M P EASURES FOR RODUCTIVITY AND · contrattazione di secondo livello prevedendo incentivi fiscali...

DECENTRALIZED BARGAINING AND

MEASURES FOR PRODUCTIVITY AND

CORPORATE WELFARE GROWTH IN ITALY

Empirical Evidence from Administrative Data

Achille Pierre Paliotta and Massimo Resce

Researchers at INAPP-National Institute for Public Policies Analysis

([email protected]; [email protected])

LOCAL-LEVEL BARGAINING AND MEASURES FOR LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY IN ITALY

2

Abstract (IT)

INCENTIVAZIONE FISCALE E IMPOSTAZIONI FISCALI IN ITALIA. EVIDENZE EMPIRICHE DA DATI AMMINISTRATIVI

In Italia il Protocollo del 23 luglio 1993, ha introdotto nuove forme di contrattazione decentralizzata.

Uno degli obiettivi era stimolare la crescita della produttività nel secondo livello di contrattazione,

collegando le dinamiche salariali alla produttività. Ancora oggi questo modello stenta a radicarsi. La

letteratura e le evidenze empiriche concordano sul fatto che la diffusione della contrattazione aziendale

in Italia sia ancora condizionata dalla posizione geografica e dalla specializzazione produttiva, e

naturalmente dalle dimensioni dell'azienda. Recentemente, il Governo italiano ha incoraggiato la

contrattazione di secondo livello prevedendo incentivi fiscali sui premi di risultato e sui programmi di

welfare aziendale previsti nel contratto collettivo aziendale / territoriale. Queste misure, inizialmente

previste dalla legge di stabilità 2016, sono state successivamente rafforzate nel 2017. Tra maggio 2016

e agosto 2017 circa 12.500 aziende hanno richiesto questo incentivo fiscale e oltre 23.000 richieste

sono state compilate on line. Queste misure sono state accompagnate da un’attività di monitoraggio

attraverso una piattaforma informatica per la raccolta dei dati di sintesi implementata dal Ministero del

lavoro e delle politiche sociali italiano. Il presente paper propone alcune analisi della contrattazione di

secondo livello, utilizzando i dati raccolti nel Repository nel biennio 2016-2017. I risultati iniziali

mostrano una parziale rottura del legame tradizionale tra la contrattazione di secondo livello e le

dimensioni delle imprese: i dati amministrativi mostrano che la dimensione non è una variabile cruciale.

In effetti, troviamo una distribuzione equa tra le aziende che richiedono il beneficio fiscale. Al contrario,

quando si considerano i programmi di welfare aziendale, le dimensioni delle aziende fanno ancora la

differenza.

Testo chiuso il: 30/03/2018

Keyword

Contrattazione di secondo livello; Programmi di welfare aziendale; Produttività del lavoro; Incentivi

fiscali; Analisi di dati amministrativi.

Il lavoro presentato non impegna l’Istituto di appartenenza e gli autori rimangono gli unici responsabili delle

considerazioni espresse.


3

Abstract (EN)


On 23 July 1993, a Cross-Sectoral Agreement (Protocollo 1993) was signed in Italy promoting new

forms of decentralized bargaining. One of its aims was to stimulate productivity growth in the second-

level bargaining by linking wages dynamics to productivity. Even now, this pattern still struggles to

catch on. Literature and empirical evidence agree on the fact that the dissemination of the firm-level

collective agreement in Italy is still affected by geographical location and production specialization, and

of course by the company’s size. Recently, the Italian government has encouraged second-level

bargaining through the provision of tax incentives related to performance bonuses and corporate

welfare programmes set forth in the firm/local-level collective bargaining. This intervention, initially laid

down in the 2016 Stability Law, was subsequently strengthened in 2017. Between May 2016 and

August 2017 about 12,500 companies applied for such tax incentives and more than 23,000

applications were submitted on-line. Monitoring measures were also provided through a special

instrument for collecting summary data, and the Italian Ministry of Labour and Social Policies activated

a Repository for such purpose. This paper proposes several analyses of the Italian second-level

bargaining, using data collected by the Repository in the two-year period 2016-2017. Initial results

show a partial breakdown in the traditional linkage between second-level bargaining and the firms’ size:

administrative data show that the size is not a crucial variable. In fact, we found a fair distribution

among firms applying for the fiscal benefit. On the contrary, when considering corporate welfare

programmes, the firms' size still makes the difference.

Closed on: 30/03/2018

Keywords

Second level bargaining; Two-tier system; Corporate welfare programmes; Labour productivity; Tax

incentives; Administrative data analysis.

INAPP cannot be held responsible for errors or any consequences arising from the use of information contained in this

paper. The views and opinions expressed are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the

Institute.


4

Contents DECENTRALIZED BARGAINING AND MEASURES FOR PRODUCTIVITY AND CORPORATE WELFARE GROWTH IN ITALY....... 5

Introduction................................................................................................................................. 5

1 Measures for decentralized bargaining...................................................................................... 7

1.1 The legislation’s role in supporting the dissemination of the second-level bargaining ................ 7

1.2 The relative success of local-level bargaining for accessing performance bonuses ................... 10

2 Measures for labour productivity in firm-level bargaining .......................................................... 16

2.1 The territorial rootedness of firm-level bargaining ............................................................... 16

2.2 The dimensional structure of firm bargaining ...................................................................... 18

2.3 The sectoral structure of firm-level bargaining .................................................................... 20

2.4 Several determinants of territorial dynamics of firm-level bargaining ..................................... 21

3 Conclusion: the risk of local concentration .............................................................................. 22

References ................................................................................................................................ 26

List of Figures

Figure 1 Distribution of local-level bargaining per economic activity division (%) ................................... 12

Figure 2 Value of the pro-capita annual bonus and number of applications per section of economic activity (a.v.) ................................................................................................................................... 14

Figure 3 Recourse to corporate welfare and profit-sharing (%) ............................................................ 15

Figure 4 Regional incidence of firm-level bargaining ............................................................................ 17

Figure 5 Regional distribution of the declared bonuses ........................................................................ 17

Figure 6 Regional distribution of the average applicants per agreement and of the average bonus per applicant ............................................................................................................................. 18

Figure 7 No. of applications and applicants involved per size ................................................................ 19

Figure 8 Distribution of shares relating to employment and applicants per firms’ size and geographical

area .................................................................................................................................... 20

Figure 9 Incidence of applicants over employees per firms’ size and geographical area.......................... 20

Figure 10 Sectoral distribution of the applicants (macro-divisions and details Ateco 2007) ....................... 21

Figure 11 Composition of applications per main sectors on the basis of the geographical area ................. 21

Figure 12 Size of the regional labour markets and incidence of the size .................................................. 22

Figure 13 Labour productivity in Italy (2007 and 2015) ......................................................................... 23

Figure 14 Added value per employee per Region (2014) ........................................................................ 24

Figure 15 Added value per employee and labour cost per employee per Region (2014) ........................... 24

List of Tables

Tabella 1 Applications, applicants and average value of the bonus per typology of agreement, territorial

division, firms’ size, economic sector (a.v.) ............................................................................ 11


5

DECENTRALIZED BARGAINING AND MEASURES FOR PRODUCTIVITY AND CORPORATE

WELFARE GROWTH IN ITALY1

INTRODUCTION

From the postwar period up to the 1970s labour productivity in Italy developed more quickly than in

other European countries. Starting in the 1990s, though, it underwent a decrease compared to the

other Member States. Moreover, from the introduction of the Euro to date, its trend has experienced an

almost flat performance.

