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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-2662 March 26, 1949

SHIGENORI KURODA,petitioner,

vs.

Maor G!"!ra# RA$AEL %ALANDONI, &r'(a)'!r G!"!ra# CALI*TO DU+UE, Co#o"!#

MARGARITO TORAL&A, Co#o"!# IRENEO &UENCONSE%O, Co#o"!# PEDRO TA&UENA, Maor

$EDERICO ARANAS, MELILLE S. HUSSE a") RO&ERT PORT,respondents.

Pedro Serran, Jose G. Lukban, and Liberato B. Cinco for petitioner.

Fred Ruiz Castro Federico Arenas Mariano Yenco, Jr., Ricardo A. Arci!!a and S. Me!"i!!e #usse$ for

respondents.

MORAN, C.J.

Shigenori Kuroda, forerl! a "ieutenant#$eneral of the %apanese &perial Ar! and Coanding

$eneral of the %apanese &perial 'orces in (he Philippines during a period covering )*+ and

)*+++ -ho is no- charged before a ilitar! Coission convened b! the Chief of Staff of the

Ared forces of the Philippines -ith having unla-full! disregarded and failed to discharge his duties

as such coand, peritting the to coit brutal atrocities and other high cries against

noncobatant civilians and prisoners of the &perial %apanese 'orces in violation of the la-s and

custos of -ar / coes before this Court see0ing to establish the illegalit! of E1ecutive 2rder No.

34 of the President of the Philippines5 to en6oin and prohibit respondents Melville S. 7usse! andRobert Port fro participating in the prosecution of petitioner8s case before the Militar! Coission

and to peranentl! prohibit respondents fro proceeding -ith the case of petitioners.

&n support of his case petitioner tenders the follo-ing principal arguents.

First. / (hat E1ecutive 2rder No. 34 is illegal on the ground that it violates not onl! the provision of

our constitutional la- but also our local la-s to sa! nothing of the fact 9that: the Philippines is not a

signator! nor an adherent to the 7ague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering "and

;arfare and therefore petitioners is charged of 8cries8 not based on la-, national and international.

7ence petitioner argues / (hat in vie- off the fact that this coission has been epanelled b!

virtue of an unconstitutional la- an illegal order this coission is -ithout 6urisdiction to tr! hereinpetitioner.

Second. / (hat the participation in the prosecution of the case against petitioner before the

Coission in behalf of the


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violation of our Constitution for the reason that the! are not >ualified to practice la- in the

Philippines.

%&ird. / (hat Attorne!s 7usse! and Port have no personalit! as prosecution the uentl! in the proulgation and

enforceent of E1ecution 2rder No. 34 the President of the Philippines has acted in conforit! -ith

the generall! accepted and policies of international la- -hich are part of the our Constitution.

(he proulgation of said e1ecutive order is an e1ercise b! the President of his po-er as

Coander in chief of all our ared forces as upheld b! this Court in the case of

aashita "s.St!er 9"#)?*, +? 2ff. $a=., 33+: 1 -hen -e said /

;ar is not ended sipl! because hostilities have ceased. After cessation of ared hostilitiesincident of -ar a! reain pending -hich should be disposed of as in tie of -ar. An

iportance incident to a conduct of -ar is the adoption of easure b! the ilitar! coand

not onl! to repel and defeat the eneies but to sei=e and sub6ect to disciplinar! easure

those eneies -ho in their attept to th-art or ipede our ilitar! effort have violated the

la- of -ar. 9'( parte uirin )@ uentl!, the President as Coander in Chief is full! epo-ered to consuate this

unfinished aspect of -ar nael! the trial and punishent of -ar criinal through the issuance and

enforceent of E1ecutive 2rder No. 34.

Petitioner argues that respondent Militar! Coission has no %urisdiction to tr! petitioner for acts

coitted in violation of the 7ague Convention and the $eneva Convention because the Philippines

is not a signator! to the first and signed the second onl! in )*+@. &t cannot be denied that the rules

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and regulation of the 7ague and $eneva conventions for, part of and are -holl! based on the

generall! accepted principals of international la-. &n facts these rules and principles -ere accepted

b! the t-o belligerent nation the


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Alleging that the


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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

(7&RD D&&S&2N

G.R. No. 91//2 %0# 16, 199/

PHILIP MORRIS, INC., &ENSON HEDGES 3CANADA, INC., AND $A&RI+UES O$ TA&AC

REUNIES, S.A.,petitioners

vs.

THE COURT O$ APPEALS AND $ORTUNE TO&ACCO CORPORATION, respondents.

+uas&a, Asperi!!a, Anc&eta, Pea - o!asco La/ 0ffice for petitioners.

%eresita Gandionco10!edan for pri"ate respondent.

MELO, J.:

&n the petition before us, petitioners Philip Morris, &nc., Benson and 7edges 9Canada:, &nc., and

'abri>ues of (abac Reunies, S.A., are ascribing -hisical e1ercise of the facult! conferred upon

agistrates b! Section 3, Rule F4 of the Revised Rules of Court -hen respondent Court of Appeals

lifted the -rit of preliinar! in6unction it earlier had issued against 'ortune (obacco Corporation,

herein private respondent, fro anufacturing and selling MARK cigarettes in the local ar0et.

Ban0ing on the thesis that petitioners8 respective s!bols MARK &&, MARK (EN, and "ARK,

also for cigarettes, ust be protected against unauthori=ed appropriation, petitioners t-ice solicited

the ancillar! -rit in the course the ain suit for infringeent but the court of origin -as unpersuaded.

Before -e proceed to the generative facts of the case at bar, it ust be ephasi=ed that resolution

of the issue on the propriet! of lifting the -rit of preliinar! in6unction should not be construed as a

pre6udgent of the suit belo-. A-are of the fact that the discussion -e are about to enter into

involves a ere interlocutor! order, a discourse on the aspect infringeent ust thus be avoided.

;ith these ca"eat, -e shall no- shift our attention to the events -hich spa-ned the controvers!.

As averred in the initial pleading, Philip Morris, &ncorporated is a corporation organi=ed under the

la-s of the State of irginia,


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Corporation has no right to anufacture and sell cigarettes bearing the allegedl! identical or

confusingl! siilar tradear0 MARK in contravention of Section ?? of the (radear0 "a-, and

should, therefore, be precluded during the pendenc! of the case fro perforing the acts

coplained of "iaa preliinar! in6unction 9p. @F, Court of Appeals Ro!!oin AC#$.R. SP No. ))?:.

'or its part, 'ortune (obacco Corporation aditted petitioners8 certificates of registration -ith thePhilippine Patent 2ffice sub6ect to the affirative and special defense on is6oinder of part!

plaintiffs. Private respondent alleged further that it has been authori=ed b! the Bureau of &nternal

Revenue to anufacture and sell cigarettes bearing the tradear0 MARK, and that MARK is a

coon -ord -hich cannot be e1clusivel! appropriated 9p.)F4, Court of Appeals Ro!!oin A.C.#$.R.

SP No. ))?:. 2n March ?4, )*4, petitioners8 pra!er for preliinar! in6unction -as denied b! the

Presiding %udge of Branch )33 of the Regional (rial Court of the National Capital %udicial Region

stationed at Pasig, preised upon the follo-ing propositions5

Plaintiffs adit in paragraph ? of the coplaint that . . . the! are

not doing business in the Philippines and are suing on an isolated transaction . . ..

(his sipl! eans that the! are not engaged in the sale, anufacture, iportation,e1porHtIation and advertiseent of their cigarette products in the Philippines. ;ith

this adission, defendant as0s5 . . . ho- could defendant8s MARK cigarettes cause

the forer irreparable daage -ithin the territorial liits of the PhilippinesJ

Plaintiffs aintain that since their tradear0s are entitled to protection b! treat!

obligation under Article ? of the Paris Convention of -hich the Philippines is a

eber and ratified b! Resolution No. 3* of the Senate of the Philippines and as

such, have the force and effect of la- under Section )?, Article && of our

Constitution and since this is an action for a violation or infringeent of a tradear0

or trade nae b! defendant, such ere allegation is sufficient even in the absence of

proof to support it. (o the ind of the Court, precisel!, this is the issue in the ain

case to deterine -hether or not there has been an invasion of plaintiffs8 right ofpropert! to such tradear0 or trade nae. (his clai of plaintiffs is disputed b!

defendant in paragraphs 3 and @ of the Ans-er hence, this cannot be ade a basis

for the issuance of a -rit of preliinar! in6unction.

(here is no dispute that the 'irst Plaintiff is the registered o-ner of tradearH0I

MARK && -ith Certificate of Registration No. )4@?, dated April ?3,)*@ -hile the

Second Plaintiff is li0e-ise the registered o-ner of tradear0 MARK (EN under

Certificate of Registration No. )))+@, dated Ma! ?4, )*3 and the (hird Plaintiff is a

registrant of tradear0 "ARK as sho-n b! Certificate of Registration No. )G*F

dated March ?, )*3+, in addition to a pending application for registration of

tradear0 MARK && filed on Noveber ?), )*4G under Application Serial No.+?+, all in the Philippine Patent 2ffice. &n sae the anner, defendant has a

pending application for registration of the tradear0 "ARK cigarettes -ith the

Philippine Patent 2ffice under Application Serial No. ++GG4. Defendant contends that

since plaintiffs are not doing business in the Philippines coupled the fact that the

Director of Patents has not denied their pending application for registration of its

tradear0 MARK, the grant of a -rit of preliinar! in6unction is preature. Plaintiffs

contend that this act9s: of defendant is but a subterfuge to give seblance of good

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faith intended to deceive the public and patroni=ers into bu!ing the products and

create the ipression that defendant8s goods are identical -ith or coe fro the

sae source as plaintiffs8 products or that the defendant is a licensee of plaintiffs

-hen in truth and in fact the forer is not. But the fact reains that -ith its pending

application, defendant has ebar0ed in the anufacturing, selling, distributing and

advertising of MARK cigarettes. (he >uestion of good faith or bad faith on the partof defendant are atters -hich are evidentiar! in character -hich have to be proven

during the hearing on the erits hence, until and unless the Director of Patents has

denied defendant8s application, the Court is of the opinion and so holds that issuance

a -rit of preliinar! in6unction -ould not lie.

