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C O N S T I T U T I O N A L L A W 1

VILLENA VS SECRETARY OF THE INTERIORPosted by kaye lee on 10:39 PMG.R. No. L-46570 April 21 1939

FACTS:Division of Investigation of the DOJ, upon the request of the Secretary of the Interior, conducted an inquiry into the

conduct of the Villena, mayor of Makati, Rizal, as a result of which the latter was found to have committed bribery,extortion, malicious abuse of authority ad unauthorized practice of the law profession. The respondent recommendedthe suspension of Villena to the President of the Philippines, in which it was verbally granted. The Secretary thensuspended Villena from office. Villena filed a petition for preliminary injunction against the Sec. to restrain him and hisagents from proceeding with the investigation.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Secretary of the Interior has jurisdiction or authority to suspend and order investigation overVillena.

RULING:The Secretary of Interior has the power to order investigation and to suspend Mayor Villena. As to the power to order

investigation, it was provided in Section 79 (C) of RAC that Department of Interior was given the authority tosupervise bureaus and offices under its jurisdiction. This was interpreted in relation to Section 86 of the same Codewhich granted the said Department of executive supervision over administration of provinces, municipalities andother political subdivisions. This supervision covers the power to order investigation because supervision impliesauthority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to render power real and effective.However, unlike this power toorder investigation, the power to suspend a mayor was not provided in any law. There was no express grant ofauthority to the Secretary of Interior to suspend a Mayor. Nevertheless, Section 2188 of the Administrative Codegranted the provincial governor the power of suspension. Yet this did not mean that the grant precluded theSecretary of Interior.

The Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency which provides that the acts of the department secretaries, performed andpromulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the President,

presumptively the acts of the President. The power to suspend may be exercised by the President. It follows that theheads of the Department under her may also exercise the same, unless the law required the President to actpersonally or that situation demanded him so, because the heads of the departments are assistants and agents ofthe President.Categories:Constitutional Law 1,G.R. No. L-46570

the power to removeJose Villena was the then mayor of Makati in the 1930s. After investigation, the Secretary of Interior recommendedthe suspension of Villena with the Office of the president who approved the same. The Secretary then suspendedVillena. Villena averred claiming that the Secretary has no jurisdiction over the matter. The power or jurisdiction islodged in the local government [the governor] pursuant to sec 2188 of the Administrative Code. Further, even if therespondent Secretary of the Interior has power of supervision over local governments, that power, according to theconstitution, must be exercised in accordance with the provisions of law and the provisions of law governing trials of

charges against elective municipal officials are those contained in sec 2188 of the Administrative Code as amended.In other words, the Secretary of the Interior must exercise his supervision over local governments, if he has thatpower under existing law, in accordance with sec 2188 of the Administrative Code, as amended, as the latterprovisions govern the procedure to be followed in suspending and punishing elective local officials while sec 79 (C) ofthe Administrative Code is the genera law which must yield to the special law.ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Interior can suspend an LGU official under investigation.HELD: Yes.
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There is no clear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a mayor of a municipality who is underinvestigation. On the contrary, the power appears lodged in the provincial governor by sec 2188 of the AdministrativeCode which provides that The provincial governor shall receive and investigate complaints made under oath againstmunicipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, andconviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude.The fact, however, that the power of suspension is expressly granted by sec 2188 of the Administrative Code to the

provincial governor does not mean that the grant is necessarily exclusive and precludes the Secretary of theInterior from exercising a similar power. For instance, Villena admitted in the oral argument that the President of thePhilippines may himself suspend the petitioner from office in virtue of his greater power of removal (sec. 2191, asamended, Administrative Code) to be exercised conformably to law. Indeed, if the President could, in the mannerprescribed by law, remove a municipal official; it would be a legal incongruity if he were to be devoid of the lesserpower of suspension. And the incongruity would be more patent if, possessed of the power both to suspend and toremove a provincial official (sec. 2078, Administrative Code), the President were to be without the power to suspenda municipal official. The power to suspend a municipal official is not exclusive. Preventive suspension may be issuedto give way for an impartial investigation.

Isidro C. Ang- Angco, petitioner, vs. Hon. Natalio P. Castillo, Et. Al.,respondents No. L-17169. November 30,1963 (9 SCRA 619)

Constitutional Law 1 Sec. 17The President shall have control of all the executive departments, burea us, andoffices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. Isidro C. Ang- Angco, petitioner, vs. Hon. Natalio P.Castillo, Et. Al., respondents

No. L-17169. November 30,1963 (9 SCRA 619)

Facts: February 12, 1960- Collector of Customs Isidro Ang-Angco was resigned effective o n the date of notice,with prejudice to reinstatement in the Bureau of Customs, being found guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interestof the service by Executive Secretary Natalio P. Castillo, by authority of the President. Upon learning of the decisionthrough the newpapers, Ang-Angco requested for rec onsideration : calling attention to the fact that the action takenby Secretary Castillo in removing him from office had the effect of depriving him of his stat utory right to have his

case originally decided by the Commissioner of Civil Ser vice, as well as his right to appeal to the Civil service Boardof Appeals, whos e decision under Republic Act No. 2260 is final, besides the fact that such dec isions is in violationof the guaranty vouchsafed by the Constitution to officer s or employees in the civil service against removal orsuspension except for cau se in the manner provided by law. Secretary Castillo, on authority of President Garciadenied the appeal; he asse rted that the President by virtue of his power of control over all executive dep artments,bureaus and offices, can take direct action and dispose of the adminis trative case in question inasmuch as theprovisions of law that would seem to ve st final authority in subordinate officers of the executive branch of the government over administrative matters falling under their jurisdiction cannot divest the President of his power of control nordiminish the same. After exhausting all administrative remedies available for Ang-Angco to secure h is reinstatementto the office from which he was removed without valid cause or in violation of his right to due process of law, he filedbefore the Supreme Cou rt, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with a petition for the issuance of apreliminary mandatory injunction. Citing that Secretary Castillo violated : Sec. 16 (i) of the Civil Service Act o f 1959which vests in the Commissioner of Civil Service the original and exclusi ve jurisdiction to decide administrativecases against officers and employees in the classified service; deprived him of his right to appeal under Section 18 (b) of the same Act of the Civil Service Board of Appeals whose decision on the ma tter is final, and removed him fromthe service without due process in violation of Section 32 of the same Act, and of Section 4, Article XII of theConstitutio n, which provides No officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed e xcept for cause asprovided for by law. Petitioner is an officer who belongs to t he classified civil service and is not a presidentialappointee, but one appoint ed by the Secretary of Finance under the Revised Administrative Code, he cannot beremoved from the service in utter disregard of the provisions of the Civil Se rvice Act of 1959. Respondent contendedthat whether the officers or employees concerned are presid ential appointees or belong to the classified civil service,

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if they are officer s and employees in the executive department, they all come under the control of the President andtherefore, his power of removal may be exercised over them dir ectly without distinction. They held, as in the case ofNegado v. Castro, 55 OG. , 10534, the President may modify or set aside a decision of the Civil Service B oard of

Appeals at the instance of the office concerned, or the employee, or may even do so motu proprio, there would be inthe final analysis no logical differ ence between removing petitioner by direct action of the President and separatin ghim from the service by ultimate action by the President should an appeal be t aken from the decision of the Civil

Service Board of Appeals to him, or if in hi s discretion he may motu proprio consider it necessary to review theBoards decision.

