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The shadows of Cold War over Latin

America: the US reaction to Fidel

Castro's nationalism, 195659Vanni Pettin

a

a

Spanish National Research Council, Human and Social SciencesCentre , Madrid, SpainPublished online: 26 Aug 2010.

To cite this article:Vanni Pettin (2011) The shadows of Cold War over Latin America: the USreaction to Fidel Castro's nationalism, 195659, Cold War History, 11:3, 317-339

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The shadows of Cold War over LatinAmerica: the US reaction to Fidel

Castros nationalism, 195659Vanni Pettina

Spanish National Research Council, Human and Social SciencesCentre, Madrid, Spain

Scholars have addressed the problem of the Dwight Eisenhower administrations

opposition to Fidel Castros nationalist insurrection (195659) following two main

perspectives. Some authors have perceived it in terms of a response to the threat

that Castros radical programme posed to American economic interests in Cuba.

Other scholars have claimed that, in the 1950s, Washington did not have a clear

perception of the differences between progressive nationalism and communism.

This article offers a different explanation. It argues that the intersection betweenthe Cold War and the decolonisation process played a crucial role in changing

the USs perception of Latin American nationalism. Specifically, the launch of the

Peaceful Coexistence strategy by the Soviet post-Stalinist leadership increased

Moscows ability to interact with nationalism of developing areas, pushing the

Republican administration into a defensive position in the Third World. During

the 1950s, this context strongly influenced Washingtons diplomatic strategy in the

Latin American and the Cuban scenarios, driving the Eisenhower Presidency to

adopt a hostile position toward nationalist governments or nationalist inspired

political movements such as Castros.

Introduction

In 1961, after the Cuban revolution had taken its definitive path toward socialism, the

Eisenhower administration decided to sever its diplomatic ties with Fidel Castros

ISSN 1468-2745 print/ISSN 1743-7962 online

q 2011 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/14682741003686115

http://www.informaworld.com

Vanni Pettinagraduated in Political Sciences at University of Florence, Italy (2004). He received his MA in Latin

American Studies by the Universidad Complutense of Madrid and the Ortega y Gasset Research Center (Madrid,

2006). He is Doctor in Contemporary History from the Universidad Complutense of Madrid (IUOG) and the

Spanish National Research Council. His research focuses on the US-Cuban relations between 1933 and 1959.

Correspondence to: Vanni Pettina, Center for Human and Social Sciences Studies (CCHS)-CSIC, Institute of

History, Madrid, Spain. Email: [email protected]; [email protected]

Cold War History

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government. Nonetheless, American diplomacy had been critical of Castros nationalist

movement almost since the summer of 1957. Existing literature has mainly tried

to tackle this problem using a local perspective. Some scholars have focused on the

issue represented by the USs determination to defendits historical economic hegemony

in Cuba from Castros radical nationalism.1 Other authors have addressed the problem

in terms of the Eisenhower administrations inability to differentiate between

communism and Castros nationalism.2 This paper will argue that the Eisenhower

administrations reaction to Castro wasthe consequence of a broader process that, in the

early 1950s, negatively changed the Republican administrations perception of

nationalism on a global scale. Particularly, it argues that the Soviet post-Stalinist

leadership was able to gain superiority when it came to interact with nationalist elites in

decolonised areas but also in developing countries, such as Latin American ones. This

condition drew the Republican government toward a policy of containment of the

radical nationalist phenomena in the periphery. The paper will try to demonstrate thatthe American policy toward the Cuban insurrection was also part of this global strategy

aimed at containing the convergence between radical nationalism and communism in

the Third World.

From the Break-Up of the Colonial Empires to the Cold War, the New Global

Powers versus Nationalism

The problem concerning the Eisenhower administrations reaction to Latin American

nationalism, and hence to Castros Cuban brand, needs to be addressed from a globalperspective. The Republican Presidency perceived Latin American nationalist

movements as part of a broader political process that, in the early 1950s, was running

through all the decolonised and developing world. From the American perspective, the

critical point was represented by the interconnection between this new wave of

nationalism and the bipolar conflict scenario. For Washington, the convergence

between nationalism and the Soviet foreign policy in the developing world launched a

frightful threat towards its national security. In Iran in 1953, Indonesia in 195557,

Guatemala in 1954 and in Cuba throughout 195761, to take some examples, the

Eisenhower administration seemed to be unable, short of military intervention, toavert the convergence between the local nationalist elites and the indigenous

communist parties. For American diplomacy, this scenario had represented a constant

source of concern since the end of the 1940s. Just a few years after the end of World

War II, in 1948, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had published an International

Estimate entitled The Break-up of the Colonial Empires and its Implications for U.S.

Security.3 In this document, the CIA identified the decolonisation process and the

Soviet ability to take advantage of it as the main future challenge to western hegemony.

More specifically, American intelligence analysts stressed the risk that recently

decolonised countries or nationalist movements, still struggling for independence,

could adopt a pro-Soviet orientation:

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The growth of nationalism in colonial areas, which has already succeeded inbreaking up a large part of the European colonial Systems and in creating a series ofnew, nationalistic states in the Near and Far East, has major implications for USsecurity, particularly in terms of possible World conflict with the USSR. This shift of

the dependent areas from the orbit of the colonial powers not only weakens theprobable European allies of the US but deprives the US itself of assured access to vitalbases and raw materials in these areas in event of war. Should the recently liberatedand currently emergent states become oriented toward the USSR, US military andeconomic security would be seriously threatened.4

The CIA also regarded the anti-colonialist movements as a vector capable of

transforming the bipolar conflict into what Odd Arne Westad has defined as the

global Cold War:5

The colonial independence movement, therefore, is no longer purely a domestic

issue between the European colonial powers and their dependencies. It has beeninjected into the larger arena of world politics and has become an element in thebroader problems of relations between Orient and Occident, between industrialisedand underdeveloped nations, and between the Western Powers and the USRR.6

Finally, the CIA claimed that the injection of independence and nationalist

movements into the broader EastWest conflict, in the end, could strongly benefit the

Soviet Unions expansionist strategy. However, even if the CIA had warned that

decolonisation and nationalism could represent a real advantage for the Soviet Union,

in 1948 the path that Third World and developing nationalism was going to follow was

still uncertain. In fact, as underlined by Westad, the NSC51 had shown that at the

beginning of 1950 Washington still believed that the best way to avert communistinfiltration of nationalist movements was to cooperate with them.7 Then, during the