(here is no >uestion that defendant has been authori=ed b! the Bureau of &nternal

Revenue to anufacture cigarettes bearing the tradear0 MARK 9"etter of Ruben

B. Ancheta, Acting Coissioner addressed to 'ortune (obacco Corporation dated

April , )*4), ar0ed as Anne1 A, defendant8s 2PP2S&(&2N, etc. dated

Septeber ?+, )*4?:. 7o-ever, this authorit! is >ualified . . . that the said brands

have been accepted and registered b! the Patent 2ffice not later than si1 93: onthsafter !ou have been anufacturing the cigarettes and placed the sae in the

ar0et. 7o-ever, this grant . . . does not give !ou protection against an! person or

entit! -hose rights a! be pre6udiced b! infringeent or unfair copetition in

relation to !our indicated tradear0sLbrands. As aforestated, the registration of

defendant8s application is still pending in the Philippine Patent 2ffice.

&t has been repeatedl! held in this 6urisdiction as -ell as in the uit! and fair pla!.

(here is no po-er the e1ercise of -hich is ore delicate -hich

re>uires greater caution, deliberation, and sound discretion, or 9-hich

is: ore dangerous in a doubtful case than the issuing of an

in6unction it is the strong ar of e>uit! that never ought to be

e1tended unless to cases of great in6ur!, -here courts of la- cannot

afford an ade>uate or coensurate reed! in daages. (he right

ust be clear, the in6ur! ipending or threatened, so as to be averted

onl! b! the protecting preventive process of in6unction. 9Bonaparte v.

Caden, etc. N. Co., '. Cas. No. ), 3)@, Bald-. ?GF, ?)@.:

Courts of e>uit! constantl! decline to la! do-n an! rule -hich

in6unction shall be granted or -ithheld. (here is -isdo in this

course, for it is ipossible to foresee all e1igencies of societ! -hich

a! re>uire their aid to protect rights and restrain -rongs. 9Merced

M. $o v. 'reeont, @ $al. )@, ?) 34 A. Dec. ?3?.:

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&t is the strong ar of the court and to render its operation begin and

useful, it ust be e1ercised -ith great discretion, and -hen

necessar! re>uires it. 9Attorne!#$eneral v. uit! -ill refuse an

application for the in6unctive reed! -here the principle of la- on

-hich the right to preliinar! in6unction rests is disputed and -ill

adit of doubt, -ithout a decision of the court of la- establishing

such principle although satisfied as to -hat is a correct conclusion of

la- upon the facts. (he fact, ho-ever, that there is no such dispute or

conflict does not in itself constitute a 6ustifiable ground for the court to

refuse an application for the in6unctive relief. 97ac0ensac0 &pr.

Con. v. Ne- %erse! Midland P. Co., ?? N.%. Eg. *+.:

7ence, the status 2uoe1isting bet-een the parties prior to the filing of this caseshould be aintained. 'or after all, an in6unction, -ithout reference to the parties,

should be violent, vicious nor even vindictive. 9pp. 4#+), Ro!!oin $.R. No. *)?.:

&n the process of den!ing petitioners8 subse>uent otion for reconsideration of the order den!ing

issuance of the re>uested -rit, the court of origin too0 cogni=ance of the certification e1ecuted on

%anuar! G, )*4+ b! the Philippine Patent 2ffice attesting to the fact that private respondent8s

application for registration is still pending appropriate action. Apart fro this counication, -hat

propted the trial court 6udge to entertain the idea of preaturit! and untieliness of petitioners8

application for a -rit of preliinar! in6unction -as the letter fro the Bureau of &nternal Revenue

date 'ebruar! ?, )*4+ -hich reads5

MRS. (ERES&(A $AND&2N$C2 2"EDAN

"egal Counsel

'ortune (obacco Corporation

Mada5

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&n connection -ith !our letter dated %anuar! ?F, )*4+, reiterating !our >uer! as to

-hether !our label approval autoaticall! e1pires or becoes null and void after si1

93: onths if the brand is not accepted and b! the patent office, please be infored

that no provision in the (a1 Code or revenue regulation that re>uires an applicant to

copl! -ith the aforeentioned condition order that his label approved -ill reain

valid and e1isting.

Based on the docuent !ou presented, it sho-s that registration of this particular

label still pending resolution b! the Patent 2ffice. (hese being so , !ou a! therefore

continue -ith the production said brand of cigarette until this 2ffice is officiall!

notified that the >uestion of o-nership of MARK brand is finall! resolved.

9p. +4, Ro!!o.:

&t appears fro the testion! of Att!. Enri>ue Madarang, Chief of the (radear0 Division of the thenPhilippine Patent 2ffice that 'ortune8s application for its tradear0 is still pending before said office

9p. )), Ro!!o:.

Petitioners thereafter cited supervening events -hich supposedl! transpired since March ?4, )*4,

-hen the trial court first declined issuing a -rit of preliinar! in6unction, that could alter the results of

the case in that 'ortune8s application had been re6ected, na!, barred b! the Philippine Patent 2ffice,

and that the application had been forfeited b! abandonent, but the trial court nonetheless denied

the second otion for issuance of the in6unctive -rit on April ??, )*4@, thus5

'or all the proli1it! of their pleadings and testionial evidence, the plaintiffs#ovants

have fallen far short of the legal re>uisites that -ould 6ustif! the grant of the -rit ofpreliinar! in6unction pra!ed for. 'or one, the! did not even bother to establish b!

copetent evidence that the products supposedl! affected adversel! b! defendant8s

tradear0 no- sub6ect of an application for registration -ith the Philippine Patents

2ffice, are in actual use in the Philippines. 'or another, the! concentrated their fire

on the alleged abandonent and forfeiture b! defendant of said application for

registration.

(he Court cannot help but ta0e note of the fact that in their coplaint plaintiffs

included a pra!er for issuance preliinar! in6unction. (he petition -as dul! heard,

and thereafter atter -as assiduousl! discussed lengthil! and resolved against

plaintiffs in a )F#page 2rder issued b! the undersigned8s predecessor on March ?4,)*4. Plaintiffs8 otion for reconsideration -as denied in another -ell#argued 4 page

2rder issued on April F, )*4+,, and the atter -as ade to rest.

7o-ever, on the strength of supposed changes in the aterial facts of this case,

plaintiffs cae up -ith the present otion citing therein the said changes -hich are5

that defendant8s application had been re6ected and barred b! the Philippine Patents

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2ffice, and that said application has been deeed abandoned and forfeited. But

defendant has refiled the sae.

Plaintiffs8 arguents in support of the present otion appear to be a ere rehash of

their stand in the first above#entioned petition -hich has alread! been ruled upon

adversel! against the. $ranting that the alleged changes in the aterial facts aresufficient grounds for a otion see0ing a favorable grant of -hat has alread! been

denied, this otion 6ust the sae cannot prosper.

&n the first place there is no proof -hatsoever that an! of plaintiffs8 products -hich

the! see0 to protect fro an! adverse effect of the tradear0 applied for b!

defendant, is in actual use and available for coercial purposes an!-here in the

Philippines. Secondl! as sho-n b! plaintiffs8 o-n evidence furnished b! no less than

the chief of (radear0s Division of the Philippine Patent 2ffice, Att!. Enri>ue

Madarang, the abandonent of an application is of no oent, for the sae can

al-a!s be refiled. 7e said there is no specific provision in the rules prohibiting such

refiling 9(SN, Noveber ?), )*43, pp. 3G 3+, Raviera:. &n fact, according toMadarang, the refiled application of defendant is no- pending before the Patents

2ffice. 7ence, it appears that the otion has no leg to stand on. 9pp. FG#

F), Ro!!oin $. R. No. *)?.:

Confronted -ith this rebuff, petitioners filed a previous petition for certioraribefore the Court,

doc0eted as $.R. No. @4)+), but the petition -as referred to the Court of Appeals.

(he Court of Appeals initiall! issued a resolution -hich set aside the court of origin8s order dated

April ??, )*4@, and granted the issuance of a -rit of preliinar! in6unction en6oining 'ortune, its

agents, eplo!ees, and representatives, fro anufacturing, selling, and advertising MARK

cigarettes. (he late %ustice Cacdac, spea0ing for the 'irst Division of the Court of Appeals in CA#$.R. SP No. ))?, rear0ed5

(here is no dispute that petitioners are the registered o-ners of the tradear0s for

cigarettes MARK &&, MARK (EN, and "ARK.9Anne1es B, C and D, petition:. As

found and reiterated b! the Philippine Patent 2ffice in t-o 9?: official counications

dated April 3, )*4 and %anuar! ?+, )*4+, the tradear0 MARK is confusingl!

siilar to the tradear0s of petitioners, hence registration -as barred under Sec. +

9d: of Rep. Act. No. )33, as aended 9pp. )G3, )*, SCA ro!!o:. &n a third official

counication dated April 4, )*43, the tradear0 application of private respondent

for the MARK under Serial No. ++GG4 filed on 'ebruar! ), )*4) -hich -as

declared abandoned as of 'ebruar! )3, )*43, is no- deeed forfeited, there beingno revival ade pursuant to Rule *4 of the Revised Rules of Practitioners in

(radear0 Cases. 9p. )G@, CA ro!!o:. (he foregoing docuents or counications

entioned b! petitioners as the changes in aterial facts -hich occurred after

March ?4, )*4, are not also >uestioned b! respondents.

