'Abdullah who held his postfor thirteen years. Both appointees were Damascus-born members of the a'yan. See al-Muradi,Iv, 38; ii, 107-8.2 The most recent conflicts had been: 1738-9-the wdal's mercenaries against most of thelocal forces; 1739-40-Kapskul against Yerliya; 1741-3-the wadl's mercenaries against theYerliya and the defterdar'smen.

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AS'AD PASHA AL-'AZM AND OTTOMAN RULE IN DAMASCUS (1743-58)roads to Damascus and raided the town itself, usually in As'ad's absence,pillaging houses and shops and taking vengeance upon his enemies. In 1746-7,Mfisa Agha, As'ad's mutasallim in Damascus, was forced to post the Ddltsand the Tiifengcisaround the town to protect the inhabitants.The worst raid took place in September 1748. Kaltakgi, Ibn Hamzah,and Kamal Khalil with their men and large numbers of Druze actually occupiedthe quarters outside the walls to the south, from al-Suwayqah to al-Maydan.They plundered and killed and prepared to attack the town itself to free theDruze incarcerated there. Musa Agha saw that the Kaptkul, the DalTs,andthe Tiifengcisat his disposal were not enough to repel the invasion and hastilybegan to muster additional forces. He rallied part of the townspeople, throughthe 'ulamd', and many falldhs from neighbouring villages. Reinforcementsof Ddlls arrived from Sidon, as did reinforcements of Beduin from the BaniSakhr tribe. With these forces Musa Agha finally launched an attack on theoccupied quarters. The battle was one of the most violent ever witnessed inDamascus. When it was over, most of the area, an important commercialcentre serving the departing and returning .Hajj, lay in ruins. Whateverproperty had not been damaged in the battle was either pillaged by Mius'stroops or carriedby the owners to safety within the walls. The vengeance takenby Mfsa and the Kapzkul on those accused of co-operating with the raidingbands in Damascus and its environs was so cruel that when Sa'd al-Din Pasha,As'ad's brother and the wadl of Tripoli, arrived in Damascus with the Jardah,he reproachedthe mutasallimfor it.As'ad was now forced to apply the full pressureof his authority, backed bythe Porte, to require Sheikh Zahir and Emir Mulhim to stop harbouringtheaggressors. Zahir was eager to bargain and in return for a firman preventingAs'ad from crossinghis territory for the Dawrah,he promptly sent the heads ofIbn Hamzah and Kamal Khalil to Istanbul. Nor did Mulhim dare to disregardwhat was demanded of him. He ordered the Banf Talhuq and Bani 'Abdal-Malik to hand over Kaltakgl and his men to As'ad. When they refusedon the ground of traditional custom, he marched on them with an army, andset villages on fire and destroyed fruit groves until Kaltakgl and his men leftthe area of their own accord. Although this finally brought an end to the raidson Damascus, the populace long lived in fear of additional attacks and the townwas reported seized by panic several times when rumours of renewed raidswere spread.

The clashes between various forces within the city were no less violent. Inthe summer of 1750, after the murder of a Kurdish soldier, a feud broke outbetween Kurdish and Baghdadi contingents and soon engulfed all the Kaptkuland Tiifengciunits. In 1753 a feud between the Kaptkul properand the Yamak(the auxiliary forces) stopped all trade in Damascus. Similar clashes werereported in other years.A heavier toll yet was exacted by numerous assaults and robberies com-mitted by the Kaptkul and the wdli's mercenaries (mostly the Dalis and the

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Maghdribah)not only in Damascus but throughout the waldyah. 'The villageshave been ruined by the oppression of the Ddals', concluded one Damasceneannalist in the year 1748.Worst was a conflict that erupted between the Kaptkul and the Ashrdf,who had emerged as the principal local force after the suppression of theYerliya. In this conflict the Kaptkul, well armed and protected by the citadel,had the upper hand. They assassinated, arrested, and humiliated Ashrdf'as though they were Jews or from among the peoples of 'Ad and Thamud '.2Conflictsflared up on the least provocation. The worst clash, which engulfedthe whole town in June 1748, began when the Agha of the Kaptkul bastinadoeda Sharif who had interrupted his sleep by testing a pistol near his house. TheAshrdf retaliated with a mass attack on the citadel which, as usual, ended infailure.To protests against the behaviour of the Kapzkul, As'ad replied that heneeded them to maintain security, but he did inflict severe punishment onturbulent Kaplkul and forced them to pay compensation for damages. SeveralKaptkul were executed for killing Ashrdf. Soldiers of other units were similarlypunished by As'ad, but to no avail. Attempts at peaceful persuasion andreconciliation by 'ulamd', Saufisheikhs, and other a'ydn produced no betterresults.3These events lead to the conclusion that a point had been reached inDamascus where the political fabric of this provincial centre had become sodisparate that the representative of the Empire's sovereignty had managed tomaintain his authority only with the greatest difficulty and that the state wasunable to shield its subjects from assaults on their lives and property. Althoughthe political divergencies which the events betrayed were partly rooted in thesocial structure of the population, it was the Ottoman system which droveit to such ruinous extremes. Under this system, which had invested numerousfunctionaries in Damascus with extensive powers intended to check andbalance each other, a governmental machine could work effectively andharmoniously only so long as the central government acted as a firm and unifiedsupervisingbody which was devoted at least to its own causes. Since in As'ad'sday support from Istanbul could be bought for a price, and since force was theprincipalmeans of gainingwealth and power,nothing kept these functionaries-and other local forces-from turningagainst each other and against the ra'aya.Two elements emerge from this picture as having worked for pacification

