FONDAZIONE GAETANO MORELLI

CENTRO PER LO STUDIO DEL DIRITTO PROCESSUALE INTERNAZIONALE E DEL DIRITTO PROCESSUALE CIVILE INTERNAZIONALE

PROCEDURE E GARANZIE DEL DIRITTO D’ASILO

Decimo corso seminariale - Isola di Capo Rizzuto, 7-11 settembre 2009

In collaborazione con la Confraternita di Misericordia – Isola di Capo Rizzuto

FASCICOLO n. 1

La politica dell’Unione europea in materia di asilo B. Nascimbene

Il principio di “non-respingimento” in mare S. Trevisanut

La protezione umanitaria secondo la direttiva 2004/83/CE C. Favilli

La rilevanza della Convenzione europea dei diritti umani nel respingimento verso Stati terzi

A. Saccucci

Procedure di ricorso alla Corte europea dei diritti umani C. Favilli

A. Saccucci

Il trattenimento dei richiedenti asilo secondo la normativa comunitaria e la giurisprudenza della Corte europea dei diritti umani

E. Ocello

INDICE Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo, decisione 11 gennaio 2001, Xhavara e altri c. Italia e Albania, ric. n. 39473/98............................................................................................................3

Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo, sentenza 21 dicembre 2001, Sen c. Paesi Bassi, ric. n. 31465/96 ..................................................................................................................................8

Corte di Giustizia delle Comunità Europee, sentenza 27 giugno 2006, Parlamento c. Consiglio, C-540/03 (Grande Sezione) ......................................................................................17

Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo, sentenza 11 luglio 2006, Saadi c. Regno Unito, ric. n. 13229/03 ................................................................................................................................27

UNHCR-IMO, Rescue at sea, A guide to principles and practice as applied to migrants and refugees, settembre 2006 .....................................................................................40

Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo, sentenza 12 ottobre 2006, Mubilanzila e Kaniki c. Belgio, ric. n. 13178/03 ..............................................................................................................45

Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo, sentenza 6 dicembre 2007, Liu e Liu c. Russia, ric. n. 42086/05 ................................................................................................................................56

Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo, sentenza 29 gennaio 2008 (GC), Saadi c. Regno Unito, ric. n. 13229/03 ...............................................................................................................66

Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo, sentenza 28 febbraio 2008 (GC), Saadi c. Italia, ric. n. 37201/06 ..........................................................................................................................77

Corte di Giustizia delle Comunità Europee, sentenza 29 gennaio 2009, Migrationsverket c. Petrosian, C-19/08, (Quarta Sezione) .......................................................95

Corte di Giustizia delle Comunità Europee, sentenza 17 febbraio 2009, Elgafaji c. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, C-465/07 (Grande Sezione)........................................................103

Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo, sentenza 24 febbraio 2009, Ben Khemais c. Italia, ric. n. 246/07 ............................................................................................................................111

Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo, sentenza 7 aprile 2009, Cherif e altri c. Italia, ric. n. 1860/07 ................................................................................................................................131

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CORTE EUROPEA DEI DIRITTI DELL’UOMO

DÉCISION SUR LA RECEVABILITÉ de la requête n° 39473/98

présentée par Viron XHAVARA ET QUINZE AUTRES contre l'Italie et l’Albanie

La Cour européenne des Droits de l’Homme (quatrième section), siégeant le 11 janvier 2001

en une chambre composée de MM. G. RESS, président, A. PASTOR RIDRUEJO, L. CAFLISCH, J. MAKARCZYK , V. BUTKEVYCH, J. HEDIGAN, K. TRAJA, juges, et de M. V. BERGER, greffier de section,

Vu la requête susmentionnée introduite devant la Commission européenne des Droits de l’Homme le 20 septembre 1997 et enregistrée le 21 janvier 1998,

Vu l’article 5 § 2 du Protocole n° 11 à la Convention, qui a transféré à la Cour la compétence pour examiner la requête,

Après en avoir délibéré, rend la décision suivante :

EN FAIT

Les requérants sont des ressortissants albanais, dont les noms, années de naissance et lieux de résidence figurent dans la liste jointe en annexe. Ils sont représentés devant la Cour par Mes J. Lau et G. Baffa, avocats respectivement aux barreaux de Florence et Cosenza.

A. Les circonstances de l’espèce

Les faits de la cause, tels qu’ils ont été exposés par les requérants, peuvent se résumer comme suit.

1. Le naufrage du Kater I Rades

Le 28 mars 1997, le Kater I Rades, un bateau albanais qui transportait des Albanais désirant entrer clandestinement en Italie, sombra dans la Méditerranée, à environ 35 milles marins de la côte italienne.

Les requérants, qui voyageaient à bord du Kater I Rades, survécurent à l’accident. Cinquante-huit personnes, parmi lesquelles des parents des requérants, trouvèrent la mort dans le naufrage.

Ce dernier eut lieu suite à une collision avec le navire de guerre italien Sibilla, qui, ayant repéré le Kater I Rades, avait essayé de l’arraisonner afin de l’empêcher de débarquer ses passagers sur les côtes italiennes. Selon la version des faits fournie par les requérants, la proue du Sibilla aurait heurté une première fois la coque du Kater I Rades à la hauteur du pont, sans provoquer de dégâts importants. Il y aurait ensuite eu une deuxième collision, qui aurait sérieusement endommagé la coque du bateau albanais.

2. Les poursuites entamées contre les commandants du Sibilla et du Kater I Rades

Des poursuites furent ensuite entamées contre X, commandant du Sibilla, et Y, commandant du Kater I Rades. Ils étaient accusés d’homicide involontaire et d’avoir provoqué un naufrage. Le chef d’accusation contre X indiquait notamment que celui-ci avait poursuivi le bateau albanais sans tenir compte ni du mauvais état dans lequel il se trouvait, ni de la force de la mer et des conditions de visibilité réduite, s’approchant à moins de dix mètres du Kater I Rades.

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Selon la thèse du parquet, cette conduite aurait exposé les passagers du Kater I Rades à un danger disproportionné par rapport au but légitime poursuivi, à savoir la protection de la sûreté nationale.

Au cours des investigations préliminaires, les accusés furent interrogés et de nombreux rapports d’expertise furent établis.

Par une ordonnance du 17 novembre 1998, le juge des investigations préliminaires de Brindisi disjoignit la procédure contre X de celle dirigée contre Y et renvoya le premier en jugement devant le tribunal de Brindisi à l’audience du 3 mai 1999.

Le jour venu, les premier, quatrième, cinquième, sixième, septième, huitième, onzième, treizième, quatorzième et seizième requérants se constituèrent parties civiles. Dans un mémoire du 8 octobre 1999, les huitième, quatorzième et seizième requérants exposèrent la situation politique et sociale en Albanie au moment de leur départ vers l’Italie et les mesures d’urgence adoptées par le gouvernement italien face à la vague d’immigration provenant de l’autre côté de l’Adriatique. Selon leurs dires, ces mesures tendaient à traiter tous les citoyens albanais comme des clandestins sans vérifier au préalable s’il s’agissait de réfugiés politiques. Par ailleurs, le Sibilla aurait délibérément heurté le Kater I Rades, en exécution des ordres qui lui imposaient d’arrêter à tout prix le bateau albanais. Etant donné que X ne pouvait pas ignorer que les manœuvres entamées à l’encontre du bateau albanais était susceptibles de provoquer la mort de ses passagers, il aurait dû être poursuivi pour homicide volontaire. Les huitième, quatorzième et seizième requérants demandèrent la convocation et l’audition de certains témoins pour démontrer cette thèse. Invoquant les articles 2 de la Convention et 2 du Protocole n° 4, ils alléguèrent enfin que le Sibilla n’avait aucun droit d’arrêter ou de poursuivre le Kater I Rades.

Par une ordonnance rendue lors de l’audience publique du 8 mai 2000, le tribunal de Brindisi rejeta la demande d’audition de témoins, observant qu’elle était incompatible avec la qualification juridique que le parquet avait donnée au chef d’accusation.

Les 22 mai, 1er et 15 juin, et 6 juillet 2000, des experts-témoins furent examinés. Les dates des audiences suivantes furent fixées aux 23 et 30 novembre, 7 et 21 décembre 2000.

3. La lettre des requérants au président du conseil des ministres

Le 20 novembre 2000, les requérants adressèrent une « lettre ouverte » (« lettera aperta ») au président du conseil des ministres et au ministre de la Défense italiens. Ils exposèrent leur situation et se déclarèrent en faveur d’un règlement amiable de l’affaire susceptible de leur faire obtenir, indépendamment de l’issue de la procédure judiciaire contre X, une réparation immédiate des dommages subis.

Le 23 décembre 2000, le Parlement italien approuva la loi de finances (loi n. 388 de 2000). L’article 82 § 3 de celle-ci autorise le ministère de la Défense à dépenser une somme globale de 10 milliards de lires italiennes pour régler à l’amiable, même en dérogeant aux dispositions législatives régissant la matière, les litiges avec toute personne physique ayant subi un préjudice en conséquence du naufrage du bateau Kater I Rades.

B. Le droit interne pertinent

Avant le naufrage du Kater I Rades, une forte vague d’immigration clandestine se produisait de l’Albanie vers l’Italie. Pour faire face à cette situation, l’Etat italien avait adopté des mesures d’urgence, notamment :

a) le décret-loi n° 60 du 19 mai 1997, incorporé dans la loi n° 128 du 19 mai 1997, donnant au préfet le pouvoir de retirer le visa provisoire d’entrée et d’accompagner sans délai à la frontière tout citoyen albanais menant des activités dangereuses pour la sûreté publique (article 2 §§ 2 et 3). Il était en outre prévu que le préfet pouvait ordonner l’expulsion immédiate de tout citoyen étranger qui, sans motif valable, refusait de produire à l’autorité publique son permis de séjour ou son visa provisoire (article 2 § 5). Contre les décisions du préfet, un recours sans effet suspensif pouvait être formé devant le tribunal administratif (article 2 §§ 3 et 5) ;

b) l’ordre du 24 mars 1997 à toutes les autorités chargées d’assurer la sûreté publique, d’empêcher les clandestins albanais d’entrer illégalement en Italie. Cet ordre fut donné à la suite d’un accord du 23 mars 1997 entre les chefs de gouvernement italien et albanais, prévoyant un « blocus naval » dans les eaux territoriales albanaises et internationales ;

c) un accord entre les ministres des Affaires étrangères italien et albanais du 25 mars 1997 (ci-après « la Convention italo-albanaise »), autorisant les bateaux militaires italiens à

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arraisonner, dans les eaux internationales ou dans les eaux territoriales albanaises, tout bateau transportant des citoyens albanais s’étant soustraits aux contrôles exercés sur le territoire albanais par les autorités compétentes de ce pays. Les modalités d’exécution de la Convention italo-albanaise furent arrêtées dans un Protocole signé par les ministres de la Défense italien et albanais le 2 avril 1997, c’est-à-dire après le naufrage du Kater I Rades. Ce Protocole autorisait notamment les navires de guerre italiens à : - pénétrer dans les eaux territoriales albanaises ; - demander à tout bateau des informations quant à la nationalité de ses passagers, à leur

provenance et à leur destination ; - inspecter les bateaux en question pour vérifier la véracité des informations reçues ; - ordonner à tout bateau de faire demi-tour dans un port albanais lorsque son équipage avait

refusé l’inspection ou lorsque des irrégularités avaient été décelées.

GRIEFS

1. Les requérants, agissant soit en leur nom propre, soit en leur qualité de parents de personnes ayant trouvé la mort dans le naufrage du Kater I Rades, invoquent l’article 2 de la Convention. Ils se plaignent de la conduite du Sibilla, qui a provoqué le décès de certains membres de leurs familles et mis leur vie en danger.

2. Invoquant les articles 3 et 5 § 1 de la Convention ainsi que des textes autres que la Convention, les requérants, agissant soit en leur nom propre, soit en leur qualité de parents de personnes ayant trouvé la mort dans le naufrage du Kater I Rades, soutiennent que le blocus naval contre les bateaux albanais visait à mettre en danger la vie et l’intégrité physique des clandestins albanais.

3. Invoquant l’article 2 § 2 du Protocole n° 4, les requérants allèguent avoir privés du droit de quitter leur pays.

4. Invoquant les articles 13 et 14 de la Convention et 4 du Protocole n° 4, les requérants se plaignent du fait que le recours au tribunal administratif contre la décision d’expulsion d’un étranger n’a pas d’effet suspensif.

EN DROIT

1. Les requérants, agissant soit en leur nom propre, soit en leur qualité de parents de personnes ayant trouvé la mort dans le naufrage du Kater I Rades, se plaignent de la conduite du Sibilla, qui a provoqué le décès de certains membres de leurs familles et mis leur vie en danger. Ils invoquent l’article 2 de la Convention, ainsi libellé :

« 1. Le droit de toute personne à la vie est protégé par la loi. La mort ne peut être infligée à quiconque intentionnellement, sauf en exécution d'une sentence capitale prononcée par un tribunal au cas où le délit est puni de cette peine par la loi.

2. La mort n'est pas considérée comme infligée en violation de cet article dans les cas où elle résulterait d'un recours à la force rendu absolument nécessaire:

a) pour assurer la défense de toute personne contre la violence illégale;

b) pour effectuer une arrestation régulière ou pour empêcher l'évasion d'une personne régulièrement détenue;

c) pour réprimer, conformément à la loi, une émeute ou une insurrection. »

Les requérants considèrent que l’accident a eu lieu suite à l’application des mesures prévues par le décret-loi n° 60 du 19 mai 1997 et par la Convention italo-albanaise, textes qui visent à empêcher à tout prix l’entrée de citoyens albanais en Italie, sans tenir compte des dangers que l’adoption des mesures en question peut entraîner pour la vie de ces derniers.

La Cour note d’emblée que le naufrage du Kater I Rades a été directement provoqué par le navire de guerre italien Sibilla. Par conséquent, toute doléance sur ce point doit être considérée comme étant dirigée exclusivement contre l’Italie. Le fait que l’Albanie est partie à la Convention italo-albanaise ne saurait, à lui seul, engager la responsabilité de cet Etat au regard de la Convention pour toute mesure adoptée par les autorités italiennes en exécution de l’accord international en question.

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La Cour constate de surcroît que les requérants n’ont fourni aucun élément susceptible d’amener à croire que le naufrage du Kater I Rades ait été provoqué « intentionnellement ».

Elle rappelle cependant que la première phrase de l’article 2 § 1 astreint les Etats non seulement à s’abstenir de provoquer la mort de manière volontaire et irrégulière mais aussi à prendre les mesures nécessaires à la protection de la vie des personnes relevant de leur juridiction (arrêt Osman c. Royaume-Uni du 28 octobre 1998, Recueil des arrêts et décisions 1998-VIII, p. 3159, § 115). En outre, l’obligation imposée par cette disposition, combinée avec le devoir général incombant aux Etats en vertu de l'article 1 de la Convention de « reconna[ître] à toute personne relevant de [leur] juridiction les droits et libertés définis [dans] la (...) Convention », implique et exige de mener une forme d'enquête officielle, efficace, indépendante et publique lorsque les actes des agents de l'Etat ont entraîné la mort d'homme (arrêts McCann et autres c. Royaume-Uni du 27 septembre 1995, série A n° 324, p. 49, § 161, et Kaya c. Turquie du 19 février 1998, Recueil 1998-I, p. 324, §§ 86-87). Par ailleurs, d'après un principe de droit international bien établi, les Etats ont le droit, sans préjudice des engagements découlant pour eux de traités, de contrôler l'entrée des non-nationaux sur leur sol (voir, parmi beaucoup d’autres, les arrêts Gül c. Suisse du 19 février 1996, Recueil 1996-I, p. 175, § 38, et Ahmut c. Pays-Bas du 28 novembre 1996, Recueil 1996-VI, p. 2033, § 67).

La Cour observe qu’en l’espèce des poursuites ont été entamées contre X, le commandant du Sibilla, qui a été accusé d’homicide involontaire et d’avoir provoqué un naufrage, et qui a été renvoyé en jugement devant le tribunal compétent. Rien ne permet de penser que l’enquête menée par les autorités italiennes a été inefficace ou non indépendante.

Par ailleurs, les débats devant le tribunal de Brindisi sont publics et au cours de ceux-ci les requérants ont eu la possibilité de se constituer parties civiles et de faire ainsi valoir leur droit à la réparation. La procédure judiciaire contre X vise précisément à établir si la conduite prétendument négligente de l’accusé a exposé les passagers du Kater I Rades à un danger disproportionné par rapport au but légitime de la protection de la sûreté nationale, et donc à déterminer si les mesures visant le contrôle de l’immigration ont été appliquées de manière incompatible avec l’obligation qui pèse sur les Etats de protéger le droit à la vie de toute personne. Cette procédure était encore pendante au 21 décembre 2000. A cette date, un peu plus de trois ans et huit mois s’étaient écoulés depuis l’accident. Compte tenu de la complexité de l’affaire, résultant notamment de l’exigence d’établir de nombreux rapports d’expertise, la Cour considère que la durée globale de la procédure contre X n’était pas, à cette date-là, assez importante pour conclure que les requérants seraient dispensés de l’obligation d’épuiser les voies de recours internes. Leurs allégations sur ce point sont donc prématurées.

Il s’ensuit que ce grief doit à ce stade être rejeté pour non-épuisement des voies de recours internes, en application de l’article 35 §§ 1 et 4 de la Convention.

2. Les requérants, agissant soit en leur nom propre, soit en leur qualité de parents de

personnes ayant trouvé la mort dans le naufrage du Kater I Rades, soutiennent que le blocus naval contre les bateaux albanais visait à mettre en danger la vie et l’intégrité physique des clandestins albanais. Ils invoquent des textes autres que la Convention, ainsi que les articles 3 et 5 § 1 de cette dernière.

L’article 3 de la Convention est ainsi libellé :

« Nul ne peut être soumis à la torture ni à des peines ou traitements inhumains ou dégradants. »

Dans ses parties pertinentes, l’article 5 § 1 se lit ainsi :

« Toute personne a droit à la liberté et à la sûreté. (...) »

La Cour rappelle d’emblée que selon la jurisprudence des organes de la Convention, le « droit (...) à la sûreté » mentionné dans la première phrase de l’article 5 § 1 est une garantie contre l’arbitraire en matière d’arrestation et de détention (Dyer c. Royaume-Uni, requête n° 10475/83, décision de la Commission du 9 octobre 1984, point 25 (des extraits sont publiés dans Décisions et rapports 39, pp. 246-266)). Les requérants n’ayant été ni arrêtés ni privés de leur liberté, aucune apparence de violation de cette disposition ne saurait être établie en l’espèce.

Pour ce qui est de l’article 3 de la Convention, la Cour estime que ce grief porte sur les mêmes faits qu’elle vient d’analyser sous l’angle de l’article 2. Elle rappelle que les requérants n’ont fourni aucun élément amenant à croire que le naufrage du Kater I Rades ait été provoqué

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intentionnellement. La même conclusion s’impose en ce qui concerne l’allégation selon laquelle les autorités nationales auraient visé à mettre en danger la vie et l’intégrité physique des clandestins albanais, les soumettant ainsi à des traitements inhumains et dégradants. Par ailleurs, la procédure pénale visant à établir les responsabilités du commandant du Sibilla était au 21 décembre 2000 encore pendante, et toute allégation sur ce point est par conséquent prématurée.

Il s’ensuit que ce grief doit à ce stade être rejeté pour non-épuisement des voies de recours internes, en application de l’article 35 §§ 1 et 4 de la Convention.

3. Les requérants allèguent avoir été privés du droit de quitter leur pays. Ils invoquent

l’article 2 § 2 du Protocole n° 4, ainsi libellé :

« Toute personne est libre de quitter n’importe quel pays, y compris le sien. »

La Cour relève que les mesures mises en cause par les requérants ne visaient pas à les priver du droit de quitter l’Albanie, mais à les empêcher d’entrer sur le territoire italien. Le second paragraphe de l’article 2 du Protocole n° 4 ne trouve donc pas à s’appliquer en l’espèce.

Il s’ensuit que ce grief est incompatible ratione materiae avec les dispositions de la Convention, au sens de l’article 35 § 3, et doit être rejeté en application de l’article 35 § 4.

4. Les requérants observent qu’aux termes de l’article 2 §§ 2 et 5 du décret-loi n° 60 du 19

mai 1997, le recours au tribunal administratif contre la décision d’expulser un étranger n’a pas d’effet suspensif, ce qui violerait les articles 13 et 14 de la Convention et 4 du Protocole n° 4.

L’article 13 de la Convention dispose :

« Toute personne dont les droits et libertés reconnus dans la présente Convention ont été violés, a droit à l'octroi d'un recours effectif devant une instance nationale, alors même que la violation aurait été commise par des personnes agissant dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions officielles. »

L’article 14 est ainsi libellé :

« La jouissance des droits et libertés reconnus dans la présente Convention doit être assurée, sans distinction aucune, fondée notamment sur le sexe, la race, la couleur, la langue, la religion, les opinions politiques ou toutes autres opinions, l'origine nationale ou sociale, l'appartenance à une minorité nationale, la fortune, la naissance ou toute autre situation. »

L’article 4 du Protocole n° 4 se lit comme suit :

« Les expulsions collectives d’étrangers sont interdites. »

La Cour observe que les requérants se plaignent de la compatibilité in abstracto avec la Convention de certaines dispositions du décret-loi n° 60 du 19 mai 1997, lequel est un acte normatif de portée générale adopté par les autorités italiennes. Or, selon la jurisprudence constante de la Cour, ne peut se prétendre victime d'une violation de la Convention que celui qui est capable de montrer qu'il est personnellement affecté, autrement que tout autre citoyen, par la loi qu'il critique puisque la Convention n’autorise pas une telle actio popularis (arrêts Ilhan c. Turquie du 27 juin 2000, § 52, et Open Door et Dublin Well Woman c. Irlande du 29 octobre 1992, série A n° 246, p. 22, § 44). En l’espèce, les requérants n’ont pas allégué avoir fait l’objet d’une procédure d’expulsion ou avoir introduit un recours sans effet suspensif au tribunal administratif. Dès lors, ils ne peuvent se prétendre victimes d’une violation des dispositions qu’ils invoquent, au sens de l’article 34 de la Convention.

Il s'ensuit que ce grief est incompatible ratione personae avec les dispositions de la Convention, au sens de l'article 35 § 3, et doit être rejeté en application de l’article 35 § 4.

Par ces motifs, la Cour, à l’unanimité,

Déclare la requête irrecevable.

