1
Approccio sistemico per la sicurezza delle gallerie in caso di incendio
e problemi strutturali specifici
Prof. Dr. Ing. Franco Bontempi
Ordinario di Tecnica delle Costruzioni
Facolta’ di Ingegneria Civile e Industriale
Universita’ degli Studi di Roma La Sapienza
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Scopo della presentazione
• Far vedere gli aspetti piu’ generali dellaprogettazione strutturale antincendio:
Complessita’ del problema;
Approccio sistemico;
Natura accidentale dell’azione incendio;
Progettazione prestazionale/prescrittiva;
Aspetti specifici delle gallerie stradali.
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OGGETTOCaratteristiche delle gallerie
Geometrie
Impianti
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GEOMETRIE
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Tipo A - autostradew
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Tipo B – extraurbane principaliw
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Tipo C – extraurbane secondariew
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Sistema vs Strutturaw
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OperaMorta
OperaViva
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IMPIANTI VENTILAZIONE
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Piston effect
• Is the result of natural induced draft caused by free-flowing traffic (> 50 km/h) in uni-directional tunnel thus providing natural ventilation.
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Mechanical ventilation
• “forced” ventilation is required where piston effect is not sufficient such as in
– congested traffic situations;
– bi-directional tunnels (piston effect is neutralized by flow of traffic in two opposite directions);
– long tunnels with high traffic volumes.
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TUNNEL VENTILATION SYSTEMS
• Road Tunnel Ventilation Systems have two modes of operation:
• Normal ventilation, for control of air quality inside tunnels due to vehicle exhaust emissions: – in any possible traffic situation, tunnel users and staff must not suffer
any damage to their health regardless the duration of their stay in the tunnel;
– the necessary visual range must be maintained to allow for safe stopping.
• Emergency ventilation in case of fire, for smoke control: – the escape routes must be kept free from smoke to allow for self-
rescue; – the activities of emergency services must be supported by providing
the best possible conditions over a sufficient time period ;– the extent of damage and injuries (to people, vehicles and the tunnel
structure itself) must be kept to a minimum.
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Longitudinal ventilation system
• employs jet fans suspended under tunnel roof; in normal operation fresh air is introduced via tunnel entering portal and polluted air is discharged from tunnel leaving portal.
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Semi-transverse ventilation system
• employs ceiling plenum connected to central fan room equipped with axial fans; in normal operation fresh air is introduced along the tunnel trough openings in the ventilation plenum while polluted air is discharged via tunnel portals.
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Transverse ventilation system
• employs double supply and exhaust plenums connected to central fan rooms equipped with axial fans; in normal operation fresh air is introduced and exhausted via openings in double ventilation plenums.
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Attachments
• Dispersion stack and fan room combined with longitudinal ventilation: may be required in order to reduce adverse effect on environment of discharge of polluted air from tunnel, where buildings are located in proximity (< 100m) to tunnel leaving portal.
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Ventilation unitAir extraction
Ventilation unitSupply of fresh air
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COMPLESSITA’Approccio prestazionale
Modellazione
Sicurezza
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LOO
SE
co
up
lings
TIG
HT
LINEAR interactions NONLINEAR
System Complexity (Perrow)w
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APPROCCIO PRESTAZIONALE
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Prescrittivo (1)
APPROCCIOPRESCRITTIVO
1) BASI DEL PROGETTO, 2) LIVELLI DI SCUREZZA, 3) PRESTAZIONI ATTESE
NON ESPLICITATI
1) REGOLE DI CALCOLO E
2) COMPONENTI MATERIALI
SPECIFICATI E DETTAGLIATI
QUALITA' ED AFFIDABILITA' STRUTTURALI
ASSICURATI IN MODO INDIRETTO
GARANZIA DIRETTA DELLE PRESTAZIONI E DELLA SICUREZZA STRUTURALI
INSIEME DI STRUMENTI
LOGICI E MATERIALI #3
INSIEME DI STRUMENTI
LOGICI E MATERIALI #1
INSIEME DI STRUMENTI
LOGICI E MATERIALI #2
OBIETTIVI PRESTAZIONALI E
LIVELLI DI SICUREZZA ESPLICITATI
APPROCCIOPRESTAZIONALE
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Req
uis
iti
Req
uis
iti
Elementi CostituentiElementi Costituenti
Elementi CostituentiElementi Costituenti
Elementi CostituentiElementi Costituenti
Req
uis
iti
Req
uisi
ti
Elementi CostituentiElementi Costituenti
Elementi CostituentiElementi Costituenti
prescrittivo
pre
stazi
onale
Req
uis
iti
Req
uis
iti
Elementi CostituentiElementi Costituenti
Req
uis
iti
Req
uis
iti
Elementi CostituentiElementi CostituentiElementi CostituentiElementi Costituenti
Elementi CostituentiElementi CostituentiElementi CostituentiElementi Costituenti
Elementi CostituentiElementi CostituentiElementi CostituentiElementi Costituenti
Req
uis
iti
Req
uisi
ti