Economists do not have a single view on the causes related to this trend. Many agree on the

concurrence of multiple determinants. In fact, some explanations do not refer to wage trends, but

consider sectoral dynamics and the firms’ size. However, in the years immediately following the crisis,

some European authorities – such as the ECB and the European Commission (Resce, 2016) – launched

a moral suasion for the adoption of flexibility measures/wage moderation with the aim to improve the

economies’ ability to recover from the various negative shocks. According to their opinion, wages must

adequately reflect labour market conditions and productivity increases. The evidence supporting this

thesis, though, refers to nominal dynamics rather than real ones which, instead, show a contained

increase in wages.

When considering the Italian two-level bargaining structure, such adjustment should occur with regard

to the decentralised or second-level bargaining. Nonetheless, such model presents issues. In fact, Italy

is the Eurozone country with the highest share of subordinate employment relationships governed by

collective bargaining (ECB, 2017). At the same time, though, there is a scarce dissemination of second-

level bargaining. Moreover, according to some, the bargaining model established in 1993 has created a

“perverse bond between wages and productivity.” Indeed, the restrictions provided for by the two

levels have created a “profit protection clause” that does not spur entrepreneurs to invest and

innovate. This has caused, in actual fact, the non-development of productivity (Tronti, 2014; 2015).

Therefore, the legislator provided a system of reforms and incentives - perhaps an obliged choice –

with the aim to increase employment on the one hand, and labour productivity on the other. Such

development, though, was not pursued through structured policies, but with several measures aimed to

foster accessory wages remunerated in the decentralised second-level (firm and local) bargaining

(Resce, 2018).

In order to better understand the recent policies supporting labour productivity in Italy, it is necessary

to start from the characteristics that typify the Italian collective bargaining system (Bergamante &

Marocco, 2017).

In particular, the wages bargaining mechanism introduced with the Protocol of July 1993 substituted

the pre-existing system of the so-called “wage indexation scale.” Such Protocol, still in force, provides

for two specialized non-overlapping bargaining levels based on a form of advance wage policy

(threshold agreement). The first level - the National Collective Labour Agreement (Contratto Collettivo

Nazionale di Lavoro - CCNL) - sets (minimum) wages linked to a programmed inflation. The second

1 Achille Pierre Paliotta (Introduction and §1) and Massimo Resce (§2 and Conclusion), INAPP researchers.

The work on the Repository is the result of an INAPP research team that benefitted from the participation, besides of the two

authors, also of Francesca Bergamante, Marco Centra and Manuel Marocco.


6

level - which includes both the firm-level bargaining and the local-level bargaining - sets negotiating

performance wages connected to productivity, profitability and production quality.

It is worth specifying that a firm-level bargaining is an agreement entered into between a single

employer and the employees’ trade union. Whereas, a local-level bargaining is an agreement entered

into at local level (region, province, district) between the workers’ representatives and those of the

employers. The local-level bargaining is disseminated only with regard to certain economic sectors,

among which manufacturing, commerce, agriculture and construction.

According to the most recent comparative studies, two-thirds of the OECD Countries use collective

bargaining mainly at firm-level (single-employer bargaining), while the national/sectoral one (multi-

employer bargaining) plays a significant role only in Continental Europe (OECD, 2017). The

decentralization of collective bargaining is a consolidated and global trend which began in the 1980s. It

then intensified in the 1990s and further strengthened during the big recession due to the termination

of the central and sectoral bargaining in several Countries, among which Romania, Greece, Slovenia,

Slovakia, Hungary, Israel, Portugal, Bulgaria, Ireland e Latvia (Visser, 2016:5).

Italy certainly followed the tendency to decentralize the bargaining structure, although only in part

(D’Amuri & Giorgiantonio, 2015), as it is still central in the National Collective Labour Agreement

(CCNL). In fact, the firm-level agreement (single-employer bargaining) is estimated to be below 10%,

according to data collected in 2013 (Visser, 2016:11). This “compromise” between the two levels -

defined in Italy as an «organized decentralization»2 - stands also on the membership of sectoral and

corporate trade unions with National Confederations (Ales & Senatori, 2015:2).

Moreover, between 2008 and 2018, the various Italian Governments fostered, who more who less, the

development of the second-level decentralized bargaining,3 also encouraged by the ECB and the

European Commission (Pallini, 2016:1).

From 2016 to 20117, which is of interest here, the Italian government utilized an economic lever

extending tax incentives. This involved performance bonuses and two significant themes: the workers’

company profit-sharing and corporate welfare. Another novelty introduced in 2016 was the collection of

data with the aim to monitor and evaluate the policy. In fact, the 2016 Stability Law (Law No.

208/2015) provided for the monitoring of firm-level and local-level agreements. To such end, the inter-

ministerial Decree of 25 March 2016 - signed by the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies and by the

Ministry of Economy and Finance - reiterated that access to tax incentives was conditional on the on-

line registration of the collective agreement, to be carried out with the Territorial Labour Inspectorate

(Ispettorato Territoriale del Lavoro - ITL). Moreover, in order to collect summarized data on the

agreements, the Decree imposed to fill in a specific instrument called “compliance statement”

(“dichiarazione di conformità”), annexed to the Decree.

2 «For what it refers to the collective bargaining system the 2014 Agreement restates the centrality of the national agreement

as the main tool to ensure the certainty of common terms and conditions of employment for all the workers of the sector. The

possibility for the company agreement to derogate from the national level is provided for within the limits and the procedures

set by the national collective agreements» (Pallini, 2106:7). 3 Over the years there has been an acceleration of this tendency process «due to various impulses and pressures, company

level bargaining has certainly been boosted. This has been possible ‘qualitatively’, by (a) reducing some exclusive prerogatives

of industry wide agreements, (b) weakening the role of external unions in coordination and (c) expanding the possibility for

opening clauses and concession bargaining but in quantitative terms, it has not taken off» (Leonardi, Ambra & Ciarini,

2017:46).


7

The procedure for the on-line registration was activated on 16 May 2016. On 22 July 2016, the Ministry

of Labour and Social Policies (MLPS) provided operational indications issuing specific Guidelines.

Basically, in order to have access to tax incentives, employers were required:

1) to indicate the firm-level agreement entered into with trade unions or the local-level agreement that

they wanted to implement;

2) to fill in the “compliance statement” specifying several aspects, such as: the number of applicants;

the parameters for measuring the result expected in terms of productivity and competitiveness; the

entity of the performance bonus; the possible membership with a category association.

In order to monitor the measure, the MLPS activated a Repository which allowed to collect summarized

data on the agreements. With the aim to increase the quality of the information collected, the data

collected was verified, as all those coming from an administrative source.4 However, INAPP did not

have access to the collective agreements filed in the central Repository, but only to the “compliance

statements.” The analyses of this paper were developed on the basis of the mentioned database.

Therefore, this paper is based on the administrative data resulting from the applications submitted to

access the specific tax bonus introduced by the 2016 Stability Law. The structure of the paper is as

follows: the first paragraph illustrates the relevance of the supporting legislation and examines the

results of the local-level agreement; the second paragraph provides details concerning the analyses

carried out on the firm-level bargaining; the conclusions highlight several initial evaluations on the

incentives.

1 MEASURES FOR DECENTRALIZED BARGAINING

1.1 The legislation’s role in supporting the dissemination of the second-level

bargaining

Over the last ten years, the Italian government has promoted the dissemination of the second-level

collective agreement through various legislative provisions, with different degrees of tax benefits.

Before the 2016 Stability Law, tax incentives were not addressed as much to the development of

decentralized bargaining in itself, but to a specific institution: variable wages. This entailed an reduction

of labour costs correlated to the variable part of wages, actually entrusted to the second-level collective

agreement since 1993.

