Politica e Burocrazia opportunità, vincoli, strategie per i Prìncipi democratici

Mauro Calise

Università di Napoli Federico II calise@unina.it

Quale dirigenza per I governi locali? Napoli, 26 e 27 gennaio 2000

Università di Napoli Federico II

Facoltà di Giurisprudenza

Il testo in allegato illustra il quadro concettuale di riferimento per la presentazione orale. E’ uno dei concetti analizzati in Mauro Calise e Theodore J. Lowi, Hyperpolitics. An Interactive Encyclopedia of Political Science, una pubblicazione open source accessibile a www.hyperpolitics.net. Oltre alla modalità «lettura», il sito offre anche la possibilità di interagire con le definizioni, proponendo varianti/versioni alternative.

Hyperpolitics

Mauro Calise & Theodore J. Lowi

An Interactive Encyclopedia of

Political Science

BiblioBreaking through Bureaucracy: A New Vision for Managing in GovernmentBerkeley, University of California Press

Regulating Business by Independent CommissionPrinceton, Princeton University Press

LeadershipNew York, Harper and Row

Faut-il supprimer l’ENA? Paris, Les editions d’organisation

The Federal Machine -- Beginning of Bureaucracy in Jacksonian AmericaBaltimore, The John Hopkins University Press

Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Translated with Notes by T.M. KnoxLondon-New York, Oxford University Press

A Question of Class: Capital, the State, and Uneven Development in MalaysiaNew Haven, Yale University Southeast Asia Studies

Executive Governance: Presidential Administrations and Policy Change in the FederalBureaucracyArmonk, Sharpe

Preussen Zwischen Reform und Revolution : Allgemeines Landrecht, Verwaltung und SozialeBewegung von 1791 bis 1848München, Klett-Cotta im Deutschen Taschenbuch Verlag

Business and Politics in IndonesiaBoulder, Westview Press

Bureaucracy and Political DevelopmentPrinceton, Princeton University Press

Bureaucracy, in Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 3New York, Mac Millan

Code: and Other Laws of CyberspaceNew York, Basic Books

At the Pleasure of the Mayor: Patronage and Power in New York City, 1898-1958New York, The Free Press of Glencoe

La corruption de la RépubliqueParis, Fayard

La vénalité des offices sous Henri IV et Louis Rouen,

Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public SectorReading, Addison-Wesley Pub. Co

The Politics of Bureaucracy: A Comparative PerspectiveNew York and London, Longman

Bureaucrats and Politicians In Western DemocraciesCambridge,Harvard University Press

Democracy, Bureaucracy, and Character: Founding ThoughtLawrence, University Press of Kansas

Politics within the State: Elite Bureaucrats and Industrial Policy in Authoritarian BrazilPittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press

Building a New American state : the Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920Cambridge, Cambridge University Press

Politics, Power and Bureaucracy in France. The Administrative ElitePrinceton, Princeton University Press

Hystory of the United States Civil Service Westport, Greenwood

Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do ItNew York, Basic Books

administration agenda

agenda law party

Barzelay, M.

Bernstein, M.

Burns, J.

Coussirou, J.

Crenson, M.

Hegel, G. W. F.

Hewison, K.

Hooton, C. G.

Koselleck, R.

Laothamatas, A.

LaPalombara, J.

Laski, H.

Lessig, L.

Lowi, T. J.

Meny, Y.

Mousnier, R.

Osborne, D.and Gaebler, T.

Peters, B. G.

Putnam, R. D. et al.

Richardson, W. D.

Schneider, B. R.

Skowronek, S.

Suleiman, E. N.

Van Riper, P.

Wilson, J. Q.

1992

1955

1978

1996

1975

1967

1989

1997

1989

1991

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1937

1999

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1992

1945

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1997

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22

System

BUREAUCRACY

patronagetrust contract

monarchy collective

reform lawelite

utopia

corporatism

bureaucracy

nation

party

AUTHORITRIANISM

ideology

oligarchycommunity

monarchy

class

bureaucracy

powerARISTOCRACY

republic

oligarchy

faction estate

market

contract

individual corporation

court

bureaucracy

state

CAPITALISM

law

charisma

police

court

bureaucracy

MONARCHY

power

religionaristocracy corporation

power

corporation

authority

state

OLIGARCHY

bureaucracy

aristocracyclass community

bureaucracy

group

party

PATRONAGE

state

civil societyinterest faction

individual

ListABSOLUTISM 4ADMINISTRATION 7AGENDA 3ALIENATION 5ANARCHISM 4ARISTOCRACY 7AUTHORITARIANISM 5AUTHORITY 13AUTONOMY 6BUREAUCRACY 8CAPITALISM 2CENTRALISM 5CHARISMA 5CHOICE 10CITIZEN 7CIVIL SOCIETY 8CLASS 9CLIENTELISM 2COALITION 11COLLECTIVE 8COLONIALISM 1COMMUNISM 2COMMUNITY 14CONFLICT 5CONSENSUS 13CONSERVATISM 4CONSTITUTION 5CONTRACT 9CORPORATION 16CORPORATISM 4CORRUPTION 2