Issue:

Whether or not the President has the power to take direct action on the case of petitioner even if he belongs to theclassified services, in spite of provisions now in force in the Civil Service Act of 1959.

Held: No. Section 16 9i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the Commissioner of the Civil Service who has theoriginal and exclusive jurisdiction to decide administrative cases of all officers an employees in the classified service.The only limitation to this power is that the decision of the Commissioner may be appealed to the Civil Service Boardof Appeals, in which case said Board shall have decided within a period of 90 days, whose decision in such caseshall be final (Section 18, Republic Act 2260). The only law that can be cited for the President to be empowered toremove officers and employees in the classified civil service is Section 64 (b) of the revised Administrative Code; butthe phrase conformably to law is significant. It show s that the president does not have blanket authority to removeany officer or employee of the government but that his power is still subject to the law that may be passed by thelegislative body particularly with regard to the procedure, ca use and finality of the removal of the persons who maybe subject to the disciplinary action. The power of the President merely applies to the exercise of control over theacts of the subordinate and not over the actor or agent himself of t he act. It means that the President may set asidethe judgment or action taken b y a subordinate in the performance of his duties. It is still the Department Head,pursuant to Section 79 (C ) who is given the direct control of all bureaus and offices under his department by virtue ofwhich he may repeal or modify decisions of the chiefs of said bureaus or offices, and under section 74 of the sameCode, the Presidents control over the executive department refers to matters of general policy. The Civil Servicesystem has the beneficient purpose of giving stability to the tenure of office of those who belong to the classifiedservice. In conclusion, the direct action taken by Secretary Castillo with authority of t he President on the

administrative case of the petitioner, without submitting the same to the Commissioner of Civil Service is contrary tolaw and should be set aside. The petitioner was reinstated to service, without prejudice to submitting his case to theCommissioner of Civil Service to be dealt according to law.

Note : Section 32 of the Civil Service law of 1959 echoes the constitutionally protected security of tenure: no officeror employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law. Shall beentitled to a forma l investigation if he so desires. A civil service employee should be heard before he is condemned.Jurisprudence has clung to this rule with such unrelentless grasp that by now it would appear trite to make citationthereof (Perez v. Subido, et al., L 26791, June 22, 1968, 28 CSRA 1074). Sheila A. Artillero LLB 1 CPC

Macalintal vs PET, GR 191618, June 7, 2011

Posted byPius Morados onNovember 13, 2011(Admin Law, PET, Quasi-judicial power)Facts: Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: The Supreme Court, sittingen banc, shall be the sole

judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and maypromulgate its rules for the purpose.Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established bylaw shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
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The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the SCs decision dismissing the formers petitionand declaring the establishment of the respondent PET as constitutional.

Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution does not providefor the creation of the PET, and it violates Sec 12, Art VIII of the Constitution.

The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm footing on the basis of the grant of authorityto the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all election contests for the President or Vice-President under par 7,Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution.

Issue:1. Whether or not PET is constitutional.2. Whether or not PET exercises quasi-judicial power.Held:

1. Yes. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional Commission to a Presidential Electoral Tribunal,with Fr. Joaquin Bernas categorically declaring that in crafting the last paragraph of Sec. 4, Art VII of the 1987Constitution, they constitutionalized what was statutory. Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by thesame Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed

by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidentialelections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect.2. No. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that

the power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. The setup embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterize the resolution of electoral contests as essentially anexercise of judicial power. When the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidentialelection contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power.

The COMELEC, HRET and SETare not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of law,they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicialpower, because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC)and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution.

Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal

Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal

G.R. No. 191618 June 7, 2011

Nachura, J.

Issue:

whether or not Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PresidentialElectoral Tribunal (PET); whether or not the PET violates Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution

Held:

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A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of authority to the SupremeCourt sitting enbanc. In the same vein, although the method by which the Supreme Court exercises this authority isnot specified in the provision, the grant of power does not contain any limitation on the Supreme Courts exercisethereof. The Supreme Courtsmethod of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, through thePET, is actually a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision.Thus, the subsequent directive in the provision for the Supreme Court to promulgate its rules for the purpose.

The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is equivalent to the full authority conferredupon the electoral tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives, i.e.,the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET)and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)

Next, petitioner still claims that the PET exercises quasi -judicial power and, thus, its members violate the proscriptionin Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, which reads:

SEC. 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to anyagency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which providesthat the power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.Consistent with our presidential system of government, the function of dealing with the settlement of disputes,controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable isapportioned to courts of justice. With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power was expanded to include theduty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable andenforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess

of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. The power was expanded, but itremained absolute.

The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes the resolution of electoral contestsas essentially an exercise of judicial power.

At the barangayand municipal levels, original and exclusive jurisdiction over election contests is vested inthe municipal or metropolitan trial courts and the regional trial courts, respectively.

At the higher levels city, provincial, and regional, as well as congressional and senatorial exclusiveand original jurisdiction is lodged in the COMELEC and in the House of Representatives and Senate ElectoralTribunals,which are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law . Although not courts of law, they are,nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power,because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) andSection 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution. Besides, when the

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COMELEC, the HRET, and the SET decide election contests, their decisions are still subject to judicial review via a petition for certiorarifiled by the proper party if there is a showing that the decision was rendered with graveabuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidentialelection contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power.

The present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with latters exercise of judicialpower inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, with full authorityin the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts oflaw, expressly provided in the Constitution.

Note:

The PET is not simply an agency to which Members of the Court were designated. Once again, the PET, asintended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institutionindependent, but not separate, from the judicialdepartment, i.e., the Supreme Court.