In 2008 the Italian government made a law (Legislative Decree No. 93/2008) for an experimental tax

incentive applied to variable wages. Such incentive was granted on an individual basis and not,

necessarily, on the basis of a collective agreement. In fact, it was implemented with regard to various

“amounts paid at corporate level,” such as “productivity increases, innovation and organizational

efficiency and other elements of competitiveness and profitability connected to the firm’s economic

trend,” as well as overtime. Therefore, in this first phase, the tax incentive was not connected to the

4 First of all, the data of the Repository were integrated with information on the sectors of economic activity and on the size of

the company, collected from the Statistics Register of Active Enterprises (Archivio statistico delle imprese attive - ASIA-ISTAT)

and from the Mandatory On-line Communications Information System (Sistema informativo sulle comunicazioni obbligatorie on-

line - SISCO-MLPS). Moreover, anomalous applications were identified, that is those for which the number of declared

applicants was above an admissible value and those that stated an average bonus pro-capita above the limits allowed (2,500 €

until 2016, 4,000 € for the following years).


8

collective agreement and concerned various uncertain elements related to wages. The measure -

confirmed up to the end of 2010 - expressly aimed to “increase labour productivity.” In actual fact,

though, it aimed to decrease tax imposition.

Only in 2011 the government decided to promote the second-level collective agreement. In fact, the

incentive was applied to a “productivity agreement” and implemented only if the amounts had been

paid “in compliance with what provided for by the local-level or firm-level collective agreements or

contracts.” In such context, the bonus had a broad and generic definition. In fact, the tax discount was

applied to allocations “connected to higher productivity, quality, profitability, innovation, organizational

efficiency linked to the results of the economic trend or the company’s profits or any other element

relevant for the improvement of corporate competitiveness” (Legislative Decree No. 78/2010). The

identification of these parameters was not well defined ex ante and delegated, in actual fact, to the

collective bargaining. Such measure was extended in the 2012 Stability Law (Law No. 183/2011).

The 2013 Stability Law identified the bonus more precisely. In fact, the connection with decentralized

bargaining was reiterated and strengthened by selecting, for the first time, the “workers’ associations

comparatively more representative at national level, or their trade unions operating in the company.”

Moreover, the law introduced the notion of “productivity wages” with the aim to pre-establish the

parameters for verifying results.5 After extending the measure for a year, without innovations of

relevance, in 2015 the concessional regime was suspended because lacking financial coverage.

A significant change was carried out in 2016 when the legislative measure was reactivated, making

important changes compared to the past. First of all, the bonus provides for new goods and services

from the concessional tax regime. Moreover, in addition to variable wages, other institutes are

incentivised and regulated in a collective framework; specifically:

1) the workers’ company sharing (financial sharing, with regard to the company’s profits; and

organizational sharing, aimed at “workers’ equal involvement in organizing work”);

2) corporate welfare.

A 10% substitutive tax is recognised to “performance bonuses,” introduced by “implementing” second-

level collective agreements. Whereas, in the absence of a corporate trade union, it is necessary to refer

to the local-level bargaining (that is a local agreement model such as, for example, the agreement of

14 July 2016 between Confindustria and CGIL, CISL and UIL). The employer’s unilateral recourse to the

local-level bargaining legitimizes, in this case, a sort of “contractual shopping”: in the absence of

corporate trade unions (Rappresentanze Sindacali Aziendali - RSA) and not holding a membership with

any Employers’ Association, the employer may implement the local-level bargaining regardless of the

economic sector of belonging and geographical location.6 Still today, the opinions on this new form of

local-level bargaining - in which the local agreement may be made up of a scheme to which the single

5 First of all, decentralised bargaining can introduce wage items expressly connected “to quantitative indicators of

productivity/profitability/quality/efficiency/innovation;” secondly, also the items connected to elements of organizational

flexibility are rewarded with regard to working hours, holidays, new technologies and duties.

6 This interpretation seems confirmed by the fact that the operational instructions recalled under the previous note - in case of a

company that intends to access the tax bonus stating to enter into a local-level collective agreement - substitute the obligation

to register with the mere indication of the date of occurred registration of the contract, and also allow the “selection of any

territorial direction.”


9

companies refer - remain controversial between those who are favourable (Leonardi, 2017) and those

who are critical (Tomasetti, 2016).

With regard to the maximum amounts established for accessing the legislative measure, a comparison

with the preceding years highlights that in 2016, and even more in 2017, the government decided to

broaden the range of applicants in favour of workers with medium-high incomes (in 2016 the maximum

limit of a subordinate income reached 50 thousand €, while in 2017 the peak amounted to 80 thousand

€). Moreover, in 2016 the maximum bonus that could be subjected to substitutive tax was equal to

2,000 €, while in 2017 it amounted to 3,000 €.

Compared to the recent past, the most important novelty is the greater rigour used in defining - hence

reducing - social parties’ discretionary power to identify “criteria for measuring” the productivity

increase. To such regard, the Inter-ministerial Decree of 25 March 2016, implementing the measure,

overcame the uncertain notion of “productivity wages” that characterized year 2013. Moreover, it

identified various criteria for measuring “the increase of production or saving in using productive

factors, or the improvement of the quality of products and processes.” The Decree required for the

second-level bargaining to refer to a “congruous period” in order to objectively ascertain the results

achieved. It also took into consideration organizational flexibility, such as the reorganization of working

hours and agile work (a form of subordinate work without precise restrictions relating to working hours

or the workplace - Law No. 81/2017), explicitly excluding overtime.

With regard to the workers’ profit-sharing, decentralized collective agreements must provide for a plan

to regulate the sharing. By way of example, they expressly provide for the creation of joint working

groups formed by company managers and workers with the aim “to improve production areas or

systems.” Moreover, they must be provided with permanent monitoring and consultation structures.

The other good provided is corporate welfare. The 2016 Stability Law better defined the scope and

notion of concessional goods and services (thus also recognizing “services relating to the assistance of

elderly or not self-sufficient family members”). Corporate welfare measures used to benefit from the

concessional regime only if paid on the basis of the employer’s voluntary or unilateral act. In fact, those

agreed upon through a collective agreement were excluded. The 2016 Stability Law, instead, expressly

allows for the measures recognized by employers “in compliance with the provisions of contract or

agreement or corporate regulation” (Treu, 2016).

In 2017, the basket of concessional goods and services was further widened. In fact, the concessional

tax regime started to be applied also to corporate welfare measures recognised “by the employer, in

the private or public sector, in compliance with the provisions of the National Collective Labour

Agreement, the inter-confederal agreement or the local-level collective agreement.” The provision, in

force since 2017, extends the regulation to any level of collective agreement, also the public sector.

The 2016 Stability Law legitimizes the “social bonus,” that is the possibility for workers to access

corporate welfare as a form of remuneration (total or partial), in alternative to the corporate

productivity bonus or profit-sharing. Within the limits for accessing the 10% flat tax, employees may

opt to transform the productivity bonus into welfare services, rather than obtain money.

Finally, the 2016 Stability Law also establishes that the basket of services may be paid through

vouchers, that is through the employer’s issue of securities, in paper or electronic format, referred to a

nominal value. This has allowed to disseminate corporate welfare also in entrepreneurial realities not

capable of providing the basket of services directly.


10

1.2 The relative success of local-level bargaining for accessing performance bonuses

From May 2016 to August 2017, the compliance statements submitted by Italian enterprises (Table 1)

in order to access tax benefits amounted to 23,063, involving almost five million applicants. The total

value of the performance bonuses was equal to more than six billion Euros, with an average value of

1,284 Euros.

Since such data highlight a very dissimilar situation between firm-level and local-level agreements, it is

important to analyze the two aspects in detail. Local-level agreements are certainly used less in Italy,

therefore this paragraph will provide only a few descriptive data on the phenomenon. Whereas, firm-

level agreements definitely have a strategic value for the development of second-level agreements.

Consequently, they will be analysed in depth in the second paragraph, starting from several

interpretative theses relating to regional imbalances still existing in Italy.

Analyzing the data obtained from MLPS’s Repository, the “compliance statements” amount to 23,063,

of which 18.1% refer to local-level bargaining (Table 1). Although the share is low, it is not of small

relevance (this contractual typology counts 4,166 applications). Almost one fifth of the firms decided to

benefit from such incentive through a so-called “simplified contractual path.”