[Omissis]

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CORTE EUROPEA DEI DIRITTI DELL’UOMO

AFFAIRE ŞEN c. PAYS-BAS

(Requête no 31465/96)

ARRÊT

STRASBOURG

21 décembre 2001

[Omissis] En l'affaire Şen c. Pays-Bas, La Cour européenne des Droits de l'Homme (première section), siégeant en une chambre

composée de : Mme E. Palm, présidente, Mme W. Thomassen, M. Gaukur Jörundsson, M. R. Türmen, M. C. Bîrsan, M. J. Casadevall, M. R. Maruste, juges, et de M. M. O'BOYLE, greffier de section,

Après en avoir délibéré en chambre du conseil le 11 décembre 2001, Rend l'arrêt que voici, adopté à cette dernière date :

PROCÉDURE

1. A l'origine de l'affaire se trouve une requête (no 31465/96) dirigée contre le Royaume des Pays-Bas, dont trois ressortissants turcs, M. Zeki Şen, son épouse Mme Gülden Şen et leur fille Sinem Şen (« les requérants »), avaient saisi la Commission européenne des Droits de l'Homme (« la Commission ») le 30 janvier 1996 en vertu de l'ancien article 25 de la Convention de sauvegarde des Droits de l'Homme et des Libertés fondamentales (« la Convention »).

2. Les requérants sont représentés devant la Cour par Maître E.J.M.Habets, avocat à Schiedam. Le gouvernement néerlandais (« le Gouvernement ») est représenté par son agent, M. Roeland Böcker, du ministère des affaires étrangères néerlandais.

3. Les requérants alléguaient que le refus de délivrer à Sinem Şen (« la troisième requérante ») un titre de séjour pour rejoindre ses parents, les deux premiers requérants, établis régulièrement aux Pays-Bas porte atteinte à leur droit au respect de leur vie familiale garanti par l'article 8.

4. La requête a été transmise à la Cour le 1er novembre 1998, date d'entrée en vigueur du Protocole no 11 à la Convention (article 5 § 2 du Protocole no 11).

5. La requête a été attribuée à la première section de la Cour (article 52 § 1 du règlement). Au sein de celle-ci, la chambre chargée d'examiner l'affaire (article 27 § 1 de la Convention) a été constituée conformément à l'article 26 § 1 du règlement.

6. Par une décision du 7 novembre 2000, la chambre a déclaré la requête recevable. 7. A la demande de la chambre, tant les requérants que le Gouvernement défendeur ont

fourni, par écrit, des informations complémentaires sur le fond de l'affaire (article 59 § 1 du règlement), la chambre ayant décidé après consultation des parties qu'il n'y avait pas lieu de tenir une audience consacrée au fond de l'affaire (article 59 § 2 in fine du règlement). Des observations ont également été reçues du gouvernement de la Turquie, qui avait exercé son droit

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d'intervenir (articles 36 § 1 de la Convention et 61 § 2 du règlement). Le Gouvernement défendeur a répondu à ces commentaires (article 61 § 5 du règlement).

8. Le 1er novembre 2001, la Cour a modifié la composition de ses sections (article 25 § 1 du règlement). La présente requête a cependant continué à être examinée par la chambre de l'ancienne section I telle qu'elle existait avant cette date.

EN FAIT

I. LES CIRCONSTANCES DE L'ESPÈCE

9. Zeki Şen (« le premier requérant ») est arrivé aux Pays-Bas en 1977, à l'âge de douze ans, pour y rejoindre son père, dans le cadre d'un regroupement familial. Il y réside depuis lors et est en possession d'un permis d'établissement (vestigingsvergunning). En 1982, il a épousé en Turquie Gülden Şen (« la deuxième requérante »). Celle-ci a continué à vivre sur le territoire turc après le mariage.

10. Le 8 août 1983, la troisième requérante est née en Turquie. 11. En 1986, la deuxième requérante a rejoint son époux aux Pays-Bas, après avoir confié la

troisième requérante à la garde de sa sœur et de son beau-frère. Elle demanda et obtint du secrétaire d'Etat à la Justice un permis de séjour (vergunning tot verblijf).

12. Le 14 novembre 1990, un deuxième enfant, Cansu, est né, à Rotterdam (Pays-Bas), de l'union des deux premiers requérants.

13. Le 26 octobre 1992, le premier requérant fit une demande d'autorisation de séjour provisoire (machtiging tot voorlopig verblijf) pour Sinem. Les requérants expliquent que c'est à cause de problèmes que leur couple rencontraient qu'ils n'ont pas fait cette demande antérieurement. Au contraire de son épouse, le premier requérant ne voulait pas que leur fille aînée les rejoigne aux Pays-Bas. Ce n'est qu'en 1992 qu'il a acquiescé au désir de son épouse.

14. Le 15 décembre 1992, le ministère des Affaires Etrangères (minister van Buitenlandse Zaken) rejeta la demande. Il releva d'abord que la troisième requérante était supposée séjourner aux Pays-Bas plus de trois mois (période maximale de validité d'un visa de séjour provisoire) et qu'il fallait donc examiner les demandes à la lumière des dispositions applicables en matière de permis de séjour (vergunning tot verblijf) aux fins de regroupement familial. A cet égard, il nota qu'aux termes de l'article 11 § 5 de la loi sur les étrangers (Vreemdelingenwet), l'octroi d'un permis de séjour pouvait être refusé pour des motifs d'intérêt public. Il rappela que les Pays-Bas étant un Etat à forte densité de population, ils suivent une politique d'immigration restrictive eu égard à la situation prévalant en matière de population et d'emploi et n'admettaient le séjour d'étrangers sur leur territoire que s'ils y étaient tenus en vertu du droit international, si cela servait leurs « intérêts essentiels des Pays-Bas » (wezenlijk Nederlands belang) ou si cela était justifié par des « raisons impérieuses d'ordre humanitaire » (klemmende redenen van humanitaire aard).

15. Le ministre était d'avis que l'enfant Sinem ne remplissait pas les conditions d'admission de l'article 11 § 5 de la loi sur les étrangers et celles résultant des règles de conduite énoncées dans la circulaire relative aux étrangers (Vreemdelingencirculaire) et, en particulier, celles relatives au regroupement familial. Il estima en effet qu'elle n'appartenait plus à la cellule familiale de ses parents dans la mesure où elle était, suite au départ de sa mère, devenue membre de la cellule familiale de sa tante. Il n'était pas non plus apparu que les requérants aient contribué, financièrement ou d'une autre manière, à l'éducation de leur fille. Ils n'avaient en outre jamais demandé l'octroi d'allocations familiales pour leur fille.

16. Examinant les demandes à la lumière de l'article 8 de la Convention, le ministre considéra qu'à l'examen des intérêts en présence, les autorités néerlandaises n'avaient aucune obligation positive d'accorder le permis de séjour demandé, rappelant notamment qu'il ne s'agissait pas d'un cas de révocation d'un permis ayant rendu possible une vie familiale aux Pays-Bas entre les requérants. Il estima enfin qu'il n'existait pas davantage de raisons humanitaires justifiant l'octroi des permis.

17. Le 1er février 1993, les deux premiers requérants firent une demande en révision de la décision rendue par le ministre des Affaires Etrangères qui la rejeta le 10 mai 1993, après une audience tenue le 10 avril 1993.

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18. Outre les raisons contenues dans sa décision du 15 décembre 1992, le ministre estima que le fait que la troisième requérante avait reçu à trois reprises la visite de ses parents en Turquie entre 1986 et 1993 n'était pas de nature à établir qu'il n'y avait jamais eu rupture de la vie familiale durant les six ans pendant lesquels elle avait vécu avec sa tante. Il était aussi d'avis que l'affirmation que l'enfant avait été laissée à la garde de sa tante parce que ses parents devaient résoudre leurs problèmes relationnels n'était pas convainquante, relevant notamment que la demande d'autorisation de séjour n'avait été introduite au nom de Sinem qu'en date du 26 octobre 1992 alors que les deux premiers requérants exposaient que leurs problèmes relationnels étaient résolus en 1990. En réponse à l'argument des requérants selon lequel personne ne pouvait prendre Sinem en charge en Turquie parce que sa tante était dépressive et sa grand-mère malade, le ministre estima que les requérants ne manquaient pas de famille proche en Turquie susceptible de prendre soin de l'enfant. Le premier requérant avait deux frères. Si le premier frère était le mari de la tante qui avait recueilli Sinem, rien ne s'opposait par contre à ce que l'enfant séjourne dans la famille du second frère du requérant, père de six enfants. En outre, le père du premier requérant vivait en Turquie neuf mois par an. Le ministre releva enfin que si le premier requérant affirmait détenir les preuves qu'il aurait fait divers versements destinés à sa fille par l'intermédiaire de son père, il n'avait pas pu déposer ces preuves lors de l'audience.

19. Le 4 juin 1993, les deux premiers requérants interjetèrent appel de cette décision devant la section juridictionnelle (Afdeling Rechtspraak) du Conseil d'Etat (Raad van State). Ils firent notamment valoir que leurs problèmes relationnels n'avaient été résolus qu'en 1991, et non en 1990, et déposèrent des documents aux fins d'établir l'état dépressif de la tante de Sinem. Parmi ceux-ci figurait une déclaration du 5 mai 1993 de la tante elle-même qui affirmait ne plus être en état de s'occuper de sa nièce qui vivait avec elle depuis sa naissance, soit depuis presque dix ans. La deuxième requérante insista sur le fait qu'elle n'avait jamais eu l'intention de confier définitivement sa fille à sa sœur.

20. Le 21 décembre 1994, un troisième enfant, Can, est né aux Pays-Bas, de l'union des deux premiers requérants.

21. Par décision du 14 décembre 1995, la section du contentieux administratif (Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak), qui avait succédé à la section juridictionnelle du Conseil d'Etat en vertu d'une loi du 16 décembre 1993 entrée en vigueur le 1er janvier 1994, rejeta le recours. Il se prononça notamment en ces termes :

« Le défendeur [le Gouvernement] a adopté, à juste titre, l'avis que le lien familial existant entre les requérants et leur fille a été rompu. Les appelants n'ont pas rendu crédible leurs affirmations qu'ils avaient seulement eu l'intention de laisser temporairement leur fille auprès de leur famille en Turquie, en raison de leurs problèmes relationnels. Il n'est en outre pas apparu que les appelants soient réellement intervenus dans l'éducation de leur fille. Dans la mesure ou ils allèguent l'existence d'un soutien financier au bénéfice de leur fille, la section (du contentieux administratif) observe que les appelants ont soutenu pouvoir démontrer ce fait, ils n'ont produit aucune information sur ce point. De surcroît, aucune allocation familiale n'a été demandée au profit de la fille des demandeurs.

Il ressort de ces considérations que les appelants n'ont pu puiser aucun droit à l'autorisation de séjour provisoire demandée dans la politique fixée par le chapitre B 19.2.1, b), de la circulaire relative aux étrangers de 1982, combiné avec son chapitre B 19.2.2.2.

Il n'est pas non plus apparu que les appelants ont pu puiser un droit à l'autorisation de séjour provisoire demandée en vue de la venue de leur fille dans quelque autre règle détaillant la politique à suivre fixée dans la circulaire relative aux étrangers.

Il est encore moins apparu qu'il existerait des circonstances propres à la situation de la fille des demandeurs ou des raisons impérieuses d'ordre humanitaire telles que le défendeur aurait néanmoins dû accorder l'autorisation de séjour provisoire demandée en dérogeant de la politique à suivre. A cet égard, la section a pris en considération le fait que si l'on peut, à la vérité, accepter que la sœur de la demanderesse G. Şen souffre de réactions dépressives, il n'en ressort cependant pas la certitude qu'elle n'est plus à même de prendre soin de la fille des requérants. Les appelants n'ont d'autre part pas non plus rendu plausible l'assertion que leur fille est totalement privée de possibilité d'accueil en Turquie. Il est apparu que deux frères de l'appelant Z. Şen vivent en Turquie, l'un étant marié à la sœur de l'appelante G.

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Şen dont il est question ci-avant. En outre, le grand-père de Sinem Şen vit en Turquie neuf mois par an.

Les appelants ont fondé leur recours sur l'article 8 § 1 de la Convention européenne de sauvegarde des Droits de l'Homme et des Libertés fondamentales, ci-après désignée sous le terme la Convention. Se référant notamment aux arrêts de la Cour européenne des Droits de l'Homme (ci-après la Cour) du 26 mai 1994 (série A no 290, NJ 1995, 247) et du 27 octobre 1994 (série A no 297-C, NJ 1995, 248) [respectivement l'arrêt Keegan et l'arrêt Kroon et autres], ils soutiennent que le refus du défendeur d'accorder une autorisation de séjour à leur fille emporte une ingérence injustifiée au droit au respect de la vie familiale existant entre eux.

Aux termes de l'article 8 § 1 de la Convention, toute personne a droit - pour ce qui concerne la présente affaire - au respect de sa vie familiale.

Ce droit vise en premier lieu et essentiellement à accorder une protection contre les ingérences dans la vie familiale.

Il est certain que le lien qui lie entre eux les appelants et leur fille constitue une vie familiale au sens de l'article 8 § 1 de la Convention.

De l'avis de la section, il n'y a cependant pas en l'espèce ingérence, dans le sens où cette notion a été entendue ci-avant. En tout cas, la décision du défendeur de ne pas accorder une autorisation de séjour provisoire au profit de la fille des appelants ne va pas jusqu'à lui retirer un titre de séjour lui ayant permis de partager une vie familiale dans notre pays.

Il faut ensuite répondre à la question de savoir s'il existe pour les appelants des faits et circonstances à ce point particuliers qu'il en résulterait du droit au respect de la vie familiale une obligation positive pour le défendeur de faire droit aux demandes d'octroi d'un titre de séjour à la fille des appelants. La section répond par la négative à cette question. A la lumière des considérations exposées ci-avant, on ne peut conclure, quant à l'affirmation des requérants qu'il existe des motifs impérieux d'ordre humanitaire, que le défendeur n'a pas suffisamment eu égard au droit des appelants au respect de leur vie familiale en refusant l'autorisation de séjour provisoire demandée pour leur fille, en inclinant pour la défense de l'intérêt public fondé sur l'application d'une politique d'immigration restrictive, au service des intérêts du bien-être économique.

La section ne partage pas le point de vue des appelants selon lequel il ressort des arrêts de la Cour [européenne] auxquels ils se sont référés que le refus d'autorisation de séjour d'un étranger dans notre pays constitue toujours une ingérence au sens de la disposition précitée de la Convention. A la lumière de ces arrêts, la Cour adopte le point de vue que les limites des obligations négatives et positives qui s'imposent aux Etats sur base de cette disposition ne sont pas susceptibles d'être définies restrictivement ; il en va de même des principes applicables. Il en ressort qu'il y a lieu de procéder à une évaluation raisonnable entre les intérêts d'un individu et ceux de la société dans son ensemble, tant dans le cadre des obligations négatives que des obligations positives. Dans le cas d'espèce, cette évaluation raisonnable a eu lieu dans le cadre de l'examen de la question de savoir si le défendeur avait l'obligation positive de délivrer l'autorisation de séjour demandée. La section est d'avis que de cette façon, l'examen de l'affaire s'est conformé à la portée des arrêts de la Cour auxquels les appelants se sont référés. »

22. Entre-temps, les deux premiers requérants se sont vu, par décision du 18 octobre 1995 de la Banque de la Sécurité Sociale (Sociale Verzekeringsbank), allouer des allocations familiales pour Sinem, à dater du troisième trimestre de l'année 1995. Par ailleurs, les deux premiers requérants exposent qu'en 1995 ils ont passé leurs vacances en Turquie auprès de leur fille. Ils ajoutent que depuis 1986, ils sont retournés à diverses reprises en Turquie pour des séjours d'environ six semaines : huit à neuf fois pour le premier requérant et au moins neuf fois pour la deuxième. Le Gouvernement relève à cet égard que, dans le cadre de la procédure devant les juridictions néerlandaises, les requérants avaient exposé s'être rendus à trois reprise en Turquie entre 1986 et 1992 : le père ayant passé ses vacances avec Sinem en 1988 tandis que les deux parents avaient passé deux mois avec leur fille en 1989, de même que du 17 juillet au 24 août 1992 en tout cas pour ce qui concerne la mère.

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II. LE DROIT ET LA PRATIQUE INTERNES PERTINENTS

23. Les autorités néerlandaises poursuivent une politique d'immigration restrictive eu égard à leur forte densité de population. Une autorisation de séjour est uniquement accordée si les autorités y étaient tenues en vertu du droit international, si la présence de la personne servait des intérêts essentiels des Pays-Bas ou s'il existait des raisons impérieuses d'ordre humanitaire. La politique relative à l'admission des étrangers est, entre autre, définie par un ensemble de directives rédigées et publiées par le ministère de la Justice : la « circulaire relative aux étrangers » (Vreemdelingencirculaire). A l'époque où la demande d'autorisation de séjour provisoire a été faite pour la troisième requérante, il s'agissait de la circulaire de 1982. La question est actuellement définie par la circulaire de 1994 qui reprend l'essentiel des principes détaillés ci-après (§§ 23 à 25).

24. Des critères particuliers s'appliquaient à l'admission d'étrangers dans le cadre du regroupement ou de l'établissement de familles comprenant les conjoints, les partenaires ou les proches parents de ressortissants néerlandais ou d'étrangers titulaires d'un permis de séjour ou d'un permis d'établissement. D'après ces critères, il était possible d'accorder l'admission aux fins de regroupement ou d'établissement d'une famille, même si les conditions applicables ne se trouvaient pas toutes remplies, en cas de « raisons impérieuses d'ordre humanitaire » (circulaire, chapitre B19, § 1.1).

25. La politique gouvernementale relative à l'admission des étrangers aux fins de leur permettre de maintenir ou d'établir une vie familiale aux Pays-Bas (gezinshereniging) était définie au chapitre B19 de la circulaire. Ce chapitre contenait une référence explicite à l'article 8 de la Convention. Il y était dit, au paragraphe 1.2, que le refus d'un permis de séjour ne s'analysait pas en une « ingérence » dans le droit à la vie familiale si le parent avec lequel l'étranger souhaitait maintenir ou établir une vie familiale pouvait raisonnablement être supposé suivre l'étranger dans un endroit situé en dehors des Pays-Bas. Il pouvait toutefois peser sur les autorités néerlandaises une obligation positive d'accorder un permis de séjour. Pour déterminer si tel était le cas, les intérêts de l'Etat à refuser pareil permis devaient être mis en balance avec les intérêts de l'individu, et il fallait prendre en considération l'âge des personnes concernées, leur situation dans leur pays d'origine, leur degré de dépendance par rapport à des parents aux Pays-Bas et, le cas échéant, la nationalité néerlandaise des personnes concernées. Si un permis de séjour était refusé après un examen du respect des exigences de l'article 8, ce fait devait être mentionné dans la décision.

26. Les enfants mineurs - la minorité étant déterminée d'après le droit néerlandais (chapitre B19, § 2.1.2.1) - qui « appartenaient de fait à la famille » (feitelijk behoren tot het gezin), tels les enfants d'un mariage précédent d'une personne légalement résidente aux Pays-Bas, se voyaient accorder un permis de séjour (chapitre B19, § 2.1.2).

EN DROIT

I. SUR LA VIOLATION ALLÉGUÉE DE L'ARTICLE 8 DE LA CONVENTION

27. Les requérants se plaignent du rejet de la demande d'autorisation de séjour faite au nom de à la troisième requérante, qui empêche celle-ci de rejoindre ses parents aux Pays-Bas et porte ainsi atteinte à leur droit au respect de leur vie familiale garanti par l'article 8 de la Convention, qui se lit comme suit :

« 1. Toute personne a droit au respect de sa vie privée et familiale, de son domicile et de sa correspondance.

2. Il ne peut y avoir ingérence d'une autorité publique dans l'exercice de ce droit que pour autant que cette ingérence est prévue par la loi et qu'elle constitue une mesure qui, dans une société démocratique, est nécessaire à la sécurité nationale, à la sûreté publique, au bien-être économique du pays, à la défense de l'ordre et à la prévention des infractions pénales, à la protection de la santé ou de la morale, ou à la protection des droits et libertés d'autrui. »

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Contrairement aux autorités néerlandaises, ils estiment que cette disposition oblige implicitement ces autorités à faire droit à l'autorisation de séjour demandée afin de leur permettre de développer leur vie familiale de la manière dont ils l'ont décidé.

A. Sur la question de savoir si le lien unissant les requérants s'analyse en une « vie familiale »

28. Le Gouvernement défendeur reconnaît l'existence d'une « vie familiale » entre les requérants, qui est établie. La Cour rappelle à cet égard qu'un enfant issu d'une union maritale s'insère de plein droit dans cette relation ; partant, dès l'instant et du seul fait de sa naissance, il existe entre lui et ses parents un lien constitutif de « vie familiale » (arrêt Gül c. Suisse du 19 février 1996, Recueil des arrêts et décisions, 1996-I, pp. 173-174, § 32, et Boughanemi c. France du 24 avril 1996, , Recueil, 1996-I, p. 608, § 35) que des événements ultérieurs ne peuvent briser que dans des circonstances exceptionnelles (arrêts Berrehab c. Pays-Bas du 21 juin 1988, série A no 138, p. 14, § 21 et Ahmut c. Pays-Bas du 28 novembre 1996, Recueil, 1996-VI, p. 2030, § 60). Le Gouvernement ne prétend pas qu'il y aurait en l'espèce pareilles circonstances exceptionnelles et l'existence d'une « vie familiale » entre les requérants est dès lors établie.

B. Sur la question de savoir si l'affaire concerne une « ingérence » dans l'exercice par les requérants de leur droit au respect de leur « vie familiale » ou, autrement, l'allégation de manquement de l'Etat défendeur à une « obligation positive »

29. Les requérants considèrent que le refus d'accorder un permis de séjour à Sinem s'analyse en une « ingérence » dans l'exercice de leur droit au respect de leur vie familiale. Le Gouvernement de la Turquie souscrit à cet avis.

30. Excipant de l'arrêt de la Cour dans l'affaire Ahmut précitée, le Gouvernement défendeur soutient que le refus de délivrer une autorisation de séjour à Sinem n'emporte pas « ingérence » dans l'exercice du droit au respect de la vie familiale des requérants, en l'absence d'obligation positive d'agir en ce sens dans le cas d'espèce. Il rappelle que, lorsque la deuxième requérante rejoignit son mari aux Pays-Bas en 1986, ces derniers laissèrent délibérément leur enfant auprès de leur famille en Turquie et qu'ils ne sollicitèrent une autorisation de séjour provisoire que 6 ans plus tard, soit 2 ans après la naissance du deuxième enfant du couple. De la sorte, la troisième requérante n'appartient plus, de facto, au cercle familial de ses parents. Le Gouvernement en déduit que le refus d'autorisation de séjour de Sinem ne prive pas les requérants de leur droit de jouir de la même vie familiale que celle qu'ils avaient choisie auparavant en laissant la troisième requérante en Turquie. La troisième requérante n'est pas non plus dépendante du soin à apporter par ses parents puisque différents membres de la famille vivant en Turquie peuvent la prendre en charge.