Atty. Evillo C. Pormento v. Joseph Ejercito "Erap" Estrada and Comelec, G.R. No. 191988, August 31, 2010R E S O L U T I O N

CORONA, C.J.:

I. THE FACTS

Private respondent Joseph Erap Ejercito Estrada was elected President of the Republic of the Philippinesin the general elections held on May 11, 1998. He was however ousted [resigned according to the decision of theSupreme Court in Estrada vs. Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001] from office and was not able to finish histerm. He sought the presidency again in the general elections held on May 10, 2010. Petitioner Atty. Evillo C.Pormento opposed Eraps candidacy and filed a petition for the latters disqualification, which was however denied bythe COMELEC 2ndDivision.His motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the COMELEC en banc.

Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorarion May 7, 2010. However, under the Rules of Court, the filingof such petition would not stay the execution of the judgment, final order or resolution of the COMELEC that is soughtto be reviewed.Besides, petitioner did not even pray for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ ofpreliminary injunction. Hence, private respondent was able to participate as a candidate for the position of Presidentin the May 10, 2010elections where he garnered the second highest number of votes.

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II. THE ISSUE

What is the proper interpretation of the following provision of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution: [t]hePresident shall not be eligible for any re-election?

III. THE RULING

[The petition was DENIED DUE COURSEand thereby DISMISSEDby the Supreme Court.]

Private respondent was not elected President the second time he ran [in the May 2010 elections]. Since theissue on the proper interpretation of the phrase any reelectionwill be premised on a persons second (whetherimmediate or not) election as President, there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case. No live conflict oflegal rights exists. There is in this case no definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches on the legalrelations of parties having adverse legal interests. No specific relief may conclusively be decreed upon by this Courtin this case that will benefit any of the parties herein. As such, one of the essential requisites for the exercise ofthe power of judicial review, the existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely lacking in this case.

As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. The Court is not empowered todecide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the resultas to the thing in issue in the case before it. In other words, when a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable.

An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issuesinvolved have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one isnot entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. There is nothingfor the court to resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events.

Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a President who hasbeen duly elected in the May 10, 2010 elections, the same is no longer true today. Following the results ofthat elections, private respondent was not elected President for the second time. Thus, any discussion of hisreelection will simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose.

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=======

Republic of the Philippines v. SandiganbayanGR. No. 152154, July 15, 2003, Corona, J.

FACTS:Republic (petitioner), through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), represented by the Officeof the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan pursuant to RA 1379, An ActDeclaring Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any Property To Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer orEmployee and Providing For the Procedure Therefor.

In the said case, petitioner sought the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$ 356M deposited in escrow in thePNB, as ill-gotten wealth. The funds were previously held by 5 account groups, using various foreign foundations incertain Swiss banks. In addition, the Republic sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in treasurynotes, which exceeded the Marcos couple's salaries, other lawful income as well as income from legitimatelyacquired property. The treasury notes were frozen at the Central Bank of the Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ngPilipinas, by virtue of the freeze order issued by the PCGG.

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Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental Agreement dated December 28,1993 were executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a globalsettlement of the assets of the Marcos family. The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements sought to identify,collate, cause the inventory of and distribute all assets presumed to be owned by the Marcos family under theconditions contained therein. The General Agreement specified in one of its "whereas clauses" the fact that petitionerobtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on December 21, 1990, that the US$356 million belongs

deposited in the name of the aforementioned 5 account groups were of illegal provenance. The funds werethereafter. remitted to the Philippines in escrow. Subsequently, respondent Marcos children moved that the funds beplaced incustodia legisbecause the deposit in escrow in the PNB was allegedly in danger of dissipation by petitioner.The Sandiganbayan, in its resolution dated September 8, 1998, granted the motion.

Hearings were conducted by the Sandiganbayan on the motion for summary judgment filed by petitioner.Sandiganbayan ruled in favor of the Petitioner, approving the General/Supplemental Agreements. However, in aresolution dated 31 January 2002, the Sandiganbayan reversed itself and denied said motion for summary judgment.It ruled that the evidence offered for summary judgment of the case did not prove that the money in the Swiss Banksbelonged to the Marcos spouses because no legal proof exists in the record as to the ownership by the Marcoses ofthe funds in escrow from the Swiss Banks. The basis for the forfeiture in favor of the government cannot be deemed

to have been established.

The Republic filed the petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner Republic was able to prove its case for forfeiture in accordance with the requisites ofSections 2 and 3 of RA 1379.

Note: Section 2. Filing of petition. Whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during hisincumbency an amount or property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officeror employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, saidproperty shall be presumedprima facieto have been unlawfully acquired.

RULING: YES. The Republic was able to establish a prima facie case for the forfeiture of the Swiss funds pursuant toRA 1379.RA 1379 raises theprima faciepresumption that a property is unlawfully acquired, hence subject to forfeiture, if itsamount or value is manifestly disproportionate to the official salary and other lawful income of the public officerwho owns it.

The following facts must be established in order that forfeiture or seizure of the Swiss deposits may be effected:a. ownership by the public officer of money or property acquired during his incumbency, whether it be in his

name or otherwise, andb. the extent to which the amount of that money or property exceeds, i. e., is grossly disproportionate to, the

legitimate income of the public officer.c. that the said amount is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to

his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property.

That spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were public officials during the time material to the instant case wasnever in dispute. The combined accumulated salaries of the Marcos couple were reflected in the Certification datedMay 27, 1986 issued by then Minister of Budget and Management Alberto Romulo. The Certification showed that,from 1966 to 1985, Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos had accumulated salaries in the amountof P1,570,000 andP718,750, respectively, or a total of P2,288,750. In addition to their accumulated salaries from1966 to 1985 are the Marcos couples combined salaries from January to February 1986 in the amount

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of P30,833.33. Hence, their total accumulated salaries amounted to P2,319,583.33. Converted to U.S. dollars on thebasis of the corresponding peso-dollar exchange rates prevailing during the applicable period when said salarieswere received, the total amount had an equivalent value of $304,372.43.

The sum of $304,372.43 should be held as the only known lawful income of respondents since they did not file

any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL), as required by law, from which their net worth could bedetermined. Besides, under the 1935 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not receive any otheremolument from the Government or any of its subdivisions and instrumentalities. Likewise, under the 1973Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not receive during his tenure any other emolument from theGovernment or any other source. In fact, his management of businesses, like the administration of foundations toaccumulate funds, was expressly prohibited under the 1973 Constitution:

Article VII, Sec. 4(2)The President and the Vice-President shall not, during their tenure, hold anyother office except when otherwise provided in this Constitution, nor may they practice anyprofession, participate directly or indirectly in the management of any business, or be financiallyinterested directly or indirectly in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege grantedby the Government or any other subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any

government owned or controlled corporation.