1950s this perception started changing, as Moscow gained some advantage in

interacting with the developing world. The launch of Peaceful Coexistence during

Georgy Malenkovs collective leadership and its strengthening during the Nikita

Khrushchev years clearly represented a serious attempt to orient, by means of

economic and political cooperation, the developing nationalism toward the Soviet

Union.8

The reaction of both Democratic and Republican leaders in the US highlights how

seriously Washington worried about the new Soviet strategy. In 1953, for example, theleader of the Democratic majority in the American Congress, William F. Knowland,

defined Peaceful Coexistence as the Soviet Unions Trojan Horse in the developing

world.9 Then, in 1955, during a gathering with Illinois manufacturers, John Foster

Dulles gave an interesting proof of the sense of inferiority that characterised the

American political leadership regarding the problem of the new Soviet Union strategy

in the developing world: The Soviet rulers have an advantage in that they find it easy

to neglect the needs of their own people and have trained a large number of scientists

and technicians whom they can send abroad as a symbol of promises which are

alluring.10 Again, in 1956 the democratic presidential candidate, Adlai Stevenson,

called a tragic irony that the United States, which has always stood for peace, freedom

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and justice, should have come to be regarded as an enemy of nationalist aspirations,

whereas the totalitarian Soviet Union should become identified with the struggles of

the oppressed and former colonial peoples.11 Washington, which since the time of the

Woodrow Wilson administration had played an important role in advancing the

decolonisation process, was now rapidly shifting toward a more conservative approach

to the issue.12 For Stevenson, the Soviet peaceful offensive was producing a powerful

and attractive call for nationalist elites, generating, at the same time, the impression

that Washington had forgotten its anti-colonialist credentials.

In this sense, there were many reasons that justified the growing American

uneasiness regarding its relations with anti-colonialist movements or Third World

nationalism. Firstly, as is well illustrated by John Lewis Gaddis, the need to preserve the

alliance with European countries, which were at the same time still colonial powers

and key partners in the struggle against the Soviet Union, represented an obstacle to

the establishment of a constructive relationship with anti-colonial movements anddecolonised countries.13 In 1956, during a news conference and using that easy

speaking tone that had made him so popular, Eisenhower summarised the complexity

of elements that were hampering the American diplomatic interaction process with

nationalism in one of the hottest areas of the developing world, the Middle East. The

President emphasised the need to guarantee access for Western European countries to

natural resources in the Middle East, while, at the same time, supporting the legitimate

aspirations of the people, economically, socially and politically, to self-rule. But,

Eisenhower stated, it becomes a very difficult thing to do because of the antagonism

and cross antagonism. They are not always running even in one direction. They seem

to cross here and there. It is a very difficult thing.14 In this sense, a good example ofwhat Eisenhower had defined as antagonism and cross antagonism was Egypt where,

during the 1950s, the Republican administration had to deal with the strongly

nationalist leader Gamal Abdel Nasser. Facing his increasing requests for military and

political support, Washington had to balance its response by taking into account

British and French opposition.15 Similarly, in Algeria, the Eisenhower administration

had to modulate its response to the Algerian aspirations for independence, carefully

considering the French position.16

If the European factor represented an American handicap, the Soviet Union could

count, on its side, on some other proactive advantages that were widening the gapbetween Washington and Moscow when it came to interacting with the Third World.

When, during the 1950s, the inexorable process of imperial collapse gave life to an

increasing number of new nations in Asia and in Africa, the focus of the nationalist

elites rapidly switched from the issue of political independence toward the quest

for economic independence and, therefore, to the sources for achieving it.17 In this

context, industrialisation was considered the only practicable way to fix the gap

between the developing Third World and the developed one. It was around the issue of

economic modernisation that newly independent Asian and African countries met

with Latin American republics. These, even if generally freed from Spanish imperial

domination since the 1820s, had usually been unable to set up a balanced and

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equitable model of economic development. For Washington, the crucial point was

that, in terms of capacity to interpret the developing nations quest for modernisation,

the Soviets had some crucial advantages. First of all, it should be considered that until

Walt Whitman Rostows proposal for a non-communist road to modernisation,

Washington had no clear model to sell.18 During the Truman and the Eisenhower

administrations, the target of American propaganda had been the issue of democracy.

The main tools of the American effort to underscore the Stalinist totalitarian

barbarisms had been the Voice of America, a radio station transmitting worldwide,

and the United States Information Agency.19 This sort of propaganda had been useful

in Europe, where the ghosts of Nazis and Fascist totalitarian regimes were still fresh,

but it was not able to meet the needs of the developing world. In contrast, the Soviet

Unions conversion from a mainly backward country, whose economy had been largely

based on agricultural production, into a leading industrial power able to launch

rockets and satellites was in itself a very powerful passport. As underlined by EricHobsbawm, the main attraction of the Soviet model was the most gifted invention

achieved by its social scientists during the 1920s and 1930s: a scientific methodology

for economic modernisation.20 In 1955, two leading American Kremlinologists clearly

summarised the problem of the competition between West and East in terms of

industrialisation models:

The communist appeal in underdeveloped areas is still formidable. In particular, itholds an attraction for those groups of the population who prefer drasticindustrialization from above to the gradualist, evolutionary tradition of the West. . .For these groups, it is the USSR and China, not the Western industrial countries,

which to borrow a phrase from Marx present to other underdeveloped areas animage of their own future.21

In 1955, the CIA issued a special report on Soviet bloc economic activities that

alarmingly underlined the rapid expansion of its economic ties with Afghanistan,

India and Indonesia. Stronger economic relations, the CIA added, are fast developing

with Yugoslavia and Egypt; . . . other Arab states, notably Syria and Lebanon, have

been object of the recent concerted trade activities.22

The Soviet trade/aid programme consisted of loans at low interest, usually 2.5 per cent,

in return for the purchase of goods and service from bloc countries or for local exports.23

As frankly acknowledged by the Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson, during aNSC meeting in November 1955: the United States seemed to have no equivalent to

match these Soviet techniques.24 Indeed, between 1953 and 1956 Soviet trade agreements

with developing countries increased from 113 to 203.25 The value of Soviet trade with

Third World countries increased from $850 million in 1954 to $1.44 billion in 1956.26

Only a year later, during the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev could proudly

claim that the new decolonised countries did not need to go begging to their former

oppressor for modern equipment; they can get it in the socialist countries, free of any

political and military obligations.27

American intelligence estimated that the Soviet trade/aid policy in Third World was

also accompanied by a new political strategy. The CIA pointed out that the new


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scenario shaped by peaceful coexistence would have made it easier for communist

parties to broaden their popular support by attracting non-Communists into united

national fronts.28 The Soviet approach towards Third World nationalism had a long

history and had gone through several stages. It was with Lenin, when the theoretical

debate switched from the production models to the means to achieve power, which the

Soviet position regarding nationalism had begun to change.29 Lenin considered the

colonised world as the Wests weak point, the place where capitalisms contradictions

would suddenly explode and thereby decided to focus Soviet attention on these

areas.30 Arguing that communist parties were still too weak to lead the initiative, Lenin

proposed at the Second Comintern Congress (July 1920) the possibility of tactical

alliances with the anti-imperialist bourgeoisie. In 1922, during the Fourth Congress of

the Comintern, the United Anti-Imperialist Front strategy was officially adopted as

the main tool of Soviet foreign policy in the colonised world.31 It plainly affirmed that

in the colonial World the main objective of communist parties was to support the anti-imperial struggle and to cooperate with the progressive nationalist bourgeoisie.