1 Al-Budayri, p. 24a.2 ibid., pp. 25a-b.3 The historical account of this section is based on the following sources: al-Budayri,pp. 10a-19b, 21a-24a, 26a-30a, 32a, 34b-37b, 42a, 46a; al-Shihabi, II, 32-9; Burayk, pp. 5a-7b;Ibn al-Qari, op. cit.; Ibn Miir, Ta'rzkh; Rufa'il b. Yisuf Karamah, Ta'rikh, ed. BasiliyusQattan in Masadir ta'rzkhfyahi-4awddithLubnan wa Suriyd, Beirut, 1929, 11; Aff. Etr., BI, 1026(Seyde), reports by de Lane dated 18 August and 1 September 1745 and by Porry dated 22 October1745; C. F. C. Volney, TravelsthroughSyria and Egypt in theyears 1783, 1784, and 1785 (tr. fromthe French, 2 vols., London, 1805), II, 64-5, 213. For the biographies of the persons men-tioned in this section see al-Muradi, ii, 63, 83-5; II, 219-28, 279-87.

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and stabilization: the a'yan-including the notables of the wealthy localfamilies, the 'ulamd' of the most prominent families, the prestigious sheikhsof tar;qahsand guilds, etc.--and the House of 'Azm which had been drawnto the local a'ydn by the duration of its rule in Syria. A combination of thesetwo elements-the traditional bridge between ruler and ruled, and a localdynasty established recently under the pressure of crisis-held hopes ofreintegration, for it would ally local interests and popular leadership with astable Ottoman supreme authority. In reality, however, it turned out that thecentrifugal forces were so numerousand powerfulthat the alliance could not beeffective. The a'ydn did not control enough forces to support their policy,and the diwdn, which was their principal political instrument, could easilybe neutralized. The wdli, on the other hand, could under the existing systemmake only limited use of his mercenariesand thus had to resort to forces whichconstituted the very cause of turbulence and disintegration. The irony andhopelessness of the situation is underscored in the fact that in order to con-solidate the power of the wali As'ad had to recall to Damascus the Kaptkulwho had been banished from the city precisely because they undermined thegovernor's authority.From the chronicles of Damascus one can almost pinpoint the day whenthese realities were recognizedby the a'ydn:'On Friday, the second [of Rajab 1161/1748], As'ad convoked a diwdnassembling the 'ulamd' and the a'ydn of Damascus. He said to them:" I am about to depart tonight for the Dawrah. Take chargeof the town anddo not allow any one to assault another ". They answered: " Yd Efendind,we are common people, some of us are 'ulamn',some are poor, and some aremudarrisun. Ouroccupation is the study and reading of books ". He saidto them: "Is this your acknowledgement? How can it be since you arethe a'ydn?" They said: " God forbid ! The a'ydn are only the Kaptkul ".Then he said to them: " So this is your acknowledgement,you have realizedthat her [the town's] a'ydn and her guardians are the Kaptkul ". Uponthis he summoned the leaders of the Kaptkul and delivered the town tothem '.2Thus there was no chance that the provincial government could be success-fully consolidated without first establishing a regular, provincial army, andthis in turn could not be accomplished before the central government hadfurther loosened its control over these provinces or embarked on a path ofradical institutional reform.III. As'AD's ADMINISTRATIONIN DAMASCUS: THE VALUES OF AN OTTOMAN

GOVERNORThe fourteen years of As'ad's rule in Damascus offer a unique opportunityto examine closely the administration of Ottoman walTsand the relations1 For more information about the a'ydn see Gibb and Bowen, I, Pt. 1, 198-9, 256-7.2 Al-Budayri, pp. 25a-b.

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AS'AD PASHA AL-'AZM AND OTTOMAN RULE IN DAMASCUS (1743-58)Yet a closer examination of As'ad's administration should concentrate on

aspects which exerted more influence on everyday life in Damascus and on thefuture development of the whole province. From this point of view-and thatof annalists of that time who belonged to the lower class --perhaps the mostsignificant development was the growing difficulty which the masses had inobtaining their bread.The dearth of bread, which had begun in Sulayman's time, prevailedthroughout As'ad's period and reached its climax at the beginning of 1743when a ghirarahof wheat cost 52 piastres and a ratl of bread 8-12 paras. Theonly exception was the period 1752-4, when they cost 15 piastres and 2-3 parasrespectively.2 The production of food suffered not only from oppression intimes of peace and war, but also from many natural causes: drought (1745,1747, 1751), locusts (1746-7), plagues (17434, 1755, 1757).Even when crops were abundant, the great merchants of the bazaar createdartificial scarcity in orderto keep prices high. The qddzand his muhtasibs,whowere supposed to prevent this by inspection, were easily bribed and even underthe most prominent qddlsno improvement was made.' Then came the year 1165 [A.D. 1751-2]... abundant rain came pouringdown and the people rejoiced, sowed and ploughed [sic] and prices began