Pitted against the petitioners8 docuentar! evidence, respondents pointed to 9): the

letter dated %anuar! G, )*@* 9p. )@, CA ro!!o: of Conrado P. Dia=, then Acting

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Coissioner of &nternal Revenue, teporaril! granting the re>uest of private

respondent for a perit to anufacture t-o 9?: ne- brands of cigarettes one of -hich

is brand MARK filter#t!pe blend, and 9?: the certification dated Septeber ?3, )*43

of Cesar $. Sandico, Director of Patents 9p. )4, CA ro!!o: issued upon the -ritten

re>uest of private respondents8 counsel dated Septeber )@, )*43 attesting that the

records of his office -ould sho- that the tradear0 MARK for cigarettes is no- thesub6ect of a pending application under Serial No. F*4@? filed on Septeber )3, )*43.

Private respondent8s docuentar! evidence provides the reasons neutrali=ing or

-ea0ening their probative values. (he penultiate paragraph of Coissioner Dia=8

letter of authorit! reads5

Please be infored further that the authorit! herein granted does not

give !ou protection against an! person or entit! -hose rights a! be

pre6udiced b! infringeent or unfair copetition in relation to !our

above#naed brandsLtradear0.

-hile Director Sandico8s certification contained siilar conditions as follo-s5

(his Certification, ho-ever, does not give protection as against an!

person or entit! -hose right a! be pre6udiced b! infringeent or

unfair copetition in relation to the aforesaid tradear0 nor the right

to register if contrar! to the provisions of the (radear0 "a-, Rep.

Act No. )33 as aended and the Revised Rules of Practice in

(radear0 Cases.

(he teporar! perit to anufacture under the tradear0 MARK for cigarettes and

the acceptance of the second application filed b! private respondent in the height oftheir dispute in the ain case -ere evidentl! ade sub6ect to the outcoe of the said

ain case or Civil Case No. +@@+ of the respondent Court. (hus, the Court has not

issed to note the absence of a ention in the Sandico letter of Septeber ?3, )*43

of an! reference to the pendenc! of the instant action filed on August )4, )*4?. ;e

believe and hold that petitioners have sho-n apri*a faciecase for the issuance of

the -rit of prohibitor! in6unction for the purposes stated in their coplaint and

subse>uent otions for the issuance of the prohibitor! -rit. 9Bua!an Cattle Co. vs.

uintillan, )?F SCRA ?@3:

(he re>uisites for the granting of preliinar! in6unction are the e1istence of the right

protected and the facts against -hich the in6unction is to be directed as violative ofsaid right. 9Bua!an Cattle Co. vs. uintillan, supra 2rtigas Co. vs. Rui=, )+4

SCRA ?3:. &t is a -rit fraed according to the circustances of the case

coanding an act -hich the Court regards as essential to 6ustice and restraining an

act it dees contrar! to e>uit! and good conscience 9Rosauro vs. Cuneta, )F)

SCRA F@G:. &f it is not issued, the defendant a!, before final 6udgent, do or

continue the doing of the act -hich the plaintiff as0s the court to restrain, and thus

a0e ineffectual the final 6udgent rendered after-ards granting the relief sought b!

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the plaintiff 9Calo vs. Roldan, @3 Phil. ++F:. $enerall!, its grant or denial rests upon

the sound discretion of the Court e1cept on a clear case of abuse 9Belish &nvestent

'inance Co. vs. State 7ouse, )F) SCRA 33:. Petitioners8 right of e1clusivit! to

their registered tradear0s being clear and be!ond >uestion, the respondent court8s

denial of the prohibitive -rit constituted e1cess of 6urisdiction and grave abuse

discretion. &f the lo-er court does not grant preliinar! in6unction, the appellate courta! grant the sae. 9Service Specialists, &nc. vs. Sheriff of Manila, )+F SCRA )*:.

9pp. )3F#)3@, Ro!!oin $.R. No. *)?.:

After private respondent 'ortune8s otion for reconsideration -as re6ected, a otion to dissolve the

disputed -rit of preliinar! in6unction -ith offer to post a counterbond -as subitted -hich -as

favorabl! acted upon b! the Court of Appeals, preised on the filing of a sufficient counterbond to

ans-er for -hateverper3uiciopetitioners a! suffer as a result thereof, to -it5

(he private respondent see0s to dissolve the preliinar! in6unction previousl!

granted b! this Court -ith an offer to file a counterbond. &t -as pointed out in its

suppleental otion that lots of -or0ers eplo!ed -ill be laid off as a conse>uenceof the in6unction and that the governent -ill stand to lose the aount of specific

ta1es being paid b! the

private respondent. (he specific ta1es being paid is the su total of P)?G,)?G,

?*F.*4 fro %anuar! to %ul! )*4*.

(he petitioners argued in their coent that the daages caused b! the

infringeent of their tradear0 as -ell as the good-ill it generates are incapable of

pecuniar! estiation and onetar! evaluation and not even the counterbond could

ade>uatel! copensate for the daages it -ill incur as a result of the dissolution of

the bond. &n addition, the petitioner further argued that doing business in the

Philippines is not relevant as the in6unction pertains to an infringeent of a tradear0right.

After a thorough re#e1aination of the issues involved and the arguents advanced

b! both parties in the offer to file a counterbond and the opposition thereto, ;E

believe that there are sound and cogent reasons for uence of the dissolution of the preliinar! in6unction.

(he petitioner -ill not be pre6udiced nor stand to suffer irreparabl! as a conse>uence

of the lifting of the preliinar! in6unction considering that the! are not actuall!engaged in the anufacture of the cigarettes -ith the tradear0 in >uestion and the

filing of the counterbond -ill apl! ans-er for such daages.

;hile the rule is that an offer of a counterbond does not operate to dissolve an

in6unction previousl! granted, nevertheless, it is e>uall! true that an in6unction could

be dissolved onl! upon good and valid grounds sub6ect to the sound discretion of the

court. As ;E have aintained the vie- that there are sound and good reasons to lift

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the preliinar! in6unction, the otion to file a counterbond is granted. 9pp. F#

F+, Ro!!oin $.R. No. *)?.:

Petitioners, in turn, filed their o-n otion for re#e1aination geared to-ards reiposition of the -rit

of preliinar! in6unction but to no avail 9p. FF, Ro!!oin $.R. No. *)?:.

7ence, the instant petition casting three aspersions that respondent court gravel! abused its

discretion tantaount to e1cess of 6urisdiction -hen5

&. . . . it re>uired, contrar! to la- and 6urisprudence, that in order that petitioners a!

suffer irreparable in6ur! due to the lifting of the in6unction, petitioners should be using

actuall! their registered tradear0s in coerce in the Philippines

&&. . . . it lifted the in6unction in violation of section 3 of Rule F4 of the Rules of Court

and

&&&. . . . after having found that the trial court had coitted grave abuse of discretionand e1ceeded its 6urisdiction for having refused to issue the -rit of in6unction to

restrain private respondent8s acts that are contrar! to e>uit! and good conscience, it

ade a coplete about face for legall! insufficient grounds and authori=ed the

private respondent to continue perforing the ver! sae acts that it had considered

contrar! to e>uit! and good conscience, thereb! ignoring not onl! the andates of

the (radear0 "a-, the international coitents of the Philippines, the 6udicial

adission of private respondent that it -ill have no ore right to use the tradear0

MARK after the Director of Patents shall have re6ected the application to register it,

and the adonitions of the Supree Court. 9pp. ?+#?F, Petition pp. ?F#?3, Ro!!o.:

(o sustain a successful prosecution of their suit for infringeent, petitioners, as foreign corporationsnot engaged in local coerce, rel! on section ?)#A of the (radear0 "a- reading as follo-s5

Sec. ?)#A. An! foreign corporation or 6uristic person to -hich a ar0 or trade#nae

has been registered or assigned under this act a! bring an action hereunder for

infringeent, for unfair copetition, or false designation of origin and false

description, -hether or not it has been licensed to do business in the Philippines

under Act Nubered 'ourteen hundred and fift!#nine, as aended, other-ise 0no-n

as the Corporation "a-, at the tie it brings coplaint5 Provided, (hat the countr! of

-hich the said foreign corporation or 6uristic person is a citi=en or in -hich it is

doiciled, b! treat!, convention or la-, grants a siilar privilege to corporate or

6uristic persons of the Philippines. 9As inserted b! Sec. @ of Republic Act No. 34.:

to drive hoe the point that the! are not precluded fro initiating a cause of action in

the Philippines on account of the principal perception that another entit! is pirating

their s!bol -ithout an! la-ful authorit! to do so. %udging fro a perusal of the

afore>uoted Section ?)#A, the conclusion reached b! petitioners is certainl! correct

for the proposition in support thereof is ebedded in the Philippine legal

6urisprudence.

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&ndeed, it -as stressed in Genera! Gar*ents Corporation "s. 4irector of Patents9+) SCRA FG

H)*@)I: b! then %ustice 9later Chief %ustice: Ma0alintal that5

Parentheticall!, it a! be stated that the ruling in the Mentholatu case -as

subse>uentl! derogated -hen Congress, purposel! to counteract the effects of said

case, enacted Republic Act No. 34, inserting Section ?)#A in the (radear0 "a-,-hich allo-s a foreign corporation or 6uristic person to bring an action in Philippine

courts for infringeent of a ar0 or tradenae, for unfair copetition, or false

designation of origin and false description, -hether or not it has been licensed to do

business in the Philippines under Act Nubered 'ourteen hundred and fift!#nine, as

aended, other-ise 0no-n as the Corporation "a-, at the tie it brings coplaint.