During 1940, the Bulgarian communist Georgi Dimitrov improved the strategy,

shaping the new Peoples Democracy concept. Dimitrov recovered Leninist positions,

stating that where communist parties were not ready to take power a sort of

compromise had to be found with the nationalist agrarian, industrialist or commercial

bourgeoisie.32 The Peoples Democracy strategy envisioned a political environment

where communists and progressive nationalists could cooperate by focusing on shared

priorities such as land reform or state planned industrialisation. After World War II,

this model helped Moscow to smoothly start the process of sovietisation even in such

East European countries where the political majority was anti-communist.33 Incolonial areas, this tactic was basically carried on during the 1930s and interrupted

only briefly after World War II, when Soviet initiatives in some cases rested on military

activities, as in Korea. But, the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research

(INR) was nevertheless convinced that by the end of the war in Korea, Moscow had

gone back to it.34

The shadows of the Cold War over Latin America

In Latin America, Washington felt that Moscow was using similar tools and a similarstrategy when it came to nationalism as those used in other developing areas of the

world. In the Western Hemisphere, the twentieth century saw the birth of a new

nationalist generation, which shared common aspirations with its Asian, Middle

Eastern or North African counterparts. Early twentieth century nationalist

movements, like the Argentinean Union Cvica Radical, held the rich exporting

oligarchy responsible for using its economic power to monopolise the political system,

thereby avoiding political reforms. After 1929, the call for political change was

overshadowed by the urge for economic development. In this context, the focus on

state control over economic processes and the strong emphasis on industrialisation

became central to many new political parties or nationalist movements that flourished

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between the end of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s. Modernisation and

progress, in Latin America as in Asia or Africa, mostly meant industrialisation and

agrarian reforms. After World War II, this political trend was still very active in the

region. In Cuba the Partido Revolucionario Autentico, in Bolivia the Movimiento

Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR), in Peru the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria

Americana and, in Guatemala Jacobo Arbenz Guzmans government epitomised the

new Latin American nationalism.35

American intelligence traced this phenomenon, its analogies with other Third

World nationalist movements, as well as its potential ties to the Soviet Unions global

strategy. In October 1958, a few months before Fidel Castro conquered the last Batista

stronghold in Cuba, the Central Intelligence Agency issued a report over 100 pages

long, which focused on the problem of nationalism and socialism in Latin America. It

is worth noting that the CIA did not use the word socialism as a synonym for

Marxism. Rather, the Agency defined socialism as an ideology of modernisation basedon a deep involvement of the state in the economic strategies of development.

Socialism embodied peoples aspirations for industrialization and a higher standard

of living. It entailed economic planning and nationalization to effect his goal and

shared with developing nationalisms the common ambition of mans emancipation

and freedom from foreign political and economic influence. In fact, the report

indicated that nationalist elites in Asia and the Middle East believed that socialism,

understood as a modernisation theory, offered the means whereby the resources of a

country could be mobilized for rapid industrialization. Most importantly, the

document emphasised that many of the elements, such as underdevelopment,

ignorance and poverty, that were contributing to the concurrent development ofnationalism and socialism in Asia and the Middle East were also present in Latin

America. The CIA also highlighted that, in the Western Hemisphere, the strong anti-

US sentiment was akin to anti-colonialism in Asia and the Middle East, in which the

U.S. is blamed for Latin Americas general backwardness and lack of industrialization

in major areas.36

From the CIA point of view, the problem was that the socialist leaning of many

nationalist movements in Latin America offered Moscow an unmatched opportunity

to extend its influence in the region. US intelligence emphasised that communists were

actively trying to attract Latin American progressive nationalism toward the Easternbloc. Moscows strategy was focused on stressing the compatibility between Soviet

positions vis-a-vis world affairs or development issues and nationalist aspirations.

In particular, the CIAs perception was that the Soviet Union was using two tools in its

effort to detach Latin American countries and nationalist elites from Washington: the

economic leverage and the Democratic Front of National Liberation strategy.37

The first one referred to the economicoffensive that Khrushchev had launched on the

continent at the beginning of 1956. In January, Nicolai Bulganin, Malenkovs successor

as Prime Minister, formally offered economic assistance to Latin American countries.38

It is worth noting that the Soviet initiative contributed to the worsening of the already

poisoned relations between the US and many Latin American countries. Since the end


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of World War II, Washington had faced increasing complaints by Latin American

leaders troubled by the decline of US aid to the continent after the relative plenty of the

Roosevelt years.39 After World War II, countries like Brazil, Cuba and Argentina were

going through a complicated stage of economic readjustment. One of the main problem

affecting Latin American economies was the lack of internal and external capital to

finance the consolidation of their industrialisation processes.40 Moreover, increasing

international competition in terms of primary production was adding even more

problems to the traditional commodities price instability. Indeed, in 1953, the end of

the Korean War provoked a fall in international prices of the main exporting

commodities, causing waves of inflation that undermined the fragile position of the

small Latin American middle class.41 In 1954, the CIA had warned that decreasing

demand and lower prices for Latin American exports, especially in the US, had aroused

the areas interest in expanding its trade with the Soviet bloc.42

These observations notwithstanding, the increasing globalisation of the Cold Warhad shifted American resources elsewhere, particularly to South Asia and the Middle

East. Under Harry Trumans Four Point Program for technical assistance, only 2 percent

of total US aid went to Latin America.43 The new Republican administration not only

followed a similar pattern, but accelerated it even further. Eisenhower considered that

after the end of the Korean War American foreign aid should be substantially reduced,

leaving room for private capital. As the new President saw it, in Latin America trade and

private capital were more appropriate than public aid for fostering development.44 In

1956, Adolf Berle, Assistant to the Secretary of State during the Truman administration,

denounced the aid policy in Latin America, underlining that during the Eisenhower

administration it had dramatically decreased to an astonishing 1 per cent of total aidspent overseas.45 In this context, the only exception was Bolivia. In spite of its agrarian

reform and nationalisation programmes, Washington helped the Bolivian nationalist

revolution led by the MNR with a $30 million aid plan.46 Yet, in this case, the United

States objective to avoid nationalism merging with socialism were clearly at the centre

of its approach. As pointed out by James Siekmeier, the Eisenhower administration used

the aid leverage to strengthen the equally nationalistic, but bitterly anti-communist,

MNR moderate wing.47

By the end of its first term, the Eisenhower administration was forced to review its

aid policy as it faced an increasing Soviet challenge in the Third World.

