Kalaitzidis Church State Milan Final-libre

FILOSOFIA ED ESPERIENZA RELIGIOSA

4

Il progetto «Filosofia ed esperienza religiosa» è promosso dal Dipartimento di Filosofia dell’Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore e dal Servizio Nazionale per il progetto Culturale della Conferenza Episcopale Italiana.

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EMANUELA FOGLIADINI

RELIGIONI, LIBERTÀ, POTEREATTI DEL CONVEGNO INTERNAZIONALE FILOSOFICO-TEOLOGICO SULLA LIBERTÀ RELIGIOSA

MILANO, UNIVERSITÀ CATTOLICA DEL SACRO CUORE E UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI16-18 OTTOBRE 2013

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RICERCHE | FILOSOFIAFILOSOFIA ED ESPERIENZA RELIGIOSA

Il Convegno Religioni, libertà, potere è stato organizzato dalla Dio-cesi di Milano, dal progetto «Filosofia ed esperienza religiosa», dall’Università degli Studi di Milano e dalla Facoltà teologica dell’Italia settentrionale.

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INDICE

Prefazione di Emanuela Fogliadini VII

Saluto del Magniico Rettore dell’Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore IX

Saluto di benvenuto di Giuseppe Colombo XV

Introduzione di Sua Eminenza Card. Angelo Scola, Arcivescovo di Milano XXIII

prima sessioneLa libertà religiosa oggi

jean-louis tauranLibertà religiosa: una realtà pluridimensionale 3

josé casanovaReligious Freedom: Models, Developments, Challenges in our Global Age 9

bernardo cervelleraLa libertà religiosa a rischio 19

brian j. grimA 21st Century Paradigm for Understanding Religious Freedom 27

seconda sessioneReligioni e Istituzioni pubbliche

pantelis kalaitzidis Church and State in the Orthodox World. From the Byzantine “Symphonia” and Nationalized Orthodoxy, to the Need of Witnessing the Word of God in a Pluralistic Society 39

silvia scatena Genesi e recezione della «Dignitatis Humanae» 75

indiceVI

alessandro ferrara La Dichiarazione «Dignitatis Humanae»: un commento 87

francesco d’agostinoLa libertà religiosa in un orizzonte post-secolare. A partire dalla «Dignitatis Humanae» 99

terza sessioneLibertà religiosa e cultura civile

debora spiniChiesa libertà potere: nuove frontiere della libertà religiosa 107

adam b. seligmanRights, Boundaries and the Challenge of Difference 115

john milbankTruth, Liberty and Feeling 127

silvio ferrariSocietà civile, laicità dello Stato e libertà di religione 143

quarta sessioneCristianesimo e libertà di credere

gabrio fortiCristianesimo e libertà di credere 161

stefano martelli Cristianesimo e libertà religiosa. Dinamiche socio-culturali in un mondo globalizzato 165

francesco botturiFede e legame sociale 187

alberto cozzi Rivelazione, pretesa di verità, relazione con l’altro religioso e non religioso 205

Conclusioni di Mons. Luca Bressan 225

PANTELIS KALAITzIDIS*

Church and State in the Orthodox World

From the Byzantine “Symphonia” and Nationalized

Orthodoxy, to the Need of Witnessing the Word

of God in a Pluralistic Society**

It is an exceptional privilege for me to have the possibility to speak of the relationship between the church and the state in the Orthodox world, at the occasion of this prestigious conference, which coincides with the 1.700 anniversary of the Edict of Milan, and thus to present my paper in the city where the Edict was issued, and to refer to a tradition, the Christian Ortho-dox tradition, which is deeply marked by the Constantinean era.

What uniies the different cases of church-state relationship in the Orthodox world, and allows us to examine them under the same label, is not political orientations, constitutional prescriptions, or legal pro-visions, but cultural background, i.e. the common byzantine past, the belonging to “Byzance après Byzance”, to recall the well-known Roma-nian historian Nicolae Iorga1. In fact, the Orthodox countries of the Balkans, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, besides their distinct his-torical trajectories, they follow today different political, economic, and geostrategic paths, while their common element remains mainly in the byzantine past. With the exception of Russia, for many centuries they all experienced Turkish rule and used to belong to the Ottoman Empire. With the exception of Greece (and Cyprus), they passed through com-munism and belonged for decades, until 1989, to the Soviet Empire, while others, like Serbia, had to wait until 2000 before being rid of their communist regime. Some of these countries, like Greece, Romania,

* Volos Academy for Theological Studies, Volos, Grecia.** The present paper is part of a wider research on “Church and State in the Orthodox World”. I would like to warmly thank the scientiic assistant in the Volos Academy for Theological Studies, Ms. Sophia Kounavi for her gracious help during the preparation of this paper, and Ms. Amal Dibo and Dr. Norman Russell for their reviewing the inal text. The com-pletion of this paper was made possible thanks to a generous grant of the Center for World Catholicism and Intercultural Theology at DePaul University, Chicago, IL, for which as well as for my stay at the Center during the spring of 2014 as Senior Research Scholar I should like to express my deep gratitude both to its Director, Professor Wil-liam T. Cavanaugh, and to Professor Michael L. Budde.1 Cf. N. Iorga, Byzantium after Byzantium, transl. into english by l. treptow, center for Romanian Studies, oxford 2000.

pantelis kalaitzidis40

Bulgaria, are now members of the Western alliance (nato), the main adversary of which remains (orthodox) Russia. there are orthodox countries which gradually joined the european Union (Greece in 1981, cyprus in 2004, Bulgaria and Romania in 2007), while others, like Ser-bia, are one step before accession, or aspiring to join (Ukraine). each of the countries under discussion has a different level of integration into the european acquis, a different level of respect for human rights, and especially religious rights, and more broadly speaking a different level of application of the principles of democracy and political liberalism, freedom of expression, and respect for minorities.

thus, when we have to deal with church-state relations in the or-thodox world, it is useful always to bear in mind that it is not about a monolithic or uniied world, but of a great variety of types or models of church-state relationship, ranging from “established church” to “strict separationism”. a further dificulty, and even a paradox of our topic is that, as Western standards are not always applicable to these countries, it happens that legally speaking, the most secular country, with a strict separationism model of church-state relationship like Russia, is more authoritarian and much less democratic and liberal than for example Greece, which relects an incomplete secular model, and has an estab-lishment type of church-state relationship.

But despite all of these real or apparent differences and legal prescrip-tions, the common feature which lies behind all the types of church-state relationship in the (eastern) orthodox world, is that of byzantine “sympho-nia” or “synallelia”, and the close relationship, to the point of identiica-tion, between church and nation, orthodoxy and ethno-cultural identity. the political ideal of “symphonia” draws its origin from the Byzantine po-litical model and serves, especially in the orthodox context, to designate the special relationship between church and state, as it refers to the loyal and mutual cooperation between these two distinctive institutions for the sake of the people, who are simultaneously members of the church and subjects or citizens of the state. in fact, with very few exceptions, there is not any approach or discussion on church-state relationship among theo-logians or church people, without referring to the model of “symphonia” or “synallelia”. Furthermore, the minds of many politicians from ortho-dox countries, on both the right and the left of the political spectrum and whether of a religious or a secular orientation2, are imbued with the

2 K. Ghodsee, Symphonic Secularism: Eastern Orthodoxy, Ethnic Identity and Religious Free-doms in Contemporary Bulgaria, «anthropology of east europe Review», 27 (2009), pp. 227-252, analyzing the case of Bulgaria (but also of other orthodox countries) re-garding church-state relations, speaks on “Symphonic Secularism”, referring to the

church and state in the orthodox world 41

same ideal, an ideal that alongside the reality of a “national orthodoxy” identiies orthodoxy with every single “orthodox” nation or state and understands the church in “national terms”. Such politicians, of course, seek political gain for their party, practicing thus de facto a thinly veiled instrumentalization of religion for the sake of political power.

in the present paper i will review in a irst step the different models of church-state relationship in the (eastern) orthodox world, briely explaining at the same time the historical background which shaped this relationship; i will then attempt to connect these different models to the byzantine “symphonia” and to provide a theological critique of the theology of the empire and the realized eschatology as well as the “nationalized orthodoxy” that support this political model; inally, in the third and last part of this paper, i will offer a theological relection inspired by the challenge of the public witness of orthodoxy in the con-text of a pluralistic society. Since the study of church-state relations in the orthodox world refers primarily, and almost exclusively, to the coun-tries where the majority religion is orthodoxy3, it is therefore obvious that we cannot extend our research to the countries or regions in which orthodoxy is a minority and seeks mainly legal recognition or respect for religious and human rights (e.g. estonia, albania, turkey, near and

particular “coexistence and interaction of modern secular elements with some reli-gious vestiges from the orthodox past”, cf. V.n. Makrides, Why are Orthodox Churches Particularly Prone to Nationalization and even to Nationalism?, «St. Vladimir’s theologi-cal Quarterly», 57 (2013), p. 331.3 With the notable exception of Finland in which the small in size orthodox church (1,1% of the Finnish population) has a status of state-recognized religion (along with the majority Finnish lutheran church). Following the Finnish model, the clergy of the orthodox church of Finland (autonomous, under the jurisdiction of ecumenical Patriarchate of constantinople) are remunerated and pensioned by the state, while the orthodox pupils could have their own lesson on religion in state schools. For a more detailed analysis of the church-state relations in Finland, and the place of the orthodox church in the Finnish society, cf. a. (Father), The Finnish Orthodox Church, in i. Bria (ed.), Martyria-Mission: The Witness of the Orthodox Churches Today, Geneva Wcc 1980; P. arvola - t. Kallonen (eds.), 12 Windows on Orthodoxy in Finland, Pub-lications committee for orthodox literature, Helsinki 2010, esp. pp. 77-86; H. Hut-tunen, Wittnessing in a secular situation: Relections on the Orthodox Church of Finland, «ortodoksia», 2002, 49, pp. 194-207; M. Heikkilä - J. Knuutila - M. Scheinin, Etat et Eglises en Finlande, in G. Robbers (éd.), Etat et Eglises en Union européenne, deuxième édition, en colloboration avec le Consortium européen pour l’étude des relations Eglises-Etat, nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 2008, pp. 557-578 (http://www.uni-trier.de/ileadmin/fb5/inst/ieVR/arbeitsmaterialien/Staatskirchenrecht/Staat_und_Kirche_in_der_eU/texte_integral.pdf); t. laitila, The Finnish Orthodox Church, in l.n. leustean (ed.), Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twenty-First Century, Rout-ledge, abingdon, oxon-new York 2014, pp. 280-294.


Middle east, africa etc.)4. While in the irst part of my paper i try, so far as possible, to provide sociological descriptions and historical informa-tion on the types of church-state relations in the orthodox world, my primary source of inspiration remains theology, and in my approach i hold the standpoint of an eastern orthodox theologian.

1. Different types of church-state relationship in the Orthodox world

1.1. Greece

it is impossible to understand church-state relations in Greece, unless we gain an elementary knowledge, of the history of Modern Greece, of the historic and national role of the orthodox church in Greece. in fact, in moments of exceptional historical urgency and need (such as the ottoman occupation), the church, the only christian institution to survive the turkish conquest, undertook the responsibility to ill the political void, and to represent the orthodox christian (religious) “na-tion” (millet) before the Muslim ottoman Sultan. thus, by replacing its main spiritual mission with a secular one and by concentrating on sav-ing the orthodox “nation” and the Greek people, its language, exist-ence, and political representation from destruction and islamization, and from becoming turkish, the church progressively became (through a complex historical process, beginning with the multi-ethnic orthodox millet but ending up, under the impetus of the principle of nationalities, with the formation of the Greek nation) the ark of Hellenism and an es-sential component of the modern Greek identity, while gradually it was transformed from an advocate of the multi-ethnic christian oikoumene to a propagandist for the national Greek idea5.