Petitioner argues that Section ?)#A ilitates against respondent8s capacit! to

aintain a suit for cancellation, since it re>uires, before a foreign corporation a!

bring an action, that its tradear0 or tradenae has been registered under the

(radear0 "a-. (he arguent isses the essential point in the said provision, -hich

is that the foreign corporation is allo-ed thereunder to sue -hether or not it hasbeen licensed to do business in the Philippines pursuant to the Corporation "a-

9precisel! to counteract the effects of the decision in the Mentholatu case:. 9at p.

F@.:

7o-ever, on Ma!, ?), )*4+, Section ?)#A, the provision under consideration, -as >ualified b! this

Court in La C&e*ise Lacoste S.A. "s. Fernandez9)?* SCRA @ H)*4+I:, to the effect that a foreign

corporation not doing business in the Philippines a! have the right to sue before Philippine Courts,

but e1isting ad6ective a1ios re>uire that >ualif!ing circustances necessar! for the assertion of

such right should first be affirativel! pleaded 9? Agba!ani Coercial "a-s of the Philippines,

)**) Ed., p. F*4 + Martin, Philippine Coercial "a-s, Rev. Ed., )*43, p. 4):. &ndeed, it is not

sufficient for a foreign corporation suing under Section ?)#A to sipl! allege its alien origin. Rather, itust additionall! allege its personalit! to sue. Relative to this condition precedent, it a! be

observed that petitioners -ere not reiss in averring their personalit! to lodge a coplaint for

infringeent 9p. @F,Ro!!oin AC#$.R. SP No. ))?: especiall! so -hen the! asserted that the ain

action for infringeent is anchored on an isolated transaction 9p. @F, Ro!!oin AC#$.R. SP No. ))?

Atlantic Mutual &ns. Co. vs. Cebu Stevedoring Co., &nc., )@ SCRA )G@ 9)*33:, ) Regalado,

Reedial "a- Copendiu, 'ifth Rev. Ed., )*44, p. )G:.

Another point -hich petitioners considered to be of significant interest, and -hich the! desire to

ipress upon us is the protection the! en6o! under the Paris Convention of )*3F to -hich the

Philippines is a signator!. et, insofar as this discourse is concerned, there is no necessit! to treat

the atter -ith an e1tensive response because adherence of the Philippines to the )*3Finternational covenant due topact sunt ser"andahad been ac0no-ledged in La C&e*ise9supraat

page *G:.

$iven these confluence of e1isting la-s aidst the cases involving tradear0s, there can be no

disagreeent to the guiding principle in coercial la- that foreign corporations not engaged in

business in the Philippines a! aintain a cause of action for infringeent priaril! because of

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Section ?)#A of the (radear0 "a- -hen the legal standing to sue is alleged, -hich petitioners have

done in the case at hand.

&n assailing the 6ustification arrived at b! respondent court -hen it recalled the -rit of preliinar!

in6unction, petitioners are of the ipression that actual use of their tradear0s in Philippine

coercial dealings is not an indispensable eleent under Article ? of the Paris Convention in that5

9?: . . . . no condition as to the possession of a doicile or establishent in the

countr! -here protection is claied a! be re>uired of persons entitled to the

benefits of the


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2rgani=ation, )*@) Ed., p. ?G:. ;ithal, the fact that international la- has been ade part of the la-

of the land does not b! an! eans ipl! the priac! of international la- over national la- in the

unicipal sphere. ual, not superior, to national legislative enactents

9Salonga and ap, Public &nternational "a-, 'ourth ed., )*@+, p. )3:.

(he afore>uoted basic provisions of our (radear0 "a-, according to %ustice $utierre=, %r.,

in 5abus&i 5ais&a 6setan "s. 6nter*ediate Appe!!ate Court9?G SCRA F4 H)**)I:, have been

construed in this anner5

A fundaental principle of Philippine (radear0 "a- is that actual use in coerce

in the Philippines is a pre#re>uisite to the ac>uisition of o-nership over a tradear0

or a tradenae.

111 111 111

(hese provisions have been interpreted in Ster!in Products 6nternationa!, 6nc. ".Farbenfabriken Ba$er Actienese!!sc&aft9?@ SCRA )?)+ H)*3*I: in this -a!5

A rule -idel! accepted and firl! entrenched because it has coe

do-n through the !ears is that actual use in coerce or business is

a prere>uisite to the ac>uisition of the right of o-nership over a

tradear0.

111 111 111

. . . Adoption alone of a tradear0 -ould not give e1clusive right

thereto. Such right gro-s out of their actual use. Adoption is not use.2ne a! a0e advertiseents, issue circulars, give out price lists on

certain goods but these alone -ould not give e1clusive right of use.

'or tradear0 is a creation of use. (he underl!ing reason for all

these is that purchasers have coe to understand the ar0 as

indicating the origin of the -ares. 'lo-ing fro this is the trader8s

right to protection in the trade he has built up and the good-ill he has

accuulated fro use of the tradear0. . . .

&n fact, a prior registrant cannot clai e1clusive use of the tradear0 unless it uses it

in coerce.

;e ruleHdI in Paasa 6ndustria! Corporation ". Court of Appea!s9))4 SCRA F?3

H)*4?I:5

. %&e %rade*ark !a/ is "er$ c!ear.6t re2uires actua! co**ercia! use of t&e *ark

prior to its reistration. (here is no dispute that respondent corporation -as the first

registrant, !et it failed to full! substantiate its clai that it used in trade or business in

the Philippines the sub6ect ar0 it did not present proof to invest it -ith e1clusive,

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continuous adoption of the tradear0 -hich should consist aong others, of

considerable sales since its first use. (he invoices 9E1hibits @, @#a, and 4#b:

subitted b! respondent -hich -ere dated -a! bac0 in )*F@ sho- that the =ippers

sent to the Philippines -ere to be used as saples and of no coercial value.

(he evidence for respondent ust be clear, definite and free fro inconsistencies.

9S! Ching v. $a- "ui, ++ SCRA )+4#)+*: Saples are not for sale and therefore,the fact of e1porting the to the Philippines cannot be considered to be e>uivalent to

the use conteplated b! the la-. Respondent did not e1pect incoe fro such

saples. (here -ere no receipts to establish sale, and no proof -ere presented to

sho- that the! -ere subse>uentl! sold in the Philippines. 9Pagasa &ndustrial Corp. v.

Court of Appeals, ))4 SCRA F?3 H)*4?I Ephasis Supplied:

(he records sho- that the petitioner has never conducted an! business in the

Philippines. &t has never prooted its tradenae or tradear0 in the Philippines. &t is

un0no-n to 'ilipino e1cept the ver! fe- -ho a! have noticed it -hile travelling

abroad. &t has never paid a single centavo of ta1 to the Philippine governent.


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(he petitionerHsI -ill not be pre6udiced nor stand to suffer irreparabl! as a

conse>uence of the lifting of the preliinar! in6unction considering that the! are not

actuall! engaged in the anufacture of the cigarettes -ith the tradear0 in >uestion

and the filing of the counterbond -ill apl! ans-er for such daages. 9p. F+. Ro!!oin

$.R. No. *)?.:

More telling are the allegations of petitioners in their coplaint 9p. )*, Ro!!o$.R. No. *)?: as

-ell as in the ver! petition filed -ith this Court 9p. ?, Ro!!oin $.R. No. *)?: indicating that the! are

not doing business in the Philippines, for these fran0 representations are inconsistent and

incongruent -ith an! pretense of a right -hich can breached 9Article )+), Ne- Civil Code Section

+, Rule )?* Section , Rule F4, Revised Rules of Court:. &ndeed, to be entitled to an in6unctive -rit,

petitioner ust sho- that there e1ists a right to be protected and that the facts against -hich

in6unction is directed are violative of said right 9Searth Coodities Corporation vs. Court of

Appeals, ?G@ SCRA 3?? H)**?I:. &t a! be added in this connection that albeit petitioners are

holders of certificate of registration in the Philippines of their s!bols as aditted b! private

respondent, the fact of e1clusive o-nership cannot be ade to rest solel! on these docuents since

doinion over tradear0s is not ac>uired b! the ere fact of registration alone and does not perfecta tradear0 right 9uarter illion pesos annuall!. 2n the other

hand, if the status >uo is aintained, there -ill be no daage that -ould be suffered b! petitioners

inasuch as the! are not doing business in the Philippines.

;ith reference to the second and third issues raised b! petitioners on the lifting of the -rit of

preliinar! in6unction, it cannot be gainsaid that respondent court acted -ell -ithin its prerogatives

under Section 3, Rule F4 of the Revised Rules of Court5

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Sec. 3. Grounds for ob3ection to, or for *otion of disso!ution of in3unction. / (he

in6unction a! be refused or, if granted e( parte, a! be dissolved, upon the

insufficienc! of the coplaint as sho-n b! the coplaint itself, -ith or -ithout notice

to the adverse part!. &t a! also be refused or dissolved on other grounds upon

affidavits on the part of the defendants -hich a! be opposed b! the plaintiff also b!

affidavits. &t a! further be refused or, if granted, a! be dissolved, if it appears afterhearing that although the plaintiff is entitled to the in6unction, the issuance or

continuance thereof, as the case a! be, -ould cause great daage to the

defendant -hile the plaintiff can be full! copensated for such daages as he a!

suffer, and the defendant files a bond in an aount fi1ed b! the 6udge conditioned

that he -ill pa! all daages -hich the plaintiff a! suffer b! the refusal or the

dissolution of the in6unction. &f it appears that the e1tent of the preliinar! in6unction

granted is too great, it ust be odified.


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;7ERE'2RE, the petition is hereb! D&SM&SSED and the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated

Septeber )+, )*4* and Noveber ?*, )*4* are hereb! A''&RMED.

S2 2RDERED.

Bidin, J., concurs.

4a"ide, Jr., concurs in t&e resu!t.

Ro*ero, J. took no part.

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EN BANC

5G.R. No. 1/946. Oc7o8!r 1, 2:::;

SECRETAR O$ %USTICE,petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION,

Pr!, respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

PUNO, J.