31. La Cour rappelle que l'article 8 peut engendrer des obligations positives inhérentes à un « respect » effectif de la vie familiale. Les principes applicables à pareilles obligations sont comparables à ceux qui gouverne les obligations négatives. Dans les deux cas, il faut tenir compte du juste équilibre à ménager entre les intérêts concurrents de l'individu et de la société dans son ensemble ; de même, dans les deux hypothèses, l'Etat jouit d'une certaine marge d'appréciation (arrêt Gül précité, pp. 174-175, § 38 et arrêt Ahmut précité, p. 2031, § 63).

32. La Cour est donc appelée à déterminer si les autorités néerlandaises avaient l'obligation positive d'autoriser Sinem à résider avec ses parents aux Pays-Bas, permettant ainsi aux intéressés de maintenir et de développer une vie familiale sur leur territoire.

C. Sur la question de savoir si l'Etat défendeur a manqué à une « obligation positive »

33. Les requérants soutiennent que l'Etat néerlandais avait en l'espèce une obligation positive : accorder l'autorisation de séjour à Sinem. A cet égard, ils insistent sur le fait que, d'une part, la troisième requérante était âgée de 9 ans seulement au moment où son autorisation de séjour fut sollicitée et que, d'autre part, deux enfants sont nés par la suite de l'union des parents et qu'ils sont scolarisés aux Pays-Bas. On ne saurait par ailleurs suivre le Gouvernement lorsqu'il affirme que les deux premiers d'entre eux auraient pris l'option de vivre séparés de la

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troisième. En effet, les liens familiaux ne sont pas absolus et exclusifs, mais peuvent varier selon les circonstances sociales. Or, si en 1986 la deuxième requérante a rejoint seule son mari c'est pour épargner leur enfant des problèmes relationnels ayant existé à cette époque au niveau du couple mais non en vertu d'un choix de laisser l'enfant pour toujours en Turquie. On ne saurait enfin limiter l'obligation qui incombe à l'Etat en considérant qu'il lui suffit de ne pas porter atteinte à l'exercice de la vie familiale telle qu'elle existait en 1992 et perdure encore actuellement : l'article 8 de la Convention va au-delà de la garantie du maintien de la vie familiale au niveau actuel et sous-entend qu'une vie familiale - qui n'a pu être poursuivie qu'à un degré minimal du fait que les parents n'avaient pas la possibilité d'assurer la charge d'un enfant mineur - doit être développée dès que l'enfant, ici en l'occurrence la troisième requérante, peut être pris en charge par ses parents. Les requérants insistent sur ce que les intérêts de leur famille doivent prévaloir sur ceux de l'Etat néerlandais.

34. Le Gouvernement turc partage ce point de vue et rappelle que, selon la jurisprudence, « pour un parent et son enfant, être ensemble représente un élément fondamental de la vie familiale » (arrêt McMichael c. Royaume-Uni du 24 février 1995, série A no 307, p. 55, § 86). Il met également en cause la légalité de l'ingérence, eu égard à l'âge de l'enfant et aux titres de séjour réguliers dont les deux premiers requérants étaient de longue date porteurs, et la légitimité du but poursuivi, estimant que le bien-être économique du pays ne saurait constituer un critère approprié en l'espèce.

35. De l'avis du Gouvernement défendeur, aucune obligation positive n'existe à sa charge au titre de l'article 8, dans la mesure où la troisième requérante n'est pas dépendante du soin à apporter par ses parents puisque différents membres de la famille vivant en Turquie peuvent la prendre en charge. Il relève notamment à ce propos que si les requérants ont soutenu, dans la procédure interne, avoir participé financièrement à la prise en charge de leur fille à dater de 1986, il n'en ont jamais apporté la preuve. Il ajoute que rien n'empêche les requérants de jouir d'une vie familiale en s'installant en Turquie. Enfin, la circonstance que les deux autres enfants issus de l'union des deux premiers requérants sont, depuis leur naissance, élevés par leurs parents aux Pays-Bas ne saurait être considérée comme un obstacle à l'émigration des parents vers la Turquie. Dans son arrêt Gül précité, la Cour a en effet considéré que le fait qu'un second enfant soit né dans le pays de la résidence, ne constituait pas une raison pour présumer qu'une émigration des parents serait impossible.

36. Pour établir l'étendue des obligations de l'Etat, la Cour est appelée à examiner les faits de la cause en se fondant sur les principes applicables, qui ont été énoncés dans ses arrêts Gül (op. cit., § 38) et Ahmut (loc. cit., § 67) de la manière suivante :

« a) L'étendue de l'obligation pour un Etat d'admettre sur son territoire des parents d'immigrés dépend de la situation des intéressés et de l'intérêt général.

b) D'après un principe de droit international bien établi, les Etats ont le droit, sans préjudice des engagements découlant pour eux de traités, de contrôler l'entrée des non-nationaux sur leur sol.

c) En matière d'immigration, l'article 8 ne saurait s'interpréter comme comportant pour un Etat l'obligation générale de respecter le choix, par des couples mariés, de leur résidence commune et de permettre le regroupement familial sur son territoire. »

37. Dans son analyse, la Cour prend en considération l'âge des enfants concernés, leur situation dans leur pays d'origine et leur degré de dépendance par rapport à des parents. On ne saurait en effet analyser la question du seul point de vue de l'immigration, en comparant cette situation avec celle de personnes qui n'ont créé des liens familiaux qu'une fois établis dans leur pays hôte (voir à cet égard arrêt Abdulaziz, Cabales et Balkandali c. Royaume-Uni du 28 mai 1985, série A no 94, p. 34, § 68).

38. La présente affaire offre nombre de points communs avec la situation examinée dans l'arrêt Ahmut où aucune violation de l'article 8 n'avait été constatée au vu des faits de l'espèce.

39. Comme dans l'affaire Ahmut, la résidence séparée des requérants est le résultat de la décision, prise délibérément par les parents lorsque la deuxième requérante a rejoint son mari aux Pays-Bas et les requérants ne se trouvent donc pas empêché de maintenir le degré de vie familiale que les parents ont eux-mêmes choisis en 1986. Après le départ de sa mère pour les Pays-Bas en 1986, Sinem fut prise en charge par sa tante et son oncle (§§ 14 et 17 ci-dessus). Elle a vécu toute sa vie en Turquie et a, en conséquence, des liens solides avec l'environnement

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linguistique et culturel de son pays où elle y possède toujours de la famille, à savoir ses deux oncles et ses deux tantes et des cousins, auxquels s'ajoute son grand-père qui réside régulièrement dans ce pays (§17 ci-dessus).

40. Contrairement à ce qu'elle a considéré dans l'affaire Ahmut, la Cour estime qu'il existe toutefois dans la présente affaire un obstacle majeur au retour de la famille Şen en Turquie. Titulaires l'un d'un permis d'établissement et l'autre d'un permis de séjour du fait de son mariage avec une personne autorisée à s'établir aux Pays-Bas, les deux premiers requérants ont établi leur vie de couple aux Pays-Bas, où ils séjournent légalement depuis de nombreuses années (voir a contrario, arrêt Gül précité, pp. 175-176, § 41) et où un second enfant est né en 1990, puis un troisième en 1994. Ces deux enfants ont toujours vécu aux Pays-Bas, dans l'environnement culturel de ce pays et y sont scolarisés (voir arrêt Berrehab précité, p. 8, § 7 et p. 16, § 29). Ils n'ont de ce fait que peu ou pas de liens autres que la nationalité avec leur pays d'origine (voir notamment, arrêt Mehemi c. France du 26 septembre 1997, Recueil 1997-VI, p. 1971, § 36) et il existait donc dans leur chef des obstacles à un transfert de la vie familiale en Turquie (voir a contrario, les arrêts Gül, p. 176, § 42, et Ahmut, p. 2033, § 69). Dans ces conditions, la venue de Sinem aux Pays-Bas constituait le moyen le plus adéquat pour développer une vie familiale avec celle-ci d'autant qu'il existait, vu son jeune âge, une exigence particulière de voir favoriser son intégration dans la cellule familiale de ses parents (voir notamment, mutatis mutandis, arrêt Johansen c. Norvège du 7 août 1996, Recueil 1996-III, pp. 1001-1002, § 52, et pp. 1003-1004, § 64, et arrêt X., Y. et Z. c. Royaume-Uni du 22 avril 1997, Recueil 1997-II, p. 632, § 43), aptes et disposés à s'occuper d'elle. Il est vrai que ces derniers ont choisi, après que Sinem ait passé les trois premières années de sa vie avec sa mère, de laisser leur aînée en Turquie lorsque la deuxième requérante est venue rejoindre son époux aux Pays-Bas en 1986. Cette circonstance intervenue dans la prime enfance de Sinem ne saurait toutefois être considérée comme une décision irrévocable de fixer, à tout jamais, son lieu de résidence dans ce pays et de ne garder avec elle que des liens épisodiques et distendus, renonçant définitivement à sa compagnie et abandonnant par là toute idée de réunification de leur famille. Il en va de même de la circonstance que les requérants n'ont pas pu établir avoir participé financièrement à la prise en charge de leur fille.

41. En ne laissant aux deux premiers requérants que le choix d'abandonner la situation qu'ils avaient acquise aux Pays-Bas ou de renoncer à la compagnie de leur fille aînée, l'Etat défendeur a omis de ménager un juste équilibre entre les intérêts des requérants, d'une part, et son propre intérêt à contrôler l'immigration, de l'autre, sans qu'il soit nécessaire pour la Cour d'aborder la question de savoir si les proches de Sinem résidant en Turquie sont disposés et aptes à s'occuper d'elle, comme l'affirme le Gouvernement défendeur.

42. Par conséquent, il y a eu violation de l'article 8 de la Convention.

II. SUR L'APPLICATION DE L'ARTICLE 41 DE LA CONVENTION

43. Aux termes de l'article 41 de la Convention,

« Si la Cour déclare qu'il y a eu violation de la Convention ou de ses Protocoles, et si le droit interne de la Haute Partie contractante ne permet d'effacer qu'imparfaitement les conséquences de cette violation, la Cour accorde à la partie lésée, s'il y a lieu, une satisfaction équitable. »

44. Les requérants n'ont présenté aucune demande de satisfaction équitable. Partant, la Cour estime qu'il n'y a pas lieu de leur accorder de somme à ce titre.

PAR CES MOTIFS, LA COUR, À l'UNANIMITÉ,

Dit qu'il y a eu violation de l'article 8 de la Convention.

Fait en français, puis communiqué par écrit le 21 décembre 2001 en application de l'article 77 §§ 2 et 3 du règlement.

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Michael O'BOYLE Elisabeth PALM Greffier Présidente

Au présent arrêt se trouve joint, conformément aux articles 45 § 2 de la Convention et 74 § 2 du règlement, l'exposé de l'opinion concordante de M. Türmen.

E.P. M.O'B.

OPINION CONCORDANTE DU JUGE TÜRMEN

Je partage l'opinion selon laquelle le refus d'autoriser la troisième requérante, Sinem, âgée de neuf ans, à venir vivre aux Pays-Bas avec ses parents n'a pas ménagé un juste équilibre entre les intérêts concurrents, d'une part, des requérants et, de l'autre, de la communauté dans son ensemble. Je ne peux cependant souscrire au raisonnement adopté.

Le constat de violation de la Chambre est essentiellement fondé sur une circonstance de fait : la naissance aux Pays-Bas de deux enfants du couple Şen qui ont toujours vécu dans l'environnement culturel de ce pays et n'ont donc que peu ou pas de liens autres que la nationalité avec leur pays d'origine. Selon la Chambre, cette circonstance fait obstacle à la reconstitution de la famille Şen en Turquie et le refus d'accorder un titre de séjour à la troisième requérante était donc disproportionné.

Il faut donc en déduire que si Sinem était restée la seule enfant du couple Şen, la Chambre aurait conclu, comme la Cour l'a fait dans l'affaire Ahmut c. Pays-Bas (arrêt du 28 novembre 1996, Recueil, 1996-VI), que les autorités néerlandaises pouvaient raisonnablement demander aux deux premiers requérants de quitter les Pays-Bas et de regagner la Turquie s'ils voulaient être réunis à la troisième requérante.

Selon mon opinion, on ne saurait admettre que de telles limitations au regroupement familial se posent dans une affaire d'« immigrants qui, déjà dotés d'une famille, l'auraient laissée derrière eux » (arrêt Abdulaziz, Cabales et Balkandali c. Royaume-Uni du 28 mai 1985, série A no 94). Une décision aussi sévère que celle prise en l'espèce par les autorités néerlandaises témoigne d'un esprit restrictif incompatible avec le sens même de la Convention et la notion des droits de l'homme.

Je me réfère sur ce point aux opinions dissidentes exposées par le Juge Martens dans les affaires Gül c. Suisse (arrêt du 19 février 1996, Recueil des arrêts et décisions 1996-I) et Ahmut précitées. J'estime comme lui que dans les cas où un père et une mère ont réussi à obtenir un statut permanent dans un pays et souhaitent que soient réunis à eux les enfants que, provisoirement, ils ont laissés derrière eux dans leur pays d'origine, il est per se déraisonnable, sinon inhumain, de leur donner le choix entre abandonner la situation qu'ils ont acquise dans le pays d'établissement ou renoncer à la compagnie de leurs enfants, qui constitue un élément fondamental de la vie familiale » (§ 14 de l'opinion dissidente de l'arrêt Gül précité).

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CORTE DI GIUSTIZIA DELLE COMUNITA EUROPEE (Grande S ezione)

27 giugno 2006

«Politica di immigrazione – Diritto al ricongiungimento familiare dei figli minori di cittadini di paesi terzi – Direttiva 2003/86/CE – Tutela dei diritti fondamentali – Diritto al rispetto della vita familiare – Obbligo di prendere in considerazione

l’interesse del figlio minore»

Nella causa C-540/03, avente ad oggetto un ricorso d’annullamento proposto, ai sensi dell’art. 230 CE, il 22 dicembre 2003, Parlamento europeo, rappresentato dai sigg. H. Duintjer Tebbens e A. Caiola, in qualità di agenti, con domicilio eletto a Lussemburgo,

ricorrente, contro

Consiglio dell’Unione europea, rappresentato dal sig. O. Petersen e dalla sig.ra M. Simm, in qualità di agenti,

convenuto, sostenuto da Commissione delle Comunità europee, rappresentata dalla sig.ra C. O’Reilly e dal sig. C. Ladenburger, in qualità di agenti, con domicilio eletto a Lussemburgo,

interveniente, e da Repubblica federale di Germania, rappresentata dalla sig.ra A. Tiemann nonché dai sigg. W.-D. Plessing e M. Lumma, in qualità di agenti,

interveniente, LA CORTE (Grande Sezione),

composta dal sig. V. Skouris, presidente, dai sigg. P. Jann, C.W.A. Timmermans, A. Rosas (relatore) e K. Schiemann, presidenti di sezione, dai sigg. J.-P. Puissochet, K. Lenaerts, P. Kūris, E. Juhász, E. Levits e A. Ó Caoimh, giudici, avvocato generale: sig.ra J. Kokott cancelliere: sig.ra M. Ferreira, amministratore principale vista la fase scritta del procedimento e in esito all’udienza del 28 giugno 2005, sentite le conclusioni dell’avvocato generale, presentate all’udienza dell’8 settembre 2005, ha pronunciato la seguente

Sentenza

1 Con il presente ricorso il Parlamento europeo chiede l’annullamento dell’art. 4, nn. 1, ultimo comma, e 6, nonché dell’art. 8 della direttiva del Consiglio 22 settembre 2003, 2003/86/CE, relativa al diritto al ricongiungimento familiare (GU L 251, pag. 12; in prosieguo: la «direttiva»)

2 Con ordinanza del presidente della Corte 5 maggio 2004, è stato ammesso l’intervento della Commissione delle Comunità europee e della Repubblica federale di Germania a sostegno del Consiglio dell’Unione europea.

La direttiva

3 La direttiva, fondata sul Trattato CE, e in particolare sull’art. 63, n. 3, lett. a), del medesimo, stabilisce i requisiti in presenza dei quali può essere esercitato il diritto al ricongiungimento familiare a favore dei cittadini dei paesi terzi che risiedano legalmente sul territorio degli Stati membri.

4 Il secondo ‘considerando’ della direttiva così recita:

«Le misure in materia di ricongiungimento familiare dovrebbero essere adottate in conformità con l’obbligo di protezione della famiglia e di rispetto della vita familiare che

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è consacrato in numerosi strumenti di diritto internazionale. La presente direttiva rispetta i diritti fondamentali ed i principi riconosciuti in particolare nell’articolo 8 della convenzione europea per la salvaguardia dei diritti dell’uomo e delle libertà fondamentali e dalla Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell’Unione europea [GU 2000, C 364, pag. 1; in prosieguo: la «Carta»].

5 Il successivo dodicesimo ‘considerando’ della direttiva precisa quanto segue:

«La possibilità di limitare il diritto al ricongiungimento familiare dei minori che abbiano superato i dodici anni e che non risiedono in via principale con il soggiornante intende tener conto della capacità di integrazione dei minori nei primi anni di vita e assicurare che essi acquisiscano a scuola l’istruzione e le competenze linguistiche necessarie».

6 La direttiva si applica, ai termini dell’art. 3 della medesima, quando il soggiornante è titolare di un permesso di soggiorno rilasciato da uno Stato membro per un periodo di validità pari o superiore a un anno e ha fondate prospettive di ottenere il diritto di soggiornare in modo stabile, se i membri della sua famiglia sono cittadini di paesi terzi, indipendentemente dal loro status giuridico.

7 Ai sensi dell’art. 3, n. 4, della direttiva stessa:

«La presente direttiva fa salve le disposizioni più favorevoli contenute:

a) negli accordi bilaterali e multilaterali stipulati tra la Comunità o tra la Comunità e i suoi Stati membri, da una parte, e dei paesi terzi, dall’altra;

b) nella Carta sociale europea del 18 ottobre 1961, nella Carta sociale europea riveduta del 3 maggio 1987 e nella convenzione europea relativa allo status di lavoratore migrante del 24 novembre 1977».

8 Ai termini del successivo art. 4, n. 1, gli Stati membri autorizzano l’ingresso ed il soggiorno, conformemente alla direttiva stessa, segnatamente, dei figli minorenni, compresi i figli adottati, del soggiornante e del coniuge, nonché di quelli del soggiornante o di quelli del coniuge quando il genitore ne abbia l’affidamento e sia responsabile del loro mantenimento. Ai sensi del penultimo comma del n. 1 del medesimo art. 4, i figli minorenni di cui al detto articolo devono avere un’età inferiore a quella in cui si diventa legalmente maggiorenni nello Stato membro interessato e non devono essere coniugati. Il successivo ultimo comma così recita:

«In deroga alla disposizione che precede, qualora un minore abbia superato i dodici anni e giunga in uno Stato membro indipendentemente dal resto della sua famiglia, quest’ultimo, prima di autorizzarne l’ingresso ed il soggiorno ai sensi della presente direttiva, può esaminare se siano soddisfatte le condizioni per la sua integrazione richieste dalla sua legislazione in vigore al momento dell’attuazione della presente direttiva».

9 L’art. 4, n. 6, della direttiva medesima prevede quanto segue:

«In deroga alla disposizione precedente gli Stati membri possono richiedere che le domande riguardanti il ricongiungimento familiare di figli minori debbano essere presentate prima del compimento del quindicesimo anno di età, secondo quanto previsto dalla loro legislazione in vigore al momento dell’attuazione della presente direttiva. Ove dette richieste vengano presentate oltre il quindicesimo anno di età, gli Stati membri che decidono di applicare la presente deroga autorizzano l’ingresso e il soggiorno di siffatti figli per motivi diversi dal ricongiungimento familiare».

10 L’art. 5, n. 5, della direttiva stessa impone agli Stati membri di tenere nella dovuta considerazione, nell’esame della domanda, l’interesse superiore dei minori.

11 Il successivo art. 8 della direttiva così dispone:

«Gli Stati membri possono esigere che il soggiornante, prima di farsi raggiungere dai suoi familiari, abbia soggiornato legalmente nel loro territorio per un periodo non superiore a due anni.

In deroga alla disposizione che precede, qualora, in materia di ricongiungimento familiare, la legislazione in vigore in uno Stato membro al momento dell’adozione della presente direttiva tenga conto della sua capacità di accoglienza, questo Stato membro può

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prevedere un periodo di attesa non superiore a tre anni tra la presentazione della domanda di ricongiungimento ed il rilascio del permesso di soggiorno ai familiari».

12 L’art. 16 della direttiva medesima elenca talune circostanze in presenza delle quali gli Stati membri possono respingere una domanda di ingresso e di soggiorno ai fini del ricongiungimento familiare ovvero, eventualmente, revocare il permesso di soggiorno di un familiare o negarne il rinnovo.

13 Il successivo art. 17 così recita:

«In caso di rigetto di una domanda, di ritiro o di mancato rinnovo del permesso di soggiorno o di adozione di una misura di allontanamento nei confronti del soggiornante o dei suoi familiari, gli Stati membri prendono nella dovuta considerazione la natura e la solidità dei vincoli familiari della persona e la durata del suo soggiorno nello Stato membro, nonché l’esistenza di legami familiari, culturali o sociali con il suo paese d’origine».

14 Ai termini dell’art. 18 della direttiva, le decisioni di rigetto di domande di ricongiungimento familiare, di revoca o di mancato rinnovo del permesso di soggiorno devono poter essere impugnate in sede giurisdizionale secondo le modalità e le competenze fissate dagli Stati membri interessati.

Sulla ricevibilità del ricorso

Sull’eccezione relativa al fatto che il ricorso non sarebbe diretto, in realtà, contro un atto delle istituzioni

15 Le disposizioni di cui viene chiesto l’annullamento costituiscono deroghe agli obblighi imposti dalla direttiva agli Stati membri che consentono a questi ultimi di applicare le proprie normative nazionali le quali, ad avviso del Parlamento, non rispetterebbero i diritti fondamentali. A parere dell’istituzione tuttavia, ammettendo l’applicabilità delle dette normative nazionali, sarebbe la direttiva stessa a violare i diritti fondamentali. Il Parlamento si richiama al riguardo alla sentenza 6 novembre 2003, causa C-101/01, Lindqvist (Racc. pag. I-12971, punto 84).

16 Il Consiglio sottolinea, per contro, che la direttiva lascia agli Stati membri ampio margine di manovra che consente loro di mantenere in vigore o adottare disposizioni nazionali compatibili con il rispetto dei diritti fondamentali. A parere del Consiglio, il Parlamento non dimostrerebbe sotto quale profilo disposizioni eventualmente contrarie ai diritti fondamentali, adottate ed applicate dagli Stati membri, costituirebbero un atto delle istituzioni ai sensi dell’art. 46, lett. d), UE, soggetto al sindacato della Corte per quanto attiene al rispetto dei diritti fondamentali.