48

The LatinAmerican position improved, even if still a minor aid recipient compared to South

Asia or the Middle East.49 An articulated aid plan aimed at supporting Latin American

development was largely incompatible with the administrations conservative

approach to fiscal policies. And, indeed, it was not going to take shape until John

Fitzgerald Kennedys Alliance for Progress initiative.50

The Soviet economic offensive was probably ineffective from a material point of

view, given the low quality of the material offered and to the small lending capacity of

Moscow.51 Still, it was able to hit a critical political point in the broader context of

intercontinental relations. The Soviets had challenged Washingtons ability to deal

with Latin Americas quest for modernisation. In 1953, John Cabot, Assistant to the

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establishment of a Peoples Democracy regime in Guatemala.56 Paul H. Nitze, the

Chief of the Policy Planning Staff, emphasised this point during a bitter conversation

with Thomas Mann, Acting Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs.57 When the

latter had described the situation in Guatemala as similar to that of Lazaro Cardenas

Mexico in the 1930s, suggesting that the United States should let things in Guatemala

take their course . . . and the pendulum . . . would have swung back, Nitze snapped.

Finding Manns statement nave, he pointed out that during the last twenty years the

Communists have developed their mechanism, which makes the situation a little

different in Guatemala from what it was in Mexico.58 Although the CIA knew that

communist numbers were very low in Guatemala, American intelligence considered

that the National Liberation strategy represented a tool that would obviate the

numerical problem by securing key positions in the administration.59 Not

surprisingly, the CIA directly linked what was happening in Guatemala to post-

World War II East Europe. As the Agency pointed out, in accordance with theNational Liberation strategy Communist minorities took control and delivered to

USSR domination the former countries of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Poland

and others. Now, CIA analysts argued, the Soviets were trying to replicate their success

in Guatemala.60 Of course, unlike Hungary or Czechoslovakia, Guatemala was

thousands of miles from the Iron Curtain and, above all, from the Red Army. Yet the

Eisenhower administrations developing global perception of the Cold War battlefield

was stronger than these geographical considerations. Indeed, with the US-orchestrated

coup in Guatemala, Latin America had fully entered the new global Cold War era.

The Cuban case

The analysis of the relationship between American diplomacy and the Cuban

insurrection led by Fidel Castro between 1956 and January 1959 offers interesting clues

on the impact of the Cold War on US relations with Latin American nationalism.

In December 1956, Fidel Castro landed on Cubas eastern shore, leading a small group

of armed men. His target was Fulgencio Batistas dictatorship. Batista had legitimately

ruled Cuba between 1940 and 1944 but, on March 1952, he had abruptly recovered

power through a military coup. Although Castros landing resulted in a failure, he was

eventually able to reach the Sierra Maestra mountains where he started a guerrilla waraimed at bringing democracy back to the country.61 In the spring of 1957, after barely

one year of struggle, US diplomatic sources estimated the chances of Batistas regime

surviving through 1958 as low.62

The instability of the Batista dictatorship and the activity of a guerrilla movement

worried Washington for many reasons. Firstly, there was the issue related to the

copious American community residing on the island. Its destiny, in the case of an

escalation of violence, was a matter of concern. Also, US diplomats worried about the

huge American investments on the island and their fate in case the regime collapsed.

Washington feared a scenario of chaos and anarchy, which could be generated by

Batistas fall.63

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Nonetheless, American fears were mainly fuelled by the nuance of the emerging

Castro leadership. Between September 1957 and January 1959, William Wieland, chief

of the Middle American Desk (MID) at Foggy Bottom and Earl T. Smith, the American

Ambassador in Cuba, were involved in several distinct efforts to find a solution to the

crisis. All of these attempts tried to avoid the victory of the main and probably most

popular force of opposition to Batista, Fidel Castros 26th of July Movement.64 Thus,

when at the end of 1958 Castros victory was only a matter of time, American

diplomacy toyed with the idea of supporting a militaryJuntato prevent it.65 Indeed, as

Secretary of State Christian Herter wrote in a Memorandum to President Eisenhower

in December 1958: the Department clearly does not want to see Castro succeed to the

leadership of the Government.66

During the first stages of the insurrection, uneasiness toward Castro was fuelled by a

lack of information concerning both his leadership and the 26th of July Movements

political programme. This was in part because of the limitations geography imposedon the capabilities of American intelligence to investigate the Movement. In January

1959, the State Department issued a paper aimed at analysing the obstacles it had faced

in collecting information on the political orientations of the insurrection. The

document outlined that the virtual isolation of Castro and the other leaders of the

Movement had proved a grave handicap to gathering hard intelligence.67 In fact,

throughout the insurrection, Castros group had been isolated in the inaccessible Sierra

Maestramountains, encircled by Batistas army and cut off from the outside by the

press censorship established by its regime.

But, in reality, geography had only exasperated a deeper problem related to the

collection of information. The real obstacle in gathering hard intelligence andthe factor that fostered American hostility toward the insurrection during 1957 was

the dichotomy represented by the vagueness of Castros political contents and his clear,

radical nationalistic orientation.68 During the insurrection, Castros discourse had

been politically vague or, as pointed out by the State Department, nebulous. In fact, at

this time, the 26th of July Movement leader had not yet clearly formulated a political

programme. Facing his sentence for the July 1953 assault on theMoncadaCuban Army

Barracks, Castro had talked of democracy, agrarian reform and nationalisations of

certain public services. But he had not entered into further details or specified the

means by which he intended to carry out his reforms. In addition, between 1956 and1959 he more than once changed the focus of his programme depending on his

interlocutors.69 Commenting in February 1957 on Castros programme, John

L. Topping, the officer in charge of political affairs at the American Embassy in La

Havana, resumed American scepticism about the guerrilla leader and his movement.