2n %anuar! )4, ?GGG, b! a vote of *#3, -e disissed the petition at bar

and ordered the petitioner to furnish private respondent copies of thee1tradition re>uest and its supporting papers and to grant hi a reasonable

period -ithin -hich to file his coent -ith supporting evidence.H)I

2n 'ebruar! , ?GGG, the petitioner tiel! filed an


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!I. The instances cited in the assailed majority decision when the twin rights of notice

and hearing may be dispensed with in this case results in a non sequiturconclusion.

!II. %imene& is not placed in imminent danger of arrest by the #xecutive 'ranch

necessitating notice and hearing.

!III. 'y instituting a (proceeding( not contemplated by ) *o. +-, the /upreme

0ourt has encroached upon the constitutional boundaries separating it from the other

two co1eual branches of government.

I2. 'ail is not a matter of right in proceedings leading to extradition or in extradition

proceedings."345

2n March ?4, ?GGG, a F4#page Coent -as filed b! the private

respondent Mar0 B. %iene=, opposing petitioners


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"9#;#A/, under the 0onstitution3,5 the hilippines adopts the generally accepted

principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy

of peace, euality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nationsuires proof be!ond

reasonable doubt for convictionH)4I-hile a fugitive a! be ordered e1tradited

upon sho-ing of the e1istence of a pria facie case. H)*I'inall!, unli0e in a

criinal case -here 6udgent becoes e1ecutor! upon being rendered final,

in an e1tradition proceeding, our courts a! ad6udge an individual e1traditable

but the President has the final discretion to e1tradite hi. H?GI(he


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adheres to a siilar practice -hereb! the Secretar! of State e1ercises -ide

discretion in balancing the e>uities of the case and the deands of the

nation8s foreign relations before a0ing the ultiate decision to e1tradite.H?)I

A< a" !7ra)'7'o" roc!!)'"( '< "o7 cr'B'"a# '" charac7!r a") 7h!!@a#0a7'o" uired b! a given set of circustances ust begin -ith a

deterination of ther!c'

for procedural safeguards call for the sae 0ind of procedure.H?I

$'=7h. Private respondent -ould also ipress upon the Court the urgenc!

of his right to notice and hearing considering the alleged threat to his libert!

-hich a! be ore priceless than life. H?+I(he supposed threat to private

respondents libert! is perceived to coe fro several provisions of the RP#


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c: a brief stateent of the facts of the case, including, if possible, the tie and location

of the offense

d: a description of the la-s violated

e: a stateent of the e1istence of a -arrant of arrest or finding of guilt or 6udgent ofconviction against the person sought and

f: a


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/ection of this )ecree, the accused shall be released from custody." 6emphasis

supplied7

Both the RP#


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?h'ch ca""o7 a#

r'@a7! r!

%0


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treaties are dul! honored devolves upon the e1ecutive departent -hich has

the copetence and authorit! to so act in the international arena. H)I&t is

traditionall! held that the President has po-er and even supreac! over the

countr!s foreign relations.H?I(he e1ecutive departent is aptl! accorded

deference on atters of foreign relations considering the Presidents ostcoprehensive and ost confidential inforation about the international

scene of -hich he is regularl! briefed b! our diploatic and consular

officials. 7is access to ultra#sensitive ilitar! intelligence data is also

unliited.HI(he deference -e give to the e1ecutive departent is dictated b!

the principle of separation of po-ers. (his principle is one of the cornerstones

of our deocratic governent. &t cannot be eroded -ithout endangering our

governent.

(he Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing criesand one -a! to do it is to facilitate the e1tradition of persons covered b!

treaties dul! entered b! our governent.More and ore, cries are becoing

the concern of one -orld. "a-s involving cries and crie prevention are

undergoing universali=ation. 2ne anifest purpose of this trend to-ards

globali=ation is to den! eas! refuge to a criinal -hose activities threaten the

peace and progress of civili=ed countries. &t is to the great interest of the

Philippines to be part of this irreversible oveent in light of its vulnerabilit! to

cries, especiall! transnational cries.

I" 7'#7'"( 7h! 8a#a"c! '" =a@or o= 7h! '"7!r!roc!!)'"(uires a deterination of -hat

process is due, -hen it is due, and the degree of -hat is due. Stated

other-ise, a r'or )!7!rB'"a7'o"


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the basis of the re>uest for his e1tradition '< B!r!# Bo@!) to the filing in

court of the foral petition for e1tradition. (he e1traditee8s right to 0no-

is BoB!"7ar'# ?'7hh!#) )0r'"( 7h! !@a#0a7'o" uest for his e1tradition. No less

copelling a7 7ha7 ual branch of the governent, the

E1ecutive, -hich has been endo-ed b! our Constitution -ith greater po-er

over atters involving our foreign relations. Needless to state, this balance of

interests is "o7 a


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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 141 S!7!B8!r 24, 2::2

GOERNMENT O$ THE UNITED STATES O$ AMERICA,R!r! a..a. MARCIO &ATACAN CRESPO,respondent

4a"ide Jr., CJ, Be!!osi!!o, Puno, 7itu, Mendoza, Pananiban, +uisu*bin, Ynares1Santiao,

Sando"a!1Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria1Martinez, Corona, Mora!es and Ca!!e3o, Sr.

D E C & S & 2 N

PANGANI&AN, J.:

&n e1tradition proceedings, are prospective e1traditees entitled to notice and hearing before -arrantsfor their arrest can be issuedJ E>uall! iportant, are the! entitled to the right to bail and provisionallibert! -hile the e1tradition proceedings are pendingJ &n general, the ans-er to these t-o novel>uestions is No. (he e1planation of and the reasons for, as -ell as the e1ceptions to, this rule arelaid out in this Decision.

Th! Ca

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 3F of the Rules of Court, see0ing to void and setaside the 2rders dated Ma! ?, ?GG)) and %ul! , ?GG)? issued b! the Regional (rial Court 9R(C: ofManila, Branch +?. (he first assailed 2rder set for hearing petitioners application for the issuanceof a -arrant for the arrest of Respondent Mar0 B. %iene=.

(he second challenged 2rder, on the other hand, directed the issuance of a -arrant, but at the saetie granted bail to %iene=. (he dispositive portion of the 2rder reads as follo-s5

;7ERE'2RE, in the light of the foregoing, the HCourtI finds probable cause againstrespondent Mar0 %iene=. Accordingl! let a ;arrant for the arrest of the respondent beissued. Conse>uentl! and ta0ing into consideration Section *, Rule ))+ of the Revised Rulesof Criinal Procedure, this Court fi1es the reasonable aount of bail for respondentsteporar! libert! at 2NE M&""&2N PES2S 9Php ),GGG,GGG.GG:, the sae to be paid in cash.

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'urtherore respondent is directed to iediatel! surrender to this Court his passport andthe Bureau of &igration and Deportation is li0e-ise directed to include the nae of therespondent in its 7old Departure "ist. +

Essentiall!, the Petition pra!s for the lifting of the bail 2rder, the cancellation of the bond, and theta0ing of %iene= into legal custod!.

Th! $ac7uel to $R No. )*+3F entitled Secretar! of %ustice v. Ralph C. "antion.F

Pursuant to the e1isting RP#


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adopted b! the trial court allo-ing the accused in an e1tradition case to be heard prior to theissuance of a -arrant of arrest.

After the hearing, the court a >uo re>uired the parties to subit their respective eoranda. &n hisMeorandu, %iene= sought an alternative pra!er5 that in case a -arrant should issue, he beallo-ed to post bail in the aount of P)GG,GGG.

(he alternative pra!er of %iene= -as also set for hearing on %une )F, ?GG). (hereafter, the courtbelo- issued its >uestioned %ul! , ?GG) 2rder, directing the issuance of a -arrant for his arrest andfi1ing bail for his teporar! libert! at one illion pesos in cash.))After he had surrendered hispassport and posted the re>uired cash bond, %iene= -as granted provisional libert! via thechallenged 2rder dated %ul! +, ?GG).)?

7ence, this Petition.)

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@. (he conditions attached to the grant of bail are ineffectual and do not ensurecopliance b! the Philippines -ith its obligations under the RP#uestions that this Court -ill address are5 9): -hether %iene= is entitled tonotice and hearing before a -arrant for his arrest can be issued, and 9?: -hether he is entitled to bailand to provisional libert! -hile the e1tradition proceedings are pending. Preliinaril!, -e shall ta0eup the alleged preaturit! of the Petition for Certiorari arising fro petitioners failure to file a Motionfor Reconsideration in the R(C and to see0 relief in the Court of Appeals 9CA:, instead of in thisCourt.)F ;e shall also preliinaril! discuss five e1tradition postulates that -ill guide us in disposingof the substantive issues.

Th! Co0r7F< R0#'"(

(he Petition is eritorious.

Pr!#'B'"ar Ma77!ruent certaint! of return to the locus delicticoissi pla! a corresponding role in the deterrence of flight abroad in order toescape the conse>uence of crie. 1 1 1. 'ro an absence of e1traditionarrangeents flight abroad b! the ingenious criinal receives direct encourageentand thus indirectl! does the coission of crie itself.?

&n Secretar! v. "antion -e e1plained5

(he Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing cries and one -a! to doit is to facilitate the e1tradition of persons covered b! treaties dul! entered HintoI b! ourgovernent. More and ore, cries are becoing the concern of one -orld. "a-s involvingcries and crie prevention are undergoing universali=ation. 2ne anifest purpose of thistrend to-ards globali=ation is to den! eas! refuge to a criinal -hose activities threaten thepeace and progress of civili=ed countries. &t is to the great interest of the Philippines to bepart of this irreversible oveent in light of its vulnerabilit! to cries, especiall!transnational cries.