17 In ogni caso, il Consiglio si chiede in qual modo la Corte potrebbe esercitare un sindacato di legittimità puramente astratto con riguardo a disposizioni di diritto comunitario che si limitino a far riferimento ad ordinamenti nazionali di cui non conosce né il contenuto né le modalità di applicazione. La necessità di prendere in considerazione le circostanze concrete emergerebbe dalle sentenze 11 luglio 2002, causa C-60/00, Carpenter (Racc. pag. I-6279), e Lindqvist, citata supra.

18 La Commissione ritiene che il sindacato da parte della Corte sul rispetto dei diritti fondamentali, insito nei principi generali del diritto comunitario, non possa limitarsi alla sola ipotesi in cui una disposizione di una direttiva obblighi gli Stati membri ad adottare determinate misure in violazione dei diritti fondamentali stessi, bensì debba necessariamente estendersi al caso in cui la direttiva consenta espressamente misure di tal genere. Infatti, non ci si potrebbe attendere dagli Stati membri che essi stessi si rendano conto che una determinata misura, consentita da una direttiva comunitaria, sia in contrasto con i diritti fondamentali. L’istituzione conclude che il sindacato della Corte non può essere negato sulla base del rilievo che le disposizioni controverse della direttiva si limiterebbero a far rinvio alle leggi nazionali.

19 La Commissione sottolinea, tuttavia, che la Corte dovrebbe pronunciare l’annullamento di disposizioni come quelle oggetto del presente ricorso, solamente quando le risulti impossibile interpretarle in modo conforme ai diritti fondamentali. Qualora la disposizione controversa lasci, alla luce delle consuete norme di ermeneutica, un margine

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di discrezionalità, la Corte dovrebbe piuttosto precisarne l’interpretazione conforme ai diritti fondamentali.

20 Il Parlamento replica che un’interpretazione a priori della direttiva da parte della Corte, come quella suggerita dalla Commissione, produrrebbe l’effetto di istituire un rimedio preventivo che inciderebbe sulle competenze del legislatore comunitario.

Giudizio della Corte

21 Come rilevato dall’avvocato generale ai paragrafi 43-45 delle conclusioni, occorre affrontare tale dibattito sotto il profilo della ricevibilità del ricorso. Il Consiglio contesta, sostanzialmente, il fatto che il ricorso è diretto contro un atto delle istituzioni, sostenendo che l’eventuale violazione dei diritti fondamentali potrebbe risultare unicamente dall’applicazione delle disposizioni nazionali mantenute in vigore o adottate conformemente alla direttiva.

22 A tal riguardo, il fatto che le disposizioni della direttiva impugnata riconoscano agli Stati membri un certo margine di discrezionalità consentendo loro di applicare, in talune circostanze, una normativa nazionale che deroghi alle regole di principio imposte dalla direttiva non può produrre l’effetto di sottrarre tali disposizioni al sindacato di legittimità della Corte previsto dall’art. 230 CE.

23 Peraltro, una disposizione di un atto comunitario potrebbe, di per sé, risultare in contrasto con i diritti fondamentali qualora imponesse agli Stati membri o autorizzasse espressamente o implicitamente i medesimi ad adottare o mantenere in vigore leggi nazionali in contrasto con i detti diritti.

24 Da tutti i suesposti elementi emerge che dev’essere respinta l’eccezione di irricevibilità relativa al fatto che il ricorso non sarebbe in realtà diretto contro un atto delle istituzioni.

Sulla separabilità delle disposizioni di cui viene chiesto l’annullamento

25 La Repubblica federale di Germania sottolinea, in limine, l’importanza che, a suo parere, riveste l’art. 4, n. 1, ultimo comma, della direttiva, che conterrebbe uno dei punti centrali del compromesso grazie al quale sarebbe stato possibile pervenire all’adozione della direttiva, per la quale era richiesta l’unanimità dei voti. Essa rammenta che l’annullamento parziale di un atto è possibile solamente nel caso in cui l’atto sia costituito da più elementi, separabili l’uno dall’altro, e in cui solamente uno di tali elementi sia viziato da illegittimità per violazione del diritto comunitario. Nella specie, non sarebbe possibile separare la regola relativa al ricongiungimento familiare enunciata all’art. 4, n. l, ultimo comma, della direttiva dal resto della medesima. Un’eventuale sentenza di annullamento parziale inciderebbe sulle competenze del legislatore comunitario, ragion per cui sarebbe pensabile solamente l’annullamento in toto della direttiva.

26 Il Parlamento contesta la tesi secondo cui l’art. 4, n. 1, ultimo comma, della direttiva non costituirebbe un elemento separabile da quest’ultima unicamente in base al rilievo che la sua redazione risulterebbe da un compromesso politico che avrebbe consentito l’adozione della direttiva stessa. Secondo la detta istituzione, occorre semplicemente accertare se sia giuridicamente possibile separare un elemento della direttiva. L’annullamento delle disposizioni oggetto del ricorso, considerato che esse costituiscono deroghe alle regole generali sancite dalla direttiva, non metterebbe in discussione né l’economia né l’effettività della direttiva stessa complessivamente intesa, di cui il Parlamento riconosce l’importanza ai fini dell’attuazione del diritto al ricongiungimento familiare.

Giudizio della Corte

27 Come risulta da costante giurisprudenza, l’annullamento parziale di un atto comunitario è possibile solo se gli elementi di cui è chiesto l’annullamento siano separabili dal resto dell’atto medesimo (v., segnatamente, sentenze 10 dicembre 2002, causa C-29/99, Commissione/Consiglio, Racc. pag. I-11221, punti 45 e 46; 21 gennaio 2003, causa C-378/00, Commissione/Parlamento e Consiglio, Racc. pag. I-937, punto 29; 30 settembre 2003, causa C-239/01, Germania/Commissione, Racc. pag. I-10333, punto 33; 24 maggio 2005, causa C-244/03, Francia/Parlamento e Consiglio, Racc. pag. I-4021, punto 12, e 30 marzo 2006, causa C-36/04, Spagna/Consiglio, Racc. pag. I-2981, punto 9).

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28 Parimenti, la Corte ha ripetutamente avuto modo di affermare che tale requisito della separabilità non è soddisfatto quando l’annullamento parziale di un atto produrrebbe l’effetto di modificare la sostanza dell’atto medesimo (sentenza 31 marzo 1998, cause riunite C-68/94 e C-30/95, Francia e a./Commissione, Racc. pag. I-1375, punto 257, e sentenze supra citate Commissione/Consiglio, punto 46; Germania/Commissione, punto 34; Francia/Parlamento e Consiglio, punto 13, e Spagna/Consiglio, punto 13).

29 Nella specie, la verifica della separabilità delle disposizioni di cui viene chiesto l’annullamento presuppone l’esame del merito della controversia, vale a dire della portata di tali disposizioni, al fine di poter valutare se il loro annullamento modificherebbe lo spirito e la sostanza della direttiva.

Il ricorso

Sulle norme giuridiche con riguardo alle quali può essere verificata la legittimità della direttiva

30 Il Parlamento sostiene che le disposizioni impugnate non rispetterebbero i diritti fondamentali, e in particolare il diritto alla vita familiare ed il diritto di non discriminazione, quali garantiti dalla Convenzione europea per la salvaguardia dei diritti dell’uomo e delle libertà fondamentali, sottoscritta a Roma il 4 novembre 1950 (in prosieguo: la «CEDU»), e risultanti dalle tradizioni costituzionali comuni agli Stati membri dell’Unione europea, quali principi generali del diritto comunitario che l’Unione è tenuta a rispettare in applicazione dell’art. 6, n. 2, UE, al quale fa rinvio l’art. 46, lett. d), UE per quanto concerne l’azione delle istituzioni.

31 Il Parlamento invoca, in primo luogo, il diritto al rispetto della vita familiare, sancito dall’art. 8 della CEDU, interpretato dalla Corte come comprensivo parimenti del diritto al ricongiungimento familiare (sentenze Carpenter, citata supra, punto 42, e 23 settembre 2003, causa C-109/01, Akrich, Racc. pag. I-9607, punto 59). Lo stesso principio è stato ripreso all’art. 7 della Carta, con riguardo alla quale il Parlamento sottolinea che, contenendo un elenco dei diritti fondamentali esistenti ancorché priva di effetti giuridici vincolanti, essa costituisce tuttavia un indice utile ai fini dell’interpretazione delle disposizioni della CEDU. Il Parlamento si richiama inoltre all’art. 24 della Carta, relativo ai diritti dei minori, il cui n. 2 prevede che «in tutti gli atti relativi ai minori, siano essi compiuti da autorità pubbliche o da istituzioni private, l’interesse superiore del minore dev’essere considerato preminente» ed il cui successivo n. 3, afferma che «il minore ha diritto di intrattenere regolarmente relazioni personali e contatti diretti con i due genitori, salvo qualora ciò sia contrario al suo interesse».

32 Il Parlamento invoca, in secondo luogo, il principio di non discriminazione fondata sull’età delle persone di cui trattasi, contemplato dall’art. 14 della CEDU e sancito espressamente dall’art. 21, n. 1, della Carta.

33 Il Parlamento si richiama parimenti a varie disposizioni di convenzioni internazionali sottoscritte sotto l’egida delle Nazioni Unite: l’art. 24 del patto internazionale sui diritti civili e politici, adottato il 19 dicembre 1966 ed entrato in vigore il 23 marzo 1976, la convenzione sui diritti del fanciullo adottata il 20 novembre 1989 ed entrata in vigore il 2 settembre 1990, la convenzione internazionale sulla protezione dei diritti dei lavoratori migranti e dei membri della loro famiglia, adottata il 18 dicembre 1990 ed entrata in vigore il 1° luglio 2003, nonché la dichiarazione dei diritti del fanciullo, adottata dall’Assemblea generale dell’Organizzazione delle Nazioni Unite il 20 novembre 1959 [risoluzione 1386(XIV)]. Il Parlamento rammenta, inoltre, la raccomandazione n. R (94) 14 del Comitato dei ministri del Consiglio d’Europa agli Stati membri, del 22 novembre 1994, riguardante le politiche familiari coerenti e integrate, nonché la raccomandazione n. R (99) 23 del Comitato medesimo agli Stati membri, del 15 dicembre 1999, sul ricongiungimento familiare per i rifugiati e le altre persone aventi necessità di protezione internazionale. Il Parlamento si richiama, infine, a varie costituzioni degli Stati membri dell’Unione europea.

34 Il Consiglio rileva che la Comunità non è parte contraente dei vari strumenti di diritto internazionale pubblico invocati dal Parlamento. In ogni caso, tali norme richiederebbero semplicemente che gli interessi dei fanciulli siano presi in considerazione e rispettati,

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senza peraltro stabilire alcun diritto assoluto in materia di ricongiungimento familiare. Il Consiglio rileva peraltro che, a suo parere, non occorre esaminare il ricorso alla luce della Carta, tenuto conto che essa non costituisce una fonte di diritto comunitario.

Giudizio della Corte

35 I diritti fondamentali fanno parte integrante dei principi generali del diritto dei quali la Corte garantisce l’osservanza. A tal fine la Corte si ispira alle tradizioni costituzionali comuni agli Stati membri e alle indicazioni fornite dai trattati internazionali relativi alla tutela dei diritti dell’uomo cui gli Stati membri hanno cooperato o aderito. La CEDU riveste, a questo proposito, un particolare significato (v., segnatamente, sentenze 18 giugno 1991, causa C-260/89, ERT, Racc. pag. I-2925, punto 41; parere 2/94, del 28 marzo 1996, Racc. pag. I-1759, punto 33; sentenze 6 marzo 2001, causa C-274/99 P, Connolly/Commissione, Racc. pag. I-1611, punto 37; 22 ottobre 2002, causa C-94/00, Roquette Frères, Racc. pag. I-9011, punto 25; 12 giugno 2003, causa C-112/00, Schmidberger, Racc. pag. I-5659, punto 71, e 14 ottobre 2004, causa C-36/02, Omega, Racc. pag. I-9609, punto 33).

36 Peraltro, ai termini dell’art. 6, n. 2, UE, «l’Unione rispetta i diritti fondamentali quali sono garantiti dalla [CEDU] e quali risultano dalle tradizioni costituzionali comuni degli Stati membri, in quanto principi generali del diritto comunitario».

37 La Corte ha già avuto modo di rammentare che il patto internazionale sui diritti civili e politici si annovera tra gli strumenti internazionali relativi alla tutela dei diritti dell’uomo di cui la Corte tiene conto per l’applicazione dei principi generali del diritto comunitario (v., in particolare, sentenze 18 ottobre 1989, causa 374/87, Orkem/Commissione, Racc. pag. 3283, punto 31; 18 ottobre 1990, cause riunite C-297/88 e C-197/89, Dzodzi, Racc. pag. I-3763, punto 68, e 17 febbraio 1998, causa C-249/96, Grant, Racc. pag. I-621, punto 44). Ciò vale parimenti per la menzionata convenzione relativa ai diritti del fanciullo che, al pari del patto citato supra, è vincolante nei confronti di ogni singolo Stato membro.

38 Per quanto attiene alla Carta, essa è stata proclamata solennemente dal Parlamento, dal Consiglio e dalla Commissione a Nizza il 7 dicembre 2000. Se è pur vero che la Carta non costituisce uno strumento giuridico vincolante, il legislatore comunitario ha tuttavia inteso riconoscerne l’importanza affermando, al secondo ‘considerando’ della direttiva, che quest’ultima rispetta i principi riconosciuti non solamente dall’art. 8 della CEDU, bensì parimenti dalla Carta. L’obiettivo principale della Carta, come emerge dal suo preambolo, è peraltro quello di riaffermare «i diritti derivanti in particolare dalle tradizioni costituzionali e dagli obblighi internazionali comuni agli Stati membri, dalla [CEDU], dalle carte sociali adottate dall’Unione e dal Consiglio d’Europa, nonché dalla giurisprudenza della Corte (...) e da quella della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo ».

39 Quanto agli altri strumenti internazionali invocati dal Parlamento, con riserva per la Carta sociale europea di cui infra, al punto 107 della presente sentenza, non risulta, in ogni caso, che essi contengano disposizioni di più intensa tutela dei diritti del fanciullo rispetto a quelle contenute negli strumenti già menzionati.

Sull’art. 4, n. 1, ultimo comma, della direttiva

40 Il Parlamento sostiene che la motivazione dell’art. 4, n. 1, ultimo comma, della direttiva, contenuta nel dodicesimo ‘considerando’ della medesima, non è convincente e che il legislatore comunitario ha confuso le nozioni di «criterio di integrazione» e di «obiettivo di integrazione». Atteso che uno degli strumenti più importanti di un’integrazione riuscita di un minore sarebbe costituito dal ricongiungimento con la sua famiglia, sarebbe incongruo esigere un test di integrazione prima che il minore, appartenente alla famiglia del soggiornante, si ricongiunga con quest’ultimo. Ciò renderebbe il ricongiungimento familiare irrealizzabile e costituirebbe la negazione di tale diritto.

41 Il Parlamento fa parimenti valere che, atteso che la nozione di integrazione non è definita nella direttiva, gli Stati membri sono quindi autorizzati a restringere sensibilmente il diritto al ricongiungimento familiare.

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42 Tale diritto sarebbe tutelato dall’art. 8 della CEDU, come interpretato dalla Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo, ed un criterio di integrazione previsto da una normativa nazionale non sarebbe ricompreso tra gli obiettivi legittimi che possono giustificare un’ingerenza come quelli previsti dall’art. 8, n. 2, della CEDU, vale a dire la sicurezza nazionale, la pubblica sicurezza, il benessere economico del paese, la difesa dell’ordine e la prevenzione dei reati, la tutela della salute o della morale, e la tutela dei diritti e libertà altrui. In ogni caso, ogni ingerenza dovrebbe essere giustificata e proporzionata. Orbene, l’art. 4, n. 1, ultimo comma, della direttiva non esigerebbe alcuna ponderazione dei rispettivi interessi in gioco.

43 La direttiva sarebbe peraltro contraddittoria, in quanto non prevedrebbe alcuna limitazione fondata sul criterio di integrazione con riguardo al coniuge del soggiornante.

44 La direttiva stabilirebbe inoltre una discriminazione fondata esclusivamente sull’età del minore, che non sarebbe obiettivamente giustificata e risulterebbe in contrasto con l’art. 14 de la CEDU. In tal senso, l’obiettivo di incentivare i genitori a ricongiungersi con i propri figli prima dell’età di 12 anni non terrebbe conto dei vincoli di ordine economico e sociale che impediscono ad una famiglia di accogliere un figlio per un periodo più o meno lungo. L’obiettivo dell’integrazione avrebbe potuto essere peraltro realizzato con mezzi meno radicali, quali misure di integrazione del minore successivamente alla sua ammissione sul territorio dello Stato membro ospitante.

45 Il Parlamento sottolinea, infine, che la clausola di standstill è meno restrittiva delle clausole di standstill abituali, atteso che la legge nazionale deve sussistere solamente alla data di attuazione della direttiva. Il margine lasciato agli Stati membri si porrebbe in contrasto con l’obiettivo della direttiva, che è quello di prevedere criteri comuni per l’esercizio del diritto al ricongiungimento familiare.

46 Il Consiglio, sostenuto dal governo tedesco e dalla Commissione, deduce che il diritto al rispetto della vita familiare non equivale, di per sé, al diritto al ricongiungimento familiare. Secondo la giurisprudenza della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo, sarebbe sufficiente che la vita familiare sia possibile, ad esempio, nello Stato di origine.

47 Il Consiglio sottolinea parimenti che la Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo ha riconosciuto, nella propria giurisprudenza, che taluni divieti di ricongiungimento familiare nell’ambito della politica di immigrazione erano giustificati da almeno una delle esigenze elencate all’art. 8, n. 2, della CEDU. A parere del Consiglio, un diniego di tal genere potrebbe fondarsi sull’obiettivo enunciato dall’art. 4, n. 1, ultimo comma, della direttiva, vale a dire l’efficace integrazione dei minori migranti per effetto dell’incentivazione delle famiglie migranti separate a ricongiungersi con i loro figli minori nello Stato membro ospitante, quando questi siano di età inferiore a 12 anni.

48 La scelta dell’età di 12 anni non sarebbe arbitraria, bensì sarebbe stata motivata dal fatto che, prima di tale età, i minori si troverebbero in una fase di sviluppo importante per le loro facoltà di integrazione nella società, come espresso nel dodicesimo ‘considerando’ della direttiva. Il Consiglio rileva a tal riguardo che la Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo ha negato l’esistenza di una violazione dell’art. 8 della CEDU in fattispecie concernenti il ricongiungimento di minori di età inferiore a 12 anni.

49 Sarebbe giustificato applicare il criterio dell’integrazione ai minori di età superiore a 12 anni e non al coniuge del soggiornante, in considerazione del fatto che, in linea generale, i minori trascorrerebbero poi nello Stato membro ospitante un periodo più importante della loro esistenza che non i genitori.

50 Il Consiglio sottolinea che la direttiva non incide sul risultato della ponderazione degli interessi individuali e collettivi sussistenti nella specie e rammenta che gli artt. 17 e 5, n. 5, della direttiva medesima obbligano gli Stati membri a prendere in considerazione gli interessi tutelati dalla CEDU e la Convenzione relativa ai diritti del fanciullo.

51 L’istituzione fa parimenti valere che la clausola di standstill, di cui all’art. 4, n. 1, ultimo comma, della direttiva, non mette in discussione la legittimità di tale disposizione. Il riferimento ivi contenuto «al momento dell’attuazione» della direttiva costituirebbe una scelta politicamente legittima del legislatore comunitario, motivata dal fatto che lo Stato membro che intenda invocare tale deroga non abbia terminato il processo legislativo di

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adozione della normativa nazionale di cui trattasi. Sarebbe stato preferibile scegliere tale criterio, infine accolto, piuttosto che attendere la conclusione del detto procedimento legislativo prima di emanare la direttiva.

Giudizio della Corte

52 Si deve rammentare, in limine, che il diritto al rispetto della vita familiare, ai sensi dell’art. 8 della CEDU, fa parte dei diritti fondamentali che, secondo costante giurisprudenza della Corte, sono protetti nell’ordinamento giuridico comunitario (citate sentenze Carpenter, punto 41, e Akrich, punti 58 e 59). Tale diritto alla convivenza con i familiari prossimi implica per gli Stati membri obblighi che possono essere di carattere negativo, qualora uno di essi sia tenuto a non espellere un soggetto, ovvero di carattere positivo, quando l’obbligo sia quello di consentire ad un soggetto di fare ingresso e di risiedere sul proprio territorio.

53 In tal senso, come affermato dalla Corte, ancorché la CEDU non garantisca, quale diritto fondamentale a favore di uno straniero, alcun diritto di entrare o risiedere nel territorio di un paese determinato, l’esclusione di una persona da un paese in cui vivono i suoi congiunti può rappresentare un’ingerenza nel diritto al rispetto della vita familiare come tutelato dall’art. 8, n. 1, della Convenzione medesima (citate sentenze Carpenter, punto 42, e Akrich, punto 59).

54 Peraltro, come affermato dalla Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo nella sentenza 21 dicembre 2001, Sen c. Paesi Bassi, paragrafo 31, «l’art. 8 [della CEDU] può far sorgere obblighi positivi inerenti ad un “rispetto” effettivo della vita familiare. I principi applicabili a tali obblighi sono analoghi a quelli che disciplinano gli obblighi di carattere negativo. In entrambi i casi, occorre tener conto del giusto equilibrio da realizzare tra i concorrenti interessi dell’individuo e della società complessivamente intesa; parimenti, nelle due ipotesi, lo Stato gode di un certo margine di discrezionalità (sentenza 19 febbraio 1996, Gül [c. Svizzera, Recueil des arrêts et décisions, 1996-I], pag. 174, paragrafo 38, e 28 novembre 1996, Ahmut [c. Paesi Bassi, Recueil des arrêts et décisions, 1996-VI, pag. 2030], paragrafo 63)».

55 Al paragrafo 36 della menzionata sentenza Sen c. Paesi Bassi, la Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo ha ricordato nei seguenti termini i principi applicabili in materia di ricongiungimento familiare, principi già enunciati nelle proprie sentenze, citate supra, Gül c. Svizzera, paragrafo 38, e Ahmut c. Paesi Bassi, paragrafo 67:

«a) La portata dell’obbligo per uno Stato di consentire l’ingresso sul proprio territorio ai congiunti di persone immigrate dipende dalla situazione degli interessati e dall’interesse generale.

b) Conformemente ad un consolidato principio di diritto internazionale, gli Stati hanno il diritto – senza pregiudizio degli obblighi per essi derivanti dai Trattati – di controllare l’ingresso di cittadini non nazionali sul loro territorio.

c) In materia di immigrazione, l’art. 8 non può essere interpretato nel senso che esso implichi per uno Stato membro l’obbligo generale di rispettare la scelta, da parte di coppie coniugate, della loro comune residenza e di consentire il ricongiungimento familiare sul proprio territorio».