COURT 6CRISIS 1CULTURE 5DECISION 9DEMOCRACY 4DICTATORSHIP 2ELECTION 9ELITE 6EQUALITY 3ESTATE 3EXECUTIVE 2FACTION 4FASCISM 2FEDERALISM 3FEUDALISM 1GOVERNMENT 5GROUP 10IDEOLOGY 7IMPERIALISM 1INDIVIDUAL 17INDIVIDUALISM 1INSTITUTION 3INTEREST 14JUSTICE 6LAW 12LEADERSHIP 3LEGISLATURE 10LEGITIMACY 3LIBERALISM 7LIBERTY 6LOBBYING 2

LOYALTY 3MAJORITY 5MARKET 9MARXISM 1MEDIA 5MINORITIES 2MONARCHY 6MOVEMENT 7NATION 6OLIGARCHY 6OPINION 6OPPOSITION 3ORDER 6PARTICIPATION 9PARTY 18PATRONAGE 3PEOPLE 7PLURALISM 6POLICE 6POLICY 7POLLING 4POPULISM 6POWER 9PRESIDENT 3PROPAGANDA 1PUBLIC 2RACISM 1RADICALISM 4REFERENDUM 5REFORM 2REGIME 3

REGULATION 1RELIGION 6REPRESENTATION 11REPUBLIC 4RESPONSIBILITY 4REVOLUTION 4RIGHTS 8RULES 4SOCIALISM 5SOCIALIZATION 1SOVEREIGNTY 5STATE 18TERRORISM 2TOTALITARIANISM 2TRUST 11UTILITARIANISM 4UTOPIA 4VIOLENCE 6WAR 5

Dictionnaire Constitutionnel

The Social Science Encyclopedia

Dizionario di Politica

Pipers Woerterbuch zur Politik

The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Science

The Encyclopedia of Democracy

Dictionnaire de la Science Politique

Summaries

BUREAUCRACY

patronagetrust contract

monarchy collective

reform lawelite

Overview

BUREAUCRACY

23

Introduction

Bureaucracy could be social science'sfirst experience with jargon -- theinvention of a word to meet a specificneed. Even the inventor is known.Vincent de Gournay, a French physio-crat, in a letter to a colleague dated July1, 1764, proposed bureaucratie to iden-tify a new form of government to add toAristotle's three basic forms of monar-chy, aristocracy and democracy. Tworoots form the concept: bureau, whichmeans office or desk; and cracy, whichmeans rule or government.Bureaucracy simply means a form ofgovernment by offices and desks.The etimology of the term also capturesthe negative slant that has accompa-nied the bureaucratization of modernsocieties, in public administration aswell as private enterprises, in unions asin political parties. The spreading ofbureaucratic rationale and routines hasbeen feared and criticized as the adventof an all-powerful and highly central-ized machinery in the service of theState, or arbitrary political power.Marx would see bureaucracy as a toolfor the authoritarian rule of the bour-geoisie; Luxembourg and Trotskyopposed it as the dominant trait of theLeninist and Stalinist party. Evenworse, Bureaucracy was easily per-ceived as a selfreferential - and selfserv-ing - corp, «a system of government thecontrol of which is so completely in thehands of officials that their power jeop-ardizes the liberties of ordinary cirti-zens» (Laski 1937). On systemicgrounds, Merton’s analysis of anomiepointed out «the side-effects» of theextension of bureaucratic rationality«into all domains of social life» (BDN).Yet, for all fear and criticism of bureau-cracy, the main question still remainsto be answered: why is bureaucracynecessary?It was Max Weber who first provided avalue free characterization of bureau-cracy, defining it as a central feature ofboth political and economic develop-ment in modern societies. Accordingto Weber, bureaucracy is «a specificmodern solution for the more general