Elementi CostituentiElementi CostituentiElementi CostituentiElementi Costituenti
Elementi CostituentiElementi CostituentiElementi CostituentiElementi Costituenti
prescrittivo
pre
stazi
onale
Prescrittivo (2)w
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Prestazionale (1)
APPROCCIOPRESCRITTIVO
1) BASI DEL PROGETTO, 2) LIVELLI DI SCUREZZA, 3) PRESTAZIONI ATTESE
NON ESPLICITATI
1) REGOLE DI CALCOLO E
2) COMPONENTI MATERIALI
SPECIFICATI E DETTAGLIATI
QUALITA' ED AFFIDABILITA' STRUTTURALI
ASSICURATI IN MODO INDIRETTO
GARANZIA DIRETTA DELLE PRESTAZIONI E DELLA SICUREZZA STRUTURALI
INSIEME DI STRUMENTI
LOGICI E MATERIALI #3
INSIEME DI STRUMENTI
LOGICI E MATERIALI #1
INSIEME DI STRUMENTI
LOGICI E MATERIALI #2
OBIETTIVI PRESTAZIONALI E
LIVELLI DI SICUREZZA ESPLICITATI
APPROCCIOPRESTAZIONALE
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Prestazionale (2)R
equ
isit
iR
equ
isit
i
Elementi CostituentiElementi Costituenti
Elementi CostituentiElementi Costituenti
Elementi CostituentiElementi Costituenti
Req
uis
iti
Req
uisi
ti
Elementi CostituentiElementi Costituenti
Elementi CostituentiElementi Costituenti
prescrittivo
pre
stazi
onale
Req
uis
iti
Req
uis
iti
Elementi CostituentiElementi Costituenti
Req
uis
iti
Req
uis
iti
Elementi CostituentiElementi CostituentiElementi CostituentiElementi Costituenti
Elementi CostituentiElementi CostituentiElementi CostituentiElementi Costituenti
Elementi CostituentiElementi CostituentiElementi CostituentiElementi Costituenti
Req
uis
iti
Req
uisi
ti
Elementi CostituentiElementi CostituentiElementi CostituentiElementi Costituenti
Elementi CostituentiElementi CostituentiElementi CostituentiElementi Costituenti
prescrittivo
pre
stazi
onale
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START
END
DEFINIZIONE E DISANIMADEGLI OBIETTIVI
INDIVIDUAZIONE DELLE
SOLUZIONI ATTE A
RAGGIUNGERE GLI OBIETTIVI
ATTIVITA' DI
MODELLAZIONE E MISURA
GIUDIZIO DELLE
PRESTAZIONI
RISULTANTI
No
Yes
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MODELLINUMERICI
MODELLIFISICI
RISPETTO DIPRESCRIZIONI
livello 1
OBIETTIVI
livello 3
DEFINIZIONE DELLA
SOLUZIONE STRUTTURALE
livello 4
VERIFICA DELLE
CAPACITA'PRESTAZIONALI
LIMITI DELLAPERFORMANCE i-esima
CRITERIO (QUANTITA') CHE MISURA
LA PERFORMANCE i-esima
DEFINIZIONE DELLAPERFORMANCE i-esima
livello 2
ESPLICITAZIONE DEGLI OBIETTIVI ATTRAVERSO L'INDIVIDUAZIONE DI n
PRESTAZIONI;ordinatamente, per ciascuna di
esse, i =1,..n:
ESITO
NO
SI'
A
C
B
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MODELLINUMERICI
MODELLIFISICI
RISPETTO DIPRESCRIZIONI
livello 1
OBIETTIVI
livello 3
DEFINIZIONE DELLA
SOLUZIONE STRUTTURALE
livello 4
VERIFICA DELLE
CAPACITA'PRESTAZIONALI
LIMITI DELLAPERFORMANCE i-esima
CRITERIO (QUANTITA') CHE MISURA
LA PERFORMANCE i-esima
DEFINIZIONE DELLAPERFORMANCE i-esima
livello 2
ESPLICITAZIONE DEGLI OBIETTIVI ATTRAVERSO L'INDIVIDUAZIONE DI n
PRESTAZIONI;ordinatamente, per ciascuna di
esse, i =1,..n:
ESITO
NO
SI'
A
C
B
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MODELLAZIONE
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5050
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51
Analysis Strategy #1: Sensitivity governance of priorities
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Analysis Strategy #2: Bounding behavior governance
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Analysis Strategy #3: Redundancy Governance
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NUMERICALMODELING
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Factors for Coupling
MECHANICALSTATE
(Strain and Stress Fields and
Mechanical related Properties)
TERMALSTATE
(Temperature Fieldand Termic Related
Properties)
INFORMATIONFLOW DIRECTION
timetK
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Fully Coupled Scheme
timetK
TERMALSTATE
(Temperature Fieldand Termic Related
Properties)
MECHANICALSTATE
(Strain and Stress Fields and
Mechanical related Properties)
timetK
TERMALSTATE
(Temperature Fieldand Termic Related
Properties)
MECHANICALSTATE
(Strain and Stress Fields and
Mechanical related Properties)
timetK
TERMALSTATE
(Temperature Fieldand Termic Related
Properties)
MECHANICALSTATE
(Strain and Stress Fields and
Mechanical related Properties)
timetK
TERMALSTATE
(Temperature Fieldand Termic Related
Properties)
MECHANICALSTATE
(Strain and Stress Fields and
Mechanical related Properties)
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Staggered Coupled Scheme
timetK
TERMALSTATE
(Temperature Fieldand Termic Related
Properties)
MECHANICALSTATE
(Strain and Stress Fields and
Mechanical related Properties)
timetK
TERMALSTATE
(Temperature Fieldand Termic Related
Properties)
MECHANICALSTATE
(Strain and Stress Fields and
Mechanical related Properties)
timetK
TERMALSTATE
(Temperature Fieldand Termic Related
Properties)
MECHANICALSTATE
(Strain and Stress Fields and
Mechanical related Properties)
timetK
TERMALSTATE
(Temperature Fieldand Termic Related
Properties)
MECHANICALSTATE
(Strain and Stress Fields and
Mechanical related Properties)
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Temperature Driven Scheme
timetK
TERMALSTATE
(Temperature Fieldand Termic Related
Properties)
MECHANICALSTATE
(Strain and Stress Fields and
Mechanical related Properties)
timetK
TERMALSTATE
(Temperature Fieldand Termic Related
Properties)
MECHANICALSTATE
(Strain and Stress Fields and
Mechanical related Properties)
timetK
TERMALSTATE
(Temperature Fieldand Termic Related
Properties)
MECHANICALSTATE
(Strain and Stress Fields and
Mechanical related Properties)
timetK
TERMALSTATE
(Temperature Fieldand Termic Related
Properties)
MECHANICALSTATE
(Strain and Stress Fields and