56 La Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo ha precisato di prendere in considerazione, nel proprio esame, l’età dei figli minori di cui trattasi, la loro situazione nel rispettivo paese di origine ed il loro grado di dipendenza rispetto ai genitori (sentenza Sen c. Paesi Bassi, citata supra, paragrafo 37; v. parimenti sentenza 31 gennaio 2006, Rodrigues da Silva c. Paesi Bassi, paragrafo 39).

57 La convenzione relativa ai diritti del fanciullo riconosce parimenti il principio del rispetto della vita familiare. Essa è fondata sul riconoscimento, espresso nel suo sesto ‘considerando’, che il minore deve poter crescere, ai fini di un armonioso sviluppo della propria personalità, nell’ambiente familiare. L’art. 9, n. 1, della detta convenzione prevede, in tal senso, che gli Stati contraenti provvedano affinché il minore non venga separato dai genitori contro la loro volontà; da tale obbligo discende, ai termini del successivo art. 10, n. 1, che qualsiasi richiesta effettuata da un minore o dai genitori al

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fine di fare ingresso in uno Stato contraente o di lasciare il medesimo ai fini del ricongiungimento familiare dev’essere considerata dagli Stati contraenti, in uno spirito positivo, con umanità e diligenza.

58 L’art. 7 della Carta riconosce parimenti il diritto al rispetto della vita privata o familiare. Tale disposizione dev’essere letta in correlazione con l’obbligo di prendere in considerazione il superiore interesse del minore, sancito dall’art. 24, n. 2, della Carta medesima, tenendo conto parimenti della necessità per il minore di intrattenere regolarmente rapporti personali con i due genitori, necessità affermata dal medesimo art. 24, n. 3.

59 Le disposizioni richiamate sottolineano l’importanza, per il minore, della vita familiare e raccomandano agli Stati di prendere in considerazione l’interesse del medesimo, senza peraltro far sorgere a favore dei familiari il diritto soggettivo ad essere ammessi nel territorio di uno Stato; tali disposizioni non possono essere interpretate nel senso di privare gli Stati di un certo potere discrezionale nell’esame delle domande di ricongiungimento familiare.

60 Al di là di tali disposizioni, l’art. 4, n. 1, della direttiva impone agli Stati membri obblighi positivi precisi, cui corrispondono diritti soggettivi chiaramente definiti, imponendo loro, nelle ipotesi contemplate dalla direttiva, di autorizzare il ricongiungimento familiare di taluni congiunti del soggiornante senza potersi avvalere di discrezionalità in proposito.

61 Per quanto attiene all’art. 4, n. 1, ultimo comma, della direttiva, tale disposizione produce l’effetto, in presenza di circostanze tassativamente definite, vale a dire quando un minore di età superiore ai 12 anni giunga indipendentemente dal resto della famiglia, di mantenere parzialmente il margine di discrezionalità degli Stati membri consentendo loro, prima di autorizzare l’ingresso ed il soggiorno del minore in base alla direttiva, di esaminare se il minore stesso risponda ai criteri di integrazione previsti dalla legge nazionale vigente alla data di attuazione della direttiva stessa.

62 In tal modo, l’art. 4, n. 1, ultimo comma, della direttiva non può essere considerato in contrasto con il diritto al rispetto della vita familiare. Infatti, nel contesto della direttiva, che impone agli Stati membri obblighi positivi precisi, la detta disposizione mantiene a favore degli Stati stessi un potere discrezionale limitato, non diverso da quello riconosciuto dalla Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo nella propria giurisprudenza in materia di diritto al rispetto della vita familiare, ponderando, in ogni singola fattispecie concreta, gli interessi in gioco.

63 Peraltro, come sancito dall’art. 5, n. 5, della direttiva, nell’ambito di tale ponderazione degli interessi gli Stati membri devono tenere nella dovuta considerazione l’interesse superiore del figlio minore.

64 Occorre inoltre tener conto dell’art. 17 della direttiva, che impone agli Stati membri di prendere debitamente in considerazione la natura e la solidità dei vincoli familiari della persona, la durata della residenza nello Stato membro interessato nonché l’esistenza di legami familiari, culturali o sociali con il rispettivo paese di origine. Come emerge dal punto 56 della presente sentenza, tali criteri corrispondono a quelli presi in considerazione dalla Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo nell’ambito della verifica se uno Stato, che abbia respinto una domanda di ricongiungimento familiare, abbia correttamente proceduto alla ponderazione degli interessi in gioco.

65 Infine, l’età di un minore ed il fatto che questi giunga indipendentemente dalla propria famiglia costituiscono parimenti elementi presi in considerazione dalla Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo, la quale attribuisce rilevanza ai vincoli esistenti tra il minore ed i propri familiari nel rispettivo paese di origine, ma parimenti ai vincoli esistenti con l’ambiente culturale e linguistico di tale paese (v., segnatamente, citate sentenze Ahmut c. Paesi Bassi, paragrafo 69, e Gül c. Svizzera, paragrafo 42).

66 Per quanto attiene al criterio di integrazione, non risulta che tale criterio sia di per sé contrario al diritto al rispetto della vita familiare, sancito dall’art. 8 della CEDU. Come precedentemente rammentato, tale diritto non deve essere interpretato nel senso che esso implichi necessariamente l’obbligo, per un determinato Stato membro, di consentire il ricongiungimento familiare sul proprio territorio, e l’art. 4, n. 1, ultimo comma, della

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direttiva si limita a mantenere il potere discrezionale dello Stato membro, limitandolo all’esame di un criterio definito dalla legge nazionale, potere che lo Stato medesimo dovrà esercitare nel rispetto, segnatamente, dei principi sanciti agli artt. 5, n. 5, e 17 della direttiva. In ogni caso, la necessità dell’integrazione può emergere da più legittimi scopi tra quelli enunciati dall’art. 8, n. 2, della CEDU.

67 Contrariamente a quanto sostenuto dal Parlamento, il legislatore comunitario non ha confuso il criterio di integrazione di cui all’art. 4, n. 1, ultimo comma, della direttiva e l’obiettivo di integrazione dei minori, il quale, a parere del Parlamento, potrebbe risultare pregiudicato da strumenti quali talune misure dirette a facilitare la loro integrazione successivamente alla loro ammissione. Si tratta, infatti, di due elementi differenti. Come emerge dal dodicesimo ‘considerando’ della direttiva, la possibilità di limitare il diritto al ricongiungimento familiare per i minori di età superiore a 12 anni che non abbiano inizialmente risieduto presso il soggiornante è volta a tener conto della capacità di integrazione dei minori fin dalla più giovane età e garantisce che essi acquisiscano l’educazione e le conoscenze linguistiche necessarie a scuola.

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CORTE EUROPEA DEI DIRITTI DELL’UOMO

CASE OF SAADI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

(Application no. 13229/03)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

11 July 2006

THIS CASE WAS REFERRED TO THE GRAND CHAMBER, WHICH DELIVERED JUDGMENT IN THE CASE ON

29 JANUARY 2008

[Omissis]

In the case of Saadi v. the United Kingdom, The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

Mr J. CASADEVALL , President, Sir Nicolas BRATZA, Mr M. PELLONPÄÄ, Mr R. MARUSTE, Mr K. TRAJA, Ms L. MIJOVIĆ, Mr J. ŠIKUTA , judges, and Mr T.L.. EARLY , Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 20 June 2006, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date:

PROCEDURE

1.. The case originated in an application (no. 13229/03) against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an Iraqi national, Mr Shayan Baram Saadi (“the applicant”), on 18 April 2003.

2.. The applicant was represented by Messrs Wilson & Co., a firm of lawyers practising in London. The United Kingdom Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr Derek Walton, of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London.

3.. The applicant alleged that his detention at Oakington was not compatible with Articles 5 § 1 and 14 of the Convention, and that he was not given adequate reasons for it, contrary to Article 5 § 2.

4.. The application was allocated to the Fourth Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). Within that Section, the Chamber that would consider the case (Article 27 § 1 of the Convention) was constituted as provided in Rule 26 § 1.

5.. By a decision of 27 September 2005, the Court declared the application admissible. 6.. The Chamber decided, after consulting the parties, that no hearing on the merits was

required (Rule 59 § 3 in fine). The parties did not submit observations on the merits.

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THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

7.. The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in London. 8.. The applicant fled Iraq and arrived at London Heathrow Airport on 30 December 2000.

On arrival at the immigration desk he spoke to an immigration officer and claimed asylum. He was granted “temporary admission” by the immigration officer and was asked to return to the airport at 8.00 am the following morning. Overnight the applicant was permitted to stay at a hotel of his choice. On the morning of 31 December 2000 he reported as required and was again granted temporary admission until the following day, 1 January 2001 at 10.00 am. When the applicant again reported as required he was (for the third time) granted temporary admission until the following day, 2 January 2001 at 10.00 am. Again the applicant reported as required. On this occasion the applicant was detained and transferred to Oakington Reception Centre (“Oakington”).

9.. On 4 January 2001 the applicant was given the opportunity to consult with legal representatives. The representative telephoned the Chief Immigration Officer on 5 January, and was told that the reason for the detention was that the applicant was an Iraqi who met the criteria to be detained at Oakington. On the same day, the applicant was interviewed by an official of the Secretary of State for the Home Department [“SSHD”] in relation to his claim. When his asylum claim was refused on 8 January 2001 he was formally refused leave to enter the UK. The applicant submitted a notice of appeal against the asylum refusal and was released on 9 January.

10.. In the subsequent asylum proceedings, the applicant’s appeal was allowed by an adjudicator on 9 July 2001 on the ground that the Home Office had failed to specify how the applicant could be returned to the autonomous region of Iraq. The SSHD’s appeal to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal was allowed on 22 October 2001, and the case was remitted to an adjudicator. On 14 January 2003 the adjudicator found that the applicant was a refugee within the meaning of the 1951 Refugee Convention, and also that there was a real risk that his return to Iraq would expose him to treatment contrary to Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. The applicant was subsequently granted asylum.

11.. The applicant, together with three other Kurdish Iraqi detainees who had been held at Oakington, applied for permission for judicial review of their detention, claiming that it was unlawful under domestic law and under Article 5 of the Convention.

12.. At first instance, Mr Justice Collins did not consider the detention to be unlawful under domestic law, essentially because he was not prepared to imply into the legislative provisions a requirement that the exercise of the power to detain had to be “necessary” for the purpose of carrying out an examination of an asylum claim. He did, however, find that the detention was not compatible with Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention on the basis that once an applicant had made a proper application for asylum and there was no risk that he would abscond or otherwise misbehave, it could not be said that he needed to be detained “to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry”. He also considered detention disproportionate because it could not be shown that it was reasonably necessary to the stated purpose for the detention which was the speedy examination of the asylum claim.

13.. In connection with the reasons given for the detention, Mr Justice Collins noted that it apparently took the Home Office three months to realise that the wording of the form handed to detainees was not appropriate, and on 7 June 2000 and again on 21 December 2000 the form was under revision. As from 12 April 2001 (2 February 2001, according to the Government), a form of words was available which stated

“Reason for Detention

I have decided that you should be detained because I am satisfied that your application may be decided quickly using the fast track procedures established at Oakington Reception Centre. In reaching this decision I have taken into account that, on initial consideration, it appears that your application may be one which can be decided quickly”.

14.. That form of words was not available at the time the applicant was detained, and Collins J. regarded it as a “disgrace” that the form lagged behind the policy. He continued:

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“The form [in use at the time] clearly indicated that detention was only used where there was no reasonable alternative. All the reasons and factors reflect some possible misconduct by the detainee or the need for him to be cared for by detention ...it was wholly inappropriate for Oakington detention and it is, for example, difficult to follow what reason could conceivably have been close to fitting [the applicant’s] case. Unfortunately, the copy of the [form] which should have been retained on the file has disappeared and so I do not know, nor does [the applicant] why it was said that he should be detained.”

15.. The shortcomings as to the reasons for detention did not affect the lawfulness of the detention.

16.. The Court of Appeal upheld the SSHD’s appeal on 19 October 2001, and the House of Lords dismissed the applicant’s appeal on 31 October 2002. Both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords held that the detention was lawful under domestic law. In connection with Article 5 § 1 (f), and by reference to the case of Chahal (Chahal v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 15 November 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-V), they each held that the detention was for the purpose of deciding whether to authorise entry and that the detention did not have to be “necessary” to be compatible with the provision. The detention was therefore “to prevent ... unauthorised entry”, and in addition was not disproportionate, Lord Slynn holding:

“The need for highly structured and tightly managed arrangements, which would be disrupted by late or non-attendance of the applicant for interview, is apparent. On the other side applicants not living at Oakington, but living where they chose, would inevitably suffer considerable inconvenience if they had to be available at short notice and continuously in order to answer questions.... Getting a speedy decision is in the interest not only of the applicants but of those increasingly in the queue.”

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE

17.. The Immigration Act 1971 provides for the administrative detention of those subject to immigration control “pending examination and pending a decision whether to give or refuse ... leave to enter” (Schedule 2, paragraph 16). Temporary admission is used as an alternative to detention. It is a form of licensed consent to enter the United Kingdom which may be subjected to conditions, including reporting requirements and restrictions on the person’s residence, employment or occupation (Schedule 2, paragraph 21).

18.. In general (that is, in cases other than those involving Oakington), the SSHD’s guidance requires an individual assessment of the need to detain to prevent absconding.

19.. On 16 March 2000 Barbara Roche MP, Minister of State at the Home Office, announced a change in detention policy specifically and exclusively related to the new Oakington Reception Centre. Oakington asylum applicants could be detained where it appeared that their application was capable of being decided ‘quickly’, including those which may be certified as being ‘manifestly unfounded’. To assist immigration officers, lists of nationalities – and categories within nationalities - were drawn up in respect of which consideration at Oakington could be justified because they were expected to be simple to deal with. It was said that Oakington would strengthen the ability of the Home Office to deal quickly with asylum applications.

20.. Further guidance was issued in the Operational Enforcement Manual in respect of individuals who were said to be unsuitable for Oakington detention. Cases in which detention at Oakington would not be suitable included the following: - any case which did not appear to be one in which a quick decision could be reached or in which there were complicating factors; - unaccompanied minor asylum seekers; - cases in which there was a dispute as to age; - disabled applicants; - persons with special medical needs; - cases involving disputes as to nationality; and - cases where the asylum seeker was violent or uncooperative.

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21.. In addition, all persons believed to be at risk of absconding (from Oakington) were not deemed suitable for detention at Oakington.

22.. The Oakington Reception Centre has high perimeter fences, locked gates and twenty-four hour security guards. The site is large, with space for outdoor recreation and general association and on-site legal advice is available. There is a canteen, a library, a medical centre, social visits room and a religious observance room. The following description was used in the present case:

“All of the normal facilities provided within an immigration detention centre are available – restaurant, medical centre, social visits room, religious observance and recreation. The practical operation and facilities at Oakington are, however, very different from other detention centres. In particular, there is a relaxed regime with minimal physical security, reflecting the fact that the purpose is to consider and decide applications. The site itself is very open with a large area for outdoor recreation and general association or personal space. Applicants and their dependents are free to move about the site although, in the interests of privacy and safety, there are two areas where only females and families may go.”

23.. The ‘House Rules’ for Oakington require, inter alia, that detainees must vacate or return to their room when required; that mail may be required to be opened in front of officers; that detainees must eat at set times and that visits can only be received at particular times. Further, detainees must carry identification at all times (to be shown to officers on request); must obey all staff and attend roll-calls. Male detainees are accommodated separately from their spouses and children and cannot stay with them overnight.

THE LAW

I . ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION

24.. The applicant contended that his detention at the Oakington Reception Centre from 2 to 9 January 2001 was not compatible with Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. That provision reads, so far as relevant, as follows:

“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:

...

(f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.”

A. The parties’ submissions

1. The Government

25.. The Government accepted that the applicant’s stay at Oakington constituted a “deprivation of liberty” for the purposes of Article 5. They considered, however, that the wording of the first limb of Article 5 § 1 (f) – detention “to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry” - described the factual state of affairs where a person was seeking to effect an entry but had no authorisation, that being a matter under consideration by the State of entry, and that it did not require the additional feature of an attempted evasion of immigration control. If it were otherwise – that is, if a person who applied for asylum could not be detained under Article 5 § 1 (f) because he was seeking to effect an authorised, rather than an unauthorised entry – States would be required to authorise entry to all who seek it. It would not even be possible to detain for short periods to make arrangements and verify identity.

26.. The Government also contested the applicant’s thesis that asylum seekers may only be detained where detention is “necessary” in order to prevent the person absconding or otherwise

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misbehaving. They noted that Article 5 § 1(c) contains such a provision, but Article 5 § 1 (f) does not, and underlined that in the context of detention with a view to deportation, the Court confirmed such an interpretation in Chahal (Chahal v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 15 November 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-V, § 112). The Government considered that the conclusion in Chahal, which was confirmed in Čonka (Čonka v. Belgium, no. 51564/99, § 38, ECHR 2002-I), applies equally to detention with a view to preventing unauthorised detention.

27.. Finally, the Government contended that, in any event, the applicant’s detention was not disproportionate in the circumstances: it was only possible to interview large numbers of applicants in a short time-frame if the applicants were available at short or no notice; the use of nationality as a criterion for choosing candidates for Oakington was only one of a number of criteria and was perfectly proper and justified, and the applicant’s contention that the use of detention was influenced by the reaction of local residents and planning committees was not made out, as the domestic courts which considered the point had also found.

2. The applicant

28.. The applicant maintained his claim that to detain a person who presented no threat to immigration control simply in order to accelerate a decision concerning their entry did not “prevent” unauthorised entry, and was not compatible with Article 5 § 1 (f): there was no risk of the applicant absconding, and indeed Oakington was only used to detain those who were not at risk of absconding. Article 5 §1 (f) did not, however, prevent detention, for example, while an assessment was being made of whether an individual presented an unacceptable risk of absconding and thereby effecting an unauthorised entry.

29.. The applicant underlined that the detention in his case was wholly unrelated to whether he was granted entry: he was granted temporary admission both before and after the period of detention in question, and entry at those times was not “unauthorised”. After a person has been assessed not to present a risk of absconding, examination of his claim and immigration control could be carried out without detention.

30.. For the applicant, detention was such a serious measure that it was only justified where other, less severe measures had been considered and found to be insufficient. The applicant cited with approval the first instance judge who said “Surely measures short of detention should be tried first and detention should be regarded as the last resort”.

B. The Court’s assessment

1. General principles of detention under Article 5 § 1 (f)

31.. Article 5 § 1 (f) permits the lawful arrest or detention of a person in two circumstances. The first is arrest or detention to prevent the person effecting an unauthorised entry into the country. The second is the arrest or detention of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.

32.. In a number of cases, the Court has had to consider the meaning of the second limb. In the case of Kolompar, it accepted that the applicant’s detention was in principle justified under Article 5 § 1 (f) where an extradition request had been made and the applicant was no longer detained under Article 5 § 1(a) or (c) (Kolompar v. Belgium, judgment of 24 September 1992, Series A no. 235-C, § 36). The Court did not consider whether the applicant’s detention was necessary in order to ensure that he could be extradited, or whether a less intrusive measure would have achieved the same aim.

33.. In the above-mentioned case of Chahal, the Court expressly determined (at § 112) the question whether the second limb of Article 5 § 1 (f) contained a “necessity” test:

“... it is not in dispute that Mr Chahal has been detained with a ‘view to deportation’ within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (f) (...). Article 5 § 1 (f) does not demand that the detention of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation be reasonably considered necessary, for example to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing; in this respect Article 5 § 1 (f) provides a different level of protection from Article 5 § 1 (c).

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Indeed, all that is required under this provision is that ‘action is being taken with a view to deportation’. It is therefore immaterial, for the purposes of Article 5 § 1 (f), whether the underlying decision to expel can be justified under national or Convention law”

The Court then noted (at § 113) that any such deprivation of liberty was justified under Article 5 § 1 (f) only for as long as deportation proceedings were in progress. If the proceedings were not prosecuted with due diligence, the detention would cease to be permissible under the provision. The Court further examined whether the detention was “lawful” for the purposes of Article 5 § 1 (f) with particular reference to the safeguards provided by the national system (§ 118).

34.. The Court’s approach in Chahal was reiterated in the above-mentioned case of Čonka (Čonka v. Belgium, no. 51564/99, ECHR 2002-I) in which it stated that Article 5 § 1 (f) did not require that the detention of a person against whom action was being taken with a view to deportation be reasonably considered necessary (§ 38).

35.. In Amuur the Court explained that although it was possible for the holding of aliens in an international zone to be interpreted as a restriction on liberty rather than a deprivation of liberty, in the circumstances of the case, the applicants were deprived of their liberty, such that Article 5 § 1 (f) applied (Amuur v. France, judgment of 25 June 1996, Reports 1996-III, §§ 43-49). The Court concluded in the case that the provision had been violated because the domestic legal rules at the relevant time did not sufficiently guarantee the applicants’ right to liberty (§ 54). It was not required to arrive at any detailed conclusions as to the test to be applied to detention contended to fall within Article 5 § 1 (f) because the case turned on the quality of the domestic rules which were applicable. It did, however, comment generally on the way in which Article 5 § 1 (f) was to be interpreted. In particular, it held at § 50 that:

“Where the "lawfulness" of detention is in issue, including the question whether ‘a procedure prescribed by law’ has been followed, the Convention refers essentially to national law and lays down the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules of national law, but it requires in addition that any deprivation of liberty should be in keeping with the purpose of Article 5, namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness (see, among many other authorities, the Kemmache v. France (no. 3) judgment of 24 November 1994, Series A no. 296-C, pp. 19-20,§ 42).

In laying down that any deprivation of liberty must be effected ‘in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law’, Article 5 § 1 primarily requires any arrest or detention to have a legal basis in domestic law. ...”

36.. By contrast, the Court has considered the stringency of the test to be applied in cases under other heads of Article 5 § 1. In the case of Article 5 § 1(b), for example, it has underlined the need for a “reasonable balance ... between the importance of securing the fulfilment of the obligations in general and the importance of the right to liberty” (Vasileva v. Denmark, no. 52792/99, § 38, 25 September 2003). In the context of Article 5 § 1 (e), the Court has emphasised that “it does not suffice that the deprivation of liberty is executed in conformity with national law but it must also be necessary in the circumstances” (Witold Litwa v. Poland, no. 26629/95, § 78, ECHR 2000-III). As the Court noted in Chahal (see above), Article 5 § 1(c) of the Convention provides in terms that detention must be “reasonably considered necessary to prevent [a person’s] committing an offence or fleeing after having done so” to be compatible with the provision.