4 Given the limitation of time and space, it was not possible to include in the present form of my paper the cases of Georgia, Moldavia, Montenegro and cyprus.5 For the history of the adoption of the national ideology by the church of Greece, cf. c. Frazee, The Orthodox Church and Independent Greece (1821-1852), cambridge University Press, 1969; J. Petrou, Church and Politics in Greece 1750-1909, Kyriakidis, thessaloniki 1992, especially pp. 141 ff. [in Greek]; a. Manitakis, The Relationship between the Church and the Nation-State in the Wake of the Identity Card Conlict, nefeli, athens 2000, pp. 21-56 [in Greek]. For a comparative study of this phenomenon in the Balkan countries, see P. Kitromilidis, ’Imagined Communities’ and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans, in M. Blinkhorn - th. Veremis (eds.), Modern Greece: Nationalism and Nationality, Sage-eliamep, london-athens 1990, especially pp. 51-60. From the very rich historical evidence on this process, cf. among others S. anagnostopoulou, Asia Minor, 19th Century to 1919, The Greek Orthodox Communities, From the Roum Millet to the Greek Nation, Hellenika Grammata, athens 1998 [in Greek];


as a result of the above historical factors, the orthodox church in Greece enjoys the status of a national church. it has always had a vast pres-ence and visibility in the national, cultural or political life of the country even before the founding of modern Greek state (1830-1832), and through-out its historical path. it followed, in its own way, the great historical and political events, and more generally the public life in Greece, while it has not always avoided being involved in political debates and political games, especially in siding with the conservative, and even with the far right par-ties. By being involved in the nation’s life, and by collaborating with those exercising political power, the church wanted to pursue a long tradition already begun under the Byzantine empire, and perpetuated during the more than four centuries of ottoman rule, a tradition of harmony and symbiosis, of “symphonia” of the church with the secular power.

one should bear in mind that the current Greek constitution (issued in 1975, amended in 1986, 2001, and 2008), is a liberal one, and even secular in many points. However it did not radically alter a church-state relationship inspired both by the model of the byzantine “symphonia”, and the German and nordic model of control of the state over religion.

it maintained, in the article 3, the reference to the eastern ortho-dox church of christ as the “prevailing” religion in Greece, although this constitutional provision is interpreted almost unanimously in a non-normative way, i.e. as based on statistical data, according to which or-thodoxy is the religion of the majority of Greeks. in the same article it is stated that “the orthodox church of Greece, acknowledging our lord Jesus christ as its head, is inseparably united in doctrine with the Great church of christ in constantinople and with every other church of christ of the same doctrine, observing unwaveringly, as they do, the holy apostolic and synodal canons and sacred traditions. it is autocepha-lous and is administered by the Holy Synod of serving Bishops and the Permanent Holy Synod originating thereof and assembled as speciied by the Statutory charter of the church in compliance with the provi-sions of the Patriarchal tome of June 29, 1850 and the Synodal act of September 4, 1928”. in virtue of this article the orthodox church of Greece is recognized as a public legal entity. the same status is also as-signed for historical reasons to the Muslim minority of Western thrace, in the nord-east of Greece, and to the Jewish religious community, while all the other religious communities (the Roman catholic church and

ead., The terms Millet, Genos, Ethnos, Oikoumenikotita, Alytrotismos in Greek Historiography, in The passage from the Ottoman Empire to the Nation-States, isis Press, istanbul 2003; d. Stamatopoulos, Reform and Secularization: Towards a Reconstruction of the History of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the 19 th Century, alexandreia, athens 2003[in Greek].


the Protestant churches included) are either registered as private legal associations or are still seeking legal recognition6.

the non-amendable article 13§1 of the constitution secures the invio-lability of freedom of religious conscience, while at the same time (art. 13§2) it is clearly stated that “all known religions shall be free and their rites of worship shall be performed unhindered and under the protection of the law”, stipulating however the overall prohibition of proselytism.

it is quite evident that the close church-state relationship in Greece is a logical extension of the relationship between religion and Greek national identity. to borrow some elements of the political scientist’s efie Fokas’ analysis, church-state linkages are embedded in Greek leg-islation and practice: the clergy of the Greek orthodox church (Goc) are remunerated and pensioned by the state; but the same applies to the mouftis of the Muslim minority; lessons on religion in state schools continue mainly to relect oficial orthodox positions, although there is a slow movement toward a more pluralistic, and more inclusive model which is taking account of the Western christian, the Muslim and the Jewish traditions; state holidays are compatible with the religious cal-endar; the Statutory charter of the church was passed by parliament, as well as laws regulating the curricula and the inances of ecclesiasti-cal seminaries and academies; icons are present in all court rooms and school classes; the President, the Prime-minister, ministers and secretar-ies of the state, as well as deputies of the parliament are sworn into ofice mainly by the archbishop of athens and all Greece (though alterna-tives are available); church and state leaders often jointly preside over state functions and national holiday celebrations; and, until recently, the “opinion” of orthodox bishops had to be sought for the issuing of li-censes for the building of places of worship for minority faiths. efforts to limit the privileges of the Goc have led to intense church-state conlict, notably over church property ownership (ongoing at some level since 1987) and, more recently, over the state’s removal of reference to reli-gious afiliation from national identity cards (in 2000). in such conlicts the Goc, relying on the religion-national identity link and its mobiliza-tion potential, has tended to mobilize public opinion in its favor and to thus limit politicians’ will to address such issues for fear of political cost. Yet in the policy domain signiicant steps have been taken and the will to change has been expressed by certain politicians7.

6 a recent project of law, not yet approved by the Parliament, it grants the status of “sui generis religious legal entity”, to all the known religious comunities of the country.7 e. Fokas, ‘Eastern’ Orthodoxy and ‘Western’ Secularization in Contemporary Europe (with Special Reference to the Case of Greece, «Religion, State and Society», 40 (2012),


on the basis of the above “national role and mission of the church”, a whole ideological and political construction is created, which is very problematic with regard both to genuine orthodox faith and to respect for human rights and religious freedom. Because of the role played in Greek history and in the survival of the Greek nation by the Greek or-thodox church, the latter is considered to be the guardian and the guar-antor of the national identity and continuity, accepting for itself the role of the mother of the nation and the people.

today, one hundred and ninety years since the Greek Revolution of 1821, the church in Greece seems unable to liberate itself from the syndrome of identiication with the nation, and from its voluntary instrumentalization for the sake of national purposes. it seems unable to see its work, its teaching and preaching, and its mission in general separated from the course of the nation; it seems unable to realize that the boundaries of the church are no longer identiied with the boundaries of the nation. and whenever the Greek state moves to-ward adapting to the new international reality and moves timidly in a direction that could lead to its divorce from the church, the latter pro-tests by pointing to the past and to its contribution to the “struggles of the nation”, in order to keep alive its co-dependence and absolute relationship to it. and as the Greek state – as a result of the broader realignment of globalization and multiculturalism – gradually de-na-tionalizes, the church re -nationalizes more and more, feeling unsafe

pp. 405-406. For the wider on-going discussion on the burning issue of church-state relationship in Greece, cf. among others, n. alivizatos, A New Role for the Greek Church?, «Journal of Modern Greek Studies», 17.1 (1999), pp. 23-40; a. Polis, Greece: A Problematic Secular State, in d. christopoulos, Legal Issues for Religious Minorities in Greece, alexandria, athens 1999 [in Greek]; n.P. diamantouros, Cultural Dual-ism and Political Change in Post Authoritarian Greece, athens 2000 [in Greek]; c.K. Papasthatis, Church and State in Greece in 2000, «european Journal for church and State Research», 8 (2001), pp. 95-117; P. dimitropoulos, State and Church [in Greece]: A Dificult Relationship, Kritiki Publications, athens 2001 [in Greek]; Y. Stavrakakis, Politics and Religion: On the Politicization of Greek Church Discourse, «Journal of Mod-ern Greek Studies», 21.2 (2003), pp. 153-181; G.th. Mavrogordatos, Orthodoxy and Nationalism in Greece, in J.t.S. Madeley - z. enyedi (eds.), Church and State in Contemporary Europe: The Chimera of Neutrality, Frank cass Publishers, london 2003, pp. 113-131; L’année canonique (special issue on “les cultes et l’etat en Grèce. les identités religieuses dans la République hellénique”), 45 (2003), pp. 123-338; e.H. Prodromou, Negotiating Pluralism and Specifying Modernity in Greece: Reading Church-State Relations in the Christodoulos Period, «Social compass», 51.4 (2004), pp. 471-485; P.d. nikolopoulos, Church-State Separation: Legal Concerns and Recommendations, ant. n. Sakkoulas Publications, athens 2006 [in Greek]; e. Karagiannis, Secularism in Context: The Relations between the Greek State and the Church of Greece in Crisis, «archives of european Sociology», 50 (2009), pp. 133-167.


and uncertain without its special relationship with the state and its absolute relationship with the nation8.

1.2. Russia

it is time now to turn to the Russian case and see what is the relationship between church and state in this country, which is the most populous and powerful in the orthodox world. as it is well known, orthodoxy did play a key role in the emergence and consolidation of the Russian nation and culture. the baptism of the Rus’ was not only a very signiicant religious event, but had also important cultural, political, and geostrategic conse-quences. Kiev was proud to be the “new constantinople”, and Moscow wanted to be the “third Rome”, while during the whole period of the Moscow Principality and even the tsarist empire, the byzantine model was an ideal to be attained in many domains of public life9. the church-state relationship could not be an exception to this; on the contrary, it was an element of crucial importance for this politico-religious vision. church and state, the patriarch and the tsar, by working together, were reproducing the byzantine ideal of “symphonia”, an ideal partly damaged with the suppression of the Patriarchate and the subsequent submission of the Russian church to the State operated by Peter the Great, but com-pletely abolished only later, during the communist period.

the end of the antireligious and anti-christian communist regime in 1990-91 did not automatically mean the return to the previous church-state relationship model. the Russian orthodox church (Roc) re-trieved its freedom, and began to develop its catechetical and educa-tional work, as well as new missionary activities, but did not regain its status of a state religion, despite its growing visibility and inluence in the public sphere.

the separation of church and state was maintained, as post-commu-nist Russia was supposed to be a secular state10. article 14 of the 1993

8 cf. P. Kalaitzidis, The Temptation of Judas: Church and National Identities, «the Greek orthodox theological Review», 47 (2002), pp. 363-364; P. Kalaitzidis - n. asproulis, Greek Religious Nationalism and the Challenges of Evangelization, Forgiveness, and Reconciliation, in S. asfaw - a. chehadeh - M.Gh. Simion (eds.), Just Peace: Or-thodox Perspectives, Wcc Publications, Geneva 2012, p. 78.9 cf. B. lourié, Russian Christianity, in K. Parry (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Eastern Christianity, Wiley-Blackwell, Malden, Ma/oxford 2010, pp. 207-208.10 For what follows, cf. M. tataryn, Russia and Ukraine: Two Models of Religious Liberty and Two Models of Orthodoxy, «Religion, State and Society», 29.3 (2001), pp. 155-161; V.l. Hesli - e. erdem - W. Reisinger - a. Miller, The Patriarch and the President: Religion and Political Choice in Russia, «demokratizatsiya», 7.1 (1999), pp. 47 ff; P.l.


constitution states that the Russian Federation shall be a secular state. no religion may be instituted as state-sponsored or mandatory religion. Religious associations shall be separated from the state, and shall be equal before the law, while article 28 stipulates religious freedom and pluralism: “everyone shall be guaranteed the freedom of conscience, the freedom of religion, including the right to profess individually or together with any other religion or to profess no religion at all, to freely choose, possess and disseminate religious and other views and act accord-ing to them”. article 19 prohibits discrimination on the basis of religious belief, whereas article 29 prohibits propaganda advocating religious su-periority or social tension. this general prohibition on propaganda nev-ertheless, often left room for the government to subjectively determine restrictions against certain religious groups. Furthermore, the principle of religious pluralism supported by the constitution is considerably re-stricted on the legislation level, since according to the 1997 law, only those groups that had existed in Russia for ifteen years (prior to 1997) can register and obtain various rights and privileges. this stipulation means that only religious groups established in Russia before the 1917 Revolution receive certain rights and privileges, because new religious groups originating during perestroika in the late 1980s do not qualify. the same law gives oficials the authority to ban religious groups and thereby prohibit all of the activities of a religious community. Following the passage of the law, groups that failed to reregister by december 31, 2000, became subject to legal dissolution (often translated as “liquida-tion”), i.e. deprivation of juridical status.

it is important to know how the Russian government came to this point11:

– in June 1997, a draft law on Freedom of conscience and Reli-gious associations introduces the recognition of the orthodox church’s unique contribution to Russia, while it names four religions in its pre-amble: orthodoxy, islam, Buddhism and Judaism. it moreover identi-ies orthodoxy as “inseparable part of the all-Russian historical, spir-itual and cultural heritage”, restricting at the same time the rights of the other religions.