problem of administration» resulting ina peculiar form of organization andlegitimation of power (BBB). The mainfeature of bureaucracy is that its hierar-chical structure, its procedures and itspersonnel recruitment and behavior allcomply with the superior principle of alegal-rational order. In contrast withprevious forms of legitimate power, likepatrimonial or charismatic power,bureaucracy is highly predictable: itsobjectives are strictly defined by lawand it operates according to the mod-ern rules of division of labour and pro-fessional specialization. on the basis of a legal-rational order iswhat accounts for bureaucracy’s diffu-sion in so many realms of activity. Yet,it also is responsbile for several of itsshortcomings and helps explain why«while the Weberian idealtype ofbureaucracy is relevant, its field ofapplication is limited» (BDN). In turn-ing to empirical observation, Weber’sbureaucracy stands as a guideline and aparameter, much more than as an ulti-mate achievement.

The Axes:The Democratic Dilemma

One first step to better evaluateWeber’s idealtype of a collective,impersonal authority is to contrast itwith the monocratic nature of olderforms of bureaucratic power.

Early bureaucracies were essentially anextension of the monarch's household.This is why so much of the nomencla-ture of bureaucracy is from regimes thatwere built around church and militaryresources. For example: from thechurch came clerk and minister. Fromthe military came line/staff distinc-tions, as well as terms as "span of con-trol" and "chain of command", corpsand commissar.

monarchy collectiveBUREAUCRACY

24

The Social Science Encyclopedia

This 1,200-word entry explains the origin of the term, gives the two main defini-tions, and describes Max Weberís contribution to the study of bureaucracy.The concept of bureaucracy was invented in the 18th century by Vincent deGournay, a French physiocrat economist. Starting with traditional typologies ofregimes, de Gournay wrote about a fourth or fifth form of government he calledìbureaucratie.î He invented the term by attaching the Greek suffix for ìrule,î cracy,to the French word bureau. The term quickly entered international political disco-urse. The entry notes that scholars differ widely about the termís meaning.Broadly speaking, there are two main definitions: (1) rule by officials, and (2) aparticular form of organization. Most scholars using the first definition regard ruleby officials as the prevalent form of government in modern society. They furtherbelieve these officials are the ones with the real power in any political systemadministered by means of bureaucracy.The second definition is associated with the work of Max Weber. In the earlytwentieth century, Weber challenged the first definition, arguing that bureaucracyis a particular form of organization. Weber argued that defining bureaucracy asrule by officials confused power and authority--the latter term meaning powercloaked with legitimacy. According to Weber, power in modern society is ìlegalîrather than ìtraditional,î and therefore requires a government of laws and notmen. In this sense, bureaucracy is a system of positions and not of people. Theentry concludes by briefly mentioning the work of Robert Merton and MichelCrozier, and how they have elaborated Weberís theories.

Dizionario di Politica

This 4,300-word entry presents several different meanings of the term, but focuseson Weberís conception of bureaucracy and its recent elaborations. The term ìbu-reaucracyî was invented in the middle of the 18th century by a French physiocrateconomist, Vincent de Gournay, who used it to refer to the staff of civil servantsand clerks attached to the absolute sovereign. For Gournay, given his physiocraticstance against centralized power, the term had a negative connotation.In the 19th century, in the work of German legal and administrative scholars, theterm took on a particular technical meaning: the new, hierarchically-organizedPrussian administrative machine. In the 20th century, ìbureaucracyî has acquired anew negative connotation, in the sense of proliferation of norms and regulations,ritualistic adherence to procedure, and waste of resources.The modern study of bureaucracy begins with Max Weber. In his analysis of typesof power, he defined bureaucracy as the administrative structure associated withthe pure type of legal power. The entry notes three levels of analysis in Weberíswork: the formulation of clearly defined concepts (main characteristics); the con-struction of models that are obtained from empirically similar historical phenome-na (historical presuppositions); and the explanation of particular historical cases(i.e., the Chinese bureaucracy). The entry ends with a short review of recent studies of bureaucracy. These focus onthe social composition of bureaucracy, the causes determining the nature and theextent of its power, its relation with interest groups, and its administrative efficacy.