to fall. But there was no one among the rulersand the notables to supervisethe people with mercy and consideration. The hoardersof food [forspecula-tion] were plentiful, the leaders kept silent and the rulers ate.... At thebeginning of Rabi' al-Awwal, Khalil Efendi al-Bakri [al-Siddiqi] enteredDamascus as the newly appointed qddz. Some people rejoiced and otherswere filled with gloom, for they thought that he had brought with himchanges, substitution, and supervision, but none of these materialized '.3Those who had both power and wealth, i.e., the upper class, including As'adhimself, could only benefit fromthis situation. They made large profitsin manyways: by direct speculation in the suq, by obtaining higher prices for theproduce of their large fiefs, by lending money to the needy at usuriousrates.Many examples of such practices are cited by contemporary sources. Atthe beginning of 1746, for example, the kahya of the Janissaries died, stillhaving in his possession large stores of wheat which, expecting prices to rise,he had refusedto sell at the currentpriceof 45 piastres per ghirarah. The peopleimploredhim to part with the grain, but he could not be induced to change hismind even in his last hour. In 1749, the mufti of Damascus himself was onethe number of Christians in Damascus was estimated at 20,000 (of whom about 10,500 wereGreek Orthodox and 8,000 Greek Catholics). Richard Pococke, A descriptionof theEast and someothercountries (3 vols. in 2, London, 1743-5), ii, 124. In 1784 their number was estimated atabove 15,000 (of whom 10,000 were Greek Orthodox) out of a total population of 80,000. Volney,I, 224-5.

1 e.g. al-Budayri, who was a barber by trade. See 'Abd al-Karim's edition of al-Budayri'swork, pp. ix-xvii.2 One para (bdrah or Misreyah) equalled one-fortieth of a piastre.3 Al-Budayri, pp. 38b-39a.VOL. XXVI. PART 1. 2

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of the biggest speculators. He stored large quantities of grain and did notallow his agents in the suq to start selling even when the price of a ghirdrahreached 50 piastres. There are also many cases of officials, 'ulamd', and evensheikhs of tar7qahswho lived luxuriously and vaunted their wealth in yearsof famine.lThe masses did not remain passive in the face of the situation. Q@dtsndother corrupt officials of the mahkamahwere cursed loudly and even stonedwhen they passed through the streets. In July 1745, a hungry crowd marchedupon the saray. As'ad heard their complaints patiently and then directed themunconcernedlyto the qddzand his mahkamah. Upon arrivingthere, the towns-people could not find anyone who would even listen to them, so they startedto stone the building. When several of the Ashraf and Yerliya joined in, theriot developed into an armed attack on the mahkamah,which was pillaged andfired. The qd.z and his nd'ib escaped through the roof to the citadel, fromwhich they did not dare emerge for an entire month. The next year saw thefirst qidz in the history of Damascus who never left his home unarmed. Still,any improvement which may have been gained by violence was short-lived,since any leaders the populace could muster were men whose ultimate interestwas to maintain the shortages.The role of As'ad in these developments was twofold. On the one hand heshowed much concernfor the economicsituation in Damascus. Tradeflourishedunder his administration and goods regularly arrived from the east by theBaghdad caravan, from the south by the .Hajj,and fromthe west by the Frenchechelles.2 The attack As'ad launched in 1746-7 against a swarm of locusts,for which he enlisted all the measures known to his time, was probably one ofhis greatest undertakings.When lack of inspection in the markets threatened to lead to anarchy,As'ad usually intervened. The diwdn was convoked and prices were fixedand published in the suq. Attempts were also made to force merchants to sellwhat they had in stock and not to withhold it. In the worst periods of scarcitythe governor orderedsupplies to be brought from Hama, mostly from his ownkhdss fiefs. When he fought the Druze, and in many expeditions againstBeduin, it was one of his main concerns to seize crops and livestock fromthe enemy and to stock the markets of Damascus with them. He thus managedto relieve the pressure of famine several times, disregarding the few whorefused to purchasefood which had reached the markets in this last manner.On the other hand, many of these measures were intended at the same timeto enrich As'ad's own treasury, while others, such as the attempts to fix prices,

1 There were also exceptions. In 1752, for example, Ahmad Agha, the mutasallim,fixed pricesin the markets, prevented speculation, and refused to take bribes. But by this he antagonizedso many influential persons that nothing further is heard of his career. Al-Budayri, p. 40a.2 Several reports on the Damascene market in 1753 are to be found in Aff. gtr., BI, 1029(Seyde). The reports reflect a considerable increase in French activity in that market. As'adhimself traded with the French, mostly through his sarrdf. Aff. Etr., BI, 1026 (Seyde),2 January 1745.

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AS'AD PASHA AL-'AZM AND OTTOMAN RULE IN DAMASCUS (1743-58)were often ineffective or even produced the opposite results. Furthermore,although As'ad strove to prevent shortages of supplies and excessive price rises,he also took measures to prevent prices from falling to their normal levels.His actions, therefore, often had the effect of stabilizing prices rather thanlowering them. When, for instance, the spoil from the Biqa' had reached themarkets of Damascus in 1747 and immediately brought pricesdown (e.g., wheatfrom 45 to an almost reasonable 25 piastres per ghirdrah),As'ad and his kdhyaMusa forced prices up again (to 35 piastres in the case cited). Those who hadtried to sell for less were cruelly tortured and their property was confiscated.Again, in 1748, a price reduction extorted under the threat of mass riots washalted by As'ad's decrees when prices were still relatively high.As'ad also lent money for interest, though again at more moderate ratesthan others. While the customary rate was 12-15% and in times of deartheven 20-30%, As'ad was usually content with 6%.As'ad's record, to be sure, is not clean of extortion. He too maintained'awdnzyahwho informed him about opportunities to seize property or tomake profits. By these means he accumulateda mass of wealth which surpassedthat of any other walt in Damascus. Throughouthis tenure he made extensivepurchases of land, houses, stores, and the like, discreetly protecting a goodpart of them from eventual expropriation by turning them into waqfs. Yetin his way As'ad tried to spare those who would suffer most from extortionatepractices. 'I have fleeced the rams', he allegedly once said of himself, 'andnot skinned the lambs and the kids '.