Mechanical related Properties)
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Scheme With No Memory
timetK
TERMALSTATE
(Temperature Fieldand Termic Related
Properties)
MECHANICALSTATE
(Strain and Stress Fields and
Mechanical related Properties)
timetK
TERMALSTATE
(Temperature Fieldand Termic Related
Properties)
MECHANICALSTATE
(Strain and Stress Fields and
Mechanical related Properties)
timetK
TERMALSTATE
(Temperature Fieldand Termic Related
Properties)
MECHANICALSTATE
(Strain and Stress Fields and
Mechanical related Properties)
timetK
TERMALSTATE
(Temperature Fieldand Termic Related
Properties)
MECHANICALSTATE
(Strain and Stress Fields and
Mechanical related Properties)
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6060
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6161
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6262
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6363
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SICUREZZA
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ATTRIBUTES
THREATS
MEANS
RELIABILITY
FAILURE
ERROR
FAULT
FAULT TOLERANT DESIGN
FAULT DETECTION
FAULT DIAGNOSIS
FAULT MANAGING
DEPENDABILITYof
STRUCTURALSYSTEMS
AVAILABILITY
SAFETY
MAINTAINABILITY
permanent interruption of a system ability
to perform a required function
under specified operating conditions
the system is in an incorrect state:
it may or may not cause failure
it is a defect and represents a
potential cause of error, active or dormant
INTEGRITY
ways to increase
the dependability of a system
An understanding of the things
that can affect the dependability
of a system
A way to assess
the dependability of a system
the trustworthiness
of a system which allows
reliance to be justifiably placed
on the service it delivers
SECURITY
High level / activeperformance
Low level / passiveperformance
Visions, I., Laprie, J.C., Randell,
B.,
Dependability and its threats:
a taxonomy,
18th IFIP
World Computer Congress,
Toulouse (France) 2004.
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ATTRIBUTES
RELIABILITY
AVAILABILITY
SAFETY
MAINTAINABILITY
INTEGRITY
SECURITY
FAILURE
ERROR
FAULT
permanent interruption of a system ability
to perform a required function
under specified operating conditions
the system is in an incorrect state:
it may or may not cause failure
it is a defect and represents a
potential cause of error, active or dormant
THREATS
Structural Robustness (1)
66
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Structural Robustness (2)
• Capacity of a construction to show a regular decrease of its structural quality due to negative causes. It implies:
a) some smoothness of the decrease of structural performance due to negative events (intensive feature);
b) some limited spatial spread of the rupture (extensive feature).
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Levels of Structural Crisis
Us
ual
UL
S &
SL
SV
eri
fica
tio
nF
orm
at
Structural RobustnessAssessment
1st level:Material
Point
2nd level:ElementSection
3rd level:StructuralElement
4th level:StructuralSystem
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Bad vs Good Collapses
STRUCTURE& LOADS
CollapseMechanism
NO SWAY
“IMPLOSION”OF THE
STRUCTURE
“EXPLOSION”OF THE
STRUCTURE
is a process in which objects are destroyed by collapsing on themselves
is a processNOT CONFINED
SWAY
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Design Strategy #1: Continuityw
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Design Strategy #2: Segmentationw
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Esempio di valutazionedi roubustezza strutturale
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Esempio: edificio altow
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Analisi di un componente tipico
D0
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75D1 D2
Scenari (1-2)w
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Scenari (3-4)w
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Modalità di collasso (1-2)
D1 D2
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Modalità di collasso (3-4)
D3 D4
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Sintesi dei risultati: elemento critico
0
4
Lo scenario D4è quello più cattivo:
l’elemento strutturalecritico individuato è lacolonna più esterna!
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Modellazione edificio alto
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Scenario 1
(1 asta eliminata)
Scenario 2
(3 aste eliminate)
Scenario 3
(5 aste eliminate)
Scenario 4
(7 aste eliminate)
Scenari di danneggiamentow
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Collasso secondo scenario 1w
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Collasso secondo scenario 2w
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Collasso secondo scenario 3w
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Collasso secondo scenario 4w
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Moltiplicatore Ultimo e sua variazione
4,053,57
3,192,64 2,40
0,480,86
1,41 1,65
0,00
0,50
1,00
1,50
2,00
2,50
3,00
3,50
4,00
4,50
D0 D1 D2 D3 D4
Scenario di danneggiamento
u Delta F
F
Sintesi dei risultati
Δ u
u
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AZIONENatura dell’azione incendio
Carattere accidentaleCarattere estensivoCarattere intensivo
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Aspetti caratteristici dell’incendio
• Carattere estensivo
(diffusione nello spazio):1.wildfire
2.urbanfire
3.all’esterno di una costruzione
4.all’interno di una costruzione
• Carattere intensivo
(andamento nel tempo).
• Natura accidentale.