Topping argued that in his programme Castro had talked vaguely of agrarian reform,

socialization of profits, industrialization of Cuba by Cubans. Yet the programme was

too nebulous to allow a reliable assessment.70 He added that Castros call for

democracy should be taken in quotes, because there is no indication of just what they

conceive the term to mean. They [Castro and his followers] seem to prefer violence to

negotiation, bullets to ballots.71 Being unable to make an assessment of his political


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programme, the American diplomats focused on the ideological implication of

Castros discourse. In spite of his vagueness in term of political contents, Castro had

been ideologically fairly understandable. He had stressed the urge for radical reform of

Cuban politics and of its economic development model. Castro had attacked the old

politicians and claimed to be heir to Cubas Founding Father JoseMarts progressive

nationalism.72 John Topping translated Castros ideology in these terms: They (Castro

and his followers) are hell-bent on change, and led by an unusual man dedicated,

fanatical, impractical, possibly megalomaniac. There is reason to believe that he is

exceptionally ambitious. He pictures himself as the great Cuban leader of the present

generation. The American diplomat concluded that Castros ideology seemed to be

nationalistic and somewhat socialistic, a judgement literally replicated in a State

Department report in January 1959.73

Eventually, the lack of confidence in Castro due to his political vagueness evolved

into hostility. The Americans began identifying Castros ideological discourse asrooted in a progressive nationalism that, since the early 1950s, they recognised as being

a threatening variable of the global Cold War scenario. Adjectives like nationalistic

and socialistic, when describing Castros ideology, were the very same words used by the

CIA to define the kind of problematic nationalism spreading through the Third World

and potentially being subjected to Soviet influence. During 1958 this perspective was

decisively strengthened by the perception that communists had the capacity to infiltrate

Castros movement using his radical nationalism like a Trojan horse.

Through the first year of the insurrection, Washington had generally linked the risk

of a communist takeover in Cuba to the chaos generated by the insurrection in the

country. In April 1957, a National Intelligence Estimate argued that Arbenzsoverthrow had lowered the chance for communists to strengthen their position in

Central America and the Caribbean. Nonetheless, the CIA considered the conditions

in Cuba to be somewhat different. For American intelligence, the mere existence of

non-Communist subversion involving exiled groups offered communists a chance to

broaden their base.74 During a conversation with State Department officers in May

1957, Topping confirmed this opinion, stressing that communists were doing all they

could to fan the breeze and had everything to gain from chaotic conditions in the

country.75 William Wieland shared this view. In a memorandum to Roy Rubottom,

the Assistant Secretary for Latin America, he argued that the insurrection wasproviding a fertile ground for a resurgence of communism in the island. Moreover,

the State Department official warned that even if the communists were biding their

time in the current crisis, letting other resort to violence, they were ready to intensify

their activity in the event of a breakdown of authority.76

After April 1958, American concerns over a communist takeover in Cuba grew. In

fact, Washington began worrying about the increasing contacts between Castro and

the Cuban Communist Party: the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP). From the very

beginning of the insurrection, American diplomats had been busy trying to determine

whether Castro could be considered a Marxist and what the nature of his relationship

with the PSP was. Since 1957, Wieland and the MID had already concluded that Castro

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was neither a Marxist nor was the insurrection communist inspired.77 In spite of what

he later claimed in his memoirs and during his declarations facing a Senate

investigation, the American documents clearly show that even Ambassador Smith had

come to the same conclusion.78 The CIA was also persuaded that Castro could not be

classified as a Marxist. On 12 March 1958, a CIA agent was able to reach Castros

headquarters in theSierra Maestra, where he spent two weeks and had a personal talk

with the rebels leader. In his report to the CIA director, Allen Dulles, the officer

confirmed that Castro was not a Marxist and added that, even if some communists had

joined the guerrillas, he did not find much evidence of communist infiltration into

the 26th of July Movement.79 Indeed, the PSP had been initially very cold toward the

26th of July Movement and Fidel Castro himself. Communist leaders had at first

labelled the young rebel leader as a bourgeois adventurist. During the first year of the

insurrection the PSP had boycotted Castros insurrection.80

However, during the first months of 1958 the PSP began to change its strategy. In aneditorial column published in the middle of March by the communist newspaper

Alerta, the PSP had declared that it felt sympathetic toward the action carried out by

the rebels. It also offered to support and collaborate with the guerrillas in

strengthening its link with the masses.81 Although we will have to await the opening of

Cuban archives to be certain, this change was probably a consequence of the new

directives for Latin American Communist Parties adopted in November 1957 at the

Soviet Union Coordination of International Communist Movement Meeting. During

the summit, A.B. Sivolobov, the head of the Latin American section within the Central

Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, had stressed the need for a more proactive

policy in the Western Hemisphere. He had invited Latin American Communist Partiesto renew their efforts to destroy the rearguard of the principal imperialist power in

the region. Sivolobov had also pointed out that the last week of January should be

declared the week of solidarity with the Cuban people.82 In Cuba, it is very probable

that the new directive took the form of an intensification of the PSPs struggle against

Batistas regime and, hence, led to the decision to support its main opposition force:

Fidel Castro and his guerrillas.

At first, Castro had rejected the PSPs offer of support. The CIA agent who visited

the Sierra Maestra headquarters had reported this to Dulles.83 But, as recalled by

Ernesto Guevara in his memoirs of the guerrilla war, April 1958 was a turning point forthe political equilibriums within the insurrection.84 Specifically, the 26th of July

Movement had called for a general strike to begin on 9 April. According to the original

blueprint, the general mobilisation fostered by the strike and supported by the

guerrilla army should have forced Batistas dismissal. During the preparation for the

strike, the question of a communist participation had become a source of tension

within the Movement. The liberal urban sector of the Movement,el llano, had strongly

opposed communist participation. On the other hand, Guevara and Fidels brother

Raul had been keener to accept communist participation.85 The details of the debate

are not yet well known but the anti-communist opinion prevailed and Castro excluded

the PSP from joining the strike.


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A few days after the strike had begun, it was evident that the attempt had not

succeeded. Poor planning, internal divisions and, above all, lack of organised and

disciplined grass-roots support were cause of the fiasco.86 The failure shook the

Movement. Castro went into attack, accusing the urban-moderates of sectarianism

and blaming them for the failure. At a crucial meeting held at the beginning of May,

Castro decided to concentrate all the Movements decisional power in the Sierra

Maestraand was nominated the Supreme Commandant of the Movement.87 At the

same time, the 26th of July Movement began to modify its position towards the PSP.

Some communists joined the guerrilla force and in the summer of 1958 a communist

group commanded by Felix Torres opened a new guerrilla front in the Yaguajay area,

very close to where Raul Castro had earlier opened a second front.88 During the

summer, the interaction between the PSP and Castros movement increased

considerably and one of its top leaders, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, was seconded to

theSierra Maestra. In the course of 1958, the PSP became part of the opposition to theBatista regime.89

From April, American diplomacy had been tracing the communist approach and

the beginning of the new relationship between the PSP and the 26th of July Movement.

At the end of July, Topping wrote to the State Department pointing out that

communism both internationally and through the Cuban Communist Party was

trying to associate itself with Castros Movement, and is probably actively assisting it.