Glanzer - K. Petrenko, Religion and Education in Post-communist Russia: Russia’s Evolving Church-State Relations, «Journal of church and State», 49.1 (Winter 2007), pp. 53-73; e. almént - H.c. oster, Religious Education in Great Britain, Sweden and Russia. Presentations, Problem Inventories and Commentaries, Peter Project, «Religion and Religious education», no 1, University electronic Press, 2000, pp. 92-98.11 cf. tataryn, Russia and Ukraine: Two Models of Religious Liberty and Two Models of Orthodoxy, pp. 157-159. cf. Hesli - erdem - Reisinger - Miller, The Patriarch and the President: Religion and Political Choice in Russia, pp. 44, 48-49.


– in July 1997, President Yeltsin vetoed the law because it infringed human rights and freedoms as spelled out in the Russian constitution, and establishes inequality among different faiths.

– in September 1997, Yeltsin’s council of cooperation with Religious associations announced the reworked documents could proceed to the duma, which inally passed the law (19th September 1997). the inal version broadens the “special role” of orthodoxy to include christianity in general. it also limited equality before the law only to those religious groups which had gained standing in the old USSR.

thus, despite or beyond constitutional or legal prescriptions, the re-ality is that orthodoxy is de facto the State religion in Russia. there are many unwritten laws and practices which run in parallel with the ofi-cial law and the legislative framework, rendering the latter arbitrary. it seems that in Russia unwritten laws are very important for everyday life as well as for social and even political life. according to these unwritten laws, which are somewhere connected to the lack of democratic culture and tradition, and to the authoritarian understanding of political power, Russia is an orthodox State, and orthodoxy is de facto the state-church. as orthodox intellectual alexei Bodrov, the Rector of St. andrews Bibli-cal theological institute, points out:

an additional problem is that an authoritative state needs an authoritative church. So, given the problems of our society along with the role of the state, there is no surprise with the recent campaign launched by the Russian ortho-dox church leadership against human rights, which are considered a foreign (Western) concept. there is a profound anti-Western attitude. dialogue east-east (for example, orthodox-Muslim) is much easier than dialogue east-West (for example, orthodox-catholic or Protestant). theology is not an issue here. in Russia, religion is widely used in politics at all levels (even though Russia is a profoundly secular country with very low levels of active church goers). While it is clear that the orthodox truth cannot be used as an ideology, or even as a political instrument, ironically orthodoxy has become a new state ideology. Be-cause orthodoxy is regarded as part of the national tradition and culture, the orthodox church becomes de facto the state church. Political Orthodoxy is strong and inluential in its very conservative form and has nothing to do with theology or spirituality. it is not a religion, it is an ideology. Recent sociological surveys indicate that about 20% of orthodox do not believe in God, and so 13-15% of the people are “orthodox non-believers”, but they can certainly inluence poli-tics. “orthodox” groups and movements are numerous and different, and all of them display nationalistic, anti-Western and antidemocratic attitudes.12

12 a. Bodrov, Relations between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Military, in asfaw - chehadeh - Simion (eds.), Just Peace: Orthodox Perspectives, pp. 44-45. cf. a. Verk-hovsky, ‘Political Orthodoxy’: Religion’s Involvement in the Identity Formation Process, «St


in recent years, religious freedom is furthermore seriously affected not only by legal restrictions and prescriptions, but also by the concept of “canonical territory”, introduced by the Roc, and supported by the Rus-sian State. From theological and ecclesiological point of view, the con-cept of “canonical territory”, as Metropolitan Hilarion alfeyev reminds us, had initially a geographical dimension, and was closely bound to a state, and more precisely to an empire (Byzantine, ottoman, tsarist), deining thus the boundaries of ecclesiastical territories, in connection with civil territorial divisions established by secular authorities13. But while the concept of “canonical territory” was traditionally associated with state power and dominion, what is in fact new in contemporary Rus-sian perceptions of “canonical territory,” is its close association with na-tional identity, and the extension of the former with a so-called “cultural canonical territory,” which means that the initially geographical concept of “canonical territory” ceases to be based upon geographical criteria and has now been transformed into an ethno-cultural one, which means that it has been extended in every place all around the world where the faithful of the Roc are living or residing, as becomes clear from the Roc’s statements on membership or extension of jurisdiction. canoni-cal territory serves therefore both, a) to ensure the integrity of Russia’s national and cultural area, and b) to prevent “foreign” (to the Russian spiritual tradition) religions to enter this ethno-cultural area.

as it is stated from the outset of the Putin administration, in the 2000 National Security Concept,

assurance of the Russian Federation’s national security also includes protect-ing the cultural and spiritual-moral legacy and the historical traditions and standards of public life, and preserving the cultural heritage of all Russia’s peoples. there must be a state policy to maintain the population’s spiritual and moral welfare, prohibit the use of airtime to promote violence or base instincts, and counter the adverse impact of foreign religious organizations and missionaries14.

Vladimir’s theological Quarterly», 57 (2013), pp. 525-540.13 B.H. alfeyev, One City, One Bishop, One Church, part i, in http://www.orthodoxyto-day.org/articles6/HilariononeBishop.php; and part ii, in http://www.orthodoxyto-day.org/articles6/HilariononeBishop2.php. 14 cf. d.P. Payne, Spiritual Security, the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Russian Foreign Ministry: Collaboration or Cooptation?, «Journal of church and State», 2010, pp. 2-3 (available at: https://www.academia.edu/603701/Spiritual_Security_the_Russian_orthodox_church_and_the_Russian_Foreign_Ministry_collaboration_or_coopta-tion), where the reference to the website for the 2000 Russian national Security concept, available at http://www. russiaeurope.mid.ru/russiastrat2000.html.


But following Fr. daniel P. Payne’s analysis, the spiritual understanding of national security saw already “its beginnings in the pursuit of the 1997 law on Freedom of conscience and on Religious associations, which brought to an end the brief period of religious freedom that Russia experienced fol-lowing the 1990 law on Freedom of Worship”. this spiritual understanding of national security is also becoming clear when considering Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad’s (now Patriarch Kirill) comments and interventions about the problem of proselytism facing the Roc15.

the idea which progressively arose was that these foreign missionar-ies were actually covert foreign intelligence intrusions, gathering infor-mation about “Russian policies and strategic activities”16. Meanwhile Pu-tin from his side stated that, “in the dialogue with other Sister-churches, the Russian orthodox church has always defended and hopefully will continue to defend the national and spiritual identity of Russians”17. this special mission assigned to the Roc met the aspirations and ethno-cultural vision of the latter itself, as these are described in the following statement by Patriarch Kirill:

there are parishes and monasteries of the Russian orthodox church in many countries. they not only unite Russians, but also the natives of other countries in the canonical space of the Moscow Patriarchate, speciically the citizens of Bela-rus, Ukraine and Moldova. all those people ind themselves drawn to the faith of their ancestors, their people, to orthodoxy, when they land in foreign countries. the church communities seek to unite orthodox christians so that they can, together, get stronger in the faith, pray and partake of the Sacraments. Moreover, our parishes fulill a cultural mission. they are an important link between their Motherland and the people living far away from their native country18.

15 See Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, Gospel and Culture, in J. Witte Jr. - M. Bourdeaux (eds.), Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Russia: The New War for Souls, orbis Book, Maryknoll 1999, pp. 66-76, and Payne, Spiritual Security, the Russian Or-thodox Church, and the Russian Foreign Ministry: Collaboration or Cooptation?, pp. 3 ff.16 cf. Payne, Spiritual Security, p. 3, and J. anderson, Putin and the Russian Orthodox Church: Asymmetric Symphonia?, «Journal of international affairs», 61.1 (2007), p. 194.17 in his response to the enthronement of Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and all Russia, Russian Orthodox Church to work for Russian Identity-Putin, interfax, February 3, 2009; available at http://www.interfax-religion.com and Payne, Spiritual Security, p. 4.18 Church Diplomacy Is Not Just a Matter of Inter-Church Relations, diplomat 173.9 (2008), p. 14, and Payne, Spiritual Security, p. 6. For a further discussion on the issue of “ca-nonical territory” see Payne, Spiritual Security, pp. 10-15; id., Nationalism and the Local Church: The Source of Ecclesiastical Conlict in the Orthodox Commonwealth, in Nationalities Papers, vol. 35.5, november 2007, pp. 834-837; d. Jackson, Canonical Territory and National Security: Patriarch, President, and Proselytism in the Russian Federation, “Baptistic theologies” 2.2, autumn, 2010, pp. 59-81; Heiko overmeyer, The Argument over


Furthermore, a number of trends can only worry even more those who are sensitive not only to christian faith, but also to religious freedom and more generally to human rights, including the recent, after the election of Patriarch Kirill, almost complete identiication of the Russian ortho-dox church with the Russian State, its voluntary instrumentalization for the sake of the Russian national idea and identity, its promotion as part of the public order; the transformation of the former into an ideological arm of the latter and of the Putin regime, to the point of continuously supporting and giving religious justiication to the multiple wars in the caucasus; the continuous efforts of this regime to retrieve all the Rus-sian churches or institutions in Western europe which used to belong to the Russian church before the 1917 Revolution or were founded in the Russian diaspora after the Revolution; and last, but not least, the recent reinforcement of the concept of “Spiritual Security”, and the related legislation on non Governmental organizations, and the obligation of these organizations to be registered in a separate register labeled “For-eign agents” (a legislation which began already to affect the independ-ent religious and theological institutions)19.

an extremely alarming example of what i am trying to present is what was said on the occasion of the celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the nuclear Weapon Shield of Russia. i will borrow again information from alexei Bodrov’s presentation: “President Vladimir Putin commented then that ‘both the traditional confessions in the Russian Federation and the nuclear shield of Russia are those constituencies that strengthen the Russian state and provide the necessary conditions for internal and external security of the country’. egor Kholmogorov, a publicist, has ex-pressed this attitude in very candid terms: ‘in order to remain ortho-dox, Russia must be a powerful nuclear state, and in order to remain a powerful nuclear state, Russia must be orthodox’”20.

it is clear to us that behind what it is described above lies the ethno-religious narrative of Russian orthodoxy and the vision of the third

‘Canonical Territory’ – an Insoluble Territorial Conlict Between the Catholic and Russian Or-thodox Churches?, «concilium», issue 2, 2007 (land conlicts, land Utopias, edited by M.t. Wacker and e.M. Wainwright, ScM Press, london), pp. 37-46.19 on the issues raised above, cf. among others, d. Uzlaner, The Pussy Riot Case and the Peculiarities of Russian Post-Secularism, translation by April French, «State, Religion and church», 1.1 (2014), pp. 23-58; id., The Pussy Riot Case and the Peculiarities of Russian Post-Secularism, in e.a. diamantopoulou - l.l. christians (eds.), Orthodox Christianity and Human Rights in Europe: Theology, Law and Religion in Interaction, Peter lang, Brussels (forthcoming); cf. Verkhovsky, ‘Political Orthodoxy’: Religion’s Involve-ment in the Identity Formation Process. 20 Bodrov, Relations between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Military, p. 47.