2. Application of the general principles

37.. The Court notes that the facts in the present case are not in dispute. The applicant was not detained for the first three days of his presence in the United Kingdom, and he was then detained at the Oakington Centre, a centre which was used for those who were not likely to abscond and who could be dealt with by a “fast-track” procedure.

38.. The present case therefore turns on whether the applicant’s detention at Oakington fell within the first limb of Article 5 § 1 (f), which permits the lawful detention “of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country”.

39.. The first question which the Court must address is whether a person who has presented himself to the immigration authorities and has been granted temporary admission to the country can be considered as a person who is seeking to effect an “unauthorised entry” into the country.

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40.. The Court does not accept that, as soon as a potential immigrant has surrendered himself to the immigration authorities, he is seeking to effect an “authorised” entry, with the result that detention cannot be justified under the first limb of Article 5 § 1 (f). In particular, it is a normal part of States’ “undeniable right to control aliens’ entry into and residence in their country” (Amuur v. France, cited above, § 41) that States are permitted to detain would-be immigrants who have applied for permission to enter, whether by way of asylum or not. Such detention must be compatible with the overall purpose of Article 5, which is to protect the individual from arbitrariness, but it is evident from the tenor of the judgment in Amuur (referred to above) that the detention of potential immigrants is capable of being compatible with Article 5 § 1 (f). As to the difference between a short period of detention on arrival in a country in order to assess the risk of absconding (which the applicant accepts is compatible with Article 5 § 1 (f)) and subsequent detention in order to facilitate the processing of cases (which he does not), the Court agrees with the Government that, until a potential immigrant has been granted leave to remain in the country, he has not effected a lawful entry, and detention can reasonably be considered to be aimed at preventing unlawful entry.

41.. The Court therefore considers that, although the applicant had applied for asylum and had been granted temporary admission to the country on 30 December 2000, and had been at large (albeit after being granted only temporary admission and subject to conditions) until 2 January 2001, his detention from that date was nevertheless to prevent his effecting an unlawful entry because, absent formal admission clearance, he had not “lawfully” entered the country.

42.. The next question for the Court, which is also the question which taxed the domestic courts, is whether it is permissible for a State to detain a potential asylum seeker or immigrant in circumstances where there is no risk of his absconding or other misconduct. The question is particularly well-defined in the present case as the applicant was held at Oakington, a centre used only for those who did not present a risk of absconding (see paragraphs 20 and 21 above) and where the application could be considered quickly (paragraphs 19 and 20 above).

43.. Mr Justice Collins, the first-instance judge in the present case, found that domestic law did not impose a “necessity” test, with the result that the detention was compatible with the domestic law. In considering Article 5 § 1 (f), however, he did not accept that the applicant needed to be detained because there was no risk that he would abscond or otherwise misbehave. That finding was overturned by the Court of Appeal, which considered that Article 5 § 1 (f) required immigration authorities not to prolong unduly the detention of aliens pending consideration of applications for leave to enter, or for deportation, but that it did not apply a necessity test to those procedures. The House of Lords underlined that the aim of detention at Oakington was to speed up immigration procedures by using a “fast-track” procedure which could be applied in relatively straightforward cases. It, too, considered that in the absence of any express or implied necessity test in the Convention or the Convention case-law, immigration detention could be compatible with Article 5 § 1 (f) even though it was not “necessary”. The House of Lords added, in connection with the question whether detention was a disproportionate response to the reasonable requirements of immigration control, that the need for speedy determination of claims favoured accepting the Oakington procedure as proportionate and reasonable.

44.. Detention of a person is a major interference with personal liberty, and must always be subject to close scrutiny. Where individuals are lawfully at large in a country, the authorities may only detain if – as the Court expressed the position in Vasileva (referred to above) – a “reasonable balance” is struck between the requirements of society and the individual’s freedom. The position regarding potential immigrants, whether they are applying for asylum or not, is different to the extent that, until their application for immigration clearance and/or asylum has been dealt with, they are not “authorised” to be on the territory. Subject, as always, to the rule against arbitrariness, the Court accepts that the State has a broader discretion to decide whether to detain potential immigrants than is the case for other interferences with the right to liberty. Accordingly, and this finding does no more than apply to the first limb of Article 5 § 1 (f) the ruling the Court has already made as regards the second limb of the provision, there is no requirement in Article 5 § 1 (f) that the detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country be reasonably considered necessary, for example to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing. All that is required is that the detention should be a genuine part of the process to determine whether the individual should be granted

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immigration clearance and/or asylum, and that it should not otherwise be arbitrary, for example on account of its length.

45.. It is plain that in the present case the applicant’s detention at Oakington was a bona fide application of the policy on “fast-track” immigration decisions. As to the question of arbitrariness, the Court notes that the applicant was released once his asylum claim had been refused, leave to enter the United Kingdom had been refused, and he had submitted a notice of appeal. The detention lasted a total of seven days, which the Court finds not to be excessive in the circumstances. The Court is not required to set a maximum period on permitted detention, although it notes that the present form of detention is ordered on administrative authority alone.

46.. The Court considers that other claims of arbitrariness made by the applicant – for example that the detention was arbitrary precisely because its aim was to decide more speedily, rather than for any reason related to the applicant, or because it involved the use of lists of countries whose nationals could or could not be detained at Oakington – are in effect re-statements of the claim that there should be a “necessity” test for such detention. Moreover, domestic law provided a system of safeguards which enabled the applicant to challenge the lawfulness of his detention, as is shown by the domestic decisions in the present case.

47.. It follows that the applicant’s detention from 2 to 9 January 2001 was not incompatible with Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention. There has therefore been no violation of that provision.

II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 2 OF THE CONVENTION

48.. The applicant contended the first reasons he was given for his detention were given, orally and to his representative, some 76 hours after his arrest and detention, in contravention of Article 5 § 2 of the Convention, which provides as follows:

“Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him.”

A. The parties’ submissions

1. The Government

49.. The Government pointed to the general statements of intent as to Oakington. They accepted that the forms in use at the time of the applicant’s detention were deficient, but contended that the reasons given orally to the applicant’s on-site representative (who knew the general reasons) on 5 January 2001 were sufficient to enable the applicant to challenge the lawfulness of his detention under Article 5 § 4 if he wished.

2. The applicant

50.. The applicant underlined that unsolicited reasons were not given at any stage, and that solicited reasons were given orally in the afternoon of 5 January 2001, some 76 hours after the arrest and detention. He contended that mere reference to policy announcements cannot displace the requirement to provide sufficiently prompt, adequate reasons to the applicant in relation to his detention.

B. The Court’s assessment

51.. Article 5 § 2 contains the elementary safeguard that any person arrested should know why he is being deprived of his liberty. This provision is an integral part of the scheme of protection afforded by Article 5: by virtue of paragraph 2 any person arrested must be told, in simple, non-technical language that he can understand, the essential legal and factual grounds for his arrest, so as to be able, if he sees fit, to apply to a court to challenge its lawfulness in accordance with Article 5 § 4. Whilst this information must be conveyed ‘promptly’, it need not be related in its entirety by the arresting officer at the very moment of the arrest. Whether the content and promptness of the information conveyed were sufficient is to be assessed in each case according to its special features (see Bordovskiy v. Russia, no. 49491/99, §§ 55, 56, 8 February 2005; Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 30 August 1990, Series A no. 182, § 40). When a person is arrested on suspicion of having committed a

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crime, Article 5 § 2 neither requires that the necessary information be given in a particular form, nor that it consists of a complete list of the charges held against the arrested person (see X v. Germany, no. 8098/77, Commission decision of 13 December 1978, DR 16, p. 111). When a person is arrested with a view to extradition, the information given may be even less complete (see K. v. Belgium, no. 10819/84, Commission decision of 5 July 1984, DR 38, p. 230).

52.. As to the question of whether information has been given “promptly”, the Court recalls that in the above-mentioned case of Čonka, the Court found no violation of Article 5 § 2 where the applicant was given broad reasons for his detention when he was detained, and written reasons were supplied two days later. In Fox, Campbell and Hartley, which concerned detention under Article 5 § 1(c) of the Convention, the applicants were given reasons for their arrest within a maximum of seven hours after arrest, which the Court accepted as “prompt” (referred to above, § 42). A violation was found where applicants who had been detained pending extradition were not given any information for the first four days’ detention (Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia, no. 36378/02, § 416, ECHR 2005-...).

53.. The Court first notes, in reply to the Government’s reference to the general statements of intent about Oakington, that it is plain from the wording of Article 5 § 2 that the duty on States is to furnish specific information to the individual or his representative. General statements – parliamentary announcements in the present case – cannot replace the need for the individual to be informed of the reasons for his arrest or detention.

54.. It became apparent in the course of the domestic proceedings in the present case that if the applicant had been given a form to explain the reasons for his detention, that form would have been inaccurate in that it would not have included the true reason, which was that the immigration officer was satisfied that his case could be decided quickly using the “fast-track procedure” established at Oakington. There has been no suggestion in the proceedings before the Court that the applicant was informed orally on 2 January 2001 of the reason for his detention.

55.. The first time the real reason for the applicant’s detention was given was when his representative was informed by telephone on 5 January 2001 that the applicant was an Iraqi who met the criteria for Oakington. At that time, the applicant had been in detention for some 76 hours. Assuming that the giving of oral reasons to a representative meets the requirements of Article 5 § 2 of the Convention, the Court finds that a delay of 76 hours in providing reasons for detention is not compatible with the requirement of the provision that such reasons should be given “promptly”.

56.. It follows that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 2 of the Convention.

III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION

57.. The applicant contended that the preparation of lists of nationalities in respect of which detention at Oakington would be considered amounted to a violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken together with Article 5 § 1 (f), as the applicant was detained because of his Iraqi nationality.

The Court has dealt with the substance of this complaint in its determination of the issues under Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention, and holds that it is not necessary to consider it separately under Article 14.

IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

58.. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

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A. Damage

59.. The applicant claimed EUR 5,000 compensation for non-pecuniary damage in respect of the seven days he spent in detention in Oakington, referring specifically to the distress he felt at the decision to detain him.

60.. The Government noted that the period of detention was relatively short, and considered that if there were a violation of Article 5 § 1 (f), the sum of EUR 2,000 represented adequate non-pecuniary compensation. As regards Article 5 § 2 of the Convention, the Government considered that a finding of a breach would provide sufficient just satisfaction.

61.. The Court has found a violation only of Article 5 § 2 of the Convention, and agrees with the Government that in these circumstances the finding of a breach provides sufficient just satisfaction for the violation established.

B. Costs and expenses

62.. The applicant claimed a total of GBP 15,305.56 by way of costs before the Court, including counsel’s fees.

63.. The Government considered that the fees were not necessarily incurred, and suggested that counsel’s fees should be reduced from GBP 11,475 plus VAT to a maximum of GBP 4,000. They contended that, if violations were not found on all the provisions of Article 5 that were found admissible, the amount should be reduced proportionately.

64.. The Court has found a violation of only one provision of the Convention. It is apparent that the major part of the work on the case, before the Court as before the domestic courts, has been that related to the compatibility of the detention with Article 5 § 1. The Court awards the applicant the sum of EUR 1,500 in respect of costs and expenses incurred in connection with the complaint under Article 5 § 2 of the Convention.

C. Default interest

65.. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT

1. Holds by four votes to three that there has been no violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention;

2. Holds unanimously that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 2 of the Convention; 3. Holds unanimously that it is not necessary to consider Article 14 of the Convention

separately; 4. Holds unanimously

(a) that finding a violation of Article 5 § 2 of the Convention constitutes sufficient just satisfaction for non-pecuniary damage; (b) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 1,500 (one thousand five hundred euros) for costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable, to be converted into the national currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement; (c) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

5. Dismisses unanimously the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

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Done in English, and notified in writing on 11 July 2006, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

T.L. EARLY Josep CASADEVALL Registrar President

In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the following separate opinions are annexed to this judgment:

(a) concurring opinion of Sir Nicolas Bratza; (b) joint dissenting opinion of Mr Casadevall, Mr Traja and Mr Sikuta.

J.C.M. T.L.E

CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE SIR NICOLAS BRATZA

I am in agreement with the majority of the Chamber on all aspects of the case and only add a few words of my own on the complaint under Article 5 § 1 (f) because of the importance of the question raised.

At the heart of the applicant’s case is the claim that to detain a person who presented no threat to immigration control for the sole purpose of facilitating an early decision concerning his entry into the United Kingdom did not serve “to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country” and was not thus compatible with Article 5 § 1 (f). That the applicant himself presented no such threat was, it is argued, amply demonstrated by the facts of the present case: the applicant had not been detained immediately on arrival in the United Kingdom but had been granted temporary admission to the country during which he had fully complied with the reporting requirements and had given no indication of any intention to abscond or otherwise to effect an unauthorised entry into the country. The fact that his detention was not intended to prevent his unauthorised entry was further confirmed by the fact that, once the decision had been taken formally to refuse him leave to enter the United Kingdom, the applicant was immediately released.

I readily accept that Dr Saadi had no intention to effect an unauthorised entry into the United Kingdom but that, on the contrary, his conduct throughout was consistent only with his intention to effect an authorised lawful entry into the country. However, I consider that to interpret Article 5 § 1 (f) as only permitting detention of a person who is shown to be seeking to effect an unauthorised entry is to place too narrow a construction on the terms of the provision. In this respect, I share the opinion of the House of Lords that, until a State has “authorised” entry, the entry is unauthorised and the State has in principle power to detain under the first limb of Article 5 § 1 (f) until the application has been considered and authorisation has been granted or refused. While the applicant was granted temporary admission on his arrival in the United Kingdom, this did not, by virtue of section 11 of the 1971 Act, constitute the authorisation of entry into the country.

Again, like the House of Lords, I do not consider that on the true construction of Article 5 § 1 (f) it is a precondition of the power to detain that detention should be “necessary” to prevent an unauthorised entry, in the sense that the use of less severe measures would not suffice either to prevent unauthorised entry or to allow a determination to be made as to whether an individual should be granted immigration clearance or asylum. As noted in the judgment, in the case of Chahal, the Court expressly rejected the contention that the second limb of Article 5 § 1 (f) demanded that the detention of a person against whom action was being taken with a view to deportation should reasonably be considered necessary to prevent the applicant from committing an offence or fleeing and that in this respect Article 5 § 1 (f) provided a different level of protection from Article 5 § 1 (c). This interpretation was reaffirmed in the Čonka case. While it is true that the first limb of the sub-paragraph (“to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry”) and the second limb (“against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation”) are not framed in identical terms, I can find no valid reason for confining the Court’s reasoning to the second limb of the sub-paragraph or for holding that a different and stricter test should be applied to the first limb.

Although for these reasons I consider that the detention of the applicant fell within the provisions of Article 5 § 1 (f), I recognise the concern felt that a person should be deprived of

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his liberty for reasons essentially of administrative efficiency and the risks of arbitrariness which such detention may entail. As has frequently been emphasised in the Court’s case-law, any deprivation of liberty must be in keeping with the purpose of Article 5, namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness. In the context of detention at the Oakington Centre, this requires not only that the detention of an immigrant lasts for no longer than is required to complete the procedures for deciding whether to grant entry but that the period of detention should be short. The detention in the present case lasted for a total of 7 days, which the majority has found not to be excessive. While I can agree that the period of the applicant’s detention at Oakington was within the limits of what could be regarded as acceptable, any period of detention significantly in excess of this period would in my view not be compatible with the first limb of Article 5 § 1 (f).

JOINT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES CASADEVALL, TRAJA AND SIKUTA

1. In the present judgment, the majority (four judges to three) held, inter alia, that there had

been no violation of Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention. We cannot support that conclusion, for the following reasons:

2. Under international law, a State has the right, by virtue of its sovereignty, to control the

entry and stay of foreigners on its territory. It is, however, equally well established that a State party to the Convention must be deemed to agree to restrict the free exercise of its rights under general international law to the extent and within the limits of the obligations which it has accepted under that Convention.

3. In the instant case, it was open to the United Kingdom authorities, when the applicant

arrived in the United Kingdom, to deprive him of his liberty (that is, to detain him) under Article 5 § 1 (f) on the following condition alone: namely, to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country. On the basis of the facts in this case, the purpose of the applicant’s detention was not, however to prevent the applicant’s entry at all. The applicant arrived at London Heathrow Airport on 30 December 2000 and applied for asylum upon his arrival. If the competent authorities had been of the opinion that there existed grounds for detaining him in order to prevent him from effecting an unauthorised entry into the territory, they could have exercised that “right to control entry” at that moment for the purpose set out in Article 5 § 1 (f). However, the immigration authorities, on the contrary, granted him “temporary admission” and he was permitted to stay at a hotel of his choice inside the country. The grant of temporary admission was subsequently extended twice, on two consecutive days. We therefore strongly believe that the pre-condition for the applicant’s detention, namely that it be for the purpose of preventing him from effecting an unauthorised entry into the country, was not met, for the simple reason that the immigration authorities had already admitted him.

4. The applicant applied for asylum upon arrival at London Heathrow Airport, at the

immigration desk, in line with the national law. He followed all the instructions given to him by the immigration authorities and reported to them on a regular basis. He did not misuse the asylum procedure and did not hide. On the contrary, he co-operated with the immigration officers. He was granted legally recognized admission, regardless of whether it was temporary or not. From the moment of lodging the asylum application, the asylum procedure started. The asylum procedure is legally recognized and prescribed by national law. It is a procedure which can last for anything from a few days to several years. The possibility of detaining an asylum seeker at any time during the asylum procedure on the ground that it was to “prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country” would represent great legal uncertainty for the person concerned. States which are parties to international instruments dealing with the legal status of asylum seekers and refugees (e.g. the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, but also instruments in other systems, e.g. the European Union and the Council of Europe) are obliged to grant an asylum seeker admission to the territory (but not a residence permit) until the final decision in the asylum procedure is taken. This also happened in the instant case, where the respondent Government admitted the applicant to the territory.

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Paradoxically, as indicated in paragraph 45 of the judgment, the applicant was detained for seven days, and was then released from detention after his asylum claim had been refused.

5. Lastly, we are of the opinion that the arguments mentioned in paragraph 54 of the

judgment, which led to a finding of a violation of Article 5 § 2 of the Convention (non-communication of reasons for detention), provide support for our argument that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention, because the true reason for detention of the applicant had nothing to do with that provision. The true reason was purely based on administrative or bureaucratic grounds aiming to place the applicant in Oakington detention and to follow the “fast-track procedure”. The majority recognized this explicitly when they affirmed that “...that form would have been inaccurate in that it would not have included the true reason...”, which would have justified such detention.

6. For those reasons, since the applicant was not, in our view, detained for the purpose of

preventing his effecting an entry into the territory, and since his entry cannot be considered as unauthorised, we do not agree with the conclusion that Article 5 § 1 (f) has not been violated.

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UNHCR - IMO

RESCUE AT SEA

A guide to principles and practice as applied to migrants and refugees

Settembre 2006

p.2

Introduction Sea-borne migrants and refugees are not a new phenomenon. Throughout the ages, people around the world have risked their lives aboard un-seaworthy ships and other craft, whether in search of work, better living conditions and educational opportunities, or international protection against persecution or other threats to their life, liberty or security, often placing their fate in the hands of unscrupulous, criminal smugglers. The term “boat people” has entered common parlance, designating all those who travel by sea in such a perilous way. Search and Rescue (SAR) services throughout the world depend on ships – for the most part merchant vessels - to assist persons in distress at sea. Nowadays, distress signals can be rapidly transmitted by satellite and terrestrial communication techniques both to search and rescue authorities ashore, and to ships in the immediate vicinity. The rescue operation can be swift and coordinated. Yet, even when the rescue has been accomplished, problems can arise in securing the agreement of States to the disembarkation of migrants and refugees, especially if proper documentation is lacking. Recognizing this problem, member States of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) have adopted amendments to two of the relevant international maritime conventions1. These aim to ensure that the obligation of the ship master to render assistance is complemented by a corresponding obligation of States to co-operate in rescue situations, thereby relieving the master of the responsibility to care for survivors, and allowing individualswho are rescued at sea in such circumstances to be delivered promptly to a place of safety.

p. 3

This leaflet has been prepared jointly by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). It is intended for masters, ship owners, government authorities, insurance companies, and other interested parties involved in rescue at sea situations. It provides guidance on relevant legal provisions, and on practical procedures to ensure the prompt disembarkation of survivors of rescue operations, and measures to meet their specific needs, particularly in the case of refugees and asylum-seekers.

p. 4

The Legal Framework This section contains relevant obligations and definitions as defined under international law. International maritime law

Obligations of the shipmaster The shipmaster has an obligation to render assistance to those in distress at sea without regard to their nationality, status or the circumstances in which they are found. This is a longstanding maritime tradition as well as an obligation enshrined in international law. Compliance with this obligation is essential to preserve the integrity of maritime search and rescue services. It is based on, inter alia, two essential texts: – 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

1 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea; and 1979 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue. Amendments were adopted in May 2004. They entered into force on 1 July 2006.

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(UNCLOS Convention) provides that “ Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag, in so far as he can do so without serious danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers: (a) to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost; (b) to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress, if informed of their need of assistance, in so far as such action may reasonably be expected of him.” (Art. 98 (1))

- 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS Convention) obliges the

“master of a ship at sea which is in a position to be able to provide assistance, on receiving information2 from any source that persons are in distress at sea, is bound to proceed with all speed to their assistance, if possible informing them or the search and rescue service that the ship is doing so.…” (Chapter V, Regulation 33(1)).

p. 5

Obligations of Governments and Rescue Co-ordination Centres Several maritime conventions define the obligations of State Parties to ensure arrangements for distress communication and coordination in their area of responsibility and for the rescue of persons in distress at sea around their coasts: - 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS Convention) imposes an obligation on every coastal State Party to

“…promote the establishment, operation and maintenance of an adequate and effective search and rescue service regarding safety on and over the sea and, where circumstances so require, by way of mutual regional arrangements co-operate with neighbouring States for this purpose”. (Art. 98 (2))

- 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS Convention) requires State Parties

“… to ensure that necessary arrangements are made for distress communication and co-ordination in their area of responsibility and for the rescue of persons in distress at sea around its coasts. These arrangements shall include the establishment, operation and maintenance of such search and rescue facilities as are deemed practicable and necessary …” (Chapter V, Regulation 7)

- 1979 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR Convention) obliges State Parties

to “…ensure that assistance be provided to any person in distress at sea…regardless of the nationality or status of such a person or the circumstances in which that person is found” (Chapter 2.1.10) and to “ […] provide for their initial medical or other needs, and deliver them to a place of safety.”(Chapter 1.3.2)

p. 6

– Amendments to the SOLAS3 and SAR Conventions4 aim at maintaining the integrity of the SAR services, by ensuring that people in distress at sea are assisted while minimizing the inconvenience for the assisting ship. They require theContracting States/Parties to

• co-ordinate and co-operate to ensure that masters of ships providing assistance by embarking persons in distress at sea are released from their obligations with minimum further deviation fromthe ship’s intended voyage; and

• arrange disembarkation as soon as reasonably practicable.