The Encyclopedia of Democracy

In approximately 1400 words, this entry defines bureaucracy, explains its originsand political significance, and explores the challenges it poses to democracy.The entry defines bureaucracy as an administrative organizational system that ishighly dependent on rules and procedures, command hierarchy and labor divi-sion. The term bureaucracy derives from French words literally meaning “rule bydesks.” Bureaucracy is the primary administrative organization of government atall societal levels in modern liberal democracies. Modern governments placemuch emphasis on bureaucratic management and reform. Modern bureaucracy‘smost important philosophical influence is German idealism, particularly the theo-ries of Max Weber. Weber emphasized the need for bureaucratic institutionsbased on law and rationally arranged power and authority in order to achieveeffective functioning in complex, modern, democratic, industrial societies.Through a combination of hierarchy and procedural mandates, bureaucratic orga-nizations are directed as well as protected from arbitrary action. Procedural ratio-nality is bureaucracy’s most significant organizing principle. These institutionalarrangements flowed from the belief that a dichotomy exists between politics andadministration. Woodrow Wilson shared these theories--he embraced them as ascholar and teacher, and shaped the modern American bureaucracy when he waselected President of the United States. Democratic government faces serious chal-lenges from institutionalized bureaucracy and its quasi-ideological partner proce-dural rationality. First, and perhaps most significantly, the relationship betweenbureaucratic government and citizens is remote with less accountability.Secondly, however, bureaucracy’s inherent expertise challenges and even under-mines the independent authority of popularly elected politicians.

Dictionnaire Constitutionnel

Bureaucracy is a term that may be understood from different points of view, manyof them polemical. In general terms, bureaucracy can be seen as the administra-tion of the State, as the sum of the political offices that carry out administrativetasks. From the perspective of political theory, this conception of bureaucracy isoften assessed critically, as that pressure by the State upon civil society andagainst individual liberty (liberal theory), or as that instrument by which the bour-geoisie maintains its power over the proletariat (Marxist theory). A second pointof view focuses on the seizure of power by the bureaucracy, especially by its elite.Bureaucratic elites, possessing the specialized knowledge necessary for theactual exercise of power, exert their influence in various spheres of power andactivity, causing a turn away from democracy and even a redefinition of ìdemo-cracyî in technocratic and bureaucratic terms. A third point of view draws onWeberís concept of bureaucracy as the legal and rational organization of society.From this view bureaucracy is characterized by specialization and hierarchizationof functions, by the centralization of decision-making, by the predominance ofimpersonal rules, and by the selection of a professional corps of functionaries. Insuch a view, bureaucracy inevitably seeks to extend itself throughout the wholesociety, and to come to regulate even private systems of relations. Finally, theterm ìbureaucracyî is often used to attack administration as slow, muddled, andinefficient. Authors like Gouldner, Selznick and Merton (on the United States) andCrozier (on France) reach such a conclusion. Such scholars argue that the narrow,formal rationality of bureaucratic work, ignoring the more complex motivations ofsocial actors, leads to a series of grave dysfunctions.

Pipers Woerterbuch zur Politik

The approximately 1300 word entry distinguishes between a societal and an inter-nal perspective of analysis, offers a general definition from a sociological per-spective, refers to main characteristics developed by Weber, and summaries criti-cal arguments against the common process of the bureaucratization of politicaland social life in advanced industrial countries. From an internal perspective,bureaucracy is defined as a specific form of social organization that adheres tothe principle of purpose-rationality. From Max Weber the entry borrows four cha-racteristics of an ideal type bureaucracy: a system of vertical lines of communi-cation, a division of labor based on specialization, a codex of rules and guideli-nes that specifies rights and responsibilities of each member of the bureaucracy,and a codified system of rules how to handle any task. The entry summarizesarguments from critics with an internal perspective, who question the effective-ness of bureaucratic forms of organization (red tape) and highlight structural con-servatism of goals pursued and means applied as a result of these organizatio-nal principles. Authors with a societal perspective highlight the expansion ofbureaucratic forms of organization during the development of industrialized coun-tries. Not only do states take on more functions and responsibility which increa-ses the relevance of the public bureaucracy. As the entry highlights, other socialorganizations (parties, interest-groups, unions, universities etc.) also adoptbureaucratic principles which therefore come to dominate political and social life.The entry summarizes critical voices from this perspective, that highlight the pro-blem that bureaucracies increasingly escape public and political control sincebureaucrats acquire specialized factual knowledge on which the public dependsbut which it does not share. The entry ends with a brief summary of attemptssince the 1970s to de-bureaucratize the state and public life.