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Carattere intensivo
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91
ISO 13387: Example of Design Firew
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Andamento nel tempo potenza termicaw
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flash
ove
rSTRATEGIE
ATTIVE(approcciosistemico)
STRATEGIEPASSIVE(approcciostrutturale)
Tempo t
Te
mpera
tura
T(t
)
andamento di T(t) aseguito del successodelle strategie attive
flash
ove
rSTRATEGIE
ATTIVE(approcciosistemico)
STRATEGIEPASSIVE(approcciostrutturale)
Tempo t
Te
mpera
tura
T(t
)
andamento di T(t) aseguito del successodelle strategie attive
Strategiew
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FLASHOVER
passive
Create fire compartments
Prevent damage in the elements
Prevent loss of functionality in the building
active
Detection measures(smoke, heat, flame detectors)
Suppression measures (sprinklers, fire extinguisher, standpipes, firemen)
Smoke and heat evacuation system
prevention protection robustness
Limit ignitionsources
Limit hazardous human behavior
Emergency procedure and evacuation
Prevent the propagation of collapse, once local damages occurred (e.g. redundancy)
Fire Safety Strategies
systemic structural
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activeprotection
passiveprotection
no failures
doesn’t trigger
Y
N
Y
N
spreads
extinguishes
damages
Y
Nrobustness
no collapse
collapse
Y
N
triggers
prevention1 42 3
Fire Safety Strategies
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97
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98
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SnakeFighterw
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Carattere estensivo
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The Great Fire of Chicago, Oct. 7-10, 1871w
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Windsor Hotel Madridw
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Natura accidentale
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Situazioni HPLC
High Probability Low Consequences
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LPHC events
Low Probability High Consequences
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HPLCHigh Probability
Low Consequences
LPHCLow Probability
High Consequences
release of energy SMALL LARGE
numbers of breakdown SMALL LARGE
people involved FEW MANY
nonlinearity WEAK STRONG
interactions WEAK STRONG
uncertainty WEAK STRONG
decomposability HIGH LOW
course predictability HIGH LOW
HPLC vs LPHC events
110
111
Approcci di analisi
HPLCEventi Frequenti con
Conseguenze Limitate
LPHCEventi Rari con
Conseguenze Elevate
Complessità:Aspetti non lineari e
Meccanismi di interazioni
Impostazionedel problema:
DETERMINISTICA
STOCASTICA
ANALISIQUALITATIVA
DETERMINISTICA
ANALISIQUANTITATIVAPROBABILISTICA
ANALISIPRAGMATICACON SCENARI
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CAPITOLO 2:SICUREZZA
EPRESTAZONI
ATTESE
QUALITA’
CAPITOLO 3:AZIONI
AMBIENTALI
CAPITOLO 6:AZIONI
ANTROPICHE
CAPITOLO 4:AZIONI
ACCIDENTALI
DOMANDA
CAPITOLO 5:NORMESULLE
COSTRUZIONI
CAPITOLO 7:NORME PER LE
OPEREINTERAGENTI
CON I TERRENI ECON LE ROCCE,
PER GLIINTERVENTI NEITERRENI E PERLA SICUREZZA
DEI PENDII
CAPITOLO 9:NORMESULLE
COSTRUZIONIESISTENTI
PRODOTTO
CAPITOLO 11:MATERIALI
EPRODOTTIPER USO
STRUTTURALE
CAPITOLO 10:NORME PER LAREDAZIONI DEI
PROGETTIESECUTIVI
CAPITOLO 8:COLLAUDO
STATICO
CONTROLLO
Italian Code for ConstructionsD.M. 14 settembre 2005
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Il Progettista, a seguito della classificazione e della caratterizzazione delle azioni,
deve individuare le possibili situazioni contingenti in cui le azioni possono
cimentare l’opera stessa. A tal fine, è definito:
lo scenario: un insieme organizzato e realistico di situazioni in cui l’opera
potrà trovarsi durante la vita utile di progetto;
lo scenario di carico: un insieme organizzato e realistico di azioni che
cimentano la struttura;
lo scenario di contingenza: l’identificazione di uno stato plausibile e
coerente per l’opera, in cui un insieme di azioni (scenario di carico) è
applicato su una configurazione strutturale.
Per ciascuno stato limite considerato devono essere individuati scenari di carico
(ovvero insiemi organizzati e coerenti nello spazio e nel tempo di azioni) che
rappresentino le combinazioni delle azioni realisticamente possibili e
verosimilmente più restrittive.
Scenari (D.M. 14 settembre 2005)w
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Determine geometry, construction and use of the building
Establish maximum likely fuel loads
Estimate maximum likely number of occupants
and their locations
Assume certain fire protection
features
Carry out fire engineering analysis
Acceptable performance
Accept design
Modify fire protection
features
Establish performance requirements
No Yes
Bu
chanan,
200
2
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115
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SVILUPPODinamica degli incendi in galleria
Effetti della ventilazione
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FIRE DYNAMICS IN TUNNELS
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Tunnel Fires vs Compartment Fires (0)
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Tunnel Fires Progression (1)w
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Tunnel Fires Progression (2)w
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Effects of ventilationw
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Temperature developmentw
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Smoke development
• A smoke layer may be created in tunnels at the early stages of a fire with essentially no longitudinal ventilation. However,the smoke layer will gradually descend further from the fire.
• If the tunnel is very long, the smoke layer may descend to the tunnel surface at a specific distance from the fire depending on the fire size, tunnel type, and the perimeter and height of the tunnel cross section.
• When the longitudinal ventilation is gradually increased, the stratified layer will gradually dissolve.
• A backlayering of smoke is created on the upstream side of the fire.
• Downstream from the fire there is a degree of stratification of the smoke that is governed by the heat losses to the surrounding walls and by the turbulent mixing between the buoyant smoke layers and the normally opposite moving cold layer.
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Backlayeringw
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Maximum gas temperatures in the ceiling area of the tunnel during tests with road vehicles
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Maximum gas temperatures in the ceiling area of the tunnel during tests with road vehicles
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Maximum gas temperatures in the cross sectionof the tunnel during tests with road vehicles
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EMERGENCY VENTILATION
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Smoke stratification w
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Natural smoke venting
• It can be sufficient in short, level tunnels where smoke stratification allows for escape in clear/tenable conditions.