Article VII, Sec. 11 No Member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel before anycourt inferior to a court with appellate jurisdiction, x x x. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, beinterested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by theGovernment, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof including any governmentowned or controlled corporation during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matterbefore any office of the government for his pecuniary benefit.

Article IX, Sec. 7 The Prime Minister and Members of the Cabinet shall be subject to theprovision of Section 11, Article VIII hereof and may not appear as counsel before any court oradministrative body, or manage any business, or practice any profession, and shall also be subject

to such other disqualification as may be provided by law.

Their only known lawful income of $304,372.43 can therefore legally and fairly serve as basis for determiningthe existence of aprima faciecase of forfeiture of the Swiss funds.

Republic v. SandiganbayanGR. No. 152154 July 15, 2003EN BANCCorona, J.

The PresidentPrivileges and Salary

Facts: Republic (petitioner), through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), represented by

the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan pursuant toRA 1379.

o declaration of the aggregate amount of US$ 356M deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gottenwealth.

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The funds were previously held by 5 account groups, using various foreign foundations incertain Swiss banks.

In addition, the Republic sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million intreasury notes which exceeded the Marcos couple's salaries other lawful income as wellas income from legitimately acquired property. The treasury notes are frozen at theCentral Bank of the Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, by virtue of the freeze

order issued by the PCGG. Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental Agreement dated

December 28, 1993 were executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman MagtanggolGunigundo for a global settlement of the assets of the Marcos family.

o

The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements sought to identify, collate, cause the inventoryof and distribute all assets presumed to be owned by the Marcos family under the conditionscontained therein. The General Agreement specified in one of its premises or "whereas clauses"the fact that petitioner "obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on December 21,1990, that the Three Hundred Fifty-six Million U.S. dollars (US$356 million) belongs in principle tothe Republic of the Philippines provided certain conditionalities are met x x x."

Hearings were conducted by the Sandiganbayan on the motion to approve the General/SupplementalAgreements.

In a resolution dated 31 January 2002, the Sandiganbayan denied the Republic's motion for summaryjudgment.

o "The evidence offered for summary judgment of the case did not prove that the money in the SwissBanks belonged to the Marcos spouses because no legal proof exists in the record as to theownership by the Marcoses of the funds in escrow from the Swiss Banks. The basis for theforfeiture in favor of the government cannot be deemed to have been established and our judgmentthereon, perforce, must also have been without basis."

The Republic filed the petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:W/N petitioner Republic was able to prove its case for forfeiture in accordance with the requisites of Sections 2 and 3of RA 1379.

HELD: RA 1379 raises theprima faciepresumption that a property is unlawfully acquired, hence subject to

forfeiture, if its amount or value is manifestly disproportionate to the official salary and other lawful income ofthe public officer who owns it.

o

The following facts must be established in order that forfeiture or seizure of the Swiss deposits maybe effected:

(1) ownership by the public officer of money or property acquired during hisincumbency, whether it be in his name or otherwise, and(2) the extent to which the amount of that money or property exceeds, i. e., is grossly

disproportionate to, the legitimate income of the public officer.(3) that the said amount is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officeror employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquiredproperty.

The Republic was able to establish a prima facie case for the forfeiture of the Swiss funds pursuant to RA1379.

o Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were public officers.

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o Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos had acquired and owned properties during their term of office, asevidenced by their admittance regarding the ownership of the Swiss accounts.

o The Swiss accounts of the Marcoses had balances amounting to US $356 million, a figure beyondthe aggregate legitimate income of $304,372.43.

The Petition was granted. The Swiss deposits which were transferred to and are now deposited in escrow at the Philippine National

Bank in the estimated aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of January 31, 2002, plus interest, arehereby forfeited in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines.

RATIO DECIDENDI: (1973 CONST) Article VII, Sec. 4(2) The President and the Vice-President shall not, during their tenure, hold any other

office except when otherwise provided in this Constitution, nor may they practice any profession, participatedirectly or indirectly in the management of any business, or be financially interested directly or indirectly inany contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government or any othersubdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government owned or controlled corporation.

Article VII, Sec. 11No Member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel before any court inferiorto a court with appellate jurisdiction, x x x. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially inany contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision,agency, or instrumentality thereof including any government owned or controlled corporation during his termof office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the government for his pecuniary benefit.

Article IX, Sec. 7 The Prime Minister and Members of the Cabinet shall be subject to the provision ofSection 11, Article VIII hereof and may not appear as counsel before any court or administrative body, ormanage any business, or practice any profession, and shall also be subject to such other disqualification asmay be provided by law.

Funa vs Executive Secretary ErmitaG.R. No. 184740 February 11, 2010

DENNIS A. B. FUNA, Petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, Office of the President,SEC. LEANDRO R. MENDOZA, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation andCommunications, USEC. MARIA ELENA H. BAUTISTA, in her official capacities as Undersecretary of theDepartment of Transportation and Communications and as Officer-in-Charge of the Maritime Industry Authority(MARINA), Respondents.D E C I S I O NVILLARAMA, JR., J.:Facts:This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 with prayer for the issuance of a temporaryrestraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, to declare as unconstitutional the designation ofrespondent Undersecretary Maria Elena H. Bautista as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the Maritime IndustryAuthority (MARINA).On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista (Bautista) asUndersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC).On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA AdministratorVicente T. Suazo, Jr., Bautistawas designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity asDOTC Undersecretary.On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the instantpetition challenging the constitutionalityof Bautistas appointment/designation, which is proscribed by theprohibition on the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to holdany other office or employment.

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On January 5, 2009, during the pendency of this petition, Bautista was appointed Administrator of theMARINAand she assumed her duties and responsibilities as such on February 2, 2009.Petitioner argues that Bautistas concurrent positions as DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA OIC is in violation ofSection 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution .On the other hand, the respondents argue that the requisites of a judicial inquiry are not present in this case. In fact,there no longer exists an actual controversy that needs to be resolved in view of the appointment of respondent

Bautista as MARINA Administrator effective February 2, 2009 and the relinquishment of her post as DOTCUndersecretary for Maritime Transport, which rendered the present petition moot and academic. Petitioners prayerfor a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction is likewise moot and academic since, with thissupervening event, there is nothing left to enjoin.Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of MARINA, concurrent with the position ofDOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which she had been appointed, violated the constitutionalproscription against dual or multiple offices for Cabinet Members and their deputies and assistants.Held:The petition is meritorious.Petitioner having alleged a grave violation of the constitutional prohibition against Members of the Cabinet, theirdeputies and assistants holding two (2) or more positions in government, the fact that he filed this suit as aconcerned citizen sufficiently confers him with standing to sue for redress of such illegal act by public officials.