Rome, i.e. the illusory dream to “resurrect” or to imitate the byzantine “symphonia”, as well as a very complex and problematic relationship to Western modernity, insofar as the Russian church’s involvement in poli-tics, and its privileged relation to the state, is seeking de-secularization of the society, understood as a partial return to the pre-modern, pre-secular state, and not at de-secularization, deined as a social process characteristic of a modern secular society21.

1.3. Ukraine

the example of Ukraine represents a unique case of church-state rela-tions in the orthodox world. an orthodox country with a long history full of weighty symbolisms, host to the baptism of the Rus’ and to Kiev-ian christianity, as a result of its historical adventures, Ukraine is maybe the only great orthodox nation without either an “established or state-church” (de facto or de jure), or any type of formal or informal model of “symphonia”. the reason for this has to do primarily with the multiple schisms, the splintering and fragmentation in many, and often rival, or-thodox jurisdictions as well as with the presence and activity, for 400 years now, of the Greek catholic church attached to the Pope of Rome since the Union of Brest-litovsk in 1596. if the creation of the latter is due both to the decay of the orthodox hierarchy of that time in Ruthe-nia and Western Ukraine, and to Roman expansionism at the expense of the orthodox, the multiplicity of the orthodox churches and jurisdic-tions is certainly linked to the long struggle for independence from Rus-sia of the Ukrainian orthodox and their will to afirm, through a distinc-tive ecclesiastical entity, their oppressed national identity. i cannot recall here the extremely complex and long history of the different jurisdic-tions and the successive schisms that penetrated Ukrainian orthodoxy. this is not my intention and my point in this paper. i will restrict myself to the present situation, in order to facilitate the understanding of the wider framework of church-state relations in Ukraine, and the absence of any model of “symphonia” from Ukrainian political and public life.

Until 1990 Ukraine had one major christian church, the Russian orthodox church22. But after the liberalization of the Soviet regime

21 cf. Verkhovsky, ‘Political Orthodoxy’: Religion’s Involvement in the Identity Forma-tion Process, p. 525. For further discussion cf. W.l. daniel - P.l. Berger - c. Marsh (eds.), Perspectives on Church-State Relations in Russia, J.M. dawson institute of church-State Studies, Baylor University 2008. 22 For what follows cf. tataryn, Russia and Ukraine: Two Models of Religious Liberty and Two Models of Orthodoxy, pp. 161-165; n.e. denysenko, Fractured Orthodoxy in Ukraine and Politics: The Impact of Patriarch Kyrill’s ‘Russian World’, «logos: a Journal


at the end of the ‘80s with glasnost and perestroika, the new law on re-ligious freedom and the Ukrainian independence that was gained, thanks to the referendum of december 1991, defections began from that church and those emerged who had been practicing their faith clandestinely were hereafter able to created alternative ecclesiastical bodies. as a result, from 1990 to 1993, except for the Former Russian church-autonomous Ukrainian orthodox church under the Moscow Patriarchate, which remained the biggest ecclesiastical entity and the only recognized by the communion of the orthodox churches world-wide, three more large church organizations emerged in Ukraine (and many others of a smaller size!): the Ukrainian orthodox church-Patri-archate of Kiev; the Ukrainian autocephalous orthodox church; and the Ukrainian Greek catholic church (in communion with the Pope of Rome).

the newly established independent Ukrainian state showed a clear will to be religiously neutral and to respect religious pluralism and free-dom, following in this point Western european standard. despite the failed attempt of its irst elected president (ex-communist) leonid Krav-chuk, to establish (with the assistance of Metropolitan Filaret denisen-ko of the Ukrainian orthodox church-Patriarchate of Kiev, defrocked by Moscow) a national or state religion, not by banning others but by strongly favoring one, Ukraine was eventually able, especially during president Kuchma’s administration (1994 onwards), to preserve its mul-ti-religious character. according to a 1993 survey, 44% of the Ukrainian population declared themselves religious, 33% undecided, 18% not re-ligious, and 5% atheists. the majority of those who said that they were religious (64%) classiied themselves as orthodox. in 1994 Ukraine was host to real religious pluralism (17,600 oficially registered religious

of eastern christian Studies», 54.1-2 (2013), pp. 33-67; J. casanova, Between Nation and Civil Society: Ethnolinguistic and Religious Pluralism in Independent Ukraine, in R.W. Hefner (ed.), Democratic Civility: The History and Cross-cultural Possibility of a Modern Political Ideal, transaction Publishers, new Brunswick, nJ london 1998, pp. 203-228; id., Ethno-linguistic and Religious Pluralism and Democratic Construction in Ukraine, in B.R. Rubin - J. Snyder (eds.), Post-Soviet Political Order: Conlict and State-Building, London and New York, Routledge, london 1998, pp. 81-103; o. zaiets, Overview of Church-State Relations in Ukraine in 2011, in http://risu.org.ua/article_blog_code.php?id=46917&name=analytic&_lang=en&; Church-State Relations in Ukraine as of 2013 (Round-table discussion), in http://www.razumkov.org.ua/eng/news.php?news_id=417; a.c. Hovorun, On Maidan, in http://byzypriest.com/?p=81; id., Christians in Ukraine: Ecumenism in the Trenches, in Catholic World Report, available at: http://insight-scoop.typepad.com/2004/2014/03/christians-in-ukraine-ecumenism-in-the-trench-es-the-conlict-between-the-state-and-the-society-in-ukraine-has-led-to-a-signi.html.


communities, from 65 different religious groups)23. With the election of leonid Kuchma as president of Ukraine, in July 1994, efforts to create a national church were abandoned, while with the Statement on the un-derstanding of the religious situation in Ukraine (august 1995), Kuch-ma’s government priority was given to engage various religious leaders in constructive dialogue, and to assure religious neutrality of the state. in october 1995 Kuchma’s government reestablished the council for Religious affairs (which was abolished since its main task during the Soviet period was the control of religious life and organizations), with the express purpose this time of encouraging dialogue among religious denominations. His head, Minister anatol Koval, furthermore identiied three speciic tasks as his duties (February 1996): a) to guarantee the separation of church and state; b) to support all religious organizations; and c) to avoid all forms of religious intolerance or special status. in June 1996 the same government voted in the new constitution, which in article 35 guarantees religious freedom and freedom of conscience, and establishes in addition the all-Ukrainian council of churches and Religious organizations (today under the responsibility of the Ministry of culture), which would advise the government on religious matters, and institutionalize cooperation and peaceful co-existence among the multiple religious communities of the country24.

during the irst two decades of the 21st century, not without set-backs, Ukraine has continued to pay attention to issues of religious freedom, especially a) to those related to the current law of freedom of conscience and religious organizations, including the procedure for registering religious organizations seeking legal status; b) to the all-Ukrainian council of churches and Religious organizations (aUc-cRo) which is the most effective forum of reconciliation and coopera-tion between different religious groups in Ukraine and which is been now concerned to prevent any developments that could negatively af-fect religious freedom in Ukraine; c) to the visas for foreign religious workers, the tariffs for utilities for religious organizations, and the sta-tus of foreign religious organizations ecc.

23 casanova (Between Nation and Civil Society: Ethnolinguistic and Religious Pluralism in Independent Ukraine, p. 215), will maintain about this pluralism that “of all euro-pean societies, Ukraine is the one most likely to approximate the american model. indeed, Ukraine has already gone through the irst incipient stages of religious de-nominationalism to an extent unsual in europe. this in my view augurs very well for the success of civil society in Ukraine”. cf. id., Ethno-linguistic and Religious Pluralism and Democratic Construction in Ukraine, p. 90.24 For this brief historical overview cf. tataryn, Russia and Ukraine: Two Models of Religious Liberty and Two Models of Orthodoxy, pp. 161-165.


the today’s Ukrainian religious landscape keeps its diversity, since none of the churches could claim to be the prevailing one or the domi-nant religious community of the country. according to Fr. cyril Hov-orun’s presentation25 (largely accepted by all the analysts), the largest christian community is the Ukrainian orthodox church (Uoc) under the Moscow Patriarchate, the only Ukrainian church recognized by the fellowship of the orthodox churches worldwide. according to the of-icial statistics, in January 2013 it had 12,485 registered communities, whereas for the last 22 years the Primate of this church was Metropoli-tan of Kiev Volodymyr Sabodan, who in recent months resigned because of the serious deterioration of his health condition. By the Synodal de-cision of the Uoc (February 24), Metropolitan onufry was elected as Locum Tenens of the Kievian See.

the second largest church is the Patriarchate of Kiev (Uoc-KP), which was founded in 1992 (with the encouragement of the President of the country at that time leonid Kravchuk) by the former exarch of Ukraine Filaret denisenko, who was defrocked, for this, by the Moscow Patriarchate. according to the statistics, this church counted 4,536 reg-istered communities.

according to the same statistics, the third largest christian church is the Ukrainian Greek-catholic church (UGcc), a catholic church sui iuris, which follows the eastern/byzantine rite. this church counted 3,734 registered communities, mostly in the western Ukrainian region of Galicia. it nevertheless developed a distinct social teaching and has a powerful voice recognized throughout the whole country.

the Ukrainian autocephalous orthodox church (Uaoc) is the fourth largest church of the country with 1,205 registered communities. With a long and complex history, and with many transformations and reversals, it originates from the Ukrainian autocephalous movement that started in 1918, then moved into the emigration, mostly canada and the US, and af-ter Ukraine became independent, returned to its motherland as a Uaoc.

according to the oficial data, there is also smaller Ukrainian churches, including the Roman catholic church with 919 communi-ties, as well as different religious groups, including Jewish and Muslim communities.

the recent dramatic events in Ukraine, and the subsequent political change will certainly lead to changes and reversals at the religious level

25 Christians in Ukraine: Ecumenism in the Trenches, in Catholic World Report, available at: http://insightscoop.typepad.com/2004/2014/03/christians-in-ukraine-ecumen-ism-in-the-trenches-the-conlict-between-the-state-and-the-society-in-ukraine-has-led-to-a-signi.html.