The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Science

This 2200 word entry discusses bureaucracyís etymology, theories of Hegel, Marxand Weber, and recurrent problems caused by bureaucracy, but does not providea definition of the term.By the early nineteenth century, the concept of bureaucracy became the mostsignificant addition to the classification of political systems since those of theancient Greeks. The termís first recorded use was in 1764 by a french physiocrat,de Gournay, who believed the public interest was becoming subordinate to a gro-wing government by bureacracy. By the nineteenth century, bureaucracy wasassociated with the centralized European state.Hegel wrote about bureaucracy in the early nineteenth century. His empiricalobservations led him to place civil servants as one of the three great classes ofsociety (the other two are agricultural and industrial). According to Hegel, civilservants worked only for the universal interest, and this work satisfied their pri-vate interests. Marx critiqued Hegelís rational view of bureaucracy as misplaced--turning formalism into an end in itself and invoking an imaginary general inte-rest. Weber is the starting point for modern theories of bureaucracy. Like Hegel, Webergives rationality a privileged place. Weber believed that rationality would gua-rantee reliability, predictability and maximum efficiency in government. In fact, heasserted that bureacracy would flourish in both capitalist and socialist politicalsystems.Because bureacracy is regarded as the core of the modern state, it is the target

of much criticism. The entry concludes by discussing some recurrent bureaucraticproblems in socialist and other western govenrments.

Summaries

BUREAUCRACY

Monarchies, in extending their courtin order to administer the greaterdomain, to penetrate the localities andcollect taxes, were adding elements ofnational organization and drawing innew classes and interests that were nec-essary for the regime but threatening atthe same time. In fact, as bureaucraciesgrew larger and more stable, it becamemore and more difficult for themonarch to obtain direct and immedi-ate implementation of his own will.Indeed, one main consequence ofbureaucratic expansion consisted inthe transformation of the rulingauthority from the personal toward theimpersonal, or from the monist to thecollective, thus creeating a permanenttension in the functioning of allbureaucracies.A process which had originated fromthe sovereign’s will to expand his spanof control, inevitably produced a corpof people which would take pride - andpower - in asserting its own autonomyfrom political interference. While thismay have come as an irony in the wayof primordial statebuilders, it certainlystruck back with a vengeance on theefforts of democratic leaders to pursuethe collective good through efficientand legal means, while also taking fullresponsibility for their policy decisions.As a consequence, the pendulum ofdemocratic concern would find itselfcontinuously swinging between twocompeting alternatives: to firmly estab-lish a structural and functional dividebetween politics and administration, asa safeguard from arbitrary power; or tofoster those systems and procedureswhich would enable elected officers toeffectively steer the administrativeprocess, in order to fulfill their personalmandates (Peters 1978, chapter 8). The same democratic dilemma can beseen from a different perspective, mov-ing from the principles and formsthrough which authority and controlare exercised towards the specificattributes of those in charge of bureau-cratic implementation.

What kind of bureaucrats is a bureau-cracy made of, after all? The verticalaxis of our matrix introduces two mainoptions, and channels, through whichbureaucracies can be created: patron-age and elite. Patronage is the original and easiestway to select a group of officers respon-sible to their own boss - be it a prince ora party leader. Patronage can thus beeasily located as the early stage in thedevelopment of modern bureaucries, inXVI century France as well as in XXcentury Nigeria (Mousnier 1945;LaPalombara 1967). It also remains themost immediate resource for any politi-cal leader striving for asserting directcontrol on a number of key administra-tive posts. Yet, there are severe limita-tions to the use of patronage as thestandard procedure for staffing theadministrative process. One first limitconcerns the scale of operations. If thecriterium is personal acquaintance withthe political leader, the number ofappointees is necessarily restricted to aclose circle of friends. After trying torely on a small network born out of pre-existing aristocratic bonds, Frenchmonarchs were forced to entrust therunning of a fast growing state machin-ery upon a larger group of people withbourgeois background. As well as fromnumerical constraints, the need for anew class arose out of a process of spe-cialization of administrative functions.Indeed, these two factors were - andstill remain - strictly correlated. Therise of an administrative elite is aresponse to the growing complexity ofbureaucratic tasks, which require edu-cational qualifications and professionalskills largely outside the reach of asmall circle of political followers.The road was paved for the emergenceof Weberian bureaucracy, as well as forits internal and external glitches. Oncea bureaucratic elite was establishedunder the firm protection of collectiveauthority regulated by public law, howcould political responsibility penetratethe administrative citadel?