According to Topping, the communists had penetrated the Movement, despite him

being unable to assess to what extent.90 In the next few months, American reports lost

some of the prudence they had showed between April and the summer. Indeed, in

November a Special National Estimate issued by the CIA stressed that Castro was notsufficiently in control of his far flung guerrillas to prevent communist infiltration

even if this is what he desired. For the CIA, communists had in the last months come

to occupy moderately important positions in the movements. The report concluded

that the nationalistic line held by the movement represented a horse which the

Communists know well how to ride.91 In December 1958, Dulles successor, Christian

Herter, debating with Eisenhower pointed out that communists were utilizing the

Castro movement to the same extent, as would be expected. Apparently, Herter also

took into consideration the possibility of using the 1954 Organization of American

States Caracas Resolution, which had allowed Washington to intervene in Guatemalaagainst Arbenz, to prevent Castro from taking power. However, in the end, Herter

rejected that possibility pointing out that there was insufficient evidence on which to

base a charge that the rebels are Communist dominated.92 Between the end of

December and the beginning of January, American diplomacy tried to play its last

card: the establishment of a militaryJuntaled by the Cuban Generals Eulogio Cantillo

and Ramon Barqun.93 The plan failed. On 2 January, Camilo Cienfuegos and

Guevaras 26th of July Movements columns, after having entered La Havana,

immediately took control of the Army headquarters, Camp Columbia, and its main

stronghold in the city, La Cabana military base.94 The military coup was eventually

prevented but the battle between Washington and Castro had just begun.

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Although it is certain that after April Castro had changed his strategy and opened

the insurrection to PSPs participation, the state of the relationship between the Cuban

Communist Party and the 26th of July Movement was not that described by the CIA.

Certainly, Castros nationalism offered elements of compatibility with the

communists strategies and, in fact, after a false start both subjects had found fertile

ground for convergence. Nonetheless, Castro was in full control of his guerrillas and

perfectly capable of preventing any attempt to infiltrate his Movement. The Cuban

rebel had consciously opened the insurrection to the PSP to alter to his advantage the

political match of forces within the Movement and to gain more organised and

disciplined support.95 Moreover, in spite of the PSPs relative numerical force,

nationalism had traditionally held a hegemonic position over other ideological

paradigms in Cuba, including communism. Since independence in 1898, governments,

political parties and even trade unions had been dominated by nationalism and the

communists had mainly followed from a subaltern position.96

In fact, when topcommunist leader Rafael Rodriguez joined the guerrillas in the Sierra, he had to accept

Castros position as supreme leader of the opposition to Batista.97 At any rate, Castro

was the one able to use the PSP for his objectives, not the other way round.

On the one hand, then, the CIA and the MID were right: Castro was developing an

increasingly close relationship with the communists. On the other hand, Castros

assumption of the communist cause and ideology was far from certain in 1958.

However, Washington at this point could not see matters in such shades of grey,

and was far too quick to accept Castro as a lost cause. US officials failed to recognise that

Castro was in control. But nationalists were now suspected, because they were

considered targets and potential recruits for the communist camp. Washington becamepersuaded that the PSP was able to infiltrate the 26th of July Movement using

the nationalist card and, eventually, take control of the insurrection. By declining

to engage with him, Washington only encouraged Castro to move solidly into the

communist camp.

Conclusions

The convergence of the EastWest conflict and the NorthSouth divide, on the brink

of decolonisation, inaugurated one of the most dramatic phases of the twentiethcentury. After the end of World War II, Washington and Moscow began to see that

decolonisation and peripheral nationalisms were capable of altering the Cold War

balance of power. Indeed, in the 1950s, the launch of Peaceful Coexistence by

Khrushchev strengthened the relevance of the Third World in the Cold War scenario.

The fight for the hearts and minds of the Third World eventually resulted in an

acceleration of the decolonisation process. It also created space and resources for

accelerating development strategies. Drawn by the quest for modernisation of

nationalist elites in Southern Asia and the Middle East, the two superpowers fought a

war based on their own recipes for social and economic development. In Egypt, the

new global Cold War helped Nasser to build dams, to refurbish his army and to shield


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his countrys independence from outdated European imperial dreams. In Morocco

and Tunisia it supported the independence process.

But the global Cold War did not just create opportunities. The increasing tensions

between Washington and Moscow in the periphery from 1954 also produced dramas

and came to interfere with the legitimate strategies of development. The state-based

path to economic modernisation offered by the Soviet Union seemed to better match the

needs of Third World nationalism. Also, political alliances, theorised by Soviet Marxism

after the October Revolution, gave Moscow a powerful tool for approaching nationalism.

This disparityof conditions waswell perceivedin Washingtonand, within theEisenhower

administration, it led to suspicion, if not hostility, towards peripheral progressive

nationalisms. In Iran, for example, Washington feared that convergence between

Mohammad Mosaddegh and the local Communist Party, the Tudeh, could change

geopolitical equilibrium in the region. This perception led to an Anglo-American-

supported coup that in 1954 brought down Mosaddeghs nationalist government.Historiography has usually excluded Latin America from this global perspective.

Nonetheless, as this article has tried to demonstrate, throughout the 1950s Washington

clearly perceived the Western Hemisphere as part of a bigger game, where converging

nationalism and Soviet foreign policy were threatening American security. In the

Western Hemisphere, the global Cold War produced mixed results as well. As the

Bolivian case shows, when the Eisenhower administration felt that nationalism was far

enough from Moscow, it plainly helped and aided the process of reform carried on by

nationalist movements. By contrast, in Guatemala, the global Cold War perception led

to intervention. The interaction between Arbenzs nationalist government and the local

Communist Party was read through a Cold War lens and targeted as Moscows likelyeffort to alter the equilibrium between the superpowers in the region. Although less

evident, during its insurrection stage Cuba replicated this scenario. This article has

shown that American diplomacy considered Castro a radical nationalist, not a Marxist.

But, in the global Cold War context, his nationalism alone made him suspect. When,

after 9 April, the26th of July MovementandPSPbegan strengthening their relations, the

Americans perceived that the communists were using Castros nationalism to infiltrate

and eventually gain influence over the insurrection. The Eisenhower administration

did not try to challenge this convergence and, in this sense, its reaction did not diverge

very much from the one Washington had had in Iran or Guatemala. To be sure, it did notgo about planning a coup, but this was because Castro was not yet in power. Instead,

Washington tried to stop him from succeeding to the leadership of the Government. It

is not easy to assess what would have happened without a global Cold War structure

standing behind the Cuban scenario. Possibly some sort of compromise between Castro

and Washington would then have been possible or, at least, tried by American

diplomacy. But counterfactual history is swampy terrain. This article aimed to show

that global considerations rather than purely economic aims or inability to

differentiate between communism and progressive nationalism played a crucial role

in affecting American perception of Castros nationalism and, hence, strongly

contributed to shaping US strategy toward the insurrection.

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Acknowledgements

The Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation has funded this research through the project

HAR2009-09844, directed by Dr. Consuelo Naranjo Orovio (CSIC-CCHS).