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, sothat a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such caseor dismiss it on ground of mootness. But even in cases where supervening events had made the cases moot, thisCourt did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guidethe bench, bar, and public. In the present case, the mootness of the petition does not bar its resolution.Resolution of the present controversy hinges on the correct application of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987Constitution, which provides:Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not,unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure.Theyshall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or befinancially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or anysubdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their

subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not, duringhis tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or asSecretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlledcorporations and their subsidiaries.On the other hand, Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B reads:Sec. 7. x x xUnless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any otheroffice or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.Noting that the prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is all -embracing, the disqualification washeld to be absolute, as the holding of "any other office" is not qualified by the phrase "in the Government"

unlike in Section 13, Article VI prohibiting Senators and Members of the House of Representatives fromholding "any other office or employment in the Government";and when compared with other officials andemployees such as members of the armed forces and civil service employees, we concluded thus:These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official family, which prohibitions arenot similarly imposed on other public officials or employees such as the Members of Congress, members of thecivil service in general and members of the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treatthe President and his official family as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.

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Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in thegovernment during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, membersof the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. Inother words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective andappointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exceptionapplicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.

Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the President,Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple offices oremployment in the government during their tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be read with equal severity.On its face, the language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended to be apositive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple government offices or employment. Verily,wherever the language used in the constitution is prohibitory, it is to be understood as intended to be a positive andunequivocal negation. The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a literalinterpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting asPresident in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary ofJustice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.Respondent Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of DOTC, she was thus covered by the stricter

prohibition under Section 13, Article VII and consequently she cannot invoke the exception provided in Section 7,paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding another office is allowed by law or the primary functions of the position.Neither was she designated OIC of MARINA in an ex-officio capacity, which is the exception recognized in CivilLiberties Union.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The designation of respondent Ma. Elena H. Bautista as Officer-in-Charge,Office of the Administrator, Maritime Industry Authority, in a concurrent capacity with her position as DOTCUndersecretary for Maritime Transport, is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of Section 13,

Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and therefore, NULL and VOID.Note:Appointmentmay be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who isto exercise the functions of a given office.When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment resultsin security of tenurefor the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his

office. Designation,on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on anincumbent official, as where, in the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the Boardof Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three Justices of the SupremeCourt are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House ofRepresentatives. It is said that appointment is essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature.Designationmay also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves the naming of aparticular person to a specified public office. That is the common understanding of the term. However, where theperson is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in atemporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority.In this sense, the designation isconsidered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenureon the personnamed.

An Act Declaring Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any Property To Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any PublicOfficer or Employee and Providing For the Procedure Therefor.

Paragraph 4 of the petition for forfeiture as to the personal circumstances of Ferdinand E. Marcos as a public officialwho served without interruption as Congressman, Senator, Senate President and President of the Republic of thePhilippines from 1 December 1965 to 25 February 1986.

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Paragraph 5 of the petition as to the personal circumstances of Imelda R. Marcos who once served as a member ofthe Interim Batasang Pambansa from 1978 to 1984 and as Metro Manila Governor, concurrently Minister of HumanSettlements, from June 1976 to February 1986.

Paragraph 11 of the petition as to the Official Report of the Minister of Budget, the total salaries of former President

Marcos as President form 1966 to 1976 was P60,000 a year and from 1977 to 1985, P100,000 a year; while that ofthe former First Lady, Imelda R. Marcos, as Minister of Human Settlements from June 1976 to February 22-25, 1986was P75,000 a year xxx.

Respondent Mrs. Marcos admitted in Paragraph 10 of her answer the allegations of paragraph 11 of the petition forforfeiture which referred to the accumulated salaries of Ferdinand Marcos and Imelda Marcos. That the said amounttotaled to P2,319,583.33 or $304,372.43.

Section 2. Filing of petition. Whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency anamount or property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to hisother lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumedprimafacieto have been unlawfully acquired.

Information that should be included in the Petition

Civil Liberties Union VS. Executive Secretary

FACTS:

Petitioners: Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83896 andJuan T. David for petitioners in 83815. Both petitions were consolidated and are being resolved jointly as both seek a

declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25,1987.

Executive Order No. 284, according to the petitioners allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries andassistant secretaries to hold other than government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions. Thepertinent provisions of EO 284 is as follows:

Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the ExecutiveDepartment may in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government andgovernment corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor.

Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is required in section 1, they must relinquish the excessposition in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than twopositions other than his primary position.

Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a secretary, orundersecretary, or assistant secretary.

The petitioners are challenging EO 284s constitutionality because it adds exceptions to Section 13 of Article VII otherthan those provided in the constitution. According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against holding any otheroffice or employment in government are those provided in the Constitution namely: 1. The Vice President may beappointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3 par.2 of Article VII. 2. The secretary of justice is an ex-officiomember of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII.

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[G.R. No. 138489. November 29, 2001]

ELEANOR DELA CRUZ, FEDERICO LUCHICO, JR., SOLEDAD EMILIA CRUZ, JOEL LUSTRIA, HENRY PAREL,HELENA HABULAN, PORFIRIO VILLENA, JOSEPH FRANCIA, CARMELLA TORRES, JOB DAVID,

CESAR MEJIA, MA. LOURDES V. DEDAL, ALICE TIONGSON, REYDELUZ CONFERIDO, PHILIPPELIM, NERISSA SANCHEZ, MARY LUZ ELAINE PURACAN, RODOLFO QUIMBO, TITO GENILO andOSCAR ABUNDO, as members of the Board of the National Housing Authority from the periodcovering 1991-1996,petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, represented by itsCommissioners, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

This petition for certiorari[1]assails the Decision No. 98-381 dated September 22, 1998, rendered by theCommission on Audit (COA), denying petitioners appeal from the Notice of Disallowance No. 97-011-061 issued by

the NHA Resident Auditor on October 23, 1997. Such Notice disallowed payment to petitioners of theirrepresentation allowances and per diems for the period from August 19, 1991 to August 31, 1996 in the total amountof P276,600.00.

Petitioners, numbering 20, were members of the Board of Directors of the National Housing Authority (NHA)from 1991 to 1996.