Thus the examination of As'ad's policies in the economic and social fieldsreveals that any improvements he effected were of limited significance: theydid not hold up the process of widening social gaps, mass impoverishment,and a decliningeconomy. As'ad not only did not see himself responsiblefor thisprocessbut he evidently was hardly aware of it. Since he was himself part andparcel of the Ottoman system of government he could regard administrationas little more than a way of fulfilling his military, political, and fiscal obliga-tions to the central government and of satisfying his own ambitions. Fromhis point of view he could rightly boast that he did not misuse his administrativepowers. The ra'dyd too seem to have seen things the same way. One of theannalists of Damascus described As'ad as 'ddil, qalil al-zulm,2obviously usingthe two adjectives in parallel construction and reflecting his conviction that1 According to an anecdote given in Volney, ii, 213-15. This anecdote has it that insteadof imposing new taxes on the millets and the guilds, as proposed by his men, As'ad collectedfour times that sum without even allowing it to be known in Damascus. What he did was to hintin turn to the Naqib, the mufti, the qdgi, the muhtasib, the Agha of the Janissaries, and thewealthiest merchants that their abuses were known to him and that he was considering reportingthem to Istanbul. They eagerly paid the required sums in order to prevent those reports frombeing sent. The historical account in this chapter is based mainly on the following sources:Burayk, pp. 4b, 7b, lOa; Ibn al-Qari, 79; al-BudayrI, pp. llb-12b, 14b-16b, 19a-24a, 36b-39b,42b-45b.2 Burayk, p. 4b.

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a certain degree of oppression was in the natural order of things and thatthe relation between the ruler's responsibilities and the living conditions ofthe masses was a very loose one.The wali of Damascus, like other Ottoman governors, shared in fact theresponsibilityfor the direct managementof administrative, economic,and socialaffairs with others-some of whom, like the qddi,were officialsdirectly respon-sible to the Ottoman government for certain administrative fields, and some,like the sheikhs of tariqahsand guilds, administered these matters accordingto the Ottoman system which allowed many social units to function auto-nomously.1 These wealthy and powerful personages made up a considerablepart of the a'ydn of Damascus and formed the equivalent of an upper class.But whereas in the political sphere, as we have seen, they exerted a stabilizinginfluence, socially and economically they emergefrom this survey as an oppres-sive class which at that time only hastened the process of deterioration. Thewdlis, and certainly the 'Azms who gradually drew near to this class, couldnot be expected to check these tendencies.The conclusion may then be drawn that the Ottoman system, faced bythis deterioration, failed to provide in its provincial government any elementcapable of recognizing this process and having the training and the powersto stop it.

IV. AS'AD'S DECLINE AND FALL: THE FATE OF A SUCCESSFUL VIZIERAs'ad's ignominious end was brought about by a combination of severalfactors, some of which can be blamed on As'ad's own deficiencies and otherson the central government's methods. While the former are significant for theevaluation of As'ad's personality and achievements, the latter throw lighton the whole system of Ottoman provincial government at that stage of itsdevelopments.After his defeat at the hands of the Druze in 1747,As'ad-who was describedas one who 'did not like war but tranquillity and wealth' 2-did not make

any further attempts to check the increasing menace from various forces inthat part of Syria. To describe the growth of these forces in As'ad's time andAs'ad's relations with them would be outside the scope of this article, but theprincipaldevelopments should be mentioned: Sheikh Zahiral-'Umar capturedAcre, fortified it, established relations with the Europeans, and penetratedinto the waldyah of Damascus; Emir Mulhim consolidated Druze controlover the Lebanesemountains and annexed Beirut, which developedinto a majorharbouron the Syrian coast; the Mutawalis, under Sheikh Nasif, allied them-selves with Zahir, captured Tyre, and became, to all intents and purposes,independent; the turbulent southern sancaks of the walayah, now separatedfrom Damascus by the area under Zahir'scontrol, openly defied the authority

1This aspect of the Ottoman system is clearly analysed in Gibb and Bowen, I, Pt. 1, 208-16.2 'Abbud al-Sabbagh, al-Rawd al-zahir ff ta'rfkh Zdhir, MS, Paris, 4610, p. 10a.

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AS'AD PASHA AL-'AZM AND OTTOMAN RULE IN DAMASCUS (1743-58)of the walz; Maltese pirates increased their raids on the Syrian coasts withoutencountering any considerable resistance; and, finally, the Beduin tribes,mainly the 'Anazah and the Banu Sakhr, who were also allied with Zahir,intensified their attacks on Syrian villages and convoys. The last of theseforces also threatened the .Hajjwhich, since 1755, when the pilgrimage startedto fall again in the hottest months of the year, suffered a heavy toll of deathsand was more exposed to Beduin raids.lThe Porte's policy only aggravated matters. Distrustful even of the loyalAs'ad, it insisted on maintaininghis rivals in the Sidon post in orderto counter-balance his influence. Although the Porte usually appointed one of As'ad'sbrothers-either Sa'd al-Din or Mustafa-to the Tripoli post (and once evento the Aleppo post), it rejected all As'ad's appeals for the appointment ofone of his confidants-either his brother Mustafa or his kdhya Musa--to theSidonpost, which was the key point for the control of the territoriesof Mulhim,Nasif, Zahir, and Zahir's Beduin allies.2 Furthermore, the state of affairsin Istanbul allowed these rebellious leaders to acquire the support of some ofthe highest dignitariesin the central government against As'ad who representedthe authority of this very government. Thus, to cite some examples, Zahirwas supported by Beiir II, the kczlaragast (executed in 1752) and evidentlyalso by MustafaPasha, the grandvizier (deposedin 1755,reappointedin 1756);with their helpZahir managed to receive, in 1752, an officialrecognition of hiscontrol in Acre. In 1755-6,HIusayn Agha Ibn Makki, As'ad's mutasalliminthe sancak of Gaza, became associated with Ahmet Agha, the newly appointedk?zlaragast, and thus managed to obtain the detachment of the sancak ofJerusalem from the waldyah of Damascus and his own appointment to thispost with the rank of pasha.3As'ad's final deposition from Damascus can safely be attributed to theintrigues of his adversaries in Syria, who were jealous of his long tenure of theDamascus office, and their associates in Istanbul, such as Ahmet Agha andMustafa Pasha, who possibly coveted the wealth accumulated by As'ad inDamascus. Towards the end of 1756, As'ad's brother Mustafa was transferredfrom his Tripoli post to Adana. Shortly afterwards, in January 1757, ordersarrived for As'ad to take over the Aleppo post and transfer that of Damascus