As mentioned, the Law legitimizes a company’s direct local-level bargaining. This means that there is

no obligation to join a representative association, and/or to have a trade union within the company,

also legitimizing contractual shopping.

The Repository’s data highlight that the local-level bargaining is strongly characterised geographically,

with a greater presence in the North: 55.9% in the North-East, 23.7% in the North-West, 15.3% in the

Centre, while only 4.9% in the South and Islands. Moreover, firm-level bargaining is more present in

the Western part of the Country, while local-level bargaining dominates in the East (Table 1).


11

Table 1 Applications, applicants and average value of the bonus per typology of agreement, territorial division, firms’ size, economic sector (a.v.)

Firm-level Local-level Total

Applications

Applicants Value of the bonus Applicat

ions

Applicants Value of the bonus Applicat

ions

Applicants Value of the bonus

Average Total Total Average Avera

ge Total Total Average

Avera

ge Total Total Average

Division of the

competent LTD

North-West 8,146 250 2,037,484 2,623,701,670 1,288 989 98 97,304 112,696,326 1,158 9,135 234 2,134,788 2,736,397,996 1,282

North-East 6,157 212 1,303,800 1.570,412,240 1,204 2,331 70 164,281 82,793,317 504 8,488 173 1,468,081 1,653,205,557 1,126

Centre 3,103 299 927,438 1.311,143,774 1,414 639 85 54,318 79,620,100 1,466 3,742 262 981,756 1,390,763,873 1,417

South and

Islands 1,491 232 346,354 549,363,557 1,586 207 86 17,834 24,797,973 1,390 1,698 214 364,188 574,161,530 1,577

Firms’ size

No answer 3,045 326 993,936 1.336,057,955 1,344 562 214 120,298 91,003,649 756 3,607 309 1,114,234 1,427,061,605 1,281

Up to 15

employees 2,031 24 48,297 63,904,686 1,323 1,757 6 11,077 8,453,467 763 3,788 16 59,374 72,358,153 1,219

From 16 to

49 3,345 34 114,302 136,290,496 1,192 823 30 24,469 23,398,236 956 4,168 33 138,771 159,688,732 1,151

From 50 to

99 2,648 69 183,532 211,258,358 1,151 371 65 23,974 23,518,444 981 3,019 69 207,506 234,776,803 1,131

From 100

to 249 3,498 138 483,331 601,337,673 1,244 294 124 36,548 28,950,156 792 3,792 137 519,879 630,287,829 1,212

250 and

over 4,330 645 2,791,678 3,705,772,073 1,327 359 327 117,371 124,583,763 1,061 4,689 620 2,909,049 3,830,355,835 1,317

Sector of

economic activity

No answer 2,341 292 683,416 939,251,577 1,374 406 242 98,372 62,213,801 632 2,747 285 781,788 1,001,465,378 1,281

Agriculture 91 58 5,248 5,445,505 1,038 55 16 862 701,833 814 146 42 6,110 6,147,338 1,006

Industry

strictly

speaking

9,893 178 1,763,024 2,768,733,766 1,570 895 68 60,876 99,369,419 1,632 10,788 169 1,823,900 2,868,103,185 1,573

Constructio

n 288 303 87,246 127,099,265 1,457 445 8 3,529 2,664,340 755 733 124 90,775 129,763,605 1,430

Services 6,284 330 2,076,142 2,214,091,127 1,066 2,365 72 170,098 134,958,323 793 8,649 260 2,246,240 2,349,049,451 1,046

Total 18,897 244 4,615,076 6,054,621,241 1,312 4,166 80 333,737 299,907,716 899 23,063 215 4,948,813 6,354,528,956 1,284

Source: INAPP’s processing of DB MLPS’s data – Registration of firm-level and local-level bargaining and concessional taxation of performance bonuses


12

This is due to the fact that the North-East is mainly characterized by smaller-sized firms. In fact, net of

13.5% of questions not answered, 42.2% of the firms that submitted a compliance statement on-line

employ less than 15 employees. Following, there are those whose size ranges from 15 to 50 employees

(19.8%) and, with lower values, all the others. For a quick comparison, 55.4% of the firms that entered

into a firm-level bargaining ranged from 50 employees up (net of 16.1% of questions not answered).

Whereas, only 24.5% of the firms in the same dimensional class entered into a local-level bargaining.

With regard to the economic sector of reference (Table 1), net of 9.7% of questions not answered,

56.8% concern the macro category of services, 21.5% the industry strictly speaking, 10.7% the

construction sector and 1.3% agriculture.

When disaggregating such data into economic activities (Figure 1), the most represented involves

manufacturing (18.1%), followed by healthcare and welfare services (14.0%), wholesale and retail

trade, car and motorcycle repair (11.6%), construction (10.7%). All the others follow with lower values.

Moreover, it is interesting to analyze in detail the peculiar characteristics of firms with regard to the

four most significant economic sectors.

The manufacturing sector accounts for 48.7% of firms ranging up to 15 employees, and for 28.3% of

firms ranging from 15 to 50 employees.

The healthcare and welfare services involve significantly larger firms: from 15 to 50 employees

(30.1%); up to 15 (27.9%); from 100 to 250 (15.4%); over 250 (10.6%); from 50 to 100 employees

(10.6%).

Figure 1 Distribution of local-level bargaining per section of economic activity division (%)

Source: INAPP’s processing of DB MLPS’s data – Registration of firm-level and local-level bargaining and concessional

taxation of performance bonuses

The firms in the commerce sector are basically small and micro: 63.1% of the firms employ up to 15

employees, and 24.3% from 15 to 50.


13 13

Also the firms in the construction sector are almost all very modestly sized, ascertained that those up to

15 employees account for 90.1%.

Therefore, the number of firms involved in local-level bargaining is indeed strongly affected by

structural dynamics connected to size and geographical position, as well as by cultural dynamics

connected to the ability to implement projects and to the knowledge of rules. However, it is also

necessary to consider the variable relating to applicants. In fact, if resulting to be numerous, this would

mean that the local-level bargaining reaches a consistent number of employees providing them with

the relevant benefits established by the applicable law, despite the relative condition of minor

dissemination compared to the firm-level bargaining.

The number of local applications (4,166) involved 333,737 workers (Table 1). Therefore, the number of

applicants of the productivity bonus is much below the 4 million and 600 thousand employees involved

in the firm-level bargaining. The applicants are located especially in the North- East (164,281) and

North-West (97,304), with values definitely lower in the Centre (54,318) and in the South and Islands

(17,834).

When comparing the percentage of applications submitted by firms (18.1%) with the percentage

relating to applicants (6.7%), the low number of employees is even more evident. Since the firms are

small and micro, as mentioned above, 30.1% of the compliance applications submitted on-line account

for 1 to 5 applicants; 44.0% account for a number of applicants up 10; and 53.4% up to 15.

As admissible to expect in such distributions, the average is rather high (80), while the median certainly

represents a more adequate value to the summarized representation of the data with a value of 14

applicants. Whereas the trend - that is, the most widespread value - is by no coincidence of 1

applicant. Moreover, it is important to highlight that in firms with one single applicant, the latter

received an annual average bonus of 404 Euros.

The total value of the performance bonus (Table 1) amounts to almost 300 million Euros and is very

distant from the corporate one which is equal to 6 billion. The pro-capita annual average value is equal

to 1,265 Euros with regard to firm-level bargaining and to 779 with regard to local-level bargaining.

Such datum is the average referring to years 2016-27. Whereas, if wanting to distinguish between the

periods relating to June-December 2016 and January-August 2017, the values amount to 727 Euros

and 917 Euros respectively.