2 The word “signal” was replaced by “information” as part of the May 2004 amendments. 3 Amending SOLAS Regulation 33. 4 Amending SAR Chapter 3.1.9.

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They also oblige masters who have embarked persons in distress at sea, to treat them with humanity,within the capabilities of the ship. Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea5 were developed in order to provide guidance to governments and to shipmasters in implementing these amendments. They contain the following provisions:

• The government responsible for the SAR region in which survivors were recovered is responsible for providing a place of safety or ensuring that such a place of safety is provided. (para. 2.5).

• A place of safety is a location where rescue operations are considered to terminate, and where:

o the survivors’ safety or life is no longer threatened; o basic human needs (such as food, shelter and medical needs) can be met; and o transportation arrangements can be made for the survivors’next or final

destination. (para. 6.12)

p. 7

• While an assisting shipmay serve as a temporary place of safety, it should be relieved of this responsibility as soon as alternative arrangements can be made. (para. 6.13)

• Disembarkation of asylum-seekers and refugees recovered at sea, in territories where their lives and freedom would be threatened should be avoided. (para. 6.17)

• Any operations and procedures such as screening and status assessment of rescued persons that go beyond rendering assistance to persons in distress should not be allowed to hinder the provision of such assistance or unduly delay disembarkation. (para. 6.20)

p. 8

International Refugee Law If people rescued at sea make known a claim for asylum, key principles as defined in international refugee law need to be upheld. While the ship master is not responsible to determine the status of the people on board, he needs to be aware of these principles.

p. 9

The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, defines a refugee as a person who

“owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his [or her] nationality6 , and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself [or herself ] of the protection of that country”. (Article 1A(2))

and prohibits that refugees or asylum-seekers

be expelled or returned in any way “to the frontiers of territories where his [or her] life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” (Article 33 (1))7

5 Resolution MSC.167(78) (adopted in May 2004 by the Maritime Safety Committee together with the SAR and SOLAS amendments). 6 Or for stateless persons, the country of former habitual residence. 7 An obligation not to return a person where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm derives from international human rights law (for example Articles 6 and 7 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). The 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or

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This refers principally to the country from which the individual has fled but also includes any other territory where he [or she] faces such a threat.

An asylum-seeker is an individual who is seeking international protection and whose claim has not yet been finally decided on by the country in which he or she has submitted it. Not every asylum seeker will ultimately be recognized as a refugee, but every refugee is initially an asylum-seeker.

p. 10

Procedures The following checklists are intended to define action that needs to be taken by the various parties involved in rescue at sea. Action by the shipmaster Inform the Rescue Co-ordination Centre (RCC) responsible for the region as to:

• the assisting ship: • its name, flag and port of registry; • name and address of the owner and the owner’s agent at the next port; • position of the vessel, its next intended port of call, its continuing safety

and current endurance with additional persons on board;

• the survivors: • name, age (if possible), gender; • apparent health, medical condition and special medical needs;

• actions completed or intended to be taken by themaster; • master’s preferred arrangement for disembarking the survivors; • any help needed by the assisting ship; • any special factors (e.g. prevailing weather, time sensitive cargo, etc.).

If people rescued at sea claim asylum

• alert the closest RCC; • contact UNHCR; • do not ask for disembarkation in the country of origin or from which the individual

has fled; • do not share personal information regarding the asylum-seekers with the authorities

of that country, or with others who might convey this information to those authorities.

p. 11

Action by Governments and Rescue Co-ordination Centres (RCCs) The RCCs have an important role to play to ensure co-operation and co-ordination arrangements under the Amendments to the SOLAS and SAR Conventions. They need to maintain effective plans of operation and co-ordinating arrangements (interagency or international plans and agreements if appropriate) in order to respond to all types of search and rescue situations, notably:

• a recovery operation; • disembarkation of survivors froma ship;

Degrading Treatment or Punishment explicitly prohibits return where there are substantial grounds for believing that a person would be in danger of being subjected to torture.

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• delivery of survivors to a place of safety; • arrangements with other entities (such as customs, border control and immigration

authorities, ship owner or flag State), while survivors are still aboard the assisting ship with regard to nationalities, status or circumstances of the survivors; including temporary provisions for hosting survivors while such issues are being resolved; and

• measures to relieve the ship as soon as practicable, avoiding undue delay, financial burden or other difficulties incurred by assisting persons at sea.

p. 12

International Organizations and Useful Contact Information

• The International Maritime Organization (IMO) provides machinery for cooperation

among governments on technical regulations and practices affecting shipping engaged in international trade, and facilitates the adoption of the highest practicable standards in matters such as maritime safety. www.imo.org (details of RCCs available by clicking on Circulars and GMDSS) Tel.: +44 207 735 7611

• The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

provides international protection and assistance to refugees, stateless persons and others of concerns. UNHCR can be contacted under the following telephone number +4122 739 8111. www.UNHCR.org

• The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) promotes

universal ratification and implementation of human rights treaties and ensures the practical implementation of universally recognized human rights norms. www.ohchr.org

• The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is committed to the principle

that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society and actswith its partners in the international community to assist in managing migration, advance understanding of migration issues and uphold the human dignity and well-being of migrants. www.iom.int

• The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)deals with questions of

transnational organized crime and combats criminal trafficking and smuggling. www.unodc.org

• The Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) /Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea

promotes the wider acceptance of UNCLOS and assists States in the uniform and consistent application and effective implementation of its provisions. www.un.org/depts/los

[Omissis]

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CORTE EUROPEA DEI DIRITTI DELL’UOMO

CASE OF MUBILANZILA MAYEKA AND KANIKI MITUNGA v. BELGIUM

(Application no. 13178/03)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

12 October 2006

In the case of Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

Mr C.L. ROZAKIS, President, Mr L. LOUCAIDES, Mr A. KOVLER, Mr K. HAJIYEV, Mr D. SPIELMANN, Mr S.E. JEBENS, judges, Mr P. MARTENS, ad hoc judge, and Mr S. NIELSEN, Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 21 September 2006, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date:

PROCEDURE

1. The case originated in an application (no. 13178/03) against the Kingdom of Belgium lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two Congolese nationals, Ms Pulcherie Mubilanzila Mayeka and Miss Tabitha Kaniki Mitunga (“the applicants”), on 16 April 2003.

2. The applicants were represented by Mr D. Vanheule, a member of the Ghent Bar. The Belgian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr C. Debrulle, Director, Federal Office of Justice.

3. The applicants alleged, in particular, that the second applicant's detention and deportation had violated Articles 3, 8 and 13 of the Convention.

4. The application was allocated to the First Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). Within that Section, the Chamber that would consider the case (Article 27 § 1 of the Convention) was constituted as provided in Rule 26 § 1. Mrs F. Tulkens, the judge elected in respect of Belgium, withdrew from sitting in the case (Rule 28). The Government accordingly appointed Mr P. Martens to sit as an ad hoc judge (Article 27 § 2 of the Convention Rule 29 § 1).

5. The applicants and the Government each filed further written observations (Rule 59 § 1). The parties replied in writing to each other's observations.

6. A hearing on admissibility and the merits took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 26 January 2006 (Rule 59 § 3).

There appeared before the Court:

(a) for the Government Mr C. DEBRULLE, Agent, Mr P. GÉRARD, Counsel, Ms C. GALLANT , Attaché, Human Rights Office, Legislation and Fundamental Rights and Freedoms Department, Federal Government

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Department of Justice, Ms L. PEETERS, Director, Aliens Office Inspectorate, Federal Government Department of the Interior, Ms R. GOETHALS, Director, National Airport Transit Centre, Ms N. BRACKE, Attaché, Departmental Head, Border Inspection Department, Aliens Office, Advisers;

(b) for the applicants Mr D. VANHEULE, Counsel.

The Court heard addresses by them. 7. By a decision of 26 January 2006, the Court declared the application admissible.

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

8. The first applicant was born in 1970 and the second applicant in 1997. They live in Montreal (Canada).

9. The applicants are a mother (hereafter “the first applicant”) and her daughter (hereafter “the second applicant”). They explained that the first applicant had arrived in Canada on 25 September 2000, where she was granted refugee status on 23 July 2001 and obtained indefinite leave to remain on 11 March 2003.

10. After being granted refugee status, the first applicant asked her brother, K., a Dutch national living in the Netherlands, to collect the second applicant, then five years old, from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (hereafter “the DRC”), where she was living with her grandmother, and to look after her until she was able to join her.

11. At 7.51 p.m. on 17 August 2002 K. arrived at Brussels National Airport with the second applicant. He did not have the necessary travel and immigration papers for his niece or documents to show that he had parental authority and so he tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade the immigration authorities that the second applicant was his daughter.

He explained to the Belgian authorities that he had been on a trip to Kinshasa to visit his father's grave and that the first applicant had asked him to bring the second applicant to Europe in order to join her in Canada. The child had been living with a grandmother who was now too old to look after her and the first applicant's attempts to bring her to Canada lawfully had failed.

12. On the night of 17 to 18 August 2002 the federal police telephoned the first applicant to inform her of the situation and to give her a telephone number where she could ring her daughter. The first applicant explained that she had made an application to the Canadian authorities on behalf of her daughter.

13. On 18 August 2002 the second applicant was refused leave to enter Belgium and directions were made for her removal on the ground that she did not have the documents required by the Aliens (Entry, Residence, Settlement and Expulsion) Act of 15 December 1980.

On the same day directions were issued for her to be held in a designated place at the border in accordance with section 74-5 of that Act.

Pursuant to that decision the second applicant was detained in Transit Centre no. 127. Her uncle returned to the Netherlands.

On the same day a lawyer was appointed by the Belgian authorities to assist the applicant and he applied for her to be granted refugee status.

14. On 19 August 2002 the Belgian authorities contacted the immigration department at the Canadian Embassy in The Hague to request information on the first applicant's immigration status in Canada. The immigration department informed them that the first applicant had applied for asylum and indefinite leave to remain in Canada. However, the application for asylum made no mention of the second applicant and so did not extend to her.

In the interim, the first applicant lodged an application in Canada for a visa for her daughter.

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15. On 20 August 2002 a lawyer, Mr Ma., informed the authorities that he had been instructed to replace the lawyer initially assigned to the second applicant and that he was taking steps to secure leave for the first applicant to bring her daughter to Canada.

16. On 22 August 2002 the Aliens Office inquired informally of the Dutch authorities whether they would be willing to take over the second applicant's request for asylum under the Dublin Convention, but they refused.

It also asked K. to furnish the addresses of the members of the family in Kinshasa. 17. In a letter to Transit Centre no. 127 dated 23 August 2002, the lawyer thanked the staff

at the centre for the friendly welcome they had given to the second applicant and the care with which they had attended to her needs.

18. On 26 August 2002 the immigration office at the Canadian Embassy in the Netherlands informed the Aliens Office by e-mail of the first applicant's former address in Kinshasa and her parents' address there.

19. On 27 August 2002 the second applicant's request for asylum was declared inadmissible by the Aliens Office, which refused her leave to enter and gave directions for her removal. The decision stated that she had a right of appeal against the refusal to the Commissioner-General for Refugees and Stateless Persons under the expedited procedure and could apply within thirty days to the Conseil d'État for an order setting aside the removal directions.

The second applicant lodged an appeal under the expedited procedure with the Commissioner-General for Refugees and Stateless Persons.

20. On 4 September 2002, in reply to an enquiry from the Aliens Office, the Belgian Embassy in the DRC advised that the addresses of the members of the applicant's family in Kinshasa it had obtained on the basis of information provided by the first applicant were incorrect. The applicants denied that K. had given false addresses.

21. In an e-mail of 23 September 2002 the immigration office at the Canadian Embassy in the Netherlands informed the Aliens Office that the first applicant had not yet been granted refugee status in Canada.

22. On 25 September 2002 at the hearing of the appeal under the expedited procedure, the Commissioner-General for Refugees and Stateless Persons upheld the refusal of leave to enter after finding that the second applicant's sole aim had been to join her mother in Canada and clearly could not form a basis for an application for refugee status. He drew the Minister of the Interior's attention to the fact that, as a minor, the second applicant was entitled to join her family by virtue of Article 10 of the Convention of New York on the Rights of the Child dated 20 November 1989.

23. On 26 September 2002 Mr Ma. sent a letter to the Aliens Office advising it that the first applicant had obtained refugee status in Canada and had applied to the Canadian authorities for a visa for her daughter. He asked the Aliens Office to place the second applicant in the care of foster parents on humanitarian grounds in view of her age and position until such time as the Canadian authorities had granted her leave to enter. He added that Ms M., an eighteen year-old Belgian national, would make a suitable foster parent. He explained that although the child was being well treated, she was very isolated at the centre and at risk of psychological damage as a result of being detained with adult foreign nationals whom she did not know.

The Aid to Young People in the French Community Department, from whom Mr Ma. had sought assistance, supported the proposal.

No reply was received to the request. From information in the case file it would appear that the Aliens Office dismissed the idea on the grounds that it would place the second applicant at risk, as a warrant had been issued in 1998 for the arrest of Ms M.'s father on suspicion of sexual offences against minors and he lived in the same town as Ms M., albeit at a different address. The Aliens Office also considered that there was a very real danger that the child would be taken away by her uncle.

24. In October 2002 the Aliens Office contacted the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (HCR), the Red Cross and the Belgian Embassy in Kinshasa.

With the Embassy's help it was able, on the basis of K.'s statements, to identify and subsequently locate a member of the second applicant's family, namely her maternal uncle, B. (a student living on a university campus with five other people in what the Embassy described as suitable accommodation and who, according to the applicants, was the sole member of the family still living in the DRC). An official from the Belgian Embassy in Kinshasa went to B.'s

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home and explained the situation to him, but B. told him that he did not have the means to look after the child.

25. On 9 October 2002 the second applicant's lawyer lodged an application for her release with the chambre du conseil of the Brussels Court of First Instance under section 74-5, paragraph 1, of the Act of 15 December 1980. In the application, he sought an order setting aside the removal directions of 27 August 2002 and an order for the second applicant's release and placement with Ms M. acting as a foster parent or, failing that, with an institute for young children.

In the interim, he also contacted the HCR, which made enquiries of the family in Kinshasa from which it emerged that no one was prepared to look after the child.

26. On 10 October 2002 the Belgian authorities booked a seat on a flight on 17 October 2002 with the same airline as the second applicant had flown with on the outward journey (they cited its obligation under section 74-4 of the Act of 15 December 1980 to transport at its own cost anyone not in possession of the requisite travel papers or who had been removed on lawful grounds to the country from which he had come or any other country prepared to accept him). The HCR, Aid to Young People in the French Community Department and the Belgian Embassy in Kinshasa were informed.

27. On 11 October 2002 Brussels Crown counsel informed the Aliens Office of the second applicant's application and requested the case file, which the Aliens Office supplied on 14 October 2002.

28. According to the Government, B. was informed on 12 October 2002 that his niece would be arriving at 5.45 p.m. on 17 October.

29. In a letter of 15 October 2002, the Aliens Office advised Crown counsel of its views on the application for the second applicant's release:

“... the enquiries have enabled the person concerned's family to be located in Kinshasa. In view of the positive results of the enquiries as a whole, a flight has already been arranged for Thursday 17 October 2002. The child will be met at Kinshasa by her family. A representative from our Embassy will also be present. Lastly, we would note that the sole responsibility for the length of the applicant's detention lies with her uncle, who has been uncooperative and has studiously avoided giving the Aliens Office the family's address. Accordingly, in the child's own interest, she should remain in detention until Thursday 17 October 2002, when she can be returned to her own family in Kinshasa.”

On the same day, after receiving confirmation from the Aliens Office that the child was to be removed, the Belgian Embassy official in Kinshasa informed B. in the following letter, which was sent by recorded delivery:

“Dear Sir,

I wish to confirm the message which the Embassy has received from the Department in Brussels, namely, the return of your niece Mubilanzila Tabitha to Kinshasa (N'Djili) arriving on the Hewa Bora flight at 5.45 p.m. on Thursday 17 October 2002.

Yours faithfully,

...”

30. On 16 October 2002 the chambre du conseil of the Brussels Court of First Instance held that the second applicant's detention was incompatible with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and ordered her immediate release. Noting that it had no jurisdiction to authorise her placement in a foster home or an institution, it held that the application was well-founded in part. Its decision was served on the director of Transit Centre no. 127 that same day.

Crown counsel, who had the right to appeal against that decision within 24 hours, informed the director of the Centre by fax the same day that he was reserving his decision whether or not to appeal.

On the same day the HCR's representative in Brussels sent a fax to the Aliens Office requesting permission for the second applicant to remain in Belgium while her application for a Canadian visa was being processed. It drew the Office's attention to the fact that there did not appear to be an adult in Kinshasa who was able and willing to look after the second applicant, since, according to the information in its possession, B. was still a student. It added that the first

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applicant had had refugee status in Canada since 23 July 2001, that the second applicant's father had disappeared in August 2000 and that her twin sister had been taken to Congo Brazzaville four months earlier.

31. On 17 October 2002 the second applicant was deported to the DRC. She was accompanied by a social worker from Transit Centre no. 127 who placed her in the care of the police at the airport. On board the aircraft she was looked after by an air hostess who had been specifically assigned to accompany her by the chief executive of the airline. The second applicant travelled with three Congolese adults who were also being deported.

There were no members of her family waiting for her when she arrived. The Government explained that after considerable efforts, the Embassy official had obtained B.'s agreement to come to the airport to meet his niece. However, he had reneged on his promise at the last minute.

32. The parties have not formally established whether or not a member of the Belgian Embassy was at the airport, as stated in the Alien Office's letter of 15 October 2002. The second applicant stayed at the airport until 5.23 p.m. before eventually being collected by Ms T., a secretary at the National Information Agency of the DRC, who offered her accommodation.

On the same day the first applicant rang Transit Centre no. 127 and asked to speak to her daughter. She was informed that she was no longer staying at the Centre and advised to contact the Aliens Office for further details, which she did. The Aliens Office did not provide her with any explanation but suggested she speak to the HCR, from whom she learnt of her daughter's deportation to Kinshasa.

33. On 18 October 2002 the official from the Belgian Embassy in Kinshasa went to B.'s home, only to discover that he had disappeared.

On the same day the Belgian authorities received a message from the Canadian Embassy in The Hague informing them that the first applicant had been granted refugee status and indefinite leave to remain in Canada with a work permit in 2002 and was consequently entitled to have her family join her.

34. The second applicant left the DRC on 23 October 2002 following the intervention of the Belgian and Canadian Prime Ministers, with the latter agreeing in principle to authorise the reunification of the family. The second applicant travelled to Paris with Ms T. and from there to Canada the same day on a Canadian visa. During the stop over in Paris, Ms T. and the second applicant were accompanied by two officials from the Belgian Embassy. The journey was paid for by the Belgian authorities.

The case attracted considerable attention from the press in the meantime. 35. On 25 October 2002 the airline which had flown the second applicant back to Kinshasa

informed the Aliens Office that she had not travelled alone, but with four other aliens who were also being removed. It said that it had arranged for an air hostess to look after her until she was handed over to the authorities in Kinshasa.

36. On 29 October 2002 the first applicant applied to the Canadian authorities for a visa permitting family reunification.

37. At the request of the Aliens Office, the director of Transit Centre no. 127 described the second applicant's conditions at the centre in a letter of 23 November 2004. He explained that she had been looked after by two women who were themselves mothers, that she had played with other children, that her uncle and mother had telephoned her nearly every day and that she had been allowed to telephone them free of charge under the supervision of a team of social workers; he added that her lawyer had paid her a number of visits and had brought her telephone cards, confectionary and money, she had often played outdoors, had watched large numbers of videos, done drawings and arithmetic and had been comforted if she showed any signs of distress after telephone calls from her family. The director also explained that during the removal procedure the second applicant had been accompanied to the embarkation area (more precisely, the federal police checkpoint) by a social worker and that the entire staff at Transit Centre no. 127 were concerned about the welfare of children, particularly unaccompanied minors.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE

Omissis

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III. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE

Omissis

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION

41. The applicants complained that the second applicant had been detained and deported in violation of Article 3 of the Convention, which provides:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

A. Detention of the second applicant

1. The applicants' submissions

. Omissis

2. The Government's submissions

Omissis

3. The Court's assessment

48. Article 3 makes no provision for exceptions. This absolute prohibition of torture and of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under the terms of the Convention shows that Article 3 enshrines one of the fundamental values of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe (Soering v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A no. 161, § 78).

In order to fall within the scope of Article 3, the ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity, the assessment of which depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, among other authorities, Raninen v. Finland, judgment of 16 December 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions, 1997-VIII, § 55).

In order to carry out this assessment, regard must be had to “the fact that the Convention is a 'living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions' [and] that the increasingly high standard being required in the area of the protection of human rights and fundamental liberties correspondingly and inevitably requires greater firmness in assessing breaches of the fundamental values of democratic societies” (mutatis mutandis, Selmouni v. France, judgment of 28 July 1999 [GC], § 101, Reports 1999-V).

49. The Court will first examine the Article 3 complaint of the second applicant – she being the person who was detained – before proceeding to consider the complaint of her mother (the first applicant), who also claims that she was a victim of the measure.

(a) The second applicant

50. The Court notes that second applicant, who was only five years old, was held in the same conditions as adults. She was detained in a centre that had initially been designed for adults, even though she was unaccompanied by her parents and no one had been assigned to look after her. No measures were taken to ensure that she received proper counselling and educational assistance from qualified personnel special mandated for that purpose. That situation lasted for two months. It is further noted that the respondent Government have acknowledged that the place of detention was not adapted to her needs and that there were no adequate structures in place at the time.

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51. A five-year-old child is quite clearly dependent on adults and has no ability to look after itself so that, when separated from its parents and left to its own devices, it will be totally disoriented.

52. The fact that the second applicant received legal assistance, had daily telephone contact with her mother or uncle and that staff and residents at the centre did their best for her cannot be regarded as sufficient to meet all her needs as a five-year-old child. The Court further considers that the uncoordinated attention she received was far from adequate.

53. It reiterates that the obligation on High Contracting Parties under Article 1 of the Convention to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 3, requires States to take measures designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, including such ill-treatment administered by private individuals (see, mutatis mutandis, Z and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 10 May 2001 [GC], ECHR 2001-V § 73; and A. v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 23 September 1998, Reports 1998-VI, p. 2699, § 22). Steps should be taken to enable effective protection to be provided, particularly to children and other vulnerable members of society, and should include reasonable measures to prevent ill-treatment of which the authorities have or ought to have knowledge (see Osman v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports 1998-VIII, pp. 3159-3160, § 116).