1 Al-Shihabi, ii, 34-41; Burayk, p. 13a; al-Budayri, pp. 35a, 39b, 44b, 45b; Mikha'ilNiqula al-Sabbagh, Ta'rfkh al-Shaykh Zahir al-'Umar al-Zayddni, ed. Qustaritin al-Basha(2 vols., Harissa, [1935]),, 67-74; Volney, ii, 80-8; reports and other documents (includinga few letters from Zahir) in Aff. ?tr., BI, 1027, 1029-31 (Seyde). For more details see Shamir,101, 113-27.2 As'ad's request for his brother Mustafa, in 1747, was not granted, as erroneously assumed by'Abd al-Karim in the introduction to his edition of al-Budayri's work (p. xxxvii); cf. SuileymanIzzi, Tarih-i vakayi, Istanbul, A.H. 1199, 184, 210, 218. Towards the end of As'ad's rule thiswaldyah was finally given to his brothers, but only for a short term each.3 Husayn Agha was descended from a Beduin family that had settled in Gaza and had beenengaged in trade. His father served under the 'Azms in Damascus and received Gaza as amalikdne. He remained in the Jerusalem post for nine months; he was then deposed and returnedto Gaza. Burayk, p. 14a; al-Budayri, p. 44a; al-Muradi,I, 60-2.

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SHIMON SHAMIRto Ragib Mehmet Pasha, an associate of Mustafa Pasha, the grand vizier,and a rising personage in the Ottoman service.' As'ad's second brother, Sa'dal-Din, was transferredfrom Sidon to Mar'ashand replacedin Sidonby HusaynIbn Makki. A month later, having failed to delay the execution of the orders,As'ad reluctantly left his splendid saray in Damascus and set out for Aleppo.Ragib Mehmet himself was soon promoted to the grand vizierate and theDamascus post was given to another of the intriguers-Husayn Pasha IbnMakki.But As'ad, who had been allowed to strike deep roots in his waldyah,could not be expected to depart from it as easily as walSs ervingunderthe short-term system. He was now resolved to regain his post by proving that no oneelse could occupy it without encountering trouble. Before departing fromDamascus, As'ad had left some of his most aggressive men in the town, andhad opened the prisons and released all the convicts. Ibn Makki, by carelesslyrestoring the Yerliyato power, unwittingly played into As'ad's hands. Withina few days all Damascus was in a turmoil. Units of Kaptkul, Yerliya,Levends,Ddlis, and Maghdribah,parties of Druze, Mawsilis, Baghdadis, and 'Anatibah,As'ad's men, Husayn's troops, Ashrif, and the populace were all fightingeach other. The fighting engulfed the whole town, which was split into manybelligerent quarters, and spread to the villages in the environs. Even mosqueswere not spared. All attempts made by the 'ulama' and the a'ydn, led by'Ali al-Muradi, and by several responsible aghas, led by Musa (now Pasha)the mutasallim,to restore peace, failed entirely. Furthermore,rumoursspreadthat Kaltak9i and his band were returning and panic seized many of theDamascenes. Damascus now looked like a town at war: all the main streetswere barricadedand whole quartersevacuated. It reachedthe point where 'thetownspeople of Damascus did not taste sleep and were waiting for day tobreak '.2The Porte had meanwhile realized that As'ad could not be left too closeto his formerwalayahand decided to scatter the family. In Marchof that yearAs'ad was appointed to Egypt, Sa'd al-Din ordered to move to Mar'ash, andMustafa transferred to Mawsil. Without realizing it, the Ottoman centralgovernment was thus testing the system which established this dynasty inSyria. Sa'd al-Din could not resist the temptation to act: on 18 March hearrived in Aleppo and proposedto As'ad a revolt of all 'Azms before they wereuprooted from their provinces.3

1 For information about this outstanding personality see Norman Itzkowitz, MehmedRaghibPasha: the making of an Ottomangrand vezir (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Princeton, 1960).2 Al-Budayri, p. 46b.3 This is reported by Clairambault in the 'Bulletin' enclosed with his report dated 16 July1763. Aff. ?tr., BI, 1032 (Seyde). There is no other confirmation of this report; it is known,however, that Sa'd al-Din conferred with his brother As'ad in Aleppo before assuming theMar'ash post. Aff. 1&tr.,BI, 87 (Alep), report by Thomas dated 21 March 1757. Sa'd al-Dinwas also the first w&dl f the 'Azm family to be restored to a Syrian post after As'ad's fall.