&ndeed, in this era of globali=ation, easier and faster international travel, and an e1panding ring ofinternational cries and criinals, -e cannot afford to be an isolationist state. ;e need to cooperate-ith other states in order to iprove our chances of suppressing crie in our o-n countr!.

2. Th! R!0!

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the re>uesting state, all relevant and basic rights in the criinal proceedings that -ill ta0e placetherein other-ise, the treat! -ould not have been signed, or -ould have been directl! attac0ed forits unconstitutionalit!.

/. Th! Proc!!)'"(< Ar! S0' G!"!r'uesting state. 2nthe other hand, failure to fulfill our obligations thereunder paints a bad iage of our countr! beforethe -orld counit!. Such failure -ould discourage other states fro entering into treaties -ith us,particularl! an e1tradition treat! that hinges on reciprocit!.+)

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eril!, -e are bound b! pacta sunt servanda to copl! in good faith -ith our obligations under the(reat!.+? (his principle re>uires that -e deliver the accused to the re>uesting countr! if the conditionsprecedent to e1tradition, as set forth in the (reat!, are satisfied. &n other -ords, HtIhe deandinggovernent, -hen it has done all that the treat! and the la- re>uire it to do, is entitled to the deliver!of the accused on the issue of the proper -arrant, and the other governent is under obligation toa0e the surrender.+Accordingl!, the Philippines ust be read! and in a position to deliver the

accused, should it be found proper.

. Th!r! I< a" U")!r#'"( R'uested state in order to th-art their e1traditionto the re>uesting state.

(he present e1tradition case further validates the preise that persons sought to be e1tradited havea propensit! to flee. &ndeed,

e1tradition hearings -ould not even begin, if onl! the accused -ere -illing to subit to trial in there>uesting countr!.+F Prior acts of herein respondent ## 9): leaving the re>uesting state right beforethe conclusion of his indictent proceedings there and 9?: reaining in the re>uested state despitelearning that the re>uesting state is see0ing his return and that the cries he is charged -ith arebailable ## elo>uentl! spea0 of his aversion to the processes in the re>uesting state, as -ell as hispredisposition to avoid the at all cost. (hese circustances point to an ever#present, underl!inghigh ris0 of flight. 7e has deonstrated that he has the capacit! and the -ill to flee. 7aving fledonce, -hat is there to stop hi, given sufficient opportunit!, fro fleeing a second tieJ

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iediate arrest and teporar! detention of the accused -ill best serve the ends of 6ustice.uate for hi to a0e an initial deterination of -hether the accused -as soeone -ho shouldiediatel! be arrested in order to best serve the ends of 6ustice. 7e could have deterined-hether such facts and circustances e1isted as -ould lead a reasonabl! discreet and prudentperson to believe that the e1tradition re>uest -as pria facie eritorious. &n point of fact, he actuall!concluded fro these supporting docuents that probable cause did e1ist. &n the second>uestioned 2rder, he stated5

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&n the instant petition, the docuents sent b! the uestfor e1tradition of herein respondent are enough to convince the Court of the e1istence ofprobable cause to proceed -ith the hearing against the e1traditee. FG

;e stress that the pria facie e1istence of probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, forissuing an arrest -arrant -as alread! evident fro the Petition itself and its supporting docuents.7ence, after having alread! deterined therefro that a pria facie finding did e1ist, respondent

6udge gravel! abused his discretion -hen he set the atter for hearing upon otion of %iene=.F)

Moreover, the la- specifies that the court sets a hearing upon receipt of the ans-er or upon failureof the accused to ans-er after receiving the suons. &n connection -ith the atter of iediatearrest, ho-ever, the -ord hearing is notabl! absent fro the provision. Evidentl!, had the holdingof a hearing at that stage been intended, the la- could have easil! so provided. &t also bearsephasi=ing at this point that e1tradition proceedings are suar!F? in nature. 7ence, the silence ofthe "a- and the (reat! leans to the ore reasonable interpretation that there is no intention to

punctuate -ith a hearing ever! little step in the entire proceedings.

&t is ta0en for granted that the contracting parties intend soething reasonable andsoething not inconsistent -ith generall! recogni=ed principles of &nternational "a-, nor -ithprevious treat! obligations to-ards third States. &f, therefore, the eaning of a treat! isabiguous, the reasonable eaning is to be preferred to the unreasonable, the orereasonable to the less reasonable 1 1 1 . F

eril!, as argued b! petitioner, sending to persons sought to be e1tradited a notice of the re>uest fortheir arrest and setting it for hearing at soe future date -ould give the aple opportunit! toprepare and e1ecute an escape. Neither the (reat! nor the "a- could have

intended that conse>uence, for the ver! purpose of both -ould have been defeated b! the escape ofthe accused fro the re>uested state.

2. O" 7h! &a


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of a -arrant of arrest. All -e re>uired -as that the 6udge ust have sufficient supporting docuentsupon -hich to a0e his independent 6udgent, or at the ver! least, upon -hich to verif! the findingsof the prosecutor as to the e1istence of probable cause.FF

&n ;ebb v. De "eon, F3 the Court categoricall! stated that a 6udge -as not supposed to conduct ahearing before issuing a -arrant of arrest5

Again, -e stress that before issuing -arrants of arrest, 6udges erel! deterine personall!the probabilit!, not the certaint! of guilt of an accused. &n doing so, 6udges do not conduct ade novo hearing to deterine the e1istence of probable cause. (he! 6ust personall! revie-the initial deterination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported b!substantial evidence.

At ost, in cases of clear insufficienc! of evidence on record, 6udges erel! further e1ainecoplainants and their -itnesses.F@ &n the present case, validating the act of respondent 6udge andinstituting the practice of hearing the accused and his -itnesses at this earl! stage -ould bediscordant -ith the rationale for the entire s!ste. &f the accused -ere allo-ed to be heard andnecessaril! to present evidence during the pria facie deterination for the issuance of a -arrant of

arrest,

-hat -ould stop hi fro presenting his entire plethora of defenses at this stage ## if he so desires ##in his effort to negate a pria facie findingJ Such a procedure could convert the deterination of apria facie case into a full#blo-n trial of the entire proceedings and possibl! a0e trial of the aincase superfluous. (his scenario is also anathea to the suar! nature of e1traditions.

(hat the case under consideration is an e1tradition and not a criinal action is not sufficient to 6ustif!the adoption of a set of procedures ore protective of the accused. &f a different procedure -erecalled for at all, a ore restrictive one ## not the opposite ## -ould be 6ustified in vie- of respondentsdeonstrated predisposition to flee.

Since this is a atter of first ipression, -e dee it -ise to restate the proper procedure5


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I< R!uoted above, as -ell as Section + of Rule ))+ of the Rules of Court, applies onl!-hen a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criinal la-s. &t does notappl! to e1tradition proceedings, because e1tradition courts do not render 6udgents of conviction orac>uittal.

Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flo-s fro the presuption of innocence in favor of ever!accused -ho should not be sub6ected to the loss of freedo as thereafter he -ould be entitled toac>uittal, unless his guilt be proved be!ond reasonable doubt. 3G &t follo-s that the constitutionalprovision on bail -ill not appl! to a case li0e e1tradition, -here the presuption of innocence is notat issue.

(he provision in the Constitution stating that the right to bail shall not be ipaired even -hen theprivilege of the -rit of habeas corpus is suspended does not detract fro the rule that theconstitutional right to bail is available onl! in criinal proceedings. &t ust be noted that thesuspension of the privilege of the -rit of habeas corpus finds application onl! to persons 6udiciall!charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directl! connected -ith invasion. 3) 7ence, thesecond sentence in the constitutional provision on bail erel! ephasi=es the right to bail in criinalproceedings for the aforeentioned offenses. &t cannot be ta0en to ean that the right is availableeven in e1tradition proceedings that are not criinal in nature.

(hat the offenses for -hich %iene= is sought to be e1tradited are bailable in the


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No 'o#a7'o" o= D0! Proc!uent opportunit! to be heard is enough. 3F &n thepresent case, respondent -ill be given full opportunit! to be heard subse>uentl!, -hen thee1tradition court hears the Petition for E1tradition. 7ence, there is no violation of his right to dueprocess and fundaental fairness.

Contrar! to the contention of %iene=, -e find no arbitrariness, either, in the iediate deprivationof his libert! prior to his being heard. (hat his arrest and detention -ill not be arbitrar! is sufficientl!ensured b! 9): the D2%s filing in court the Petition -ith its supporting docuents after adeterination that the e1tradition re>uest eets the re>uireents of the la- and the relevant treat!

9?: the e1tradition 6udges independent pria facie deterination that his arrest -ill best serve theends of 6ustice before the issuance of a -arrant for his arrest and 9: his opportunit!, once he isunder the courts custod!, to appl! for bail as an e1ception to the no#initial#bail rule.

&t is also -orth noting that before the uested the e1tradition of respondent,proceedings had alread! been conducted in that countr!. But because he left the 6urisdiction of there>uesting state before those proceedings could be copleted, it -as hindered fro continuing -iththe due processes prescribed under its la-s. 7is invocation of due process no- has thus becoehollo-. 7e alread! had that opportunit! in the re>uesting state !et, instead of ta0ing it, he ran a-a!.