25

patronage

BUREAUCRACY

elite

26

BUREAUCRACY

patronagetrust contract

monarchy collective

reform lawelite

utopia

corporatism

bureaucracy

nation

party

AUTHORITRIANISM

ideology

oligarchycommunitymonarchy

class

bureaucracy

powerARISTOCRACY

republic

oligarchy

faction estate

market

contract

individual corporation

court

bureaucracy

state

CAPITALISM

law

charisma

police

court

bureaucracy

MONARCHY

power

religionaristocracy corporation

power

corporation

authority

state

OLIGARCHY

bureaucracy

aristocracyclass community

bureaucracy

group

party

PATRONAGE

state

civil societyinterest faction

individual

System

Upper right Quadrant

The upper right quadrant captures themain characteristics - and shortcom-ings - of the Weberian idealtype.The means through which the bureau-cratic elite excercises its collectiveauthority are strictly defined - and con-fined - by public and administrativelaw. Modern bureaucracy cannot becoinceived outside a coherent set ofrules and obligations set forth by a leg-islative body. This is indeed its mainlinkage to that collective entity - theState - that serves as the legitimatingprinciple for all bureaucratic behavior.The development of modern bureau-cracy is, to a very large extent, coinci-dent with the development ofRechtstaat, a centralized state using therule of law as its guiding principle -- arelationship to which Hegel’sPhilosophy of Right (1821) paid trib-ute as the first and most prominentmanifesto of the new administrativeorder. Hegel also was the first one tofully grasp the implications of the«holy union» between the bureaucraticelite and state law. He «accorded civilservants a position more exhalted thanthey have occupied in any account,before or since. The civil servant wasentrusted with the maintenance of thestate’s universal interest and of legalityin general» (BGD). Because of its supe-rior function, the administrative elitewas thus to enjoy a privileged status,turning into a closed estate, with socialprerogatives and esoteric language. In Hegel’s contemporary Prussia, thesewere indeed the necessary ingredientsfor bureaucracy to develop as a cohe-sive corp, able to stay independentfrom political and economic pressures(Koselleck, 1989). Yet, as democratiza-tion permeated the modern polity, theelitist nature of bureaucratic authoritycame under severe criticism. Even incountries like France, which had longbeen proud to nurture a highly skilledadministrative class, Enarchs came tobe portrayed as a self-referential net-work of mandarins, who had eventuallybecome so powerful to occupy thehigher echelons of political office(Coussirou 1996, Suleiman 1974). Was

democracy turning into atechnocracy? Where wasthe line to be drawnbetween bureaucrats andpoliticians (Putnam,Aberbach and Rockman1981)? To whom, andhow, was the bureaucraticestate to be responsible?

Lower Left Quadrant

What, according to Weberian ortho-doxy, is to be condemned as the intru-sion of arbitrary politics into the neu-tral sphere of bureaucracy, can insteadbe regarded as the necessary balancebetween popular sovreignty andadministrative autonomy.The lower left quadrant shows howdemocratic theory - and practice - wasto confront the same issue that absolutemonarchs had originally faced in theirrelationship with he bureaucraticmachine. American Presidents werethe first ones to raise the issue publicly,declaring that «to the victors belongthe spoils». Why should one try andwin an election if he were to leave therunning of the state apparatus in thehands of a hostile bureaucracy? Theywere also the first ones topromote patronage on alarge scale, staffing a fastgrowing federal machin-ery with party followers(Crenson 1975). Trustthus remained the maincriterion for the selec-tion for public office, yetthe process expanded farbeyond the small groupof a royal coterie. With the advent ofmass democracy, party had grown fromits original meaning as a faction at theprince’s court into a large scale organi-zation for electoral mobilization. Partybureaucracy - or a «state of parties»(Skowronek 1982) - was the first sys-tematic response offered by the prac-tice of democracy to the risks ofbureaucratic autocracy. Yet, whenAndrew Jackson promulgated his «doc-trine of simplicity» Manifesto in his

27

BUREAUCRACY

patronage

monarchy

trust

BUREAUCRACY

collective

law

BUREAUCRACY

elite

28

BiblioBreaking through Bureaucracy: A New Vision for Managing in GovernmentBerkeley, University of California Press

Regulating Business by Independent CommissionPrinceton, Princeton University Press

LeadershipNew York, Harper and Row

Faut-il supprimer l’ENA? Paris, Les editions d’organisation

The Federal Machine -- Beginning of Bureaucracy in Jacksonian AmericaBaltimore, The John Hopkins University Press

Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Translated with Notes by T.M. KnoxLondon-New York, Oxford University Press