On September 19, 1997, the COA issued Memorandum No. 97-038[2]directing all unit heads/auditors/teamleaders of the national government agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations which haveeffected payment of any form of additional compensation or remuneration to cabinet secretaries, their deputies andassistants, or their representatives, in violation of the rule on multiple positions, to (a) immediately cause thedisallowance of such additional compensation or remuneration given to and received by the concerned officials, and(b) effect the refund of the same from the time of the finality of the Supreme Court En Banc Decision in the

consolidated cases of Civil Liberties Union vs. Exexcutive SecretaryandAnti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. etal. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, et al.,promulgated on February 22, 1991.[3]The COA Memorandum furtherstated that the said Supreme Court Decision, which became final and executory on August 19, 1991,[4]declaredExecutive Order No. 284 unconstitutional insofar as it allows Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants to holdother offices, in addition to their primary offices, and to receive compensation therefor.

Accordingly, on October 23, 1997, NHA Resident Auditor Salvador J. Vasquez issued Notice of DisallowanceNo. 97-011-061[5]disallowing in audit the payment of representation allowances and per diems of "Cabinet memberswho were the ex- officio members of the NHA Board of Directors and/or their respective alternates who actuallyreceived the payments." The total disallowed amount of P276,600 paid as representation allowances and per diemsto each of the petitioners named below, covering the period from August 19, 1991 to August 31, 1996, is brokendown as follows:[6]

Petitioners, through then Chairman Dionisio C. Dela Serna of the NHA Board of Directors, appealed from theNotice of Disallowance to the Commission on Audit[7]based on the following grounds:

1. The Decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Liberties Union andAnti-Graft League of the Philippines,Inc.was clarified in the Resolution of the Court En Bancon August 1, 1991, in that the constitutionalban against dual or multiple positions applies only to the members of the Cabinet, their deputies orassistants. It does not cover other appointive officials with equivalent rank or those lower than theposition of Assistant Secretary; and
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subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporations or theirsubsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the Presidentshall not duringhis tenure be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of Ombudsman, or asSecretaries, Undersecretaries, Chairmen, or heads of bureaus of offices, including government-owned or controlled

corporations and their subsidiaries.

Interpreting the foregoing Constitutional provisions, this Court, in Civil Liberties Union andAnti-Graft League ofthe Philippines, Inc.,[10]held:

The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of theConstitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specifiedtherein without additional compensation in an ex-officiocapacity as provided by law and as requiredby the primaryfunctions of said officials' office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise any other office within thecontemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on saidofficials. x x x

x x x x x x x x x

To reiterate, the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII isnot to be interpreted as covering positions held withoutadditional compensation in ex-officiocapacities as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of theconcerned officials office.The term ex-officiomeans from office; by virtue ofoffice. It refers to an authority derivedfrom official character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the officialposition.Ex-officiolikewise denotes an act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and withoutany other appointment or authority than that conferred by the office. An ex-officiomember of a board is one who is amember by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further warrant or appointment. To illustrate, by expressprovision of law, the Secretary of Transportation and Communications is the ex-officioChairman of the Board of thePhilippine Ports Authority, and the Light Rail Transit Authority.

x x x x x x x x x

Theex-officioposition being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows thatthe official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the saidposition. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attachedto his principal office. It should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of Finance attends a meeting of theMonetary Board as an ex-officiomember thereof, he is actually and in legal contemplation performing theprimary function of his principal office in defining policy in monetary banking matters, which come underthe jurisdiction of his department. For such attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to collect any extracompensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other sucheuphemism. By whatever name it is designated, such additional compensation is prohibited by the

Constitution.

x x x x x x x x x

(Emphasis ours)

Since the Executive Department Secretaries, as ex-oficio members of the NHA Board, are prohibited fromreceiving extra (additional) compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an allowance,
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or some other such euphemism," it follows that petitioners who sit as their alternates cannot likewise be entitled toreceive such compensation. A contrary rule would give petitioners a better right than their principals.

We thus rule that in rendering its challenged Decision, the COA did not gravely abuse its discretion.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Facts:

The 20 petitioners herein were members of the board of directors of the NHA from 1991 10 1996. On September 19,1997, the COA issued a memo directing all unit heads, auditors, team leaders of the national government agenciesand government-owned and controlled corporations which have effected payment of any form of additionalcompensation or remuneration to cabinet secretaries, their deputies and assistants or their representatives, inviolation of the rule on multiple positions to immediately cause the disallowance of such additional compensation orremuneration given to and received by the concerned officials and to effect there fund of the same from the time ofthe finality of the Supreme Court En banc decision in the consolidated cases of the Civil Liberties Union vs. ExecutiveSecretary and Anti-Graft league of the Philippines, Inc. Et al. Vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, et al, promulgated onFebruary 22, 1991. The COA memo further stated that the said SC Decision, which became final andexecutory on August 19, 1991, declared Executive Order No. 284 unconstitutional insofar as itallows Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants to hold other offices, in addition to theirprimary offices and to receive compensation therefore Accordingly, on October 23, 1997, NHA Resident

Au dit or is sue d a No ti ce of Di sal lo wa nc e disallowing in audit the payment of representation allowances andper diems of "Cabinet members who were the ex- officio members of the NHA Board of Directors and/or theirrespectivealternatesw h o a c t u a l l y r e c e i v e d t h e p a y m e n t s . " T h e t o t a l d i s a l l o w e d a m o u n t o f P 2 7 6 , 6 0 0 p a i d a s representation allowances and per diems to each of the petitioners covering the periodfrom August19, 1991 to August 31, 1996. Petitioners, through then Chairman Dela Serna of the NHA Board ofDirectors, appealed from the notice of disallowance to the Commission on Audit arguing that the SC decision in CivilLiberties union and Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. Was clarified in the resolution of the court en banc on

August 1, 1991, in that the constitutional ban against dual or multiple positions applies only to members of theCabinet, their deputies or assistants. It does not cover other appointive officials with equivalent rank or those lowerthan the position of Assistant Secretary and that the NHA Directors are not Secretaries, Undersecretaries or

Assistant Secretaries and that they occupy positions lower than the position of Assistant Secretary. On September22, 1998, the COA issued a decision denying petitioners' appeal.