also, especially since all the religious communities, the Ukrainian or-thodox church (Uoc) under the Moscow Patriarchate included, were involved to a lesser or greater degree in the uprising in favor of the pro-european perspective. it is still too early to know or even to predict what these changes and reversals will be as things are changing rapidly and constantly, especially if the Russian aggressiveness increases. Up to now, thanks to its history and tradition of multi-religious, multi-racial, and multi-lingual co-existence, Ukraine has followed a different, more tolerant and more pluralistic path in matters of religious pluralism and freedom, than its powerful neighbor, i.e. Russia. However, Ukrainian christian communities, despite their differences were not exempt from their almost exclusive attachment to the state and to the ideal of the byzantine “symphonia”. Following the penetrating analysis of Fr. cyril Ho-vorun (from the Ukrainian orthodox church under the Moscow Patri-archate) on the spiritual importance of the Maidan uprising,

Historically, the christian church both in the east and the west had primarily a bilateral relationship with what we call the public and political sphere and which is also known under the Greek word politeia. namely, this relationship existed almost exclusively between the church and the state. Relatively recently the churches began to realize that these two dimensions: church and state – are insuficient. there exists a third self-suficient dimension – the society – which is also important for the church. […]the orthodox church in the Russian empire developed its relations with society in a different way, which better resembled the church in Byzantium. this means that the relationship between the church and society was overshadowed by the relationship between the church and the state. in the Soviet Union, the church failed to develop distinct relations with the society. […] after the state had mar-ginalized the church, the latter did nothing but wait in a ghetto until it would regain recognition. When this has eventually come to pass after the collapse of the communist regime, the church promptly started to rebuild its relations with the state instead of connecting with the society. Partially this can be explained by the fact that the post-Soviet society for a long time did not realize its distinc-tiveness from the state. […]the Maidan pushed the churches to rise above the status quo that dominated their relationship with the state for years, and to take the side of the society in its struggle with the violent regime. now the churches need to make a step further and to judge the regime honestly. it is irresponsible for them to hide behind the reduced interpretation of the Scriptural statement that ‘all authority comes from God’ (Rom 1, 13). […]now the churches that want to follow the example of the saints have an op-portunity to articulate what the majority of the Ukrainian people have clearly understood, even though these peoples did not study moral theology in the theological seminaries and academies. they nevertheless clearly see that the present Ukrainian regime is not christian even though it demonstrates an in-


clination to the religious cult. its christianity is a simulacrum. it has a form, but not the content. it has no christian morality in it. this regime does not treat the others as their brothers and sisters. […]the churches now have an opportunity to recognize that they often serve as mediators between God and the criminals, who want to protect themselves from God. the churches receive “commission” for their mediation. Where does this mediation lead? – it leads to legitimization of corruption and to its sacraliza-tion. indeed, corruption in our society has become sacred. the Maidan gives the churches an opportunity to change this status quo and to refuse to fulill this mediating role, which only serves to legitimize corruption, social injustice, abuse of power, etc. […] it is time for the Ukrainian churches to reach for the moral achievements of the society which is rapidly evolving on the basis of values that the church should have upheld. it is time to revise the relationships with the state. it is time to build relationships with the people. and to learn from them to value and to struggle for dignity, honesty, and humanity26.

1.4. Romania

despite its latin language and culture, Romania is one of the Balkan countries most rooted in the byzantine tradition. it is not by chance that the “Byzance après Byzance” idea was proposed by a Romanian historian, i.e. nicolae iorga. at the same time, precisely because of its latin cultural roots, Romania is very open to Western inluences, while its political and intellectual élite aspire to be considered as part of the Western cultural and political system. thanks to its inluentially large size (the majority of Romania’s population, i.e. 16,367,267, or 85.9%, according to the 2011 census data, belongs to the orthodox church), and to its formative role in the shaping of the Modern national Roma-nian identity, the Romanian orthodox church did play, and continues to play, a very important role in politics as well as in the formation of public opinion and in society. the current church-state relationship in Romania relects this ambiguity, i.e. this oscillation between the model of the Byzantine “symphonia” and Western style liberal democracy27.

26 a.c. Hovorun, On Maidan, in http://byzypriest.com/?p=81.27 i draw information on church-state relations in Romania from the following pa-pers and books: l. Stan - l. turcescu, Church, State, and Democracy in Expanding Eu-rope, oxford University Press, new York 2011, pp. 134-149; id., Religion and Politics in Romania: Between Restrained Pluralism and Orthodox Establishment?, available at: http://www.academia.edu/1657581/Religion_and_Politics_in_Romania_-_Between_Re-strained_Pluralism_and_orthodox_establishment#; id., Secularization or ‘Twin Tol-erations’? Redeining Church-State Relations in Post-Communism, in a. Kilp - a. Saumts (eds.), Religion and Politics in Multicultural Europe: Perspectives and Challenges, national


there is no special place or role reserved for the orthodox church in the post-communist 1991 Romanian constitution (in force until today, with some particular amendments, not related however to mat-ters of religion), nor any mention of any type of established religion, despite the growing efforts of the Romanian orthodox church, to be constitutionally recognized as such, and to regain somehow the place it enjoyed before communist regime, i.e. the position of national church thanks to its sheer numbers, and its historical contribution to the state and nation-building process as the “mother of the nation”. on the con-trary, the 1991 constitution clearly establishes, in article 29§1, freedom of conscience, of thinking, and of religious beliefs, and guarantees the assistance of the state in matters of protection of religious freedom, while in article 29§5, it is stressed that religious communities are inde-pendent from the State.

if the Romanian constitution still maintains at least a formal neu-trality with respect to any religion “or non-religious convictions”, the case is not the same with the 2006 law on religious freedom and the general status of denominations, which in many regards is considered to establish a privileged status for the orthodox church, both de jure and de facto. While this law in article 1, explicitly guarantees freedom of thought, conscience, and religion of all citizens, and in article 9 declares the equality of all religions and ideologies (even atheistic) before the state, it is however quick to point out in article 7§2, , the “important role of the Romanian orthodox church and that of other denominations as recognized by the national history of Romania and in life of Romanian society”.

this law coined a new concept, that of the church-state “partner-ship”, which theoretically was open to all recognized denominations. to this end it introduces also a two-tiered recognition system for the religious denominations, and a quite strict registration process, which did create several complaints especially on behalf of minority religious groups. it seems that this law establishes strict registration requirements, like the extremely high membership threshold (0.1% of the population,

defense college, tartu, estonia 2009, pp. 172-193; l.n. leustean, Orthodoxy and Political Myths in Balkan National Identities, «national identities», 10 (2008), pp. 421-432; J. conovici, Concepts of Church-State Relations in Romania: Beyond Symphonia and the ‘Privileged Orthodox Church’, paper available at: http://www.units.miamioh.edu/havighurstcenter/conferences/documents/Religion%20YRc/conovici-Beyond-symphonia.pdf; e. Fokas, Limitations to Religious Freedom in Majority Orthodox Coun-tries, in e.a. diamantopoulou - l. christians (eds.), Orthodox Christianity and Hu-man Rights in Europe: Theology, Law and Religion in Interaction, Peter lang, Brussels (forthcoming, courtesy of the author).


approx. 22,000 people), and the long waiting period (sometimes up to 12 years!). By the application of these criteria, only 18 denominations met the requirements and are recognized by the Romanian authorities.

the same law stipulates that the state will support and facilitate reli-gious assistance to hospitals, prisons, orphanages and nursing homes, and introduces at the same time the principle of “proportionality” of state sup-port in the distribution of institutional, legal and inancial advantages al-lowing for a de facto dominance of the orthodox church in several areas. in fact, since the law entails fairly extensive inancial support to religious groups, on a proportional basis to their number of members, it is not dificult to understand that by default a huge percentage goes to the or-thodox church. a last eloquent example is the signiicant inancial state support of the highly criticized (even within the theological circles of the Romanian orthodox church) ambitious project of the new Patriarchal cathedral in Bucharest. currently, the Romanian state provides the funds necessary for paying the salaries of priests, as well as for expenses related to lay church personnel. the same applies also to all state-recognized religious communities in Romania. the state funds, additionally, all the expenses of orthodox and non-orthodox university theological faculties and ecclesiastical seminaries, including teachers’ and professors’ salaries.

a crucial element of the church-state relationship is the issue of Re-ligious education, which is de facto compulsory, and mainly orthodox and catechetical in nature, giving, however, the possibility to the other religious communities of the country to organize a class on their own faith or confession for their children. However, the speciic conditions required by the law for the Religious education class of the non-ortho-dox communities (10-child threshold minimum for other-faith classes), is the reason for which the precise legislation is viewed as profoundly “anti-minority” by the religious communities concerned, since it is dif-icult to reach that number in small towns.

an integral part of the church-state relationship in Romania is i-nally the legal prescriptions assigned to the Secretariat of State for Re-ligious affairs: it issues an opinion on the registration application of religious communities, as well as on withdrawal of recognition status. For minority groups and secular intellectuals the State Secretary’s role is particularly problematic because, in practice, this person is always an orthodox theologian.

the greatest challenge related to the church-state relations in Roma-nia is that of the pluralism and the real, and not only formal, acceptance of religious otherness in the midst of a more or less religiously homog-enous country. the orthodox church (and its theology) could help the Romanian state and society to move further in its direction if it would be able to free itself from the past and out-of-date model of “symphonia”,


and from the permanent temptations of religious nationalism, and ag-gressive provincialism. Unfortunately, the voluntary instrumentalization of the Romanian church for the sake of the state and the nation; the insistence of the dominant ecclesiastical discourse, and particularly of Patriarch daniel, to the role of the Romanian orthodox church as the mother of the nation; the emergence and further development of a pe-culiar version of a cultural “canonical territory” which the Romanian church, in imitating in this point the example of the Russian orthodox church, tries to apply to its “diaspora”, and many other alarming signs do not allow us to be optimistic in this regard28.

1.5. Serbia

in the particular context deined not only by the traditional role of the Serbian orthodox church (Soc) as the main identity marker of the Serbian orthodox people, but also by the tragic events related to the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the discussion on the issue of church-state re-lationship and religious freedom in the Republic of Serbia is of a par-ticular signiicance. it seems that the terrible experience of the hybrid totalitarian phenomenon of “national communism” operated by Milo-sevic, did affect negatively the always sensitive issues of religious matters, but did indirectly help Serbia to move forward to a better interreligious and ecumenical understanding, and to make some signiicant steps in the direction of a fairly liberal legislation on religious freedom.

according to the 2006 constitution, Serbia is a secular state, imple-menting the separation of church and state29. article 43 of the constitu-

28 For further readings on church and state in Romania see, l. Stan - l. turcescu, Religion and Politics in Post-Communist Romania, oxford University Press, new York 2007; o. Gillet, Religion et nationalisme. L’idéologie de l’Eglise orthodoxe roumaine sous le régime communiste, Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles, Bruxelles 1997; L’année canonique, special issue on «les cultes et l’état en Roumanie», 45 (2003), pp. 9-120; c. Schifirnet, Orthodoxy, Church, State, and National Identity in the Context of Tenden-tial Modernity, «Journal for the Study of Religions and ideologies», vol. 12, issue 34 (Spring 2013), pp. 173-208.29 i draw information on church-state relations in Serbia from the following papers and books: a. ilic, On the Road towards Religious Pluralism? Church and State in Serbia, «Religion, State and Society», 33.4, december 2005, pp. 273-313; M. Blagojevic, Current religious changes in Serbia and Desecularization, «Filozoija/drustvo», 3 (2006), pp. 239-253; i. Midic, The Orthodox Catechism: Guidelines for the Teachers in Elementary and High Schools, institute for textbooks and teaching Resources, Belgrade 2003, pp. 6, 20-36 [in Serbian]; R. Yovic, History of the Religious Education in Serbia, in S. Gasic-Pavisic - S. Sevkusic (eds.), Religious Education in the Schools of Belgrade, cathecetical institute-theological Faculty of Belgrade, Belgrade 2011, pp. 78-89 [in Serbian].


tion guarantees freedom of thought, conscience, beliefs and religion. it also states that every person has the right to manifest his/her religion or religious beliefs in worship, observance, practice and teaching, in private or in community, while article 44 states that all churches and religious com-munities are equal and separated from the state. according to the same constitution, the Soc does not enjoy any special rights over those of oth-ers, despite the fact that it is accorded more visibility in some public events because of its historic role. the great religious feasts of the Soc are, how-ever, recognized as state holidays (according to the Julian calendar), while members of other religions are guaranteed the right to celebrate their own religious holidays. the clerics of the Soc are not paid by the state; every priest needs to support himself inancially. Serbian public television does not broadcast religious services or emissions of the Soc nor of other reli-gious communities or groups. churches or religious communities can run their own radio stations according to the general rules of the state, if they are able to support them inancially. there is no such thing as religious tV. the Soc runs a local radio station (only for Belgrade), whereas the Roman catholic church has its own radio station in Serbia too.