By way of mere information, we here provide the median and trimmed mean at 5% in order to better

contextualize the data of the Repository: in 2016, the median was equal to 455 Euros (trimmed mean

of 683 Euros), while in 2017 it amounted to 620 Euros (trimmed mean of 842 Euros).

A first interpretation of such data may lead to infer that the value of the bonus increased over time.

However, in order to have a confirmation in such sense, it is necessary to wait for next year’s data. In

fact, the Repository highlighted various issues connected to the modalities for submitting the

compliance applications which does not allow, in actual fact, to totally compare the two periods.

With regard to the geographical position (Table 1), the value of the bonus amounts to 112 million

Euros in the North-West, almost 83 million in the North-East, almost 80 in the Centre and 24 in the

South and Islands. This allows to infer that in the North-Eastern part of the Country the number of

applications was higher, with a greater variability. However, they concern a much lower average value


14

of the bonus (582 Euros) compared to the North-West (824 Euros), as well as to the Centre (1,276

Euros ).

As mentioned, the highest value of the bonus is not registered in the sectors where it is most

disseminated, but in others where it represents an uncommon event (Figure 2).

The manufacturing sector (18.3% of the cases) is certainly among the most important sectors in Italy,

and in this division the estimated value of the bonus is equal to 1,337 Euros. The value is among the

highest, and in half of the cases it concerns firms with less than 15 employees. Also on the basis of this

datum, it is possible to assert that the manufacturing sector represents a very significant reality in Italy

even with regard to the dissemination of the local-level bargaining.

In the healthcare sector (13.5% of the cases), the performance bonus is quite low compared to that of

the engineering industry (365 Euros). The commerce sector (11.5% of the cases) registered a bonus

slightly below the average, that is of 649 Euros, while the construction sector (10.2% of the cases)

registered an even lower average bonus amounting to 242 Euros. It is important to highlight, with

reference to the latter datum, that in almost all of the cases the dimensional class was under 15

employees (91.3%).

Figure 2 Value of the pro-capita annual bonus and number of applications per section of economic activity (a.v.)



As mentioned, the local-level bargaining may also envisage the presence of specific institutes, such as

corporate welfare or the workers’ profit-sharing.

Corporate welfare is an issue currently under the spotlight of the Italian media, of experts and policy

makers. Therefore, much more significant numbers could have been expected (Figure 3). However, in

this case only 6.0% of the firms with a local-level bargaining when registering the compliance

statement on-line indicated the intent to use it. Actually, there is a symptomatic datum that concerns

1.337 365

649 242

602 1.245

590 744

1.336 1.343

1.219 585

490 801

380 832

2.070 236

2.000 689

0 400 800 1.200 1.600 2.000 2.400

Manufacturing activities

Healthcare and welfare services

Wholesale and retail trade; Repair

Construction

Rental, travel agencies, support services

Financial and insurance activities

Transport and warehouse

Accommodation and catering services

Professional, scientific and technical activities

Mineral extraction from caves and mines

Information and communication services

Agriculture, forestry and fishery

Other services

Water supply; Drainage system, management activities

Education

Real estate activities

Supply of energy, gas, steam, and air

Arts, sports, entertainment

Public administration and defence; Social insurance

No answer

Number of…Value of the bonus


15 15

the number of firms that did not answer the relevant question (13.1%). This may be due to various

reasons: the small size of a firm may cause a situation of uncertainty, not allowing to give a positive

answer in that specific moment; or a welfare plan may be adjusted on the employees’ needs; or the

fact that nowadays access to services platforms is in quick development; or due to lack of knowledge

concerning the regulations on the matter, etc..

With regard to the geographical position, the situation is quite uniform: 6.7% in the North-West, 6.4%

in the North-East , 5.0% in the Centre, while in the South and Islands the value is minimum (1.4%).

With regard to the economic sectors, a value above the average was registered only in the financial

and insurance firms (29.6%), while a minimum use was registered in the manufacturing sector (3.5%),

healthcare and welfare services (6.7%), commerce (3.1%) and construction (0.4%).

Figure 3 Recourse to corporate welfare and profit-sharing (%)



Access to welfare services still seems to represent a problem, if not insurmountable, not totally

irrelevant. Access modalities, if not a member of an Employers’ Association (and not wanting to become

a member) could be solved by creating a network among the firms interested. This could be easier to

realise between firms of the same industrial district, for example, or by joining private groups

specialized in the sector that have already set up and offer on the market a platform of services at a

price deemed acceptable by such firms. In all these cases, however, such services platforms would be

able to take off only with high scale volumes.

Unlike corporate welfare, the theme of profit-sharing does not occupy a relevant position in the public

opinion and in that of experts (Carrieri, Nerozzi & Treu, 2015). This is very well reflected in the data of

the Repository (Figure 3), where it does not even reach 1% among firms that registered local-level

agreements. Also considering the questions not answered (3.6%), profit-sharing is truly residual,

regardless of its relevance. For such reason, it does not make much sense to analyze this aspect in

depth, neither at local nor at sectoral level.

The lack of interest toward this aspect certainly constitutes a missed opportunity. Indeed, in the view

of the employees’ ideal involvement in corporate policies, it is a theme that could develop in the

upcoming future, but currently it is still suffering from very strong cultural hesitations (Ichino, 2013).

However, although there is no participation yet in firms’ management, profit-sharing represents

3,6 0,8

95,7

Workers’ profit-sharing


16

another element toward a sort of horizontal firm, shared and sharing, to which also the labour force is

called to give its contribution nowadays, not only in terms of work performance, but also by joining an

overall common project.

2 MEASURES FOR LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY IN FIRM-LEVEL BARGAINING

2.1 The territorial rootedness of firm-level bargaining

With the aim to analyze the territorial rootedness of the measures for labour productivity in firm-level

bargaining, this paper took into consideration the regional level for various reasons.

First of all, because such measures represent useful local statistics for territorial comparisons also at

international level (NUTS 2). Moreover, with regard to the labour market legislation, the Regions

currently have powers with regard to the State which at times are competing and at others are

exclusive. Indeed, such circumstance has generated local labour markets.

The variables highlight a territorial distribution of firm-level bargaining with distinct characteristics. In

fact, most of the applications were submitted in the Centre-North (17,406), while those submitted in

the South were fewer (1,491).

Each firm-level bargaining can have a different impact, as the number of employees applying for the

measure varies from firm to firm. Therefore, besides the number of applications registered, it is

advisable to consider the number of applicants actually involved in the measure. Also in this case,

taking into consideration the number of applicants, this progressive gap per area of reference is

confirmed. In particular, the 4.6 million applicants are divided as follows: 44.1% in the North-West,

28.3% in the North-East, 20.1% in the Centre and 7.5 in the South and Islands. Each region presents

different firm sizes and employment conditions. Therefore, in order to better understand the ability of

the measure to penetrate the local labour markets, the relevant incidence was calculated7 (Figure 4).

When considering the absolute values, Lombardy results to rank first among the regions per number of

applications submitted (5,940) and per number of applicants involved (1,408,807), distancing by large

the other regions. Whereas, when calculating the incidence, it ranks second due to the large amount of

people employed throughout the territory. Basically, the regions with the highest incidence result to be:

Emilia Romagna (11.17%), Lombardy (10.52%), Piedmont (9.52%), Valle d’Aosta (9.03%), Lazio

(8.68%), Friuli Venezia Giulia (8.56%), Veneto (7.05%). In the Southern regions and Islands the

incidence is extremely low and does not go beyond 2%, with the exception of Basilicata and Abruzzo

(4.06% and 3.93% respectively). All the other regions show values included between 3% and 4%.

7 The incidence was calculated as number of total beneficiaries out of the average number of people employed per region

registered in the period 2015-17.