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As'ad, however, preferred to live up to the family's reputation of uncon-ditional loyalty to the Sultan and Sa'd al-Din's proposalwas rejected. Besides,As'ad felt that he was able to counter the Porte's move. Within the short timesince his arrival in Aleppo he had demonstrated such an efficient and con-scientious rule that when the town learned about his transfer to Egypt, anunprecedented reaction occurred: the suqs were spontaneously closed and thepopulace rushed to the wdlT's aray, shouting that they would not allow himto leave Aleppo. The 'ulamS' and the notables were made to send a petition toIstanbul demanding that As'ad remain. The excitement infected even theforeign consuls. When asked by As'ad to obtain additional support for hiscause in Istanbul, the French consul wrote to his ambassador: 'Tous leshabitants d'Alep et des environs . . . ne peuvent assez louer le desinteressementde ce Gouverneur.... Nous ne pourrion jamais avoir un Gouverneurpareila notre Pacha'.1The extent of his success surprised even As'ad himself, who now fearedthat too much pressure on the Porte would only antagonize it. He thereforeleft the town and camped in the outskirts, impatiently awaiting the Porte'sdecision and closely following developments in Damascus. Only in May, afterhaving been informed that the populace in Aleppo was armed and would riseupon receiving a negative answer, did the Porte finally confirm As'ad inthat post.The role As'ad played in the next development in the area is a controversialquestion to this day. In September 1757, the Hajj was attacked on its returnfrom Mekkaby Beduin of Banu Sakhr and Harb and met with one of the mostterrible disasters in its history. First the Jardah was completely destroyed, itsserdar, Mtus Pasha, being among the dead. When Ibn Makki learned aboutthis, he stopped the caravan in Tabuk and awaited help from Damascus. Littledid he know that anarchy in Damascus had reached such proportionsthat hismutasallim was not even showing anyone the letters arriving from Tabuk.Within three weeks the caravan had exhausted all its supplies and Ibn Makkidesperately gave orders to resume marching. The convoy was now an easyprey for the Beduin, and its resistance was crushed after a short battle. Thecaravan was then cruelly plundered, leaving those who had not been killedto wander in the desert without food or water and actually stripped of theirclothes. The number of those who perished was estimated at 20,000, amongthem the Sultan's sister and many dignitaries of the Empire. Of those fewwho survived to reach the rescue party, which had finally been sent fromDamascus, a large percentage died of exhaustion in Damascus itself.The whole Empire was shocked by this disaster and many towns were leftin mourningfor their dead. In the indignation and confusionwhich followed, itwas difficult to find out who was responsible. Ibn Makki, who had survived,managed to escape to Gaza and did not dare return to Damascus. He was

1 Aff. Itr., BI, 87 (Alep), report by Thomas dated 21 March 1757.

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SHIMON SHAMIRaccused of having neglected, out of avarice, to pay the Beduin the customaryprotection fee. In Istanbul, Ahmet Agha, who was responsiblefor the appoint-ment of Ibn Makki, was immediately executed. Zahir, the ally of the BanfiSakhr, who openly bought and traded in the spoils of that caravan, was alsoaccused, but he diverted rage from himself by retrieving the lost mahmaland the Prophet's banner. Finally, a new accusation was voiced which foundmany listeners. It asserted that As'ad had arranged the attack on the .Hajjin orderto prove that his services as Amir al-.Hajjwere indispensable.When these rumours reached Istanbul, orderswere issued for an investiga-tion and for As'ad's transfer to Sivas. This time the transfer was carried outwithout objections. In the atmosphere prevailing at the time, Ibn Makkiand some other enemies of As'ad found no difficulty in establishing the caseagainst As'ad by producing false evidence. As'ad was found guilty of 'negli-gence in making secure the route of the .Hajj'1and was immediately degraded.He was ordered to go to Ankara where, in the spring of 1758, while bathingin a hammdm,he was strangledby a hassekiof the Sultan. His head was broughtto Istanbul.2It took the kaptczsmore than six months to find, confiscate, and consolidateAs'ad's possessions in gold, jewellery, horses, arms, slaves, etc. Floors andwalls were torn open in his saray in the search for his hidden treasures. Theunprecedented proportions of As'ad's wealth captured the imagination of hiscontemporaries. It was estimated by both European and native sources asexceeding fifty million piastres.3Whether the cause of As'ad's ruin was this immense wealth or his guiltin the disaster of the caravan, is to-day a matter for speculation. Nor is itknown whether As'ad was in fact guilty at all, despite the Porte's convictionthat he was. On the contrary, there is much evidence to support the case of hisinnocence: most of the Syrian contemporary sources and the European1 Ahmet Vasif, Mad8sin il-dsdr ve-iaqd'iq iil-akhbdr(2 vols., Bulaq, A.qH. 1243-6), I, 72.2 Some of the Syrian sources-e.g. al-Shihabi, ii, 35-suggest that As'ad had been promisedthat, because of his distinguished service to the .Hajj,he would never be punished by the swordand that this was the reason for the unusual method chosen for his execution. A verse quotedby Vasif saying ' he who does not die by the sword dies another way' evidently refers to thesame story.3 The confiscation of this property was, of course, in accordance with the common Ottomanpractice. The fortunes of the former Damascus wdalsof the 'Azm family, Isma'il and Sulayman,had similarly been confiscated. As'ad, in his turn, had confiscated the property of his ownofficials upon their death, e.g. that of his wakAlal-kharj, Ibn Dayri, and of his divan efendisi.Al-Budayri, pp. 19a, 39b. The historical account of this chapter is based on the following sources:Burayk, pp. 17a-18b, 23b; Ibn al Qari, 79-81; M.N. al-Sabbagh, i, 67-80; A. al-Sabbagh,pp. 9a-lla; al-Mur5di, II, 60-2, 111-12, II, 161, Iv, 98, 433; Kamil b. Husayn al-Ghazzi,Nahr al-dhahabft ta'rikh .Halab(3 vols., Aleppo, 1824-6), in, 299-300; al-Budayri, pp. 39b,44b-50a; Vasif, i, 46, 57, 64-5, 72; Volney, II, 215-17, 320; Aff. gtr., BI, 1026 (Seyde), reportby de Lane dated 2 February 1745; 1029 (Seyde), report by Gautier dated 30 March, and byde Verrayon dated 1 July 1752; 1030-1 (Seyde), reports by Bourguignon dated 10, 11 April,23 November, 30 December, 1755, 4 February, and others of 1756; 1119 (Tripoli), report byGautier dated 8 July 1756; 87-8 (Alep), reports by Thomas dated 10, 21, 26 March, 5 April,2 May, 30 August, 7 October 1757, 1, 31 May 1758.