But despite these positive constitutional prescriptions there are still some cases in which the law on religion discriminates among religious groups and requires minority groups, including those that were previ-ously recognized, to reregister and through a burdensome procedure to attain or retain their status as recognized religious groups30. in addition, despite the fact that in Serbia all religious communities are considered equal according to the law, in practice, however, the Serbian orthodox church (which is by far the majority religious community of the coun-try with 84.5% of the Serbians)31 seems to enjoy a special status and to receive some preferential consideration as the church of the Serbian na-tion and has been given media and other support”32. Following the anal-

30 according to ilic, On the Road towards Religious Pluralism? Church and State in Serbia, p. 275, “the preamble of the draft law [sc. of 2001] enumerated seven so-called his-torical religious communities: the most important of these was the Serbian ortho-dox church, followed by the islamic community, the Roman catholic church, the Jewish community, the evangelical christian churches of the augsburg confession, and the Reformed christian church. these religious communities were recognized for their longstanding contribution to society, and were selected because each one of them possessed a special agreement with the state before the Second World War”.31 according to the oficial statistics of 2011, in Serbia there are members of Soc 84.5%, Muslims 3.1%, Protestants 0.99%, Roman catholics 4.97%, Jews 0.008%, see: www.popis2011.stat.rs32 See for evidence ilic, On the Road towards Religious Pluralism? Church and State in Serbia, p. 285.


ysis by angela ilic, “the lack of regulation regarding the legal position of religious communities in the country has left a vacuum, which has been to the advantage of the Serbian orthodox church. although the church no longer enjoys the status of an established religion, it has nonethe-less de facto taken up the role of an indispensable national church. this is because religious and national identities are intertwined within the Serbian orthodox church; the belief is prevalent that all Serbs are (or should be) orthodox”33.

the old demons of nationalism that used to haunt both the Serbi-an state and the Soc, are for sure connected to this kind of sacralized ethno-religious exclusivism, instrumental in the explosion of the ethnic conlicts and wars in the former Yugoslavia34. However, for the last ten years there are many encouraging examples of theological renewal, ac-ceptance of the otherness, ecumenical and inter-religious cooperation, and compliance with the european acquis on behalf of the Soc and the other religious communities of the country, that give the impression, and the hope, that Serbia, without losing its attachment to its spiritual tradition, is slowly moving toward a religious pluralism model, and a genuine religious freedom, tolerance, and coexistence.

Perhaps the best example of this quite new interreligious and ecu-menical understanding and cooperation among different religious com-munities in Serbia, and of the respect of religious freedom on behalf of the state, is the consensus reached, not without problems since there have been many reactions from the secular side, to reintroduce Religious education into Serbian schools in 200135. Religious education has been reestablished in Serbian public schools ifty years after being canceled,

33 Ibidem.34 cf. V. Perica, Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States, oxford Uni-versity Press, oxford 2002; c. Mylonas, Serbian Orthodox Fundamentals: The Quest for an Eternal Identity, central european University Press, Budapest-new York 2003.35 according R. drezgic, Religion, Politics and Gender in the Context of Nation-State For-mation: The Case of Serbia, «third World Quarterly», 31.6, (2010), pp. 961-964, the reestablishment of religious education in public schools represents a turning point in the church-state relationship in Serbia, opening up space for religion and reli-gious institutions to enter all the pores of social life, while it demonstrates a shift from “instrumental pious nationalism” toward a model of “religious nationalism” which occurred after Milosevic was removed from power. Following the perspective of this Serbian scholar, “the integration of religious education into the public school system, in addition to being inconsistent with the principle of separation between the church and the state has had many other negative implications, some of them gender-speciic”, since popular religious literature often contains an explicit con-servative, and even reactionary, model of “orthodox womanhood”, belonging to pre-modern and anti-modern conceptions of womanhood.


allowing the seven “traditional” religious communities to have their own confessional teaching. the Serbian orthodox church, even though it is the major religious denomination, insisted during the dialogue with gov-ernment that all other denominations should have their own Religious education, respecting diversity and multiculturalism in Serbia. as has been pointed out by the young orthodox Serbian theologian dr. Rastko Yovic, this has been a major step toward better understanding between many different religious groups in Serbia. in that sense, according to the pre-eminent Serbian orthodox bishop ignatije Midic, Religious educa-tion, even though it is confessional, discovers and examines a christian heritage that is common to Roman catholics and the many Protestants that live in Serbia. also, according to the same bishop, in its holistic and more comprehensive attitude toward the world and life, the Religious education of the orthodox church in Serbia is not only compatible with other christian confessions, but also with other religions, providing solid ground for meeting these differences in a search for a common goal. af-ter more than 10 years of Religious education in Serbian schools, the Soc was preparing some changes in its curriculum during 2013. the change should achieve two goals: to express and explain ecumenical dimensions of orthodoxy and, at the same time, to raise tolerant citizens.

1.6. Bulgaria

as in the majority of cases of the former communist countries, Bulgaria remained a secular state, while the Bulgarian orthodox church (Boc), the most important religious community of the country (according to sta-tistical data from the mid-1990’s, 87% of the population of Bulgaria claim to be orthodox christians), did not completely recover the state religion status it enjoyed before the imposition of the communist regime. never-theless, taking into account the crucial role of the Boc in the preservation of Bulgarian into identity and culture, especially during the long period of turkish occupation, and the diachronic prevailing position of the Boc as relected in Bulgarian society, the 1991 constitution (amended in 2003, 2005, 2006 and 2007) points out the historic role of the traditional eastern orthodox Religion in the life of the Bulgarian people, whilst irmly pro-claiming in article 6 the complete equality of all religious denominations under the law36. thus, the article 13 of 1991 constitution declares the

36 For what follows, cf. P. Petkoff, Church-State Relations under the Bulgarian Denomina-tions Act 2002: Religious Pluralism and Established Church, «Religion, State and Society», 33.4, december 2005; id., Freedom of Religion or Belief in the Jurisprudence of the Bulgar-ian Constitutional Court, «Religion, State and Society», 36.3, September 2008, pp.


practicing of any religion to be unrestricted, and conirms the separation of the state and the religious to be communities, while at the same time granting the Boc the status of the traditional religion in the Republic of Bulgaria. article 37 makes it clear that the state will favor tolerance and cooperation between believers of different denominations, and between believers and non-believers, without allowing however freedom of con-science and religion to be practiced to the detriment of national security, public order, public health and morality.

it is worth noting that, in deining the identity of the Boc, constitu-tional legislators use theological terms as well as terms taken from canon law and administrative law. thus:

– the Boc is described as part of the “one Holy catholic and apos-tolic church”;

– it is autocephalous having the status of a Patriarchate;– it is the legal successor of the Bulgarian exarchate;– it’s governing body is described as a Holy Synod, chaired by the

Patriarch, who is also metropolitan of Soia.the above arrangement clearly follows the example of the Hellenic

constitution of 1975 (amended in 1986, 2001, and 2008) and the place the latter ascribes to the eastern orthodox church.

Following the prescriptions of the post-communist constitution, on 20 december 2002 the Bulgarian Parliament passed a new Religious denominations act. Until 2002, the denominations act of 1949 was

205-223; id., Religion and the Secular State in Bulgaria, in J. Martinez-torrón - W.c. durham Jr. (eds.), Religion and the Secular State. Interim National Reports Issued for the Occasion of the XVIIIth International Congress of Comparative Law, Washington, dc, July 2010, Provo, Ut, international center for law and Religion Studies, Brigham Young University, 2010, pp. 145-182; V. Kostov, Religious freedom and Church-State rela-tions in Post-Communist Bulgarian Society. Missiological implications, Phd, Fuller theo-logical Seminary, School of intercultural Studies, 2009; i.z. dimitrov, The Orthodox Church in Bulgaria Today, «the Greek orthodox theological Review», 45 (2000), pp. 491-511; id., La Chiesa ortodossa nella società bulgara contemporanea, in L’Ortodossia nella nuova Europa. Dinamiche storiche e prospettive, torino 2003, pp. 285-302; id., Legal Settlement of the Relations Between the State and Religions in Bulgaria Today, in Legal Aspects of Religious Freedom. International Conference, 15-18 September 2008, ljubljana 2008, pp. 305-309; id., La dificile transizione in Bulgaria, «la nuova europa. Rivista inter-nazionale di cultura», novembre 2009, 6, pp. 58-64; id., Bulgarian Christianity, in K. Perry (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Eastern Christianity, Wiley-Blackwell Publica-tions, Malden, Ma/oxford 2010, pp. 47-72; t. Sabev, The Orthodox Church of Bulgaria in the Twentieth Century, in c. chaillot (ed.), The Orthodox Church in Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, Peter lang, oxford-Bern 2011; Stan - turcescu, Church, State, and Democracy in Expanding Europe, pp. 17-34; Fokas, Limitations to Religious Freedom in Majority Orthodox Countries.


the main legal framework regulating religious freedom in Bulgaria, but in interfered in religious affairs, and de facto controlled the life of the Boc, the islamic community, and other religious groups. the legal framework of the new 2002 law on religion aims at cultivating religious pluralism and tolerance, but does not avoid in article 10§1 a privileged treatment of the Boc, because of its historic role in the life of the Bul-garian people:

eastern orthodoxy is the traditional denomination in the Republic of Bulgaria. it has played a historic role in Bulgaria’s statehood and has current meaning in its political life. its spokesperson and representative is the autocephalous Bul-garian orthodox church, which, under the name Patriarchy, is the successor of Bulgaria’s exarchate. […] it is led by the Holy Synod and is represented by the Bulgarian Patriarch who is the Metropolitan of Soia.

the Boc is recognized in the same article 10 of this law as a legal per-son ex lege and is thus exempted from the registration process, while other religious groups need to register at the central (Soia city court), and the local level (provincial capital cities court). the registration re-gime is now fairly liberal and over 100 groups are registered. Still, reli-gious minorities have qualms about the law, due to the preferential and privileged treatment of the Boc, the role maintained for the executive branch (i.e. the directorate of Religious affairs, which issues an “opin-ion” on each registration application), and the violations of religious freedoms at the local level (towns rather than in the capital cities).

the Boc has the possibility to broadcast its religious ceremonies through the second channel of public television. legitimacy is also given to the Boc to perform a public role at oficial holidays and state ceremo-nies.

despite this special treatment of the Boc on behalf of the Bulgar-ian state, orthodox clerics are paid not by the state, but by the Holy Synod or their parishes. Paradoxically also, Religious education in pub-lic schools is constantly and persistently a matter of dispute between the Bulgarian Ministry of education (and the rest of political parties, since it seems that there is a political consensus on this refusal across the lines) and the Boc which complains that the Ministry violates the religious rights of the pupils and their families by its persistent refusal to reintro-duce compulsory religious instruction in the curricula37.