17 17

Figure 4 Regional incidence of firm-level bargaining

Figure 5 Regional distribution of the declared bonuses

Source: INAPP’s processing of DB MLPS’ data – Registration firm-level and local-level bargaining and concessional


Italy’s economy is territorially dichotomic from many viewpoints. The divergence between the Central-

Northern regions and those of the South emerges especially when measuring the labour market

conditions and the territorial rootedness of intervention policies (Resce, 2016a). Also in this case, a

marked regional concentration is identified, characterised by a strong incidence in the Central-Northern

areas.

These divergences are confirmed also by the overall distribution of the bonuses (Figure 5). The total

amount of wages to subject to tax reduction amounted to about 6 billion, of which 43% concentrated

in the North-West, 26% in the North-East, 22% in the Centre and only 9% in the South and Islands.


18

Figure 6 Regional distribution of the average applicants per agreement and of the average bonus per

applicant

Source: INAPP’s processing of DB MLPS’s data – Registration of firm-level and local-level agreements and concessional


Figure 6 highlights several territorial tendencies. In particular, the Southern regions (the South and

Islands) show values of the average bonus per applicant above or equal to the national average. At the

same time, the number of average applicants involved per agreement is below the national average,

with the exception of Sicily, Basilicata and Campania which result in line. The Northern regions instead

show values of the bonus below the national average (with the exception of Piedmont and Friuli) and a

number of applicants almost in line with the national average (with the exception of Trentino A.A.). In

the Central regions, the average values of both the bonus and the applicants are below the national

average. In this context, the average number of applicants in Lazio is so relevant (525) to condition not

only the data of the area, but also the national averages. Summarizing per area the values of the

average applicants per agreement and of the average bonus per applicant, the data are as follows:

North-West (250, € 1,287.72); North-East (212, € 1,204.49); Centre (299, € 1,413.73); South and

Islands (232, € 1,586.13).

2.2 The dimensional structure of firm-level bargaining

One of the determinants that mostly affects the tendency to activate firm-level bargaining involves the

firms’ size. Although most of the agreements are not comparable due to lacking data (about 16%), it is

possible to state that the larger the size of a firm, the higher the tendency to enter into firm-level

agreements. With the exception of a slight decrease of the applications submitted by firms ranging

from 50 to 100 employees, the agreements have progressively increased (see Figure 7).


19 19

Figure 7 No. of applications and applicants involved per size



The impact of the size is greatly evident when considering the total number of applicants involved in

the measure. In fact, net of the lacking data, when distinguishing two groups of firms - one up to 100

employees and the other from 100 employees up - it is possible to notice that in terms of applications

submitted the situation is almost equivalent (actually the first group prevails over the second with a

42.46% share against 41.42 %). Whereas, in terms of applicants involved, the situation is completely

different because the first group involves 7.5% applicants, while the second group involves 70.96%.

This natural multiplying effect on applicants is concentrated in dimensional extremes. In fact, the last

category, referring to firms with more than 250 employees (Figure 7), shows 4,330 agreements

(22.91%), involving 2,791,678 applicants (60.49%).


20

Figure 8 Distribution of shares relating to employment and applicants per firms’ size and geographical area

Figure 9 Incidence of applicants over employees per firms’ size and geographical area



This correlation between the firm’s size and the tendency to enter into firm-level bargaining is one of

the most used topics to justify the scarce rootedness of the second-level collective agreement in the

South, motivating it with the high presence of micro and small firms in that area.

In fact, employment rates per firm’s size (Figure 8) show a high concentration of firms up to 50

employees in the South and Islands and a scarce presence of medium-large firms. This explains only in

part the entering into such agreements. Another explanation can derive from the scarce tendency of all

of the firms (both small and medium/large) in this area of the Country to use this measure through the

second-level collective agreement. This scarce tendency can be explained with the crowding-out of the

measure due to the presence of other incentives on the labour market.

Other explanations may be searched in the sectoral structure.

2.3 The sectoral structure of firm-level bargaining

The sectoral structure of the applications (Figure 10), net of a lacking data that accounts for about

14.81%, sees the prevalence of the services sector, which in terms of applicants involved represents

44.99%, followed by the industry strictly speaking (38.20%), the construction sector (1.89%), and the

agricultural sector (0.11%).

Breaking up these macro-sectors into single activities, it is clear that the greatest contribution comes

from the industry, and in particular from the manufacturing (32.18%), followed by the financial and

insurance activities (14.58%), commerce (8.09%), transport (7.33%), professions (4.76%) and

communication services (3.57%). All the other activities have an incidence below 3%.

Therefore, it is possible to observe very different sectoral dynamics. When considering the regional

specialization models, these may have affected the actual territorial dynamics.


21 21

Figure 10 Sectoral distribution of the applicants (macro-divisions and details Ateco 2007)

Figure 11 Composition of applications per main sectors on the basis of the geographical area



The compositions of the single productive sectors per geographical area (Figure 11) show that the

South is relatively less present in the heaviest sectors. An exception is given by the transport sector, as

its contribution has increased.

On the contrary, the North-West alone absorbs 44% of the applicants. Therefore, it shows a relatively

higher presence in the sectors more involved in registrations of firm-level bargaining, in particular

manufacturing, commerce, information and communication, and financial and insurance services.

2.4 Several determinants of territorial dynamics of firm-level bargaining

The data collected through the registration of firm-level agreements with the MLPS and on the

concessional taxation of performance bonuses highlight a strong territorial divergence. In fact, there is

a greater use of firm-level bargaining in the Centre-North and a limited use in the Southern regions.

The traditional explanation of the phenomenon is based on the greater presence in the latter area of

micro and small firms that have a lower tendency to use these agreements. However, such reasoning

does not seem sufficient. In fact, the registration of agreements deriving from the South and Islands is

relatively less present for micro and small enterprises, where a greater presence was expected.

Whereas, it is more consistent with regard to large enterprises.

A more useful explanation of this territorial dichotomy is the sectoral specialisation of the regional

economies. In fact, in the sectoral composition of firm-level bargaining - calculated on the basis of the

number of applications submitted and the number of applicants involved - the regions of the South are

relatively less present in the most dynamic sectors.


22

Figure 12 Size of the regional labour markets and incidence of the size

Source: INAPP’s processing of DB MLPS’ data – Registration of firm-level and local-level bargaining and concessional


A further interpretation takes into account the actual size of the local labour markets (Figure 12). In

fact, when using the number of people employed as proxy of the size of the labour markets, it is

possible to observe that the greater the size of the market (share of people employed), the higher the

number of applicants involved in the firm-level bargaining (share of applicants). Indeed, the linear

tendency line (see Figure 12 green line) dominates the bisecting line (blue line). This could derive from

the fact that there is a higher information flow in “big” markets, enabling an easier activation of

emulation phenomena. This circumstance is not true for several Southern regions (Campania, Sicily and

Apulia) which, although having wider markets, do not register the same performances of other regions.

Since these markets register a higher number of unemployed, they may be considered relatively less

efficient. Moreover, it is important not to underestimate the aspect of undeclared work (Resce, 2016b),

which by definition does not intercept bargaining in general. In fact, another aspect, not measured in

this report, refers to the frequent recourse to undeclared work, typical of this area of the country.

On the basis of such data, it is possible to infer that the labour markets’ efficiency could improve by

increasing the size. This leads to consider with favour all the actions aimed to increase the connection

and coordination of the regional markets.

3 CONCLUSION: THE RISK OF LOCAL CONCENTRATION

It is still too early to evaluate whether the system of incentives introduced mainly with the aim to

increase productivity in decentralized bargaining led to an increase of labour productivity or to a mere

reduction of the tax burden.

However, it is possible to make several considerations on the territorial distribution of the incentives.

When analyzing separately the two typologies of collective agreements admitted to the benefit (both

the firm-level and local-level bargaining), it is clear that, in both cases, the characteristics of the local

economy are fundamental (sectoral specialization and the firms’ size).