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AS'AD PASIA AL-'AZM AND OTTOMAN RULE IN DAMASCUS (1743-58)travellers who visited the area a short time after these events tend to blameIbn Makki, while As'ad's guilt is hardly mentioned. The previous intriguesagainst As'ad as well as Ibn Makki's attempts to make As'ad his scapegoat,seem to indicate that the affair was exploited by As'ad's enemies in order toget rid of him. Even if it be accepted that a plot between As'ad and the Beduindid exist as a part of As'ad's consistent tactics to regain Damascus, there is noreason to believe that As'ad wanted the Hajj to be destroyed, but rather thathe wanted only to frighten the pilgrims, which is in fact claimed by thecontemporary Ottoman chronicle.True, it was under As'ad's rule that the conditions developed which madethat disaster possible-i.e. the loss of control over the southern sancaks andthe unchecked growth of the power of Zahir and the Beduin. But the Porte,whose system of counterbalanceshad deprived him of essential support againsthis adversaries and whose corruption had even allowed those adversaries toundermine As'ad's position in Syria, certainly could not blame As'ad forthe loosening of the control of Damascus over the territories of the waldyah.Nor could the Porte claim that As'ad's removal from Damascus was justifiedon the grounds of doubtful loyalty-As'ad's record as a governor and thePorte's own decisions to appoint him to such key posts as Aleppo and Egypt,argue against such a contention. The disastrous substitution of an incompetentand intrigue-minded man like Ibn Makki for an experienced and worthywali like As'ad can, therefore, be explained only on the grounds of eighteenth-century realities of Ottoman rule of the provinces.Contemporary observers in Damascus, however, apparently regardedAs'ad's tragic end rather as a manifestation of the ephemeral nature of allworldly gains than as a logical consequence of Ottoman policies:. . . for it had not happened to any vizier before to make fourteen

Hajjs, neither had anyone ruled Damascus for so long. Furthermore, his[As'ad's] brothers had been the governors of Tripoli and Sidon and theirrule extended from Aleppo to al-'Arish. But did that wealth and thatpower help him? He passed away as dust and as though he had neverexisted and his palace was left sealed and forsaken '.1

In attempting to evaluate the significance of As'ad's rule to the politicalhistory of Syria, two conclusions emerge. The first, which is based on thereconstruction of the events of As'ad's incumbency, indicates that by the timeof As'ad's fall no material improvement in the affairsof Syria, which could havechecked the process of deterioration, had been achieved. The relative stabilityand security that As'ad had managed to establish in Damascus (to a largeextent at the expense of the native populace) disintegrated completely underthe rule of Ibn Makkl. At the end of 1757 the Porte was obliged to send toDamascus one of its firmest military commanders, 'Abdullah Pasha Qeteci,1 Burayk, p. 23b.

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SHIMON SHAMIRin order to restore peace in the town. A considerablepart of Damascus lay inruins before Qeteciwas able to execute his orders,l In the area of the waldyaha critical stage had already been reached during the first half of As'ad's rule.The loosening of control over this area, which is described above, had longgone beyond the measureof local autonomy allowedby the Ottoman provincialsystem. Even the .Hajj, to which the central government never failed to giveits closest attention, suffered a sharp decrease in the number of pilgrims as aresult of the disaster of 1757, the continuing menace of the Beduin, and theturmoil in the Hijaz. The slow but persistent and ruinous process of economicdecline had been going on underAs'ad's rule. The advanced stage of deteriora-tion reached at that time manifested itself clearly, less than two years afterAs'ad's deposition from Damascus, when a series of earthquakes was enoughto cause famine and plagues and end in the devastation of many rural areas.2An examination of the analysis of the various developments presentedabove at the end of each section leads to a second conclusion, namely thatthe decline of the provinces owed its origin as much to the very system ofOttoman provincialrule as to the effects of the decay of the central governmentin the eighteenth century. It is the suggestionof this study that the latter ratherrevealed the basic deficiencies of the former than corrupted ts solid foundations.This study also indicates that the process of decay in the Syrian provinces waswell underway by the first half of the century and that the causes of this decaywere rather internal than external; hence, they cannot be attributed to theinvasions which swept this area beginningwith that of 'All Bey in 1771.3In the circumstances of As'ad's failure may be found all the elements thatcan explain the failure of the whole 'Azm dynasty to change things for the

1 Burayk, pp. 19b-28a; al-Budayri, pp. 50a-54b; al-Muradi, i, 98, in, 81-2; Vasif, I, 90-2,95, 107, 122-3. Volney, in ii, 217-22, relates a story according to which eeteci was even thenalready conscious of the fact that in spite of his accomplishments and success, his end would notdiffer much from that of As'ad.