Notes

[1] See, for instance, Morley, Imperial; Alzugaray, Cronica; Gott, Cuba. The same historical

perspective, applied to the broader Latin American context, can be found in: Loayza, An

Aladdins Lamp.

[2] The issue related to the confusion between nationalism and communism in the Third World,

during the Eisenhower administration, goes far behind the Cuban and the Latin American

scenarios. The best resume of this historical perspective, applied to several different cases,

can be found in: McMahon, Eisenhower. For Latin America see: Rabe, Eisenhower,

especially 468. For the Cuban case see: Benjamin,The United States.[3] Central Intelligence Agency, Freedom of Information Act (hereafter cited as CIA FOIA), The

Break-up of the Colonial Empires and its Implications for U.S. Security, 9 March 1948,

International Estimate, Confidential, 1.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Westad,The Global.

[6] Central Intelligence Agency, Freedom of Information Act (hereafter cited as CIA FOIA), The

Break-up of the Colonial Empires and its Implications for U.S. Security, 9 March 1948,

International Estimate, Confidential, 1.

[7] Westad,The Global, 114.

[8] Fursenko and Naftali,Khrushchevs Cold War.

[9] Views on Coexistence Idea in Washington,The New York Times, 17 November 1954, 3.

[10] Dulles Condemns,Guile. of Soviet on Aiding Underdeveloped Areas,The New York Times,

9 December 1955, 1 and 8.

[11] Policy for US? Stevensons View,The New York Times, 22 April 1956, Section n. 4, 1.

[12] See Manela,The Wilsonian.

[13] Gaddis,We Now Know, 165. See also Connelly, A Diplomatic, 42 64.

[14] The Transcript of Eisenhowers News Conference on Foreign and Domestic Issue, The New

York Times, 5 April, 1956, 10.

[15] Gaddis,We Now Know, 168. Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchevs Cold War, 65.

[16] Connelly,A Diplomatic, 61. See also, Yaqub, Containing.

[17] Engermann and Unger, Towards a Global; see also, Touraine,Come liberarsi.

[18] Westad, The Global, 33; Osgood, Words and Deeds, 9; See also Letham, Modernization as

Ideology.

[19] Belmonte,Selling the American Way, 50 70.

[20] Hobsbawm,I Rivoluzionari, 68.

[21] Current Communist Strategy in Non-industrialized Countries, Problem of Communism,

September October 1955, Vol. IV, no.5, United States Information Services, Washington DC.

[22] CIA FOIA, Special Survey of Select Soviet Bloc Economic Activities in Certain Free World

Countries (September 1955), Secret, 3.

[23] Department of State Bulletin, Soviet Bloc Offensive in Less Developed Area, Vol. 38, no. 970,

144. Also see: CIA, FOIA, The Nature and Problems of Soviet Economic Penetration of

Underdeveloped Areas, 14 March 1956, Secret.

[24] Foreign Relations of the United States of America, 195557, Volume X, Foreign Aid and

Economic Defense Policy, United States Government Printing Office, Washington 1989,


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Memorandum of Conversation at the 266th Meeting of the National Security Council,

Washington, 15 November 1955.

[25] Kaufman,Trade, 64.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Pravda, 15 February 1956, quoted in Communism in the Underdeveloped Countries, SovietEconomic Expansionism, Problem of Communism, JulyAugust 1958, Vol. 7, no. 4, p. 31,

United States Information Services, Washington DC.

[28] CIA FOIA, National Intelligence Estimate, NIE-95,The Soviet Bloc Courses of Action Through

Mid-1955, 25 September 1953, Top Secret, 6.

[29] Kanet, The Soviet, 5; Avieri, Marxist, 644.

[30] Fukuyama,El fin, 151.

[31] Shinn Junior, The National Democratic, 379; Light, The Soviet, 80 90.

[32] Claudn,The Communist Movement, 461.

[33] See, for instance, Seton-Watson,The Eastern European; Krebs,Dueling Visions.

[34] US National Archives, Record Group 59 (hereafter quoted as NARA RG59) Records of

Component Offices of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 194763, LOT87D33.[35] Annino, Ampliar la Nacion, 550; Carmagnani, America latina, 16 7; Halperin Donghi,

Historia contemporanea, 2956. See also Knight, Democratic and Revolutionary; Lambert,

America Latina.

[36] Retrospective Collection, CIA Digital Reading Room, CIA Declassified Documents, Library of

Congress Washington DC, Operation General Intelligence Aid, CSHB-F 52-890-2, (Est. Pub.

Date)Principal Aspects of Socialism in Latin America, October 1958, Secret, vivii.

[37] Ibid., vii.

[38] Sewell, A Perfect (Free Market) World?, 855; Zubok,A Failed Empire.

[39] Becker and McClenahan Jr.,The Market, The State, 329.

[40] Hilton, The United States, Brazil; Ameringer,The Cuban Democratic Experience.

[41] South America is Beset by Internal Inflation as World Prices Fall, The New York Times,

7 January 1953, 47 and 72. Siekmeier,Aid, Nationalism, 159.

[42] CIA FOIA, National Intelligence Estimate, Soviet Bloc Economic Warfare Capabilities and

Courses of Action, NIE 10-54, 9 April 1954, Secret, 9.

[43] Bethell and Roxborough,Latin America, 22.

[44] Adamson, The Most Important, 54.

[45] The New York Times, 8 April 1956, 27.

[46] Lehman, Revolutions and Attributions, 185.

[47] Siekmeier, Persistent Condor, 201.

[48] Adamson, The Most Important, 489.

[49] Rabe, Eisenhower, 656.

[50] See, for instance, Rabe,The Most Dangerous Area.

[51] Graziosi,LURSS, 186; See also, Sewell, A Perfect.

[52] Cabot Points Way in Latin America,The New York Times, 18 March 1953, 47.

[53] Gilbert, What We Now Know, 21.

[54] Hearings Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security

Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary United States

Senate (hereafter cited as SISS Hearings), Communist Threat to the United States trough the

Caribbean, hearings before the subcommittee to investigate the administrations of internal

security act and other internal security laws, part III, testimony of General C.P. Cabell,

Deputy Director, Central Intelligence, Agency, 5 November 1959, United States Government

Printing Office, Washington 1960. Library of Congress, Washington DC.

[55] British National Archives, Foreign Office Department, American Department, General,

A 1015/13, 1953,Communism in Latin America. Department of State, Intelligence Report No.

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5180.12. Communism in the Other American Republics, Quarterly Survey, October December,

1952, Secret, 10.

[56] CIA FOIA,Field Comments on NIE-70, Conditions and Trends in Latin America Affecting US,

4 March 1953, Secret, 2.

[57] In 1949, Paul H. Nitze joined the State Departments Policy Planning Staff and becameGeorge F. Kennans successor as Director of Policy Planning. In 1950, he wrote a classified

memo for the National Security Council, NSC 68, which became the blueprint for the

American strategy in the long Cold War years. In 1953, Nitze moved from the State

Department to the Pentagon, serving as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International

Security Affairs.