Issue:W.hether or not the COA erred in disallowing the compensation in favour of NHA Board of Directors

Held:No. Under Sec. 7 of P.D. 757 or the law creating the NHA, the persons mandated by law to sit as members of theNHA Board are the following: (1) the Secretary of Public Works,Transportationand Comm un i c a t i ons , ( 2 ) t he D i re c t o r Gen era l o f t h e Na t i o na l E co nom i c a n

d D e v e l o p m e n t Authority, (3) the Secretary of Finance, (4) the Secretary of Labour, (5) the Secretary ofIndustry, (6) the Exec utive Secretar y, and (7) the General Manager of the NHA. While petit ioners arenot among those officers, however, they are alternates of the said officers, whose acts shallbe considered the acts of their principals. The Supreme Court, in Civil Liberties Union and Anti -Graft League of thePhilippines, Inc., interpreted Sec. 13 of Article VII of the Constitution to mean that the prohibition against holding dualor multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be construed asapplying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided bylaw and as required by the primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is that

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these posts do not comprise any other office within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but areproperly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. The ex-officio position bei ng ac tu al ly an din legal contemplation part of the principal off ice, it follows that the official concerned has no rightto rece ive addit ional compe nsati on for his serv ices in the said posi tion. The reason is that theseservices are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office. It should be obviousthat if, say, the Secretary of Finance attends a meeting of the Monetary Board as an ex-officio member

thereof, he is actually and in legal contemplation performing the primary function of his principaloff ice in def ini ng pol icy in mon eta ry ban king matters, which come under the jurisdiction of hisdepartment. For such attendance, therefore, he is n ot e n t it l ed to c o l le c t an y e x tr a c o mp e n s a ti o n ,whether it be in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other sucheuphemism. By whatever name it is designated such additional compensation is prohibited bythe Constitution.Since the Executive Department Secretaries, as ex-oficio members o f the NHA Board ,are prohibited from receiving extra (additional) compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or anhonorarium or an allowance, or some other such euphemism," it follows that petitioners who sit as their alternatescannot likewise be entitled to receive such compensation. A contrary rule would give petitioners a better right thantheir principals

Bitonio vs. COAPost undercase digests,Political Law atFriday, March 09, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: In 1994, petitioner Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio, Jr. was appointed Director IV of the Bureau of LaborRelations in theDepartment of Labor and Employment. As representative of theSecretary of Labor to the PEZABoard, he was receiving a per diem for every board meeting he attended during the years 1995 to 1997.

After a post audit of the PEZAs disbursement transactions, the COA disallowed the payment of per diems to Mr.Bitonio pursuant to the Supreme Court ruling declaring unconstitutional the holding of other offices by the cabinetmembers, their deputies and assistants in addition to their primary office and the receipt of compensation therefore,and, to COA Memorandum No. 97-038 dated September 19, 1997, implementing Senate Committee Reports No.509.

In his motion for reconsideration to the COA, he contended that the Supreme Court modified its earlier ruling in theCivil Liberties Union case which limits the prohibition to Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries and their Assistants.Officials given the rank equivalent to a Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretaryand other appointive officialsbelow the rank of Assistant Secretaryare not covered by the prohibition.

He further stated that the PEZA Charter (RA 7916), enacted four years after the Civil Liberties Union case becamefinal, authorized the payment of per diems; in expressly authorizing per diems, Congress should be conclusivelypresumed to have been aware of the parameters of the constitutional prohibition as interpreted in the Civil Liberties

Union case.

COA rendered the assailed decision denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
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Issue: Whether COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the petitioner for his attendance in the PEZABoard of Directors meetings as representative of the Secretary of Labor.

Held: The assailed decision of the COA is affirmed.

The petitioner is, indeed, not entitled to receive per diem for his board meetings sitting as representative ofthe Secretary of Labor in the Board of Directors of the PEZA.

The petitioners presence in the PEZA Board meetings is solely by virtue of his capacity as representative ofthe Secretary of Labor. Since the Secretary of Labor is prohibited from receiving compensation for his additionaloffice or employment, such prohibition likewise applies to the petitioner who sat in the Board only in behalf ofthe Secretary of Labor. The Supreme Court cannot allow the petitioner who sat as representative of the SecretaryofLabor in the PEZA Board to have a better right than his principal.

Moreover, it is a basic tenet that any legislative enactment must not be repugnant to the Constitution. No law canrender it nugatory because the Constitution is more superior to a statute. The framers of R.A. No. 7916 must haverealized the flaw in the law which is the reason why the law was later amended by R.A. No. 8748 to cure such defect.The option of designating representative to the Board by the different Cabinet Secretaries was deleted. Likewise, theparagraph as to payment of per diems to the members of the Board of Directors was also deleted, considering thatsuch stipulation was clearly in conflict with the proscription set by the Constitution.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G. R. No. 156982 September 8, 2004

NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION,petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON AUDIT, JUANITO G. ESPINO, Director IV, NCR, Commission on Audit, and ERNESTO C.EULALIA, Resident Auditor, National Amnesty Commission.respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CORONA, J.:

This petition for review1seeks to annul the two decisions of respondent Commission on Audit (COA)2dated July 26,20013and January 30, 2003,4affirming the September 21, 1998 ruling5of the National Government Audit Office(NGAO). The latter in turn upheld Auditor Ernesto C. Eulalia's order disallowing the payment of honorariato therepresentatives of petitioner's ex officiomembers, per COA Memorandum No. 97-038.

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Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency created on March 25, 1994 by thenPresident Fidel V. Ramos through Proclamation No. 347. The NAC is tasked to receive, process and review amnestyapplications. It is composed of seven members: a Chairperson, three regular members appointed by the President,and the Secretaries of Justice, National Defense and Interior and Local Government as ex officiomembers.6

It appears that after personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the three ex officiomembers turned over said

responsibility to their representatives who were paid honorariabeginning December 12, 1994. However, on October15, 1997, NAC resident auditor Eulalia disallowed on audit the payment of honorariato these representativesamounting to P255,750 for the period December 12, 1994 to June 27, 1997, pursuant to COA Memorandum No. 97-038. On September 1, 1998, the NGAO upheld the auditor's order and notices of disallowance were subsequentlyissued to the following:7

REPRESENTATIVES AMOUNT

1. Cesar AverillaDepartment of National Defense P 2,500.00

2. Ramon Martinez

Department of National Defense 73,750.003. Cielito Mindaro,

Department of Justice 18,750.00

4. Purita DeynataDepartment of Justice 62,000.00

5. Alberto BernardoDepartment of the Interior And Local Government 71,250.00

6. Stephen VillaflorDepartment of the Interior and Local Government 26,250.00

7. Artemio AspirasDepartment of Justice 1,250.00

P255,750.00

Meanwhile, on April 28, 1999, the NAC passed Administrative Order No. 2 (the new Implementing Rules andRegulations of Proclamation No. 347), which was approved by then President Joseph Estrada on October 19, 1999.Section 1, Rule II thereof provides:

Section 1, Composition- The NAC shall be composed of seven (7) members:

a) A Chairperson who shall be appointedby the President;

b) Three (3) Commissioners who shall be appointedby the President;

c) Three (3) Ex-officio Members

1. Secretary of Justice

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2. Secretary of National Defense

3. Secretary of the Interior and Local Government

The ex officiomembers may designatetheir representativesto the Commission. Said Representativesshall be entitled toper diems,allowances, bonuses and other benefits as may be authorized bylaw.(Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner invoked Administrative Order No. 2 in assailing before the COA the rulings of the resident auditor and theNGAO disallowing payment of honoraria to the ex officiomembers' representatives, to no avail.