37 Stan - turcescu, Church, State, and Democracy in Expanding Europe, pp. 29-32, in their account of the debate over religious instruction, offer a quite different picture on this issue suggesting the possibility for the Boc and the other religious communi-ties to have an optional religious class in the public schools.


as in every country with a majority or prevailing church, genuine religious pluralism is to a great extent dependent on the readiness of that church to accept the reality of pluralistic societies as well as on its openness to ecumenical of rapprochement and inter-religious co-operation. Unfortunately, the Bulgarian orthodox church seems to be quite the reverse of ecumenically open and eager to cooperate at the inter-religious level, and instead of dialogue with (post-)modernity and the challenges of pluralism, is more and more inclined to fun-damentalism and the spirit of introversion. it is hoped, however, that the election of the new Patriarch neoit at the head of the Boc will bring it back to the main ecumenical organizations (World council of churches, council of european churches) from which it withdrew in 1998, and will enable it to engage anew in the path of dialogue and theological and ecclesial renewal38.

38 For further reading on church and state relations in Bulgaria cf. J.l. Hopkins, The Bulgarian Orthodox Church: A Socio-Historical Analysis of the Evolving Relationship between Church, Nation and State in Bulgaria, columbia University Press, Boulder, co/new York 2009. For further discussion on church-state relations in orthodox coun-tries, the Byzantine and imperial heritage of “symphonia”, as well as a comparative analysis which bring together the related issues of the domination of the state over the church and the democratic deicit of these countries, the “national churches” phenomenon, and the mixture of ethno-religious identities, cf. n.K. cvosdev, Em-perors and Elections: Reconciling the Orthodox Tradition with Modern Politics, Huntington troitsa Books, new York 2000; id., An Examination of Church-State Relations in the Byz-antine and Russian Empires with an Emphasis on Ideology and Models of Interaction, the edwin Mellen Press, lewiston, new York 2001; P. Ramet, Autocephality and National Identity in Church-State Relations in Eastern Christianity: An Introduction, in id. (ed.), Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twentieth Century, duke University Press, dur-ham, nc 1988; B.J. Groen, Nationalism and Reconciliation: Orthodoxy in the Balkans, «Religion, State and Society», 26 (1998), pp. 111-128; e. Pope, Ecumenism, Religious Freedom, and National Church Controversy in Romania, in a.R. de luca - P.d. Quinlan (eds.), Romania, Culture and Nationalism: A Tribute to Radu Florescu, University Presses of california, Berkeley 1999; V. clark, Why Angels Fall: A Journey through Orthodox Europe from Byzantium to Kosovo, St. Martin Press, new York 2000; V. Roudometof, Greek Orthodoxy, Territoriality, and Globality: Religious Responses and Institutional Disputes, «Sociology of Religion», 69 (2008), pp. 67-91; S. zrinšcak, Church, State and Society in Post-Communist Europe, in J. Barbalet - a. Possamai - B.S. turner (eds.), Religion and the State. A Comparative Sociology, anthem Press, london 2011, pp. 157-182; d. Kalkandjieva, A Comparative Analysis on Church-State Relations in Eastern Orthodoxy: Concepts, Models, and Principles, «Journal of church and State», 53 (2011), pp. 587-614; l.n. leustean, Orthodoxy and Political Myths in Balkan National Identities, «na-tional identities», 10 (2008), pp. 421-432; id. (ed.), Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twenty-First Century, Routledge, abingdon, oxon-new York 2014; a. Krawchuk - t. Bremer (eds.), Eastern Orthodox Encounters of Identities and Otherness: Values, Self-Relection, Dialogue, Palgrave MacMillan, new York 2014.


2. Church and State in the Shadow of Byzantium and of National Orthodoxy: The Theology of the Empire and Realized Eschatology39

as i suggested at the beginning of this paper, what unites these otherwise different cases of church-state relationship in the orthodox world, is the heritage of Byzantine “symphonia”, alongside the reality of “national or-thodoxy”, i.e. the identiication of orthodoxy with every single “ortho-dox” nation or state, and the understanding of the church in “national terms”. i have already, in previous sections of this paper, commented on the problematic aspects of “national orthodoxy”. let us now turn to the theological presuppositions of the idea of byzantine “symphonia”, which among the orthodox both of the traditional settings and the “diaspora” continue to incarnate the ideal political system, and therefore to enjoy a high degree of acceptance and theological appreciation40.

Byzantine secularized degree of political eschatology, and the asso-ciation of the earthly empire with the Kingdom of God has its roots in theology, and even in liturgical texts. according to the relevant analysis of the great orthodox theologian and historian Fr. John Meyendorff,

the great dream of Byzantine civilization was a universal christian society admin-istered by the emperor and spiritually guided by the church. this idea obviously combined Roman and christian universalisms in one single socio-political pro-gram. it was also based upon the theological presuppositions concerning man […]: man, by nature, is God-centered in all aspects of his life, and he is responsible for the fate of the entire creation. as long as christianity was persecuted, this Biblical assertion could be nothing more than an article of faith, to be realized at the end of history and anticipated in the sacraments. With the “conversion” of constantine, however, it suddenly appeared as a concrete and reachable goal. the original en-thusiasm with which the christian church accepted imperial protection was never corrected by any systematic relection on the nature and role of the state or of secu-lar societies in the life of fallen humanity. there lies the tragedy of the Byzantine system: it assumed that the state, as such, could become intrinsically christian41.

39 in this part of my paper i rely on the analyses i offered in my book, Orthodoxy and Political Theology, in Doxa & Praxis: Exploring Orthodox Theology series, Wcc Publica-tions, Geneva 2012.40 See for instance, V. Yannopoulos, Relations de l’Eglise et de l’état selon les critères de la tradition orthodoxe, in Eglise et Etat en Europe, «les etudes théologiques de chambésy», n. 11, chambésy, les editions du centre orthodoxe du Patriarcat œcuménique, Ge-nève 1996, pp. 153-170 [in Greek]; and J.a. McGuckin, The Orthodox Church: An In-troduction to its History, Doctrine, and Spiritual Culture, Blackwell, Malden, Ma/oxford 2008, pp. 380-384.41 J. Meyendorff, Byzantine Theology: Historical Trends and Doctrinal Themes, 2nd edition with revisions, Fordham University Press, new York 1979, p. 213.


But liturgical texts also, like as the well-known hymn in the second tone from the orthodox christmas Vespers service (attributed to the nun cas-siani), give a theological vision to a Byzantine secularized political escha-tology, and the association of the earthly empire with the Kingdom of God which it operates by linking democracy with polytheism on the one hand, and monarchy, with monotheism and christianity on the other. one can clearly see here the structural analogy between theological and political concepts, to recall the now classic analysis on “political theolo-gy” of the conservative Roman catholic German philosopher of law carl Schmitt42. thus, according to the orthodox christmas Vespers hymn:

When augustus reigned alone on the earth, the many kingdoms of mankind came to an end; and when you became man from the pure Virgin, the many gods of idolatry were destroyed; the cities of the world passed under one sin-gle rule; and the nations came to believe in one single Godhead; the peoples were enrolled by decree of caesar; we the faithful were enrolled in the name of the Godhead, when you became man, o our God. Great is your mercy, lord; glory to you!43

We now know, following the work of many respected historians and theologians (for example, Francis dvornik, Gerhard Podskalsky, Hans-Georg Beck, Hélène ahrweiler, Gilbert dagron, Georges Florovsky, John Meyendorff, Savas agourides), that the Byzantines believed that their state and their society were the materialization of the kingdom of God on earth. Runciman states this quite explicitly at the outset of his classic study The Byzantine Theocracy, which he describes as an attempt to give an “account of an empire whose constitution[…]was based on a clear religious conviction: that it was the earthly copy of the Kingdom of Heaven”44. Historians, political scientists, theolo-gians, and other scholars seem to agree on tracing back this “theol-ogy of the empire”, this theological justiication of monarchy, irst to eusebius of caesarea, and to his works Ecclesiastical History, and the Life of Constantine, and then to the Byzantine emperor Justinian and to the politico-theological vision articulated around the two crucial con-cepts, emperor and the priest, as expressed in his Novellae, his major legal work, of which the Sixth Novella is very characteristic:

42 For a more detailed analysis of Schmitt “political theology”, and its theological critique, cf. Kalaitzidis, Orthodoxy and Political Theology, pp. 15-25.43 english translation by a. ephrem (lash) at: http://www.anastasis.org.uk/25decves.htm.44 S. Runciman, Byzantine Theocracy, cambridge University Press, cambridge-new York 1977, p. 1.


there are two greatest gifts which God, in his love for man, has granted from on high: the priesthood and the imperial dignity. the irst serves divine things, the second directs and administers human affairs; both, however, proceed from the same origin and adorn the life of mankind. Hence, nothing should be such a source of care to the emperors as the dignity of the priests, since it is for the [imperial] welfare that they constantly implore God. For if the priesthood is in every way free from blame and possesses access to God, and if the emperors administer equitably and judiciously the state entrusted to their care, general harmony will result, and whatever is beneicial will be bestowed upon the hu-man race45.

in the words of Fr. John Meyendorff commenting on this key text for the Byzantine concept of “symphonia”, what emerges from Justinian’s Novellae; is that “in the thought of Justinian, the ‘symphony’ between ‘divine things’ and ‘human affairs’ was based upon the incarnation, which united the divine and human natures, so that the person of christ is the unique source of the two – the civil and ecclesiastical hierarchies. the fundamental mistake of this approach”, Meyendorff continues, “was to assume that the ideal humanity which was manifested, through the incarnation, in the person of Jesus christ could also ind an adequate manifestation in the Roman empire. Byzantine theocratic thought was, in fact, based upon a form of ‘realized eschatology,’ as if the Kingdom of God had already appeared ‘in power’ and as if the empire were the man-ifestation of this power in the world and in history”46. in this seamless political-theological vision, the emperor stood “in the place of christ”, and his kingdom was a relection of its heavenly counterpart. as the Greek Professor Savas agourides notes, “the Byzantine state, particularly from the Justinianic era forward, following as it does along the lines of Jewish apocalyptic literature […] sees itself as the inal actualization of

45 For the text of the Novella see Corpus juris civilis, ed. Rudolfus Scoell, Berlin 1928, iii, pp. 35-36. For the english translation see J. Meyendorff, Byzantine Theology, p. 213. cf. the now classic studies by F. dvornik, Early Cristian and Byzantine Political Phi-losophy: Origins and Background, v. i-ii, dubarton oaks center for Byzantine Studies, trustees for Harvard University, Washington, dc 1966; G. dagron, Empereur et prêtre. Etude sur le césaropapisme byzantin, Gallimard, Paris 1996. cf. also J. Meyendorff, Justinian, the Empire, and the Church, «dombarton oaks Papers», 22 (1968), pp. 45-60; cf. also c. Pitsakis, La ‘Synallèlia’ principe fondamental des rapports entre l’Eglise et l’Etat. Idéologie et pratique byzantines et transformations contemporaines, «Kanon», 1991, 10, pp. 17-35; H.J. Magoulas, Byzantine Christianity: Emperor, Church and the West, Rand Mc-nally & company, chicago 1970.46 Meyendorff, Byzantine Theology, pp. 213-214. the crucial theme which needs fur-ther discussion is that of the connection of the emperor and imperial function with the person of christ, the High Priest, and the Kingdom of God.