2 For the conditions in Syria in those years see, in addition to the sources listed above,the MSS summarized in al-Mashriq, XLII, 1948, 334-9; contemporary letters in AvrahamYa'ari (ed.), Igrot Eres-Yisrd'el, Tel-Aviv, 1943, 290-8; Aff. lEtr., BI, 1032 (Seyde), report byClairambault dated 28 December 1759.3 Some of these conclusions do not agree with the views expressed in Gibb and Bowen'schapter on the Arab provinces. Their work, to which this article owes a great debt, is neverthe-less often inaccurate in its presentation of the events of the 'Azms' incumbency. Perhaps as aresult of these inaccuracies the authors tend to overrate the administration and government ofAs'ad Pasha (and his predecessors) and reach the conclusion that 'apart from the weakeningcontrol of the Porte there is practically no indication prior to 1760 or so that a crisis was so nearat hand' (p. 231, also pp. 204, 207, 218). The numerous accounts of revolts, massacres, anddestruction which had taken place in the Syrian provinces in the first half of the eighteenthcentury (if not earlier), contradict this statement. Nor do the accounts support another viewexpressed by the authors (partly based on their first conclusion), namely, that the decline of theprovinces does not owe its origin to the Ottoman system itself, but to the fact that 'duringthe course of the eighteenth century various factors . . . created new problems which the oldorganization was totally unable to deal with' (p. 216, also pp. 200, 231). In the Syrian provinces,as we have seen, the Ottoman system had started the process of disintegration and devastationlong before new factors emerged.

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better, despite their general competence, loyalty, and benevolence. It hasalready been shown that the attempt to consolidate and stabilize the administra-tion and government in these provinces under the 'Azm dynasty, logical andpromising as it may have appeared, was inconsistent and half-hearted. More-over, the changes that were introduced did not attack the roots of the problem :if the Porte sought to impose heavier responsibilities on these governors,whose principalfunctions were military in nature-it should have allowed themthe necessary military support; if it hoped to regenerate the office of theWildyah,which had originallybeen based on the feudal organization-it shouldhave taken into account the fact that by that time this organization had allbut ceased to exist as a vital organism; and if it expected these walts toimprove the administration of their provinces-it should have subdued allthe functionaries of the provincial administrative machine to their authority.This superficiality of the changes introduced by the establishment of the'Azms also explains a characteristic paradoxical feature of their rule: theirpopularity among the masses vis-a-vis their failure to ensure stability andpeace. This paradox, so manifest in As'ad's rule, is even more striking at thetime of the next wdal of the dynasty, Muhammad Pasha al-'Azm. Muham-mad-who as third generation of Damascus walTsof this family had finallyclosed the gap between the governorshipand the local a'ydn class-was praisedby his contemporariesas 'the best of all governors of Damascus ' 1 and uponhis death was sincerely mourned by the populace. Yet it was in his time thatDamascus ceased to play the principal role in Syrian politics and proved tooweak to overcome the threat of Zahir al-'Umar and 'Ali Bey, and later thecompetition of Ahmad al-Jazzar.The weakness of As'ad and the other walis of the 'Azm dynasty, lay there-fore mainly in their limited military powers. Not only did that prevent themfrom consolidating the administration of the provinces, but it also broughtabout their ultimate ruin. The fate of As'ad had already shown that thepolicy of the 'Azms-i.e. a faithful discharge of their duties to the centralgovernment-could not safeguard their place in the government of Syria ata time when popular support carried little weight and the Porte could nolonger be trusted to reward its officials for their good services.Ahmad al-Jazzar, who supplanted the 'Azms,2 seems to have drawn theright conclusions, since this wali based his rule mainly on his efficient militaryforces. One might have expected the Porte to regardhis effortswith approval,for it was thanks to these forces that Bonaparte was repulsed from Syria,while a quarter of a century before none of the Syrian walts had managed topresent any effective resistance to invasions. Yet the Porte was unwilling,or unable, to approve such a radical change in its policies and to authorize

1 Al-Muradi, iv, 102. For the rule of this walf, see Shamir, 154-216.2 This substitution was finally decided upon by the central government in a meeting whichtook place on 19 January 1785, in the konak of feyhlisi8am. A detailed report of its discussionsis given in Ahmet Cevdet, Tarih-i Cevdet(2nd ed., 12 vols., Istanbul, A.H. 1309), II, 152-7.

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28 AS'AD PASHA AL-'AZM AND OTTOMAN RULE IN DAMASCUS (1743-58)the establishment of stable and powerful provincial governments which wouldbe more loosely controlled by Istanbul, even if it meant the strengtheningof their ability to resist external pressure and the paving of the way to localreforms. Consequently, the later attempts to establish such governments inthe provinces had to assume the form of an open revolt against the Porte.Since such a revolt could succeed only in a province like Egypt but not innearby Syria (as later developments prove), the latter was condemned tocontinuing decline for another century. It is in the light of this developmentthat the failure of As'ad, and of all the 'Azm dynasty, to regenerate thegovernment and administration of their provinces can be correctly judged.

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