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Smoke filling long tunnel w
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Emergency ventilation with longitudinal system
• It can be employed in unidirectional, medium length tunnels, with free flowing traffic conditions. Smoke is mechanically exhausted in direction of traffic circulation, clear tenable conditions for escape are obtained on upstream side of fire.
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k size factor for HGV firew
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k size factor for small pool firew
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Emergency ventilation with semi-transverse “point extraction” system
• Smoke is mechanically exhausted from single ceiling opening (reverse mode) leaving clear tenable escape conditions on both sides of fire.
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Observation: goal
• The purpose of controlling the spread of smoke is to keep people as long as possible in a smoke-free environment.
• This means that the smoke stratification must be kept intact, leaving a more or less clear and breathable air underneath the smoke layer.
• The stratified smoke is taken out of the tunnel through exhaust openings located in the ceiling or at the top of the sidewalls.
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Observation: longitudinal velocity
• With practically zero longitudinal air velocity, the smoke layer expands to both sides of the fire. The smoke spreads in a stratified way for up to 10 min.
• After this initial phase, smoke begins to mix over the entire cross section, unless by this time the extraction is in full operation.
• The longitudinal velocity of the tunnel air must be below 2 m/s in the vicinity of the fire incidence zone. With higher velocities, the vertical turbulence in the shear layer between smoke and fresh air quickly cools the upper layer and the smoke then mixes over the entire cross section.
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Observations: turbulence
• With an air velocity of around 2 m/s, most of the smoke of a medium-size fire spreads to one side of the fire (limited backlayering) and starts mixing over the whole cross section at a distance of 400 to 600 m downstream of the fire site. This mixing over the cross section can also be prevented if the smoke extraction is activated early enough.
• Vehicles standing in the longitudinal air flow increase strongly the vertical turbulence and encourage the vertical mixing of the smoke.
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Observation: fresh air
• In a transverse ventilation system, the fresh air jets entering the tunnel at the floor level induce a rotation of the longitudinal airflow, which tends to bring the smoke layer down to the road.
• No fresh air is to be injected from the ceiling in a zone with smoke because this increases the amount of smoke and tends to suppress the stratification.
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Observation: smoke extraction
• In reversible semi-transverse ventilation with the duct at the ceiling, the fresh air is added through ceiling openings in normal ventilation operation.
• If a fire occurs, as long as fresh air is supplied through ceiling openings, the smoke quantity increases by this amount and strong jets tend to bring the smoke down to the road surface. The conversion of the duct from supply to extraction must be done as quickly as possible.
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Observation: traffic conditions
• For a tunnel with one-way traffic, designed for queues (an urban area), the ventilation design must take into consideration that cars can likely stand to both sides of the fire because of the traffic. In urban areas it is usual to find stop-and-go traffic situations.
• For a tunnel with two-way traffic, where the vehicles run in both directions, it must be taken into consideration that in the event of a fire vehicles will generally be trapped on both sides of the fire.
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Strategies
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Smoke extraction
• Continuous extraction into a return air duct is needed to remove a stratified smoke layer out of the tunnel without disturbing the stratification.
• The traditional way to extract smoke is to use small ceiling openings distributed at short intervals throughout the tunnel.
• Another efficient way to remove smoke quickly out of the traffic space is to install large openings with remotely controlled dampers. They are normally in an open position where equal extraction is taking place over the whole tunnel length.
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Tunnel with a single-point extraction system
The usual way to control the longitudinal velocity is to provide several independent ventilation sections. When a tunnel has several ventilation sections, a certain longitudinal velocity in the fire section can be maintained by a suitable operation of the individual air ducts. By reversing the fan operation in the exhaust air duct, this duct can be used to supply air and vice versa.
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FIRE MODELING
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153
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Levels
154
1Dw
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1Dw
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2D (zone model)w
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2D (zone model)w
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158
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159
FDS Simulation3D (ventilation)
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FDS Simulation3D (fire)
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3D (traffic)w
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162
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Multiscalew
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Multiscale (ventilation)w
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Multiscale (fire)w
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Multiscale (structural)w
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Multiscale (structural)w
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PROGETTOBasis
Failure path
Risk
5w
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BASIS
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Design Process - ISO 13387
A. Design constraints and possibilities (blue),
B. Action definition and development
(red),
C. Passive system and active response(yellow),
D. Safety and performance
(purple).