christian hope, as the eschatological prelude to the kingdom of God”47. in this perspective, we are clearly facing a peculiar form of “realized es-chatology” (of a political or secular sort) which seems to have largely lost the tension between the “already” and the “not yet”, that is, between the irst and the second coming of christ, his resurrection and the expecta-tion of our own resurrection and the recapitulation of history, which will signal our personal incorruptibility and the end of the reign of death. christians are “aliens and exiles” (1 Pt 2:11), moving continuously to-ward the eschaton, in accordance with the biblical injunction to be “in the world, but not of the world”. again what we lose, as orthodox chris-tians, is our focus on and our orientation toward the anticipated new world, from which the present takes its identity and hypostasis, its mean-ing and its purpose. in the light, then, of this absence of biblical escha-tology and active anticipation and openness toward the future, even the second coming of christ itself is reduced to a mere conirmation that the kingdom of God has already been realized with Byzantium. Hence we are faced here with a peculiar political theology, a political eschatol-ogy, or an eschatological ideology concerning the state.

thus, realized eschatology, and identiication of the true and genu-ine faith with Byzantium, tsarist Russia or with one of the Balkan mon-archies is, in fact, the permanent temptation of historical orthodoxy insofar as it annuls the paradoxical dialectics between history and escha-tology as well as the eschatological expectation of the Kingdom of God and the openness of history.

in the perspective encapsulated by The Epistle to Diognetus, a classic, late 2nd century christian text with a strong eschatological character, it is important for us to understand that, in the ecclesial way of life, no change or progress is imposed from the outside. the christian virtues or char-acteristics cannot be legislated in a worldly way, as if they were the goals of some political agenda or obligations according to some code of con-ventional morality. Rather, they arise voluntarily as the natural concomi-tant of the re-orientation of existence in the light of the Kingdom, as a natural consequence of conscious participation in the ecclesial/eucha-ristic life and of progress in the spiritual life. according to The Epistle to Diognetus, the lives of christians are such that they have no need for laws. christian life, when it is genuine, leads inevitably to transcendence of

47 Savas agourides, The Roots of the Great Idea, in agourides, Theology and Society in Dialogue, artos zoes, athens 1999, pp. 16-17 [in Greek]; cf. id., Religious Escha-tology and State Ideology in the Byzantine Tradition, the Post-Byzantine Era, and the Mod-ern Greek State, in agourides, Theology and Current Issues, artos zoes, athens 1966, pp. 53-54 [in Greek].


the ego and the spirit of authoritarianism, to the abrogation of the law and authority, to a unique christian eschatological anarchism. all this, however, pertains to christians, those who choose as their rule of life the scandal of the cross and the foolishness of the Resurrection, those who live in a state of “in between”, who base their whole existence on the eschaton and the anticipated new world, from which the present takes its identity and hypostasis, its meaning and its purpose. thus, any attempt to impose – through political means – biblical, ecclesiastical, or ascetical standards on public life, and indeed on citizens who are not or who do not desire to become christians, is incomprehensible. christian ethics are anarchical because they are eschatological and cross-centered, and because they are – following the example of Jesus christ – ascetical eth-ics of the voluntary surrender of the ego and individual self-suficiency, power, and authority. Hence, for the church any entanglement with power, any attempt to establish a christian state, and any daydream of returning to an ideal theocratic “christian” society or empire, constitute an aberration, distortion, and contradiction in terms.

When the church forgets this, when its eschatological vision – the vi-sion of the Kingdom of God – is usurped by the temptation to be vindicat-ed within history and to identify with one form or one period of history (which is deemed “christian”), then the church reverts from a symbol of the eschaton, a foretaste of the Kingdom of love and freedom, to an insti-tutionalized and authoritarian organization. then the Kingdom of God is conceived in terms of the political forms of the past and is identiied with the vision of a “christian ecumene” and Byzantine theocracy, which results in an authoritarian understanding of the Kingdom realized within history. the church no longer draws its hypostasis from the eschaton but rather from history, and instead of a foretaste of the Kingdom, the church declares itself to be the worldly Kingdom48. the church is transformed from a community that is open to the future and its challenges, into one that yearns for the past and its political forms. it no longer yearns for the eschaton, the Kingdom of God, and the coming lord, but instead for a return to a “christian” empire and Byzantine theocracy – a theocracy which, just as in ancient israel or ancient Rome, blurs the line between the worldly and the religious spheres, between the realms of caesar and God, and about which Fr. Georges Florovsky, probably the most distin-guished orthodox theologian of the twentieth century, leveled such a devastating critique – which we, however, try to ignore:

48 cf. the excellent analysis by dimitris arkadas in Power and the Church: Political As-pects of Eschatological Ecclesiology, “Synaxi”, issue 79, 2001, pp. 89-97, from which we have borrowed some of the preceding discussion.


the “Holy empire” of the Middle ages was an obvious failure, both in its West-ern and its eastern forms. it was at once an utopia and a compromise. the “old world” was still continuing under the christian guise. Yet it did not continue unchanged. the impact of the christian faith was conspicuous and profound in all walks of life. the faith of the Middle ages was a courageous faith, and the hope was impatient. People really did believe that “this world” could be “christened” and converted, not only that it was “forgiven”. there was a irm belief in the possibility of an ultimate renewal of the entire historical existence. in this conviction all historical tasks have been undertaken. there was always a double danger involved in the endeavor: to mistake partial achievements for ul-timate ones, or to be satisied with relative achievements, since the ultimate goal was not attainable. it is here that the spirit of compromise is rooted[…] the story of Byzantium was an adventure in christian politics. it was an unsuccessful and probably an unfortunate experiment. Yet it should be judged on its own terms[…] Byzantium had failed, grievously failed, to establish an unambiguous and adequate relationship between the church and the larger commonwealth. it did not succeed in unlocking the gate of the Paradise lost. Yet nobody else has succeeded, either. the gate is still locked. the Byzantine key was not a right one. So were all other keys, too. and probably there is no earthly or historical key for that ultimate lock. there is but an eschatological key, the true “Key of David”. Yet Byzantium was for centuries wrestling, with fervent commitment and dedication, with a real problem49.

3. The Challenges of the Pluralistic Society, and the Public Witness of Church and Theology

it is not possible to really address the crucial issue of church-state re-lation in the orthodox world without being aware of the challenges of secularization, and the still pending encounter of orthodoxy with modernity and post-modernity. as eastern christians we more or less have in mind the effects of secularization in Western christianity, but we do not really make an attempt to relect on and consider the pos-sible effects of secularization on eastern orthodoxy, preferring the complacent certainty of an orthodox impermeability to it. if we spare a moment, however, to look at the relevant academic discussion and to compare it with our empirical observations, we will then realize that we are not immune from secularization, which is (or will be) an issue for eastern orthodoxy too. as the Greek-american political scientist efie Fokas maintains:

49 G. Florovksy, Antinomies of Christian History, in Christianity and Culture, volume ii in the Collected Works of G. Florovsky, nordland, Belmont, Ma 1974, pp. 97, 77, 99-100. cf. id., Christianity and Civilization, in Christianity and Culture, p. 130.


While differences in secularization across a notional east–West divide are widely accepted (and somewhat obvious), there is a conspicuous divergence in scholar-ly perspectives on what the future holds in this domain. Speciically, a question remains as to whether eastern (orthodox) europe will continue to be unsecu-lar or differently secular, or whether it will secularize in time and speciically un-der the inluence of Western europe. david Martin, for example, sees christian orthodoxy as resistant to secularization which comes to it from Western europe and from the european Union (eU) in particular. Speciicities in the historical evolution of the relationship between religion and nation and between church and state in orthodox contexts lead, according to Martin, to a different type of secularization. From a different perspective, Peter Berger predicts the or-thodox world’s impending secularization, via integration into european insti-tutions. Berger considers that Western european secularization is a powerful force which spreads eastwards with the ambit of the eU. according to Berger orthodoxy is unable to “provide immunity” against this development50.

of course this is not the place to debate and to discuss this major prob-lem for the years to come. i hope it has become clear from my previous analyses that the answer cannot be found either on the side of the Byzan-tine “symphonia” or on the side of “nationalized orthodoxy” and the or-thodox Statism. Besides, the christian life, according to the example set by abraham51, is one of continual movement and journey, including the elements of estrangement and migration, of exodus, and diaspora, and even of voluntary exile. “a christian is one who moves ‘toward’, not one who remains ‘within’”, as the French philosopher Regis debray has ob-served52. it seems to me that this whole ideology of “national orthodoxy” – as well as the analogous theories and mythologies of the Greeks as the “new chosen people of God”, “Holy Russia” being the “third Rome”, the Slavophile movement, the medieval christian kingdom of Serbia, the “Serbian people as the servant people of God”, antiochian uniqueness and arabhood, the latin character of Romanian orthodoxy, etc. – do nothing but intensify the sense of geographical conditioning and isola-tion, our collective cultural narcissism and intellectual self-suficiency, while also promoting a metaphysical essentialist view of an ethno-cultur-al identity that is unsusceptible to change within time and history, and which has come to be equated with the identity of the church.

For the orthodox church, however, the adoption of an ecumeni-cal ecclesiastical discourse, free from the continuous references to the

50 e. Fokas, ‘Eastern’ Orthodoxy and ‘Western’ Secularization in Contemporary Europe (with Special Reference to the Case of Greece), «Religion, State and Society», 40 (2012), p. 396.51 See Genesis, chapter 12.52 R. debray, Dieu, un itinéraire, odile Jacob Poches, Paris 2003, pp. 195-196.


nation and to the outward forms of the constantinian era, is not just a demand for genuineness, authenticity and faithfulness to the orthodox tradition; it is also an absolutely indispensable and urgent prerequisite, and an inviolate condition for the church, in order for it to participate in the century in which we live and not to ind an easy and safe shelter in the past. Without this element, no true or lasting revelation of God in creation and history can exist, the church cannot pray, dialogue, or struggle “for the life of the world”, nor can any real discourse take place regarding catechesis or the eucharistic and eschatological conscious-ness of the people of God.

the orthodox church’s irst and foremost concern in the present context cannot be to preserve at all costs the “christian” or “orthodox” character of the state, nor the utopian and seductive illusion of a “chris-tian” society or a “christian civilization”. it must instead engender the call to repentance, humankind’s preparation to receive the preaching about the Kingdom of God, a creative, spiritual fruitfulness, and the christ-centered healthiness of christian communities. thus, the ortho-dox church in traditionally “orthodox” countries, instead of engaging in a struggle for internal spiritual renewal and reformation, wastes its resources and its energy on imposing its presence and activities in the public sphere, not in the context of an open society, but of yearning for a traditional, closed society. as long as this paradox stands, the theologi-cal voice of the church will continue to operate in a daydream and will probably remain an illusion, while its “political” engagement will likely be limited to medieval/pre-modern models of intervention, rather than witness, solidarity, and justice.

From the orthodox point of view, at least, we think that the key to answering the issues raised in the previous sections of this paper is to be found in eschatology, which is related to the dialectic between the present and the future, the “already” and the “not yet”, which pervades the church’s sojourn in the world. eschatology introduces, furthermore, an attitude toward life that maintains a distance from the structures of the world, a refusal to settle down and identify oneself with the world and history, without however any trace of disdain for the world and his-tory or any light from them. For eschatology also entails repentance for the past, as well as faith in and openness toward the future and the inal outcome of history, while at the same time pointing to a permanent suspension of any inal and established meaning within history, to con-stant doubt and radical criticism of the meaning of all institutions, and implying instead the notion of movement without end, unceasingly and constantly gaining in richness.

Kalaitzidis Church State Milan Final-libre

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