23 23

Local-level bargaining was a prerogative of small and micro firms concentrated in the northern part of

the Country aimed to access the supporting measure. Several nuances are evident depending on the

various economic sectors, mostly services (with the relevant datum of healthcare and welfare services)

the industry strictly speaking (especially the manufacturing activities), commerce and construction.

Also firm-level bargaining highlights a strong territorial divergence with a greater use in the Centre-

North and a limited use in the Southern regions. Moreover, the scarce appeal of the tax bonus in this

area of the Country does not seem to refer to the greater presence of micro and small firms (in the

South and Islands the number of applications submitted by micro and small firms is the lowest).

This concentration in the distribution of applications rises some concern especially with regard to firm-

level bargaining. In fact, when considering how the firms entered into the agreements, such measures

could increase the already marked territorial dualism which characterises the Italian regions. Indeed, it

grafts onto an inefficient allocation of the territorial distribution of the increases of productivity already

dichotomic.

From 2007 to 2015 – that is from the pre-crisis to the post-crisis -, the already wide labour productivity

gap between the South and the Centre-North slightly increased (Carmignani & Staderini, 2016), even if

with differentiated sectoral dynamics (see Figure 13).

Figure 13 Labour productivity in Italy (2007 and 2015)

Source: ISTAT, Territorial Economic Accounts

With regard to the industry strictly speaking, the Centre-North quickly recovered the labour productivity

drop of 2009 and showed values higher than those of the pre-crisis. Instead, in the South the recovery

was weak, causing a widening of the productivity gap between the areas. In the services sector, the

drop of productivity in the Centre-North was more marked compared to that in the South, especially

due to the greater stability of employment levels in the Centre-North. This dynamic is identified also in

the construction sector. Owing to these dynamics, the South reduced its delay in those sectors

compared to the rest of the Country. The overall added value decreased more intensely than the

*Thousands of Euros to

connected values (basic year

2010) per person employed.

**Percentage.

***Percentage difference

between labour productivity in

the South and that in the

Centre-North.


24

number of people employed in both areas of the Country. These dynamics were characterized in part

by a more marked increase of the allocative efficiency8 in the Centre-North compared to the South

(Linarello & Petrella, 2016).

When comparing the added value per employee per region before the introduction of the incentives

(see Figure 14) with the territorial incidence of the entering into governmental productivity measures

within the framework of the firm-level bargaining (see Figure 4), it is evident, should such measures

succeed, the divergence process of the Southern regions’ productivity would increase more markedly

for several regions, such as Molise, Campania, Apulia, Calabria, Sardinia and Sicily.

Figure 14 Added value per employee per Region (2014)

Figure 15 Added value per employee and labour cost per employee per Region (2014)

Source: Processing of ISTAT’s data (2017 Italian Statistics Report)

The current debate involves the advisability to redefine the structure of the collective bargaining system

in order to support the recovery of competitiveness of the Italian economy. There is the need for an

industrial relations system capable of guaranteeing flexibility in regulating wages and a greater

employment resilience toward the economic cycle (Boeri, 2014 and 2017).9 Some suggest a daring

reform of the industrial relations system in favour of the decentralised system, also recognising the

possibility to set lower wages.10 Others tend toward the introduction of legal minimum wages leaving to

8 The allocative efficiency measures the ability of an economic system to direct resources toward the most efficient firms. 9 In particular, reference is made to the debate organized by AREL, Agenzia di Ricerche e Legislazione (Research and Legislation

Agency), on the occasion of the presentation of the volume "Salari, produttività, disuguaglianze" (Rome, Thursday 14

September 2017), with the intervention, besides the curators (Treu T. Dell’Aringa C., Lucifora C.) and various stakeholders, also

of Tito Boeri and Enrico Letta. 10 The inter-confederal agreement of Confcommercio of 2016 expressly provided for the possibility for the the second-level

collective agreement to derogate to institutes the economic content established at national level. Also the confederal agreement


25 25

the decentralised bargaining system the setting of further wage components (Tufo, 2018). The intent is

to use decentralised bargaining to decrease wages in the South. However, such decrease could lower

the families’ consumptions with a down spinning of the economic growth of these territories already in

sufferance. Often, behind wages, there is a world that goes beyond corporate production, and refers to

social cohesion conditions. Therefore, these dynamics should be analyzed taking into account also the

trend relating to wealth, which sees in the South the maximum incidence of individuals at risk of

poverty (about 40%).11 Moreover, the motivation based on the idea to increase the youth’s mobility

toward the territories where wages are higher is not convincing. In fact, such circumstance would

increase the already strong drainage of competences from the South. This would leave these territories

lacking of the generational change and of the human capital necessary for the processes of

endogenous local development.12

Among the motivations adopted to justify the need of a reduction of wages in the South, there is the

need to increase firms’ profit margins considering the low productivity. Actually, labour costs per

employee in the South are the lowest in Italy. Beyond the considerations on wages as lever for internal

demand, it is difficult to imagine that labour costs per employee may be further squeezed considering

the already very low levels (see Figure 15). To recover competitiveness in this area compared to the

Eastern European Countries is an unreachable target considering the very low levels of labour costs

registered.13 The run-up must not be downward but upward, increasing the qualitative up-grading of

productions. In fact, other policies, outside of the labour market, could be much more effective

intervening on the mainly contextual breakdown variables on which the Southern regions register

delays, such as the development of infrastructures, the quality of education and training, bank

stickiness, etc.. The regulation of the labour market is certainly important. However, besides a closer

internal interconnection between industrial relations and active and passive labour policies, what is

needed is also a greater external integration with the other development policies.

European policies draw inspiration from the aim of convergence, also in industrial relations (Vaughan-

Whitehead & Vazquez-Alvarez, 2018). However, the models are still substantially very different. This

paper highlights that although the regulations and conditions for accessing a measure may be equal,

the different local market conditions determine a different effectiveness of the measure with the risk to

trigger further divergence processes.

In conclusion, this first analysis suggests that, for the future, it will be necessary to design instruments

which adequately invest on the specific characteristics of the local labour markets in order to promote

second-level bargaining.

Moreover, the current incentive system needs to be integrated with other policies that keep into

account the differences of context. The answer should be searched not only in labour policies, but also

of Confesercenti of September 2017 provides for the possibility of derogation at local-level of the wages defined by the CCNL,

upon explicit delegation of the CCNL. 11 Bank of Italy, Survey on Italian families’ budgets, in Statistics, March 2018. 12 Cf different SVIMEZ Reports and “La mobilità costretta – La mobilità geografica dei giovani italiani: caratteristiche e

prospettive delle regioni del mezzogiorno” edited by M. Resce - series ISFOL Temi&Strumenti – Studi&Ricerche - No. 30. 13 Eurostat, newsrelease No. 58/2017– “Labour costs in the EU Hourly labour costs ranged from €4.4 to €42.0 across the EU

Member States in 2016” - 6 April 2017.


26

in wider policies of context, in particular industrial policies and in those relating to territorial

development.