3/22/2011
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171
SS0a
PRESCRIBEDDESIGN
PARAMETERS
SS0bESTIMATED
DESIGN
PARAMETERS
SS1initiation and
developmentof fire and
fire efluent
SS2movement of
fire effluent
SS3
structural response and fire spread
beyond enclosureof origin
SS4
detection,
activitation andsuppression
SS5
life safety:occupant behavior,
location andcondition
SS6
propertyloss
SS7business
interruption
SS8contamination
of
environment
SS9
destruction
ofheritage
(0)
DESIGNCONSTRAINTS
AND
POSSIBILITIES
(1+2)ACTION
DEFINITION
ANDDEVELOPMENT
(3+4)
SYSTEMPASSIVE
AND ACTIVERESPONSE
BU
S O
F I
NF
OR
MA
TIO
N
RESULTS
DESIGN
ACTION
SA
FE
TY
& P
ER
FO
RM
AN
CE
FSEw
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DESIGN
RESPONSE
172
STRUCTURAL
CONCEPTION
STRUCTURAL TOPOLOGY
&
GEOMETRY
threats
No
Yes
threats
STRUCTURALMATERIAL
& PARTS
No
Yespassive structural
characteristics
threats
FIRE DETECTION
& SUPPRESSION
No
Yes
active structural
characteristics
threats
ORGANIZATION &
FIREFIGHTERS
No
Yes
threats
MAINTENANCE& USE
No
Yes
threats
No
alivestructural
characteristics
Yes
STRUCTURAL SYSTEM
CHARACTERISTICS
STRUCTURALSYSTEM
WEAKNESS
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173
STRUCTURAL
CONCEPTION
STRUCTURAL TOPOLOGY
&
GEOMETRY
threats
No
Yes
threats
STRUCTURALMATERIAL
& PARTS
No
Yespassive structural
characteristics
threats
No
Yes
STRUCTURAL CONCEPTION
STRUCTURAL TOPOLOGY
&
GEOMETRY
threats
No
Yes
threats
STRUCTURALMATERIAL
& PARTS
No
Yespassive
structural
characteristics
threats
FIRE DETECTION
& SUPPRESSION
No
Yes
active
structural characteristics
threats
ORGANIZATION & FIREFIGHTERS
No
Yes
threats
MAINTENANCE
& USE
No
Yes
threats
No
alivestructural
characteristics
Yes
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174
FIRE DETECTION
& SUPPRESSION
No
active structural
characteristics
threats
ORGANIZATION &
FIREFIGHTERS
No
Yes
threats
MAINTENANCE& USE
No
Yes
threats
No
alivestructural
characteristics
Yes
STRUCTURAL CONCEPTION
STRUCTURAL TOPOLOGY
&
GEOMETRY
threats
No
Yes
threats
STRUCTURALMATERIAL
& PARTS
No
Yespassive
structural
characteristics
threats
FIRE DETECTION
& SUPPRESSION
No
Yes
active
structural characteristics
threats
ORGANIZATION & FIREFIGHTERS
No
Yes
threats
MAINTENANCE
& USE
No
Yes
threats
No
alivestructural
characteristics
Yes
3/22/2011 174PROGETTAZIONE STRUTTURALE
ANTINCENDIO
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Fire fighting timeline w
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STRUCTURAL
CONCEPTION
STRUCTURAL
TOPOLOGY&
GEOMETRY
STRUCTURAL
MATERIAL& PARTS
FIRE DETECTION& SUPPRESSION
ORGANIZATION & FIREFIGHTERS
MAINTENANCE
& USE
CRISIS
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177IN
-DEPTH
DEFE
NCE
FAILURE PATHw
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Controlled vs. Uncontrolled Eventsw
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Controlled vs. Uncontrolled Eventsw
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Fire safety concepts tree (NFPA)1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Bu
chanan,
200
2
Strategie perla gestione
dell'incendio
1
Prevenzione
2
Gestionedell'evento
3
Gestionedell'incendio
4Gestione delle
persone edei beni
15
Difesa sul posto16
Spostamento17
Disposibilitàdelle vie di fuga
18
Far avvenireil deflusso
19
Controllo della quantità
di combustibile
5
Soppressione
dell'incendio
10Controllo
dell'incendio
attraverso ilprogetto
13
Automatica11
Manuale12
Controllo deimateriali
presenti
6Controllo
del movimento
dell'incendio
7Resistenza e
stabilità
strutturale
14
Contenimento9
Ventilazione8
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181
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Strategie perla gestione
dell'incendio
1
Prevenzione
2
Gestionedell'evento
3
Gestionedell'incendio
4Gestione delle
persone edei beni
15
Difesa sul posto16
Spostamento17
Disposibilitàdelle vie di fuga
18
Far avvenireil deflusso
19
Controllo della quantità
di combustibile
5
Soppressione
dell'incendio
10Controllo
dell'incendio
attraverso ilprogetto
13
Automatica11
Manuale12
Controllo deimateriali
presenti
6Controllo
del movimento
dell'incendio
7Resistenza e
stabilità
strutturale
14
Contenimento9
Ventilazione8
Fire safety concepts tree (NFPA)
Bu
chanan,
200
2
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Basis of tunnel fire safety design
• The first priority identified in the literature for fire design of all tunnels is to ensure:1. Prevention of critical events that may endanger
human life, the environment, and the tunnel structure and installations.
2. Self-rescue of people present in the tunnel at time of the fire.
3. Effective action by the rescue forces.
4. Protection of the environment.
5. Limitation of the material and structural damage.
• Furthermore, part of the objective is to reduce the consequences and minimize the economic loss caused by fires.
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RISK CONCERN
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Risk treatment
Option 1 :
RISK AVOIDANCE
Option 2 :
RISK REDUCTION
Option 3 :RISK
TRANSFER
Option 4 :RISK
ACCEPTANCE
START
STOP
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
100 %
50 %
50 %
30 %
20 %
25 %
5 %
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Option 1 Risk avoidance, which usually means not proceeding to continue with the system; this is not always a feasible option, but may be the only course of action if the hazard or their probability of occurrence or both are particularly serious;
Option 2 Risk reduction, either through (a) reducing the probability of occurrence of some events, or (b) through reduction in the severity of the consequences, such as downsizing the system, or (c) putting in place control measures;
Option 3 Risk transfer, where insurance or other financial mechanisms can be put in place to share or completely transfer the financial risk to other parties; this is not a feasible option where the primary consequences are not financial;
Option 4 Risk acceptance, even when it exceeds the criteria, but perhaps only for a limited time until other measures can be taken.