&n this light, -ould it be proper and 6ust for the governent to increase the ris0 of violating its treat!obligations in order to accord Respondent %iene= his personal libert! in the span of tie that itta0es to resolve the Petition for E1traditionJ 7is supposed iediate deprivation of libert! -ithoutthe due process that he had previousl! shunned pales against the governents interest in fulfillingits E1tradition (reat! obligations and in cooperating -ith the -orld counit! in the suppression ofcrie. &ndeed, HcIonstitutional liberties do not e1ist in a vacuu the due process rights accorded toindividuals ust be carefull! balanced against e1igent and palpable governent interests. 33

(oo, -e cannot allo- our countr! to be a haven for fugitives, co-ards and -ea0lings -ho, instead offacing the conse>uences of their actions, choose to run and hide. 7ence, it -ould not be good polic!to increase the ris0 of violating our treat! obligations if, through overprotection or e1cessivel! liberaltreatent, persons sought to be e1tradited are able to evade arrest or escape fro our custod!. &nthe absence of an! provision ## in the Constitution, the la- or the treat! ## e1pressl! guaranteeing theright to bail in e1tradition proceedings, adopting the practice of not granting the bail, as a generalrule, -ould be a step to-ards deterring fugitives fro coing to the Philippines to hide fro or

evade their prosecutors.89/p&i8.n:t

(he denial of bail as a atter of course in e1tradition cases falls into place -ith and gives life toArticle )+3@ of the (reat!, since this practice -ould encourage the accused to voluntaril! surrender tothe re>uesting state to cut short their detention here. "i0e-ise, their detention pending the resolutionof e1tradition proceedings -ould fall into place -ith the ephasis of the E1tradition "a- on thesuar! nature of e1tradition cases and the need for their speed! disposition.

Ec!7'o"< 7o 7h! No &a'# R0#!

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(he rule, -e repeat, is that bail is not a atter of right in e1tradition cases. 7o-ever, the 6udiciar!has the constitutional dut! to curb grave abuse of discretion34 and t!rann!, as -ell as the po-er toproulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights. 3* 'urtherore, -e believe that the rightto due process is broad enough to include the grant of basic fairness to e1traditees. &ndeed, the rightto due process e1tends to the life, libert! or propert! of ever! person. &t is d!naic and resilient,adaptable to ever! situation calling for its application.@G

Accordingl! and to best serve the ends of 6ustice, -e believe and so hold that, after a potentiale1traditee has been arrested or placed under the custod! of the la-, bail a! be applied for andgranted as an e1ception, onl! upon a clear and convincing sho-ing 9): that, once granted bail, theapplicant -ill not be a flight ris0 or a danger to the counit! and 9?: that there e1ist special,huanitarian and copelling circustances@) including, as a atter of reciprocit!, those cited b! thehighest court in the re>uesting state -hen it grants provisional libert! in e1tradition cases therein.

Since this e1ception has no e1press or specific statutor! basis, and since it is derived essentiall!fro general principles of 6ustice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the abovet-o#tiered re>uireent -ith clarit!, precision and ephatic forcefulness. (he Court reali=es thate1tradition is basicall! an e1ecutive, not a 6udicial, responsibilit! arising fro the presidential po-er

to conduct foreign relations. &n its barest concept, it parta0es of the nature of police assistanceaongst states, -hich is not norall! a 6udicial prerogative. 7ence, an! intrusion b! the courts intothe e1ercise of this po-er should be characteri=ed b! caution, so that the vital international andbilateral interests of our countr! -ill not be unreasonabl! ipeded or coproised. &n short, -hilethis Court is ever protective of the sporting idea of fair pla!, it also recogni=es the liits of its o-nprerogatives and the need to fulfill international obligations.

Along this line, %iene= contends that there are special circustances that are copelling enoughfor the Court to grant his re>uest for provisional release on bail. ;e have carefull! e1ained thesecircustances and shall no- discuss the.

). Alleged Disenfranchiseent

;hile his e1tradition -as pending, Respondent %iene= -as elected as a eber of the 7ouse ofRepresentatives. 2n that basis, he clais that his detention -ill disenfranchise his Manila district of3GG,GGG residents. ;e are not persuaded. &n People v. %alos6os,@? the Court has alread! debun0edthe disenfranchiseent arguent -hen it ruled thus5

;hen the voters of his district elected the accused#appellant to Congress, the! did so -ithfull a-areness of the liitations on his freedo of action. (he! did so -ith the 0no-ledgethat he could achieve onl! such legislative results -hich he could accoplish -ithin theconfines of prison. (o give a ore drastic illustration, if voters elect a person -ith full0no-ledge that he is suffering fro a terinal illness, the! do so 0no-ing that at an! tie, hea! no longer serve his full ter in office.

&n the ultiate anal!sis, the issue before us boils do-n to a >uestion of constitutional e>ualprotection.

(he Constitution guarantees5 1 1 1 nor shall an! person be denied the e>ual protection ofla-s. (his sipl! eans that all persons siilarl! situated shall be treated ali0e both inrights en6o!ed and responsibilities iposed. (he organs of governent a! not sho- an!undue favoritis or hostilit! to an! person. Neither partialit! nor pre6udice shall be displa!ed.

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Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allo-s differenttreatentJ &s being a Congressan a substantial differentiation -hich reoves the accused#appellant as a prisoner fro the sae class as all persons validl! confined under la-J

(he perforance of legitiate and even essential duties b! public officers has never been ane1cuse to free a person validl! HfroI prison. (he duties iposed b! the andate of the

people are ultifarious. (he accused#appellant asserts that the dut! to legislate ran0shighest in the hierarch! of governent. (he accused#appellant is onl! one of ?FG ebersof the 7ouse of Representatives, not to ention the ?+ ebers of the Senate, charged-ith the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function -ell in the ph!sical absence ofone or a fe- of its ebers. Depending on the e1igenc! of $overnent that has to beaddressed, the President or the Supree Court can also be deeed the highest for thatparticular dut!. (he iportance of a function depends on the need for its e1ercise. (he dut!of a other to nurse her infant is ost copelling under the la- of nature. A doctor -ithuni>ue s0ills has the dut! to save the lives of those -ith a particular affliction. An electivegovernor has to serve provincial constituents. A police officer ust aintain peace and order.Never has the call of a particular dut! lifted a prisoner into a different classification frothose others -ho are validl! restrained b! la-.

A strict scrutin! of classifications is essential lestH,I -ittingl! or other-ise, insidiousdiscriinations are ade in favor of or against groups or t!pes of individuals.

(he Court cannot validate badges of ine>ualit!. (he necessities iposed b! public -elfarea! 6ustif! e1ercise of governent authorit! to regulate even if thereb! certain groups a!plausibl! assert that their interests are disregarded.

;e, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressan is not a reasonableclassification in criinal la- enforceent. (he functions and duties of the office are notsubstantial distinctions -hich lift hi fro the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedoand restricted in libert! of oveent. "a-ful arrest and confineent are gerane to thepurposes of the la- and appl! to all those belonging to the sae class.@

&t ust be noted that even before private respondent ran for and -on a congressional seat in Manila,it -as alread! of public 0no-ledge that the uesting his e1tradition. 7ence, hisconstituents -ere or should have been prepared for the conse>uences of the e1tradition caseagainst their representative, including his detention pending the final resolution of the case.Preises considered and in line -ith %alos6os, -e are constrained to rule against his clai that hiselection to public office is b! itself a copelling reason to grant hi bail.

2. A"7'c'a7!) D!#a

Respondent %iene= further contends that because the e1tradition proceedings are length!, it -ouldbe unfair to confine hi during the pendenc! of the case. Again -e are not convinced. ;e ust

ephasi=e that e1tradition cases are suar! in nature. (he! are resorted to erel! to deterine-hether the e1tradition petition and its anne1es confor to the E1tradition (reat!, not to deterineguilt or innocence. Neither is it, as a rule, intended to address issues relevant to the constitutionalrights available to the accused in a criinal action.

;e are not overruling the possibilit! that petitioner a!, in bad faith, undul! dela! the proceedings.(his is >uite another atter that is not at issue here. (hus, an! further discussion of this point -ouldbe erel! anticipator! and acadeic.

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7o-ever, if the dela! is due to aneuverings of respondent, -ith all the ore reason -ould thegrant of bail not be 6ustified. $iving preiu to dela! b! considering it as a special circustance forthe grant of bail -ould be tantaount to giving hi the po-er to grant bail to hiself. &t -ould alsoencourage hi to stretch out and unreasonabl! dela! the e1tradition proceedings even ore. (his-e cannot allo-.

/. No7 a $#'(h7 R'uest in %une )*** !et, he has not fled the countr!. (rue, he has not actuall! fledduring the preliinar! stages of the re>uest for his e1tradition. et, this fact cannot be ta0en to eanthat he -ill not flee as the process oves for-ard to its conclusion, as he hears the footsteps of there>uesting governent inching closer and closer. (hat he has not !et fled fro the Philippinescannot be ta0en to ean that he -ill stand his ground and still be -ithin reach of our governent ifand -hen it atters that is, upon the resolution of the Petition for E1tradition.

&n an! event, it is settled that bail a! be applied for and granted b! the trial court at an!tie afterthe applicant has been ta0en into custod! and prior to 6udgent, even after bail has been previousl!

denied. &n the present case, the e1tradition court a! continue hearing evidence on the applicationfor bail, -hich a! be granted in accordance -ith the guidelines in this Decision.

&r'!= R!=07a7'o" o= D'uires to be suar! in character. ;hat -e need no- is prudent and deliberate speed, not

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unnecessar! and convoluted dela!. ;hat is needed is a fir decision on the erits, not a circuitouscop#out.

(hen, there is also the suggestion that this Court is allegedl! disregarding basic freedos -hen acase is one of e1tradition. ;e believe that this charge is not onl! baseless, but also unfair. Suffice itto sa! that, in its length and breath, this Decision has ta0en special cogni=ance of the rights to due

process and fundaental fairness of potential e1traditees.

S0BBa7'o"

As -e dra- to a close, it is no- tie to suari=e and stress these ten points5

). (he ultiate purpose of e1tradition proceedings is to deterine -hether the re>ueste1pressed in the petition, supported b! its anne1es and the evidence that a! be adducedduring the hearing of the petition, coplies -ith the E1tradition (reat! and "a- and -hetherthe person sought is e1traditable. (he proceedings are intended erel! to assist there>uesting state in bringing the accused ## or the fugitive -ho has illegall! escaped ## bac0 toits territor!, so that the criinal process a! proceed therein.