REFERENCES

ALES E., IACOPO S., Collective Bargaining and workers' (trade union) representation: the company level in Italy, Draft prepared for the Labour Law Research Network Conference, Amsterdam, 25-27 June, pp. 11, 2015

ARMAROLI I., MASSAGLI E., Nuovi sgravi per le misure di conciliazione e welfare aziendale: doppio vantaggio?, in @bollettinoADAPT, 26 settembre 2017, n. 31, 2017

BERGAMANTE F., MAROCCO M., 2017, Il doppio livello di contrattazione collettiva in Italia: tendenze recenti

alla luce dell’indagine Inapp-RIL, in “Quaderni di Rassegna Sindacale”, a. XVIII, n. 4, ottobre-

dicembre, pp. 181-197

BOERI T., 2014, Two-Tier Bargaining, IZA DP No. 8358, IZA Discussion Paper No. 8358, July 2014,

https://goo.gl/846G2J

BOERI T., 2017, Perverse effects of two-tier wage bargaining structures, IZA World of Labor,

https://goo.gl/6ZiRaq

BORDOGNA L. AND PEDERSINI R., 2015, Economic crisis, new EU economic governance and the regulation of labour, paper presentato al 17th Ilera World Congress Cape Town 7-15 September

CALLIGARIS S., DEL GATTO M., HASSAN F., OTTAVIANO G.I.P. , SCHIVARDI F., 2016, Italy’s Productivity Conundrum, A Study on Resource Misallocation in Italy, Discussion Paper n. 30, maggio 2016, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg

CARMIGNANI A., STADERINI A., 2016, Economie regionali – L’economia delle regioni Italiane – Dinamiche recenti e aspetti strutturali, Banca d’Italia, n. 43/2016, dicembre

CARRIERI D., NEROZZI P. E TREU T., 2015, La partecipazione incisiva. Idee e proposte per rilanciare la democrazia nelle imprese, Il Mulino, Bologna

COMMISSIONE EUROPEA, 2016, Relazione per paese relativa all'Italia 2016 comprensiva dell'esame approfondito sulla prevenzione e la correzione degli squilibri macroeconomici, Documento di lavoro dei servizi della commissione, Bruxelles, 26.2.2016 SWD(2016) 81 final

COMMISSIONE EUROPEA, 2017, Relazione per paese relativa all'Italia 2017 Comprensiva dell'esame approfondito sulla prevenzione e la correzione degli squilibri macroeconomici, Documento di lavoro dei servizi della commissione, Bruxelles, 22.2.2016 SWD(2017) 77 final

D’AMURI F., NIZZI R., 2017, I recenti sviluppi delle relazioni industriali in Italia, Occasional Papers – Questioni di Economia e finanza n. 416, Banca d’Italia, dicembre

D’AMURI F., GIORGIANTONIO C., 2015, The Institutional and Economic Limits to Bargaining

Decentralization in Italy, in IZA Policy Paper n. 98

D’AMURI F., GIORGIANTONIO C., 2014, Diffusione e prospettive della contrattazione aziendale in Italia, Occasional Papers – Questioni di Economia e finanza n. 211, Banca d’Italia, luglio

DAVIES H, 2017, Understanding the productivity puzzle, in “Social Europe - politics, economy and employment & labour”, https://www.socialeurope.eu/, 26 giugno.

DEAKIN S., KOUKIADAKI A., 2013,The sovereign debt crisis and the evolution of labour law in Europe, in

COUNTOURIS N., FREEDLAND M. (eds), Resocialising Europe in a time of crisis, Cambridge University

press, Cambridge.

https://goo.gl/846G2J

https://goo.gl/6ZiRaq

https://www.socialeurope.eu/


27 27

DELL’ARINGA C., LUCIFORA C., TREU T. (a cura di), 2017, Salari, Produttività Disuguaglianze – Verso un nuovo modello contrattuale?, il Mulino–AREL, Roma.

ECB, 2017, Wage adjustment and employment in Europe: some results from the Wage Dynamics Network Survey, Economic Bulletin, Issue 8, Issue 1.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2015, Industrial Relations in Europe 2014, February.

FAZIO F., TIRABOSCHI M., 2011, Una occasione mancata per la crescita. Brevi considerazioni a proposito

della misura di detassazione del salario di produttività, @bollettinoADAPT, 19 dicembre.

ICHINO P. 2013, Partecipazione dei lavoratori nell’impresa: le ragioni di un ritardo, in Rivista italiana di

diritto del lavoro, vol. 4, pp. 861-880.

KANGUR A., 2018, Competitiveness and Wage Bargaining Reform in Italy, IMF Working Papers, WP n.61, March.

LEHNDORFF S., HEINER DRIBBUSCH , THORSTEN SCHULTEN (EDS), 2017, Rough Waters, European Trade

Unions in a Time of Crises, European Trade Union Institute (ETUI) Report, Bruxelles.

LEONARDI M., 2017, Le nuove norme sui premi di produttività e il welfare aziendale, in C. Dell’Aringa, C.

Lucifora, T. Treu (a cura di), Salari, produttività, disuguaglianze. Verso un nuovo modello

contrattuale, Il Mulino-AREL, Roma.

LEONARDI S., AMBRA M.C., CIARINI A., 2017, Italian Collective Bargaining at a Turning Point, Centre for

the Study of European Labour Law "Massimo D'Antona", University of Catania, n.139, pp. 52.

LINARELLO A., PETRELLA A., 2016, Productivity and reallocation. Evidence from the universe of Italian firm level data, Questioni di economia e finanza n. 353.

MAROCCO M., 2018, Gli incentivi economici al salario variabile, in Diritto delle Relazioni Industriali, n. 2, a.XXVIII.

MAROCCO M., 2017, Il salario minimo legale nel prisma europeo: prospettive per l’Italia, in Giornale di diritto del lavoro e delle relazioni industriali, n.154.

OECD, 2017, Employment Outlook 2017, OECD Publishing, Paris,

http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/empl_outlook-2017-en.

PALLINI M., 2016, Italian Industrial Relations. Toward a Strongly Decentralized Collective Bargaining?, in

“Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal”, vol. 38, n. 1, pp. 1-12.

RESCE M., 2016a, Evoluzione delle politiche per il mercato del lavoro in Italia durante la crisi, in

Francesca Bergamante (a cura di), Crisi economica e squilibri territoriali. Una lettura

multidimensionale dei contesti regionali, Isfol, I libri del FSE, Roma.

RESCE M., 2016b, Le incursioni della BCE sul mercato del lavoro italiano, in Economia e Politica, n. 12 a. 8-.

RESCE M., 2018, Produttività del lavoro in Italia e misure di sostegno nella contrattazione aziendale, in corso di pubblicazione in Economia e Lavoro, Carocci, Roma.

TOMASETTI P., 2016, Detassazione 2016: il ritorno degli accordi “fotocopia” di livello territoriale,

@adapt_rel_ind, 19 ottobre.

TREU T., 2016, Introduzione - Il welfare aziendale: problemi, opportunità, strumenti, in T. Treu (a cura

di), Welfare aziendale 2.0 Nuovo welfare, vantaggi contributivi e fiscali, IPSOA INDICITALIA,

Milano.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/empl_outlook-2017-en


28

TREU T., 2017, Contrattazione e rappresentanza, in C. Dell’Aringa, C. Lucifora, T. Treu (a cura di),

Salari, produttività, disuguaglianze. Verso un nuovo modello contrattuale, Il Mulino-AREL, Roma.

TRONTI L., 2014a, Elementi di analisi macroeconomica delle relazioni industriali. Modello contrattuale, produttività del lavoro e crescita economica, Scuola nazionale dell’amministrazione - Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, Università di Roma Tre.

TRONTI L., 2014b, Produttività, crescita e riforma della contrattazione: un dialogo tra economisti, nelMerito.com, 24 febbraio.

TUFO M., 2018, The minimum wage in Italy during the Eurozone crisis age and beyond, IUSLabor 1,

https://goo.gl/d7rDTL.

VAUGHAN-WHITEHEAD D., VAZQUEZ-ALVAREZ R., 2018, Convergence in the EU: what role for industrial

relations? ILO documents.

VISSER J., 2016, What happened to collective bargaining during the great re-cession?, IZA Journal of

Labor Policy, 2016, 5:9, https://goo.gl/XGqv6p.

https://goo.gl/d7rDTL

https://goo.gl/XGqv6p

M P EASURES FOR RODUCTIVITY AND · contrattazione di secondo livello prevedendo incentivi fiscali...

Documents

Transcript of M P EASURES FOR RODUCTIVITY AND · contrattazione di secondo livello prevedendo incentivi fiscali...