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Quantitative Risk Analysis
Luur,
200
2
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Risk Analysis, Assessment, Management (IEC 1995)
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RISK CONCERNS
DEFINE CONTEXT
(social, individual, political, organizational,
technological)
RSK ANALYSIS
(for the system are defined organization, scenarios, and consequences of
occurences)
RISK ASSESSMENT(compare risks
against criteria)
RISK TREATMENT
option 1 - avoidance option 2 - reduction
option 3 - transfer
option 4 - acceptance
MONITORAND
REVIEW
RISKMANAGEMENT
RISKANALYSIS
RISKASSESSMENT
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SCENARIOS
DEFINE SYSTEM
(the system is usually decomposed into a number of smaller subsystems and/or
components)
HAZARD SCENARIO ANALYSIS
(what can go wrong?
how can it happen?waht controls exist?)
ESTIMATE
CONSEQUENCES(magnitude)
ESTIMATE
PROBABILITIES(of occurrences)
DEFINE RISK SCENARIOS
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
RISKANALYSIS
FIREEVENT
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ISHIKAWA DIAGRAMw
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EVENT TREE
Triggering event
Fireignition
1. Fireextinguished by personnel
2. Intrusion of fire fighters
Arson
Explosion
Short circuit
Cigarette fire
YES (P1)
NO (1-P1)YES (P2)
NO (1-P2)
Scenario
Other
A1
A2
A3
A4
A5
3. Fire suppression
YES (P3)NO (1-P3)
YES (P3)NO (1-P3)
Firelocation
AREA A(PA)
YES (P1)
NO (1-P1) YES (P2)
NO (1-P2)
B1
B2
B3
B4
B5
YES (P3)NO (1-P3)
YES (P3)NO (1-P3)
AREA B(PB)
YES (P1)
NO (1-P1) YES (P2)
NO (1-P2)
C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
YES (P3)NO (1-P3)
YES (P3)NO (1-P3)
AREA C(PC)
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PREPARAZIONE EVOLUZIONE
195
DEFINE SYSTEM
(the system is usually decomposed into a number of smaller subsystems and/or
components)
HAZARD SCENARIO ANALYSIS
(what can go wrong?
how can it happen?waht controls exist?)
ESTIMATE
CONSEQUENCES(magnitude)
ESTIMATE
PROBABILITIES(of occurrences)
DEFINE RISK SCENARIOS
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
RISKANALYSIS
NUMERICALMODELING
SIMULATIONSw
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198
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F (frequency) – N (number of fatalities) curve
• An F–N curve is an alternative way of describing the risk associated with loss of lives.
• An F–N curve shows the frequency (i.e. the expected number) of accident events with at least N fatalities, where the axes normally are logarithmic.
• The F–N curve describes risk related to large-scale accidents, and is thus especially suited for characterizing societal risk.
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FN-curves UK Road Rail Aviation Transport, 67-01w
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Persson, M. Quantitative Risk Analysis Procedure for the Fire Evacuation of a Road Tunnel - An Illustrative
Example. Lund, 2002
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Risk acceptance – ALARP (1)
RISK MAGNITUDE
INTOLERABLEREGION
AsLowAsReasonablyPracticable
BROADLY ACCEPTABLEREGION
Risk cannot be justified in any circumstances
Tolerable only if risk reduction is impracticable or if its cost is greatly disproportionate to the improvement gained
Tolerable if cost of reduction would exceed the improvements gained
Necessary to maintain assurance that the risk remains at this level
AsLowAsReasonablyAchievable
RISK MAGNITUDE
INTOLERABLEREGION
AsLowAsReasonablyPracticable
BROADLY ACCEPTABLEREGION
Risk cannot be justified in any circumstances
Tolerable only if risk reduction is impracticable or if its cost is greatly disproportionate to the improvement gained
Tolerable if cost of reduction would exceed the improvements gained
Necessary to maintain assurance that the risk remains at this level
AsLowAsReasonablyAchievable
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Risk acceptance – ALARP (2)w
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Risk reduction by designw
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Monetary values – cost of human life (!)
What is the maximum amount the society (or the decisionmaker) is willing to pay to reduce the expected number of fatalities by 1?
Typical numbers for the value of a statistical life used in cost-benefit analysis are 1–10 million euros.
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RESISTENZA
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The burnt out interior of the Mont Blanc Tunnel
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Curve temperatura - tempo
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Types of fire exposure for tunnel analysis
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
0 30 60 90 120 150 180
Tem
per
atu
re (
°C)
Time (min.)
Cellulosic Hydrocarbon Hydrocarbon modified
RABT-ZTV train RABT-ZTV car RWS
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Cellulosic curve
• Defined in various national standards, e.g. ISO 834, BS 476: part 20, DIN 4102, AS 1530 etc.
• This curve is the lowest used in normal practice.
• It is based on the burning rate of the materials found in general building materials.
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Hydrocarbon (HC) curve
• Although the cellulosic curve has been in use for many years, it soon became apparent that the burning rates for certain materials e.g. petrol gas, chemicalsetc, were well in excess of the rate at which for instance, timber would burn.
• The hydrocarbon curve is applicable where small petroleum fires might occur, i.e. car fuel tanks, petrol or oil tankers, certain chemical tankers etc.
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Hydrocarbon mod. (HCM) curve
• Increased version of the hydrocarbon curve, prescribed by the French regulations.
• The maximum temperature of the HCM curve is 1300ºC instead of the 1100ºC, standard HC curve.
• However, the temperature gradient in the first few minutes of the HCM fire is as severe as all hydrocarbon based fires possibly causing a temperature shock to the surrounding concrete structure and concrete spalling as a result of it.
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RABT ZTV curves
• The RABT curve was developed in Germany as a result of a series of test programs such as the EUREKA project. In the RABT curve, the temperature rise is very rapid up to 1200°C within 5 minutes.