A Question of Class: Capital, the State, and Uneven Development in MalaysiaNew Haven, Yale University Southeast Asia Studies

Executive Governance: Presidential Administrations and Policy Change in the FederalBureaucracyArmonk, Sharpe

Preussen Zwischen Reform und Revolution : Allgemeines Landrecht, Verwaltung und SozialeBewegung von 1791 bis 1848München, Klett-Cotta im Deutschen Taschenbuch Verlag

Business and Politics in IndonesiaBoulder, Westview Press

Bureaucracy and Political DevelopmentPrinceton, Princeton University Press

Bureaucracy, in Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 3New York, Mac Millan

Code: and Other Laws of CyberspaceNew York, Basic Books

At the Pleasure of the Mayor: Patronage and Power in New York City, 1898-1958New York, The Free Press of Glencoe

La corruption de la RépubliqueParis, Fayard

La vénalité des offices sous Henri IV et Louis Rouen,

Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public SectorReading, Addison-Wesley Pub. Co

The Politics of Bureaucracy: A Comparative PerspectiveNew York and London, Longman

Bureaucrats and Politicians In Western DemocraciesCambridge,Harvard University Press

Democracy, Bureaucracy, and Character: Founding ThoughtLawrence, University Press of Kansas

Politics within the State: Elite Bureaucrats and Industrial Policy in Authoritarian BrazilPittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press

Building a New American state : the Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920Cambridge, Cambridge University Press

Politics, Power and Bureaucracy in France. The Administrative ElitePrinceton, Princeton University Press

Hystory of the United States Civil Service Westport, Greenwood

Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do ItNew York, Basic Books

administration agenda

agenda law party

Barzelay, M.

Bernstein, M.

Burns, J.

Coussirou, J.

Crenson, M.

Hegel, G. W. F.

Hewison, K.

Hooton, C. G.

Koselleck, R.

Laothamatas, A.

LaPalombara, J.

Laski, H.

Lessig, L.

Lowi, T. J.

Meny, Y.

Mousnier, R.

Osborne, D.and Gaebler, T.

Peters, B. G.

Putnam, R. D. et al.

Richardson, W. D.

Schneider, B. R.

Skowronek, S.

Suleiman, E. N.

Van Riper, P.

Wilson, J. Q.

1992

1955

1978

1996

1975

1967

1989

1997

1989

1991

1963

1937

1999

1964

1992

1945

1992

1978

1981

1997

1992

1982

1974

1958

1989

inaugural speech to the Congress onDecember 1829, he was speaking to alargely agrarian society and the Federalburaucracy he referred to had very fewand elementary tasks to perform. Withindustrialization and economic devel-opment, the job for federal administra-tors became much more complex anddemanding. And the US had to gothrough a painstaking process ofbureaucratic reform in order to estab-lish a professional civil service similarto that of most European countries(van Riper 1958). On a longer termperspective, however, the Americandemocratic legacy has not proved to beonly a hindrance. Elected officers inthe U.S. - Presidents, Mayors,Governors - have kept a considerablenumber of political appointments «attheir pleasure» (Lowi, 1964). Thesecan now be recruited on a highly pro-fessionalized market, thus allowingAmerican leaders to keep a steeringcapacity over the policy-makingprocess that many of their Europeancounterparts are far from being able toachieve.

Upper Left Quadrant

On the whole, however, the span ofpolitical control over bureaucraticbehavior remains heavily constrainedby both the scale of operations and thetime slot available. Much as the spoilsystem is being reintroduced in moderngovernments through more qualifiedand professionalized channels, politicalpatronage can only reach into a limitednumber of higher posts, hardly scratch-ing the surface of the bureaucratic ice-berg. Besides, individual leaders areelected for a relatively short term,while bureaucrats - at all levels of thehyerarchical pyramid - stay in officemuch longer. Last not least, the logicitself of administrative operating proce-dures often proves to be incompatiblewith the policy frames of elected offi-cers and their staff. Even when admin-istrators may be willing to cooperate,the political calendar may result farbeyond the reach of bureaucratic rou-tine (Hooton 1997). All of this