Hence, on March 14, 2003, the NAC filed the present petition, contending that the COA committed grave abuse ofdiscretion in: (1) implementing COA Memorandum No. 97-038 without the required notice and publication under

Article 2 of the Civil Code; (2) invoking paragraph 2, Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution to sustain thedisallowance of honorariaunder said Memorandum; (3) applying the Memorandum to the NAC ex officiomembers'representatives who were all appointive officials with ranks below that of an Assistant Secretary; (4) interpreting lawsand rules outside of i ts mandate and declaring Section 1, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 2 null and void, and (5)disallowing the payment of honorariaon the ground of lack of authority of representatives to attend the NACmeetings in behalf of the ex officiomembers.8

We hold that the position of petitioner NAC is against the law and jurisprudence. The COA is correct that there is nolegal basis to grantper diem,honorariaor any allowance whatsoever to the NAC ex officio members' officialrepresentatives.

The Constitution mandates the Commission on Audit to ensure that the funds and properties of the government arevalidly, efficiently and conscientiously used. Thus, Article IX-D of the Constitution ordains the COA to exerciseexclusive and broad auditing powers over all government entities or trustees, without any exception:

Section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority and duty to examine, audit, and

settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds andproperty, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government,or any of its subdivisions,agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations with originalcharters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have beengranted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) othergovernment-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental entitiesreceiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the government, which are required by lawof the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where theinternal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such measures,including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. Itshall keep the general accounts of the Government and, for such period as may be provided by law,preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto.

(2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, todefine thescope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, andpromulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention anddisallowance of irregular, unnecessary, inexpensive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures,or uses of government funds and properties.

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Section 3. No lawshall be passed exempting any entityof the Government or its subsidiary in any guisewhatever, or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the Commission onAudit.(Emphasis supplied).

It is in accordance with this constitutional mandate that the COA issued Memorandum No. 97-038 on September 19,1997:

COMMISSION ON AUDIT MEMORANDUM NO. 97-038

SUBJECT: Implementation of Senate Committee Report No. 509, Committee on Accountability of PublicOfficers and Investigations and Committee on Civil Service and Government Reorganization.

The Commission received a copy of Senate Committee Report No. 509 urging the Commission on Audit toimmediately cause the disallowance of any payment of any form of additional compensation orremuneration to cabinet secretaries, their deputies and assistants, or their representatives, inviolation of the rule on multiple positions, and to effect the refund of any and all such additionalcompensation given to and received by the officials concerned, or their representatives, from thetime of the finality of the Supreme Court ruling in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretaryto thepresent. In the Civil Liberties Union case, theSupreme Court ruled that Cabinet Secretaries, theirdeputies and assistants may not hold any other office or employment. It declared Executive Order284 unconstitutional insofar as it allows Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants to holdother offices in addition to their primary office and to receive compensation therefor.The saiddecisionbecame final and executory on August 19, 1991.

In view thereof, all unit heads/auditors/team leaders of the national government agencies and governmentowned or controlled corporations which have effected payment of subject allowances, are directed toimplement the recommendation contained in the subject Senate Committee Report by undertaking thefollowing audit action:

1. On accounts that have not been audited and settled under certificate of settlements andbalances on record from August 19, 1991 to present - to immediately issue the Notices ofdisallowance and corresponding certificate of settlements and balances.

2. On accounts that have been audited and settled under certificate of settlements and balances onrecord - to review and re-open said accounts, issue the corresponding notices of disallowance, andcertify a new balance thereon. It is understood that the re-opening of accounts shall be limitedto those that were settled within the prescriptive period of three (3) years prescribed inSection 52 of P.D. 1445.

3. On disallowances previously made on these accounts - to submit a report on the status of thedisallowances indicating whether those have been refunded/settled or have become final and

executory and the latest action taken by the Auditor thereon.

All auditors concerned shall ensure that all documents evidencing the disallowed payments are kept intacton file in their respective offices.

Any problem/issue arising from the implementation of this Memorandum shall be brought promptly to theattention of the Committee created under COA Officer Order No. 97-698 thru the Director concerned, forimmediate resolution.

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An initial report on the implementation of this Memorandum shall be submitted to the Directors concernednot later than October 31, 1997. Thereafter, a quarterly progress report on the status of disallowances madeshall be submitted, until all the disallowances shall have been enforced.

The Committee created under COA Office Order No. 97-698, dated September 10, 1997, shall supervisethe implementation of this Memorandum which shall take effect immediately and shall submit a consolidated

report thereon in response to the recommendation of the Senate Committee on Accountability of PublicOfficers and Investigation and Committee on Civil Service and Government Reorganization.9(Emphasissupplied)

Contrary to petitioner's claim, COA Memorandum No. 97-038 does not need, for validity and effectivity, thepublication required by Article 2 of the Civil Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the OfficialGazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.

We clarified this publication requirement in Taada vs. Tuvera:10

[A]ll statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a conditionfor their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity dateis fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President inthe exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, atpresent, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also bepublished if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnelof the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication

required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning therules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.(Emphasissupplied.)

COA Memorandum No. 97-038 is merely an internal and interpretative regulation or letter of instruction which doesnot need publication to be effective and valid. It is not an implementing rule or regulation of a statute but a directiveissued by the COA to its auditors to enforce the self-executing prohibition imposed by Section 13, Article VII of theConstitution on the President and his official family, their deputies and assistants, or their representatives fromholding multiple offices and receiving double compensation.

Six years prior to the issuance of COA Memorandum No. 97-038, the Court had the occasion to categorically explainthis constitutional prohibition in Civil Liberties Union vs. The Executive Secretary:11

Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in effect, allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretariesand assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions, albeitsubject to the limitation therein imposed, runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, whichprovides as follows:

"Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shallnot, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure.

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They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in anybusiness, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted bythe Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned orcontrolled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of theiroffice."

x x x x x x x x x

[D]oes the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members,their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for appointiveofficials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B which, for easy reference is quoted anew,thus:"Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shallhol

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