• The failure criteria for specimens exposed to the RABT-ZTV time-temperature curve is that the temperature of the reinforcement should not exceed 300°C. There is no requirement for a maximum interface temperature.
RABT-ZTV (train)Time (minutes) T (°C)
0 155 120060 1200
170 15RABT-ZTV (car)
Time (minutes) T (°C)
0 155 120030 1200
140 15
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RWS (Rijkswaterstaat) curve
• The RWS curve was developed by the Ministry of Transport in the Netherlands. This curve is based on the assumption that in a worst case scenario, a 50 m³ fuel, oil or petrol, tanker fire with a fire load of 300MW could occur, lasting up to 120 minutes.
• The failure criteria for specimens is that the temperature of the interface between the concrete and the fire protective lining should not exceed 380°C and the temperature on the reinforcement should not exceed 250°C.
RWS, RijksWaterStaatTime
(minutes) T
(°C) 0 203 8905 1140
10 120030 130060 135090 1300120 1200180 1200
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Lönnermark, A. and Ingason, H., “Large Scale Fire Tests in the Runehamartunnel – gas temperature and Radiation”,
Proceedings of the International Seminar on Catastrophic Tunnel Fires, Borås, Sweden, 20-21 November 2003.
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Fire Scenario Recommendationw
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Verifiche
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Mechanical Analysis
• The mechanical analysis shall be performed for the same duration as used in the temperature analysis.
• Verification of fire resistance should be in:– in the strength domain: Rfi,d,t ≥ Efi,requ,t
(resistance at time t ≥ load effects at time t);– in the time domain: tfi,d ≥ tfi,requ
(design value of time fire resistance ≥time required)
– In the temperature domain: Td ≤ Tcr
(design value of the material temperature ≤critical material temperature);
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Verification of fire resistance (3D)
R = structural resistance
T = temperature
t = time
T=T(t)
R=R(t,T)=R(t,T(t))=R(t)
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Verification of fire resistance (R-safe)
R = structural resistance
T = temperature
t = time
Rfi,d,t
Efi,requ,t
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Verification of fire resistance (R-fail)
R = structural resistance
T = temperature
t = time
Efi,requ,t
Rfi,d,t
Failure !ww
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Verification of fire resistance (t)
R = structural resistance
T = temperature
t = time
Efi,requ,t Rfi,d,t
Failure !
tfi,d ≥ tfi,requ
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Verification of fire resistance (T)
R = structural resistance
T = temperature
t = time
Efi,requ,t
Rfi,d,t
Failure !
Td ≤ Tcr
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Verification of fire resistance (T)
R = structural resistance
T = temperature
t = time
Efi,requ,t
Rfi,d,t
Failure !
Td ≤ Tcr
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Comportamenti termo-meccanici
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Trasformazione del calcestruzzo alle alte temperature
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Parametri per la relazione tensioni-deformazioni
per il calcestruzzo ad elevate temperature.
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Calcestruzzo ad aggregato siliceo in condizioni di compressione uniassiale ad elevate temperature
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Variazione del coefficiente di riduzione della resistenza a compressione del calcestruzzo ad
aggregato siliceo con la temperatura
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Relazioni tensioni-deformazioni per acciai da calcestruzzo armato ordinario
laminati a caldo ad elevate temperature
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Parametri per la relazione tensioni-deformazioni per acciai da calcestruzzo armato ordinario
laminati a caldo, a temperature elevate
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Spalling
Spalling is an umbrella term, covering different damage phenomena that may occur to a concrete structure during fire. These phenomena are caused by different mechanisms:
•Pore pressure rises due to evaporating water when the temperature rises;
•Compression of the heated surface due to a thermal gradient in the cross section;
•Internal cracking due to difference in thermal expansion between aggregate and cement paste;
•Cracking due to difference in thermal expansion/deformation between concrete and reinforcement bars;
•Strength loss due to chemical transitions during heating.
www.francobontempi.org
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• Explosive spalling occurs during the first 20-30 minutes of the standard cellulosic and hydrocarbon fire curves.
• After the 2nd minute of a typical hydrocarbon exposure, spalling can occur in high strength concretes with polypropylene fibres and in concretes with high moisture content independent of the type of standard curve. Also, concretes with high moisture content can suffer spalling after the 3rd minute of exposure.
• External temperature increments between 20-30ºC/min are typical in the occurrence of explosive spalling.
• Temperature increments of more than 3ºC/min are enough for the occurrence of explosive spalling.
• Concrete external layers can be released from concrete members when these reach temperatures between 250 - 420ºC; 375 - 425ºC.
Spalling criteria (literature review)
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CONCLUSIONIConceptual design
Resilience
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Conceptual Designw
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Conceptual Design
MULTI-HAZARD
BLACK-SWAN
DISASTER CHAIN
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Flow chart
Tabella dotazioni Frejùs
Forensic Engineeringw
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Resiliencew
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Resilience
• Resilience is defined as
“the positive ability of a system or company to adapt itself to the consequences of a catastrophic failure caused by power outage, a fire, a bomb or similar event”
or as
"the ability of a system to cope with change".
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RESILIENCE
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
• Dr. Konstantinos GKOUMAS – Uniroma1
• Dr. Francesco PETRINI – Uniroma1
• Ing. Alessandra LO CANE – MIT
• Dr. Filippo GENTILI – Coimbra (PT)
• Mr. Tiziano BARONCELLI – Uniroma1
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StroNGER S.r.l. Research Spin-off for Structures of the Next Generation:
Energy Harvesting and Resilience
Roma – Milano – Terni – Atene - Nice Cote Azur
Sede operativa: Via Giacomo Peroni 442-444, Tecnopolo Tiburtino, 00131 Roma (ITALY) - [email protected]
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