?. B! entering into an e1tradition treat!, the Philippines is deeed to have reposed its trust inthe reliabilit! or soundness of the legal and 6udicial s!ste of its treat! partner, as -ell as inthe abilit! and the -illingness of the latter to grant basic rights to the accused in the pendingcriinal case therein.

. B! nature then, e1tradition proceedings are not e>uivalent to a criinal case in -hich guiltor innocence is deterined. Conse>uentl!, an e1tradition case is not one in -hich theconstitutional rights of the accused are necessaril! available. &t is ore a0in, if at all, to acourts re>uest to police authorities for the arrest of the accused -ho is at large or hasescaped detention or 6uped bail. 7aving once escaped the 6urisdiction of the re>uestingstate, the reasonable pria facie presuption is that the person -ould escape again if given

the opportunit!.

+. &ediatel! upon receipt of the petition for e1tradition and its supporting docuents, the6udge shall a0e a pria facie finding -hether the petition is sufficient in for andsubstance, -hether it coplies -ith the E1tradition (reat! and "a-, and -hether the personsought is e1traditable. (he agistrate has discretion to re>uire the petitioner to subitfurther docuentation, or to personall! e1aine the affiants or -itnesses. &f convinced that apria facie case e1ists, the 6udge iediatel! issues a -arrant for the arrest of the potentiale1traditee and suons hi or her to ans-er and to appear at scheduled hearings on thepetition.

F. After being ta0en into custod!, potential e1traditees a! appl! for bail. Since theapplicants have a histor! of absconding, the! have the burden of sho-ing that 9a: there is no

flight ris0 and no danger to the counit! and 9b: there e1ist special, huanitarian orcopelling circustances. (he grounds used b! the highest court in the re>uesting state forthe grant of bail therein a! be considered, under the principle of reciprocit! as a specialcircustance. &n e1tradition cases, bail is not a atter of right it is sub6ect to 6udicialdiscretion in the conte1t of the peculiar facts of each case.

3. Potential e1traditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundaental fairness.Due process does not al-a!s call for a prior opportunit! to be heard. A subse>uentopportunit! is sufficient due to the flight ris0 involved. &ndeed, available during the hearings

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on the petition and the ans-er is the full chance to be heard and to en6o! fundaentalfairness that is copatible -ith the suar! nature of e1tradition.

@. (his Court -ill al-a!s reain a protector of huan rights, a bastion of libert!, a bul-ar0 ofdeocrac! and the conscience of societ!. But it is also -ell a-are of the liitations of itsauthorit! and of the need for respect for the prerogatives of the other co#e>ual and co#

independent organs of governent.

4. ;e reali=e that e1tradition is essentiall! an e1ecutive, not a 6udicial, responsibilit! arisingout of the presidential po-er to conduct foreign relations and to ipleent treaties. (hus, theE1ecutive Departent of governent has broad discretion in its dut! and po-er ofipleentation.

*. 2n the other hand, courts erel! perfor oversight functions and e1ercise revie-authorit! to prevent or e1cise grave abuse and t!rann!. (he! should not allo- contortions,dela!s and over#due process ever! little step of the -a!, lest these suar! e1traditionproceedings becoe not onl! inutile but also sources of international ebarrassent due toour inabilit! to copl! in good faith -ith a treat! partners siple re>uest to return a fugitive.

;orse, our countr! should not be converted into a dubious haven -here fugitives andescapees can unreasonabl! dela!, uif!, oc0, frustrate, chec0ate and defeat the>uest for bilateral 6ustice and international cooperation.

)G. At botto, e1tradition proceedings should be conducted -ith all deliberate speed todeterine copliance -ith the E1tradition (reat! and "a- and, -hile safeguarding basicindividual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions, dela!s and technicalities that a! negatethat purpose.

;7ERE'2RE, the Petition is $RAN(ED. (he assailed R(C 2rder dated Ma! ?, ?GG) is hereb!declared N

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Ra*on A. Gonza!es in &is o/n be&a!f as petitioner.

0ffice of t&e So!icitor Genera! and 'stanis!ao Fernandez for respondents.

CONCEPCION, J.:

(his is an original action for prohibition -ith preliinar! in6unction.

&t is not disputed that on Septeber ??, )*3, respondent E1ecutive Secretar! authori=ed the

iportation of 3@,GGG tons of foreign rice to be purchased fro private sources, and created a rice

procureent coittee coposed of the other respondents herein)for the ipleentation of said

proposed iportation. (hereupon, or Septeber ?F, )*3, herein petitioner, Raon A. $on=ales /

a rice planter, and president of the &loilo Pala! and Corn Planters Association, -hose ebers are,

li0e-ise, engaged in the production of rice and corn / filed the petition herein, averring that, in

a0ing or attepting to a0e said iportation of foreign rice, the aforeentioned respondents are

acting -ithout 6urisdiction or in e1cess of 6urisdiction, because Republic Act No. +F? -hich

allegedl! repeals or aends Republic Act No. ??G / e1plicitl! prohibits the iportation of rice and

corn the Rice and Corn Adinistration or an$ ot&er o"ern*ent aenc$ that petitioner has noother plain, speed! and ade>uate reed! in the ordinar! course of la- and that a preliinar!

in6unction is necessar! for the preservation of the rights of the parties during the pendenc! this case

and to prevent the 6udgent therein fro coing ineffectual. Petitioner pra!ed, therefore, that said

petition be given due course that a -rit of preliinar! in6unction be forth-ith issued restraining

respondent their agents or representatives fro ipleenting the decision of the E1ecutive

Secretar! to iport the aforeentioned foreign rice and that, after due hearing, 6udgent be

rendered a0ing said in6unction peranent.

'orth-ith, respondents -ere re>uired to file their ans-er to the petition -hich the! did, and

petitioner8s pra! for a -rit of preliinar! in6unction -as set for hearing at -hich both parties

appeared and argued orall!. Moreover, a eorandu -as filed, shortl! thereafter, b! therespondents. Considering, later on, that the resolution said incident a! re>uire soe

pronounceents that -ould be ore appropriate in a decision on the erits of the case, the sae

-as set for hearing on the erits thereafter. (he parties, ho-ever, -aived the right to argue orall!,

although counsel for respondents filed their eoranda.

&. Sufficienc$ of petitioner;s interest.

Respondents aintain that the status of petitioner as a rice planter does not give hi sufficient

interest to file the petition herein and secure the relief therein pra!ed for. ;e find no erit in this

pretense. Apart fro prohibiting the iportation of rice and corn b! the Rice and Corn

Adinistration or an! other governent agenc!. Republic Act No. +F? declares, in Section )thereof, that the polic! of the $overnent is to engage in the purchase of these basic

foods direct!$fro those tenants, farers, gro-ers, producers and lando-ners in t&e

P&i!ippines-ho -ish to dispose of their products at a price that -ill afford the a fair and 6ust return

for their labor and capital investent. ... . Pursuant to this provision, petitioner, as a planter -ith a

rice land of substantial proportion,?is entitled to a chance to sell to the $overnent the rice it no-

see0s to bu! abroad. Moreover, since the purchase of said coodit! -ill have to be effected -ith

public funds ainl! raised b! ta1ation, and as a rice producer and lando-ner petitioner ust

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necessaril! be a ta1pa!er, it follo-s that he has sufficient personalit! and interest to see0 6udicial

assistance -ith a vie- to restraining -hat he believes to be an attept to unla-full! disburse said

funds.

&&. '(&austion of ad*inistrati"e re*edies.

Respondents assail petitioner8s right to the reliefs pra!ed for because he has not e1hausted all

adinistrative reedies available to hi before coing to court. ;e have alread! held, ho-ever,

that the principle re>uiring the previous e1haustion of adinistrative reedies is not applicable

-here the >uestion in dispute is purel! a legal one,or -here the controverted act is patentl!

illegal or -as perfored -ithout 6urisdiction or in e1cess of 6urisdiction,+or -here the respondent is

a departent secretar!, -hose acts as an alter#ego of the President bear the iplied or assued

approval of the latter,Funless actuall! disapproved b! hi,3or -here there are circustances

indicating the urgenc! of 6udicial intervention.@(he case at bar fails under each one of the foregoing

e1ceptions to the general rule. Respondents8 contention is, therefore, untenable.

&&&. Merits of petitioner;s cause of action.

Respondents >uestion the sufficienc! of petitioner8s cause of action upon the theor! that the

proposed iportation in >uestion is not governed b! Republic Acts Nos. ??G@ and +F?, but -as

authori=ed b! the President as Coander#in#Chief for ilitar! stoc0 pile purposes in the e1ercise

of his alleged authorit! under Section ? of Coon-ealth Act No. )4that in cases of necessit!, the

President or his subordinates a! ta0e such preventive easure for the restoration of good order

and aintenance of peace and that, as Coander#in#Chief of our ared forces, the President ...

is dut!#bound to prepare for the challenge of threats of -ar or eergenc! -ithout/aitin for an$

specia! aut&orit$.

Regardless of -hether Republic Act No. +F? repeals Republic Act No. ??G@, as contended b!petitioner herein # on -hich our vie- need not be e1pressed / -e are unaniousl! of the opinion #

assuing that said Republic Act No. ??G@ is still in force / that the t-o Acts are applicable to the

proposed iportation in >uestion because the language of said la-s is such as to include -ithin the

purvie- thereof a!!iportations of rice and corn into the Philippines. Pursuant to Republic Act No.

??G@, it shall be unla-ful for an$person, association, corporation oro"ern*ent aenc$to iport

rice and corn into an! point in the Philippines, although, b! -a! of e1ception, it adds, that


53/157

I

). (he iportation peritted in Republic Act

Set 4 Consti

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Transcript of Set 4 Consti