[58] CIA FOIA, Conversation regarding Guatemala with Policy Planning Staff Members of State

Department, 3 April 1953, Secret, 2.

[59] On this point see also: Gleijeses,Shattered Hope, 191.

[60] CIA FOIA,Communist Penetration of Guatemala, 16 February 1954, Secret, 1.

[61] Szulc,Fidel, 289300.

[62] CIA FOIA, National Intelligence Estimate, Number 8057,Political Stability in Central Americaand the Caribbean Through 1958, 23 April 1957, Secret, 1. See also: NARA RG 59, Intelligence

and Research. Division of Research for American Republics. Special Paper No. 132 (INR)

LOT75D242 CU22 17 May 1957, Secret, 1.

[63] US National Archives, College Park, MD, Record Group 59 (hereafter cited as NARA RG59),

737.00/11-2157 Office Memorandum, United States Government. To ARA-Mr. Rubottom,

Form MID Mr. Wieland and Mr. Stewart.Possible United States Courses of Action in Restoring

Normalcy to Cuba, Secret, 1.

[64] SISS Hearings,Communist Threat to the United States Through the Caribbean,Testimony of Earl

T. Smith, Eighty-Sixth Congress, Second Session, Part 9, 27, 30 August 1960; Smith, The

Fourth Floor, 228.

[65] NARA RG59, 737.00/3-2458, Office Memorandum, From MID, C. Allan Stewart, Thru MID,

Mr. Wieland, to ARA Mr. Snow,Dr. Varonas Views on CivilianMilitary Junta Membership,

Secret; CIA FOIA, SNIE 85/1-58, 16 December 1958, No. 288, Special National Intelligence

Estimate, The Situation in Cuba, Secret, 2; see also Paterson, Contesting Castro, 2079;

Skierka,Fidel Castro, 64.

[66] Retrospective Collection, CIA Digital Reading Room, CIA Declassified Documents, Library

of Congress Washington DC, Department of State, Memorandum for the President

from Acting Secretary of State Christian Herter. Subject: Cuba, Top Secret, 22 December

1958, 3.

[67] NARA RG59, 611.37/1-1559, State Department.Draft White Paper on Cuba, Official Use Only.

[68] On Castros dichotomy see Annino,DallInsurrezione, 71.

[69] OConnor,The Origins, 446.

[70] NARA RG59, 737.00/2-2857, Foreign Service Dispatch. From AmEmbassy Habana, to the

Department of State, Washington. 28 February 1957,Situation in Cuba: Articles in New York

Times by Herbert L. Matthews, Secret, 4.



Times by Herbert L. Matthews, Secret, 4.

[72] Annino, DallInsurrezione, 71.



Times by Herbert L. Matthews, Secret, 4; Library of Congress RG59 State Department

Records,Staff Summary Biographic Supplement. Fidel Castro, Cuban Revolutionary Leader, 9

January 1959, Confidential, 2.


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[74] CIA FOIA, National Intelligence Estimate, Number 80-57,Political Stability in Central America

and the Caribbean Through 1958, 23 April 1957, Secret, 1.

[75] NARA RG59, Records of Component of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research 194763, Lot

75d242 Box 15, Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Revolutionary

Development in Cuba and other Matters, 28 May 1957, Official Use Only, 3.[76] NARA RG59, 737.00/11-2157 Office Memorandum, United States Government. To ARA-

Mr. Rubottom, Form MID Mr. Wieland and Mr. Stewart. Possible United States Courses of

Action in Restoring Normalcy to Cuba, Secret, 1.

[77] NARA RG59, Records of Component of Offices of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research

1947 63, Lot 75D242 Box 15, INR Ambassador Hugh S. Cuming; DRA Robert A. Stevenson;

Background Information on the Cuban Political Situation, Confidential, 7 April 1958, 1.

[78] NARA RG59 737.00/3-1058 Foreign Service Dispatch, From AmEmbassy, Habana to the

Department of State, Washington. Fidel Castro Ruiz; Documents Concerning Him and His

Activities: Appraisal, Secret.

[79] CIA FOIA, NSC Briefing, Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence, Report on

(Portion Sanitized)s Visit to the Fidel Castro Headquarters in the Sierra Maestra (1226

March 1958), 11 April 1958, Secret.

[80] Bonachea and San Martn,The Cuban Insurrection, 2201.

[81] Alertaarticle is quoted in Castro Rebels Reject Backing of Cuban Reds,Chicago Daily Tribune,

26 March 1958, 11.

[82] The Meeting is summarised in a CIA paper: CIA FOIA,(EST PUB DATE) CPSU Coordination of

International Communist Movement: Implement, created in 25 July 1958, Secret, 6.

[83] CIA FOIA, NSC Briefing, Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence, Report on

[portion sanitised]s Visit to the Fidel Castro Headquarters in the Sierra Maestra (1226

March 1958), Secret.

[84] Guevara,Obras Completas, 465.

[85] Balfour, Castro, 55; Sweig, Inside, 127; NARA RG59, LOT75D242 CU244, INR, DRA, Special

Paper No. A-8-9, Raul Castro and Communist Infiltration of the 26th of July Movement, 10

July 1958, Secret.

[86] NARA RG59, 737.00/5-558, Foreign Service Dispatch, From AmEmbassy, Habana to The

Department of State, Causes for Failure of General Strike Attempt, Confidential; Balfour,

Castro, 55.

[87] Guevara,La Guerra, 16772; Sweig, Inside, 150.

[88] Sweig,Inside, 221.

[89] Paterson,Contesting Castro, 1856.

[90] NARA RG59, 737.00/7-3058, Foreign Service Dispatch, From AmEmbassy to the

Department of State, Fidel Castro Ruz; Documents Concerning Him and His Activities:

Appraisal, Secret.

[91] Retrospective Collection, CIA Digital Reading Room, CIA Declassified Documents, Library ofCongress Washington DC, Special National Intelligence Estimate, The Situation in Cuba ,

SNIE 85-58, 24 November 1958, 3, n. 292.

[92] Retrospective Collection, CIA Digital Reading Room, CIA Declassified Documents, Library of

Congress Washington DC, Department of State, Washington, Memorandum for the

President, Subject Cuba, 23 December 1958, 3.

[93] Skierka,Fidel Castro, 646.

[94] Paterson,Contesting Castro, 2089; Coltman,The Real Fidel, 1369.

[95] Balfour,Castro, 54; Skierka, Fidel Castro, 61.

[96] On Cuban nationalism see, for instance, Kapcia,Cuba; Rojas,Isla.

[97] Skierka,Fidel Castro, 61.

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