amounts to a verdict of defeat, or mea-ger compromise at best, for most politi-cal efforts to significantly steer theadministrative machine. If leaders real-ly want to make a more diffused andlasting impact on the pol-icy process, the alterna-tive they are left with isto fight the bureaucraticLeviathan on their owngrounds, launching anoverarching reformcampaign. In order toreally make bureaucracypolitically responsible,bureaucracy must beturned into a political issue. The politics of administrative reformhas been a constant for transformation-al leadership (Burns 1978), with a spe-cial emphasis on the creation of a newbureaucratic elite to replace theentrenched interests of the old systemand/or to push the state’s interventioninto new territories. From Friedrich theGreat to FDR, bureaucratic reform hasbeen a recurrent strategy for bringingnew social forces and ideas into thegovernmental process, while leaving anexceptional imprint on the overallinstitutional framework. Nevertheless, «reinventing govern-ment» from above is a complex andchallenging task that only very fewcharismatic leaders are likely to under-take and successfully pursue. In most ofall remaining instances, the deadlockbetween policy innovation and bureau-cratic conservatism may well be bettercoped with through a different strategy(Osborne and Gaebler 1992). Insteadof relying on presidential leadership atthe macro level, administrative reformcan be pushed forward through incre-mental changes of the microprocessesof management, by giving administra-tors more, rather than less, discretionover their own organization (Wilson1989). Given the dificulty of and resist-ance to making civil servants responsi-ble towards policymakers, it may wellbe the case to try and turn administra-tors into policymakers, with more per-sonal power as well as more publicresponsibility. A «postbureaucratic per-

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spective» (Barzelay 1992) strongly -albeit ironically - resemblant of theoriginal Hegelian ethos of the foundingstage of bureaucratic power(Richardson 1997).

Lower Right Quadrant

Public responsibility - and visibility -for top administrators beomes all themore important in light of the trends inthe lower right quadrant, describingchanges and adjustments occurringwithin the administrative process inorder to adapt it to social and econom-ic pressures. This is a more and morewidespread variant to the Weberianidealtype, consisting of a contractualrelationship between bureaucracy andvarious corporate actors as a substitutefor bureaucracy’s direct interventionand implementation. In many respects,this is a formalized version of patron-age, yet with bureaucrats performingthe role - and prerogatives - of politicalauthority: a modern form of clientelecovering a wide spectrum of groups andassociations under the firm protectionof a legal agreement. Other than forthe functions of the groups involved,the corporatization of the administra-tive process can vary as to the degree ofexternal penetration, from occasionalcooperation up to outright substitu-tion. If the case of the «captive agen-cies» still refers to a set of informal rela-tionships supporting the official regula-tory activity (Bernstein 1955) neo-cor-poratist regimes, as in Germany,Scandinavia and the Low Countries,fully legitimize arrangements in whichpressure groups are «legally and offi-cially in the process of making andadministering public policy» (Peters1978, p.143). Corporate bureaucracyalso refers to illegitimate practiceswhich manage to comply with formaladministrative requirements. Asidefrom outright corruption - a widespreadphenomenon in underdeveloped coun-tries as well as in advanced democracies(Meny 1992) - white collar crime canflourish through various forms of collu-sion: from pre-packaging the contract-ing out of public works, to leaving a«revolving door» open for circulation

between top adminis-trative posts and cor-porate boards of direc-tors, to mere «cozinessbetween ministerialofficials and theirconunterparts in pri-vate industry andbanking» (Schneider1992).The latter attitude - andpractice - leads into the muddy watersof the relationship between top bureau-crats and economic development inauthoritarian regimes. In countrieswith no democratically elected officersto lead the process of change, canadministrators provide the necessaryleadership and vision for turning stateintervention into a useful subsidiary formarket regulation and expansion(Hewison 1989; Laothamatas 1991)?

Conclusion

Bureaucracy has become a pejorativeword in many if not all countries. It isdeemed a threat to democracy and it ischarged with inefficiency, formalism,redundancy, conservatism and a host ofother vices. In fact, most of the chargeslodged against these administratieorganizations, even when they are cor-rect and accurate criticism, are due tonot enough bureaucracy. The perfectlyorganized, fully bureaucratized admin-istrative agency would display a mini-mum of this alleged bad conduct andpoor results. This is precisely why everyprivate business organization bureau-cratizes itself to the maximum.The threat of bureaucracy is not fromits inherent weaknesses but from thestrength of its uncurtailed self-fullfill-ment. Before there were computersthere was programming - the pro-gramme of administrators and theirunits to comply with the mission of theagency. And the people and the unitswill continue to pursue the missionuntil a force stronger and more rationalintervenes to alter the software. Thechallenge for political vision, whichev-er be the quadrant it may choose or beforced to enter, is to write the new codeand keep the copyright (Lessig 1999).

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