54. In this connection, the Court must examine whether or not the impugned regulations and practices, and in particular the manner in which they were implemented in the instant case, were defective to the point of constituting a violation of the respondent State's positive obligations under Article 3 of the Convention.

55. The second applicant's position was characterised by her very young age, the fact that she was an illegal immigrant in a foreign land and the fact that she was unaccompanied by her family from whom she had become separated so that she was effectively left to her own devices. She was thus in an extremely vulnerable situation. In view of the absolute nature of the protection afforded by Article 3 of the Convention, it is important to bear in mind that this is the decisive factor and it takes precedence over considerations relating to the second applicant's status as an illegal immigrant. She therefore indisputably came within the class of highly vulnerable members of society to whom the Belgian State owed a duty to take adequate measures to provide care and protection as part of its positive obligations under Article 3 of the Convention.

56. The Court observes that, whereas under the general law minors came within the jurisdiction of the youth courts, there was a legal void at the time in respect of unaccompanied foreign minors. The respondent Government accepted that the prospects of finding accommodation in a more suitable centre were virtually non-existent and that such centres as did exist did not have facilities for the child's supervision or, therefore, protection. Furthermore, there was no statutory basis on which the courts could review the conditions under which minors were held or require the authorities to provide legal, humanitarian and social assistance where necessary (see, mutatis mutandis, Amuur v. France, judgment of 25 June 1996, Reports 1996-III, § 53). The only available remedy was an application to the chambre du conseil under section 71 of the aforementioned Act. In such cases, the question before the chambre du conseil was whether the detention was lawful, not whether it was appropriate.

57. Following an application by the second applicant's lawyer on 9 October 2002, the chambre du conseil ruled on 16 October 2002 that the second applicant's detention was unlawful under the Convention on the Rights of the Child and ordered her immediate release. It expressly found that it had no jurisdiction to examine the appropriateness of detention or the conditions in which she was held, or to modify the regime and order alternative arrangements.

Moreover, prior to applying to the chambre du conseil the second applicant's lawyer had referred the matter to the Aliens Office on 26 September 2002 when, because of her isolation and the risks of psychological damage, he requested her placement with foster parents or, failing that, in a specialised institution. The inescapable conclusion must therefore be that the domestic authorities failed to take action to avoid or remedy the alleged shortcomings, despite being expressly informed of the position.

Furthermore, in his decision of 25 September 2002, the Commissioner-General for Refugees and Stateless Persons had drawn the Minister of the Interior's attention to the fact that the second applicant was a minor and entitled to be reunited with her family by virtue of Article 10

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of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. On 13 June 2002 the Committee on the Rights of the Child had recommended that the Belgian State should expedite efforts to establish special reception centres and that stays in such centres should be for the shortest time possible.

58. The Court considers that the measures taken by the Belgian authorities – informing the first applicant of the position, giving her a telephone number where she could reach her daughter, appointing a lawyer to assist the second applicant and liaising with the Canadian authorities and the Belgian Embassy in Kinshasa – were far from sufficient to fulfil the Belgian State's obligation to provide care for the second applicant. The State had, moreover, had an array of means at its disposal. The Court is in no doubt that the second applicant's detention in the conditions described above caused her considerable distress. Nor could the authorities who ordered her detention have failed to be aware of the serious psychological effects it would have on her. In the Court's view, the second applicant's detention in such conditions demonstrated a lack of humanity to such a degree that it amounted to inhuman treatment.

59. There has therefore been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.

(b) The first applicant

60. The Court reiterates, firstly, that Article 3 affords absolute protection, irrespective of any reprehensible conduct on the part of the applicant (see, mutatis mutandis, Soering, judgment cited above, § 88). Accordingly, it cannot accept the Belgian Government's argument that the conduct of the first applicant was such as to prevent the Court from finding a violation.

61. The Court reiterates, secondly, that the issue whether a parent qualifies as a “victim” of the ill-treatment of his or her child will depend on the existence of special factors which gives the applicant's suffering a dimension and character distinct from the emotional distress which may be regarded as inevitably caused to relatives of a victim of a serious human rights violation. Relevant elements will include the proximity of the family tie – in that context, a certain weight will attach to the parent-child bond –, the particular circumstances of the relationship and the way in which the authorities responded to the parent's enquiries. The essence of such a violation lies in the authorities' reactions and attitudes to the situation when it is brought to their attention. It is especially in respect of this latter factor that a parent may claim directly to be a victim of the authorities' conduct (see, mutatis mutandis, Çakıcı v. Turkey [GC], no. 23657/94, ECHR 1999-IV, § 98; and Hamiyet Kaplan and Others v. Turkey, no. 36749/97, § 67, 13 September 2005).

62. As regards the Belgian authorities' conduct towards the first applicant, it is apparent from the material before the Court that the only action the Belgian authorities took was to inform her that her daughter had been detained and to provide her with a telephone number where she could be reached. The Court has no doubt that, as a mother, the first applicant suffered deep distress and anxiety as a result of her daughter's detention. In view of the circumstances of the case, the Court concludes that the level of severity required for a violation of Article 3 of the Convention was attained in the present case.

63. There has therefore been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.

B. The second applicant's deportation

1. The applicants' submissions

. Omissis

2. The Government's submissions

. Omissis

3. The Court's assessment

66. The Court will begin by examining the complaint concerning the second applicant's rights and would state at the outset that it is struck by the failure to provide adequate preparation, supervision and safeguards for her deportation.

For example, the Belgian authorities stood by their decision to proceed with the second applicant's deportation on 17 October 2002 despite two new factual developments, these being the chambre du conseil's decision of the previous day to order her immediate release on the

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grounds that her detention was unlawful and the fact that the HCR had informed the authorities that the first applicant had acquired refugee status in Canada.

67. As regards the conditions in which the second applicants travelled, the Court notes that although an assistant from the centre accompanied her as far as customs, the second applicant had to travel alone as the Belgian authorities had not assigned an adult to accompany her.

As to the arrangements in her country of origin, the Belgian authorities merely informed her uncle B., who was the only relative they had managed to trace in Kinshasa, of her arrival, but did not expressly require his presence or make sure that he would be at the airport. The Court cannot, therefore, accept the Government's submission that they were not responsible for the situation or for the fact that B. did not to turn up. The Belgian authorities had not considered or made alternative arrangements for the second applicant's arrival and it was only after several hours' wait at the airport that a solution – and a wholly improvised one at that – was found by the Congolese authorities.

68. In the Court's view, this shows that the Belgian authorities did not seek to ensure that the second applicant would be properly looked after or have regard to the real situation she was likely to encounter on her return to her country of origin. This view is not altered by the fact that the airline decided to assign an air hostess – an ordinary member of the flight crew – to look after her for the duration of the flight or that the second applicant was ultimately taken into the home of a representative of the Congolese authorities after an almost six-hour wait at the airport.

69. The Court considers that the second applicant's deportation in such conditions was bound to cause her extreme anxiety and demonstrated such a total lack of humanity towards someone of her age and in her situation as an unaccompanied minor as to amount to inhuman treatment. The Court also finds that by deporting the second applicant, the Belgian State violated its positive obligations to take requisite measures and precautions.

70. As regards the first applicant and in the light of the case-law it has cited in relation to the previous complaint (see paragraph 61 above), the Court notes in particular that the Belgian authorities did not trouble to advise her of her daughter's deportation so that she only became aware of it when she tried to reach her at the closed centre on the telephone after the deportation had already taken place. The Court has no doubt that this caused the first applicant deep anxiety. The disregard such conduct showed for her feelings and the evidence in the case file lead the Court to find that the requisite threshold of severity has been attained in the present case.

71. It follows from the foregoing that there has been a violation of both applicants' rights under Article 3 of the Convention on account of the second applicant's deportation.

Omissis

V APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

115. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A. Damage

116. The applicants said that they had sustained non-pecuniary damage which they put at 10,000 euros (EUR) for the first applicant and EUR 25,000 for the second.

117. The Government observed that the first applicant had only requested family reunification after her daughter's deportation and arrival in Canada (on 29 October 2002) and said that the first applicant's role in the case had not been clearly established. Either she had been unaware that her daughter had left Kinshasa, in which case it had been on her brother's initiative and it was to him and not the Government that she should address her grievances, or she herself had been the instigator, in which case she ought not to be awarded anything because she had knowingly broken the law. In the light of these considerations, the Government submitted that a finding of a violation would afford adequate compensation for the non-

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pecuniary damage sustained by the first applicant. They left the issue of the non-pecuniary damage sustained by the second applicant to the Court's discretion whilst pointing out that they had had sought to defend her interests as best they could in what, to say the least, had been a complex situation.

118. In the light of the various violations it has found, including the violation of both the first and second applicant's rights under Article 3, which, as has been noted, confers absolute protection (Soering v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A no. 161, § 88), the Court considers the sums claimed by each of the applicants reasonable and awards them the amounts by way of just satisfaction.

B. Costs and expenses

119. The applicants, who have produced detailed fee notes, claimed EUR 14,177.04 for costs and expenses. This amount was broken down into EUR 10,500 for the fees and expenses of Mr Vanheule, EUR 3,042 for the fees and expenses of Mr Ma., EUR 141 for the fees of a Canadian lawyer, Mr A., in connection with family reunification in Canada in 2002, EUR 35 for the costs of a visa to enable the first applicant to attend the hearing before the Court and EUR 459.04 in travel expenses.

120. The Government referred to the principles established by the Court and submitted that it should disallow the fees and expenses of Mr A., and at least part of the fees and expenses of Mr Ma. It left the remainder of the claim to the Court's discretion.

121. According to the Court's established case-law, costs and expenses will not be awarded under Article 41 unless it is established that they were actually and necessarily incurred and were also reasonable as to quantum. Furthermore, legal costs are only recoverable in so far as they relate to the violation found (Beyeler v. Italy (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 33202/96, § 27, 28 May 2002).

The Court notes that the Government have not contested Mr Vanheule's fees or the first applicant's claim in respect of the cost of her visa and travel expenses. It considers that the action taken by Mr Ma. was intended to prevent the violation it has found to have occurred and that the amount claimed in respect thereof is reasonable. Consequently, it awards the applicants the sum of EUR 14,036 for costs and expenses, less the amount which the Court has granted in legal aid.

C. Default interest

122. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1. Holds that there has been a violation of the second applicant's rights under Article 3 of the Convention as a result of her detention;

2. Holds that there has been a violation of the first applicant's rights under Article 3 of the

Convention as a result of the second applicant's detention; 3. Holds that there has been a violation of the second applicant's rights under Article 3 of the

Convention as a result of her deportation; 4. Holds that there has been a violation of the first applicant's rights under Article 3 of the

Convention as a result of the second applicant's deportation; 5. Holds that there has been a violation of both applicants' rights under Article 8 of the

Convention as a result of the second applicant's detention;

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6. Holds that there has been a violation of both applicants' rights under Article 8 of the

Convention as a result of the second applicant's deportation; 7. Holds that the first applicant cannot claim to be a “victim” for the purposes of Article 34 of

the Convention of a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention; 8. Holds that there has been a violation of the second applicant's rights under Article 5 § 1 of

the Convention; 9. Holds that the first applicant cannot claim to be a “victim” for the purposes of Article 34 of

the Convention of a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention; 10. Holds that there has been a violation of the second applicant's rights under Article 5 § 4 of

the Convention; 11. Holds that no separate examination of the complaint under Article 13 of the Convention is

necessary; 12. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 35,000 (thirty-five thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage (comprising EUR 10,000 for the first applicant and EUR 25,000 for the second applicant) and EUR 14,036 (fourteen thousand and thirty-six euros) for costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable; (b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

13. Dismisses the remainder of the applicants' claim for just satisfaction.

Done in French, and notified in writing on 12 October 2006, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Søren NIELSEN Christos ROZAKIS Registrar President

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CORTE EUROPEA DEI DIRITTI DELL’UOMO

CASE OF LIU AND LIU v. RUSSIA

(Application no. 42086/05)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

6 December 2007 FINAL

02/06/2008

[Omissis]

In the case of Liu and Liu v. Russia, The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

Mr C.L. ROZAKIS, President, Mr L. LOUCAIDES, Mrs N. VAJIĆ, Mr A. KOVLER, Mrs E. STEINER, Mr K. HAJIYEV, Mr G. MALINVERNI , judges, and Mr S. NIELSEN, Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 15 November 2007, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1. The case originated in an application (no. 42086/05) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Chinese national, Mr Liu Jingcai (“the first applicant”), and a Russian national, Mrs Yulia Aleksandrovna Liu (“the second applicant”), on 25 November 2005.

2. The applicants were represented before the Court by Mr M. Rachkovskiy, a lawyer with the International Protection Centre in Moscow. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were initially represented by Mr P. Laptev, the former Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights, and subsequently by their new Representative, Mrs V. Milinchuk.

3. The applicants alleged, in particular, that the first applicant's detention pending expulsion proceedings had been unlawful and that his deportation to China would hamper their family life.

4. On 3 October 2006 the Court decided to communicate the application to the Government. Under the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it decided to examine the merits of the application at the same time as its admissibility. The President made a decision on priority treatment of the application (Rule 41 of the Rules of Court).

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

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5. The first applicant was born in 1968. The second applicant was born in 1973. They are husband and wife and live in the town of Sovetskaya Gavan in the Khabarovsk Region.

1. Background information

6. In 1994 the first applicant arrived in Russia on the basis of a valid visa and married the second applicant. In 1996 the second applicant gave birth to a daughter. In November 1996, after his visa had expired, the first applicant was deported to China.

7. In 1999 the second applicant gave birth to a son. 8. In 2001 the first applicant obtained a work visa valid until 1 August 2002 and resumed his

residence in Russia. The visa was later extended until 1 August 2003.

2. Requests for a residence permit

9. In November 2002 the first applicant went to the Khabarovsk department of internal affairs (hereinafter “the Khabarovsk police department”) to lodge an application for a residence permit. The Khabarovsk police department did not have the necessary forms; therefore, the first applicant could not lodge his application. It was only on 11 July 2003 that the forms became available.

10. On 24 July 2003 the first applicant applied for a residence permit for a second time. The Khabarovsk police department refused to examine the application and returned the documents to the first applicant.

11. The first applicant challenged the refusal before a court. On 22 October 2003 the Sovetskaya Gavan Town Court found that the refusal to examine the application had been unlawful. It ordered that the Khabarovsk police department examine the first applicant's application for a residence permit.

12. On 22 July 2004 the Khabarovsk police department rejected his application by reference to section 7 (1) of the Foreign Nationals Act (see paragraph 33 below). No further reasons were provided.

13. The applicants challenged the refusal before a court. They complained, in particular, that the Khabarovsk police department had not given any reasons for the refusal. The first applicant had never been charged with any criminal offence or engaged in any subversive activities. The applicants also claimed that the refusal had interfered with their right to respect for their family life and had caused them non-pecuniary damage.

14. On 4 November 2004 the Tsentralniy District Court of Khabarovsk found that the decision of 22 July 2004 had been lawful and rejected the applicants' claim in respect of non-pecuniary damage. It found that the Khabarovsk police department had received information from the Federal Security Service that the first applicant posed a national security risk. That information was a State secret and could not be made public. There is no indication in the judgment that the information had been made available for judicial scrutiny.

15. The applicants appealed. On 18 January 2005 the Khabarovsk Regional Court upheld the judgment of 4 November 2004. It reiterated that, according to the information from the Federal Security Service, the first applicant posed a national security risk. That information was a State secret and was not subject to judicial scrutiny.

16. On 4 March 2005 the Khabarovsk police department rejected a new application for a residence permit. It found that the first applicant was unlawfully residing on Russian territory, that he had taken no steps to make his stay legal, and that he would therefore have to leave Russia. The refusal of a residence permit did not hinder his family life.

17. It appears that the applicants did not challenge the refusal of 4 March 2005 before a court. Instead they asked the Khabarovsk Regional Court to direct that the Khabarovsk police department issue the first applicant with a residence permit. They claimed that by refusing to provide the first applicant with a residence permit the authorities had showed disrespect for their family life. They asked for compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage. On 9 September 2005 the Khabarovsk Regional Court rejected their claims in the last instance as having no basis in domestic law. It referred to the judgment of 4 November 2004 and held that there were no reasons to depart from its findings.

18. On several occasions in 2003, 2004 and 2005 the first applicant was administratively fined for living in Russia without a valid residence permit. However, the domestic courts reversed most of those decisions, finding them procedurally defective or time-barred.

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19. It is apparent from a certificate issued by a deputy head of the Sovetskaya Gavan Town prosecutor's office on 15 December 2005 that no criminal proceedings had been brought against the first applicant between 1996 and 2005.

3. Administrative removal proceedings

20. On 18 November 2005 the first applicant was stopped by the police. The police officer drew up a report on the commission of an offence under Article 18.8 of the Administrative Offences Code (see paragraph 34 below). The report was transmitted to a judge.

21. On 21 November 2005 the Sovetskaya Gavan Town Court held that the first applicant had infringed the residence regulations and ordered his administrative removal and detention pending removal. On the same day he was placed in a detention centre.

22. On 13 December 2005 the Khabarovsk Regional Court quashed the decision of 21 November 2005 on appeal, remitted the case for a new examination by the Town Court, and ordered the first applicant's release. It held that, in accordance with Article 27.3 § 1 of the Administrative Offences Code, detention with a view to administrative removal could only be ordered if there were sufficient reasons to believe that the person would try to avoid execution of the removal order. The Town Court had not given reasons for the detention order and the case file did not contain any information justifying the first applicant's detention. On the same day the first applicant was released.

23. On 28 December 2005 the Sovetskaya Gavan Town Court held that the report of 18 November 2005 did not indicate which residence regulations had been infringed by the first applicant. It returned the report to the local police department for correction.

24. On 3 February 2006 the administrative proceedings against the first applicant were discontinued as time-barred.

4. Deportation proceedings

25. In the meantime, on 3 February 2005, the Khabarovsk police department prepared a decision that the first applicant's presence on the Russian territory was undesirable and submitted it to the head of the Federal Migration Service for approval. The draft decision indicated that the first applicant had been unlawfully resident on Russian territory and had been repeatedly fined under Article 18.8 of the Administrative Offences Code for his failure to leave Russia after the expiry of the authorised residence period. On 22 March 2005 the head of the Federal Migration Service confirmed the decision and it became enforceable. The applicants were informed about the decision on 21 April 2005.

26. On 22 August 2005 the Khabarovsk police department asked the Federal Migration Service to order the first applicant's deportation. On 12 November 2005 the head of the Federal Migration Service ordered the first applicant's deportation by reference to section 25.10 of the Law on the Procedure for Entering and Leaving the Russian Federation (see paragraph 35 below). No further reasons were provided. The applicants were informed of the decision on 12 December 2005.

27. On 15 May 2006 the Sovetskaya Gavan Town Court ordered the first applicant's placement in a detention centre with a view to deporting him. It held that the first applicant was unlawfully residing on Russian territory, and that on 12 November 2005 the Federal Migration Service had ordered his deportation. Therefore, he had to be held in custody until deportation. The first applicant was not present at the hearing. He was informed of the decision on 5 September 2006.

28. On 24 November 2006 the Khabarovsk Regional Court quashed the decision of 15 May 2006 on appeal and remitted the case. It found that the decision had been taken in the first applicant's absence, in breach of Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention.

29. On 25 December 2006 the Sovetskaya Gavan Town Court for a second time ordered the first applicant's placement in a detention centre with a view to deporting him. It referred to the same reasons as in the decision of 15 May 2006.

30. It appears that the deportation order was not enforced. The applicant is at present living with his family in Russia.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW

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Omissis

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION

41. The applicants complained under Article 8 of the Convention that the refusal to grant a residence permit to the first applicant and the subsequent decision to deport him to China had entailed a violation of the right to respect for their family life. Article 8 reads as follows:

“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

A. Admissibility

42. The Government submitted that the final decision for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention had been the judgment of 4 November 2004, by which the refusal to grant the first applicant a residence permit had been declared lawful. The subsequent deportation decision had simply been a consequence of the residence permit refusal. Therefore, the six-month period had started to run from 4 November 2004. The applicants had not lodged their application until 25 November 2005, thereby failing to comply with the six-month rule. Moreover, the applicants had not appealed against the judgment of 4 November 2004. They had not therefore exhausted domestic remedies.

43. The applicants maintained that they had appealed against the judgment of 4 November 2004. They further argued that the final decision for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention had been the judgment of 9 September 2005 by which their request for a residence permit and their compensation claim had been rejected.

44. The Court notes that the applicants appealed against the judgment of 4 November 2004 to the Khabarovsk Regional Court, which examined and dismissed their appeal on 18 January 2005 (see paragraph 15 above). It is therefore satisfied that the applicants have exhausted domestic remedies.

45. The Court further observes that the applicants complain about the cumulative effect produced on their family life by several decisions taken by the domestic authorities against the first applicant, namely the refusals to grant a residence permit upheld by the domestic courts on 18 January and 9 September 2005 and the deportation order of 12 November 2005. By lodging their application on 25 November 2005 within six months of the deportation order the applicants complied with the requirements of Article 35 § 1.

46. The Court concludes that the Government's objections must be rejected. It considers that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

1. Existence of interference

47. The Government contested the allegation that there had been interference with the applicants' family life.

48. The applicants submitted that the first applicant had been residing in Russia since 1994. By marrying the second applicant, a Russian citizen, and by fathering two children with her, he

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had established family life in Russia. The refusal to grant him a residence permit and the decision to deport him had interfered with the applicants' family life.

49. The Court observes that no right of an alien to enter or to reside in a particular country is as such guaranteed by the Convention. As a matter of well-established international law and subject to its treaty obligations, a State has the right to control the entry of non-nationals into its territory (see, among other authorities, Boultif v. Switzerland, no. 54273/00, ECHR 2001-IX, § 39). Where immigration is concerned, Article 8 cannot be considered to impose on a State a general obligation to respect the choice by married couples of the country of their matrimonial residence and to authorise family reunion in its territory (see Gül v. Switzerland, judgment of 19 February 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-I, § 38). However, the removal of a person from a country where close members of his family are living may amount to an infringement of the right to respect for family life as guaranteed in Article 8 § 1 of the Convention (see Boultif, cited above, § 39).

50. As the Court has reaffirmed on several occasions, Article 8 cannot be construed as guaranteeing, as such, the right to a particular type of residence permit. Where the domestic legislation provides for several different types, the Court must analyse the legal and practical implications of issuing a particular permit. If it allows the holder to reside within the territory of the host country and to exercise freely there the right to respect for his or her private and family life, the granting of such a permit represents in principle a sufficient measure to meet the requirements of that provision. In such cases, the Court is not empowered to rule on whether the individual concerned should be granted one particular legal status rather than another, that choice being a matter for the domestic authorities alone (see Sisojeva and Others v. Latvia [GC], no. 60654/00, § 91, ECHR 2007-..., with further references).

51. The applicants have been married since 1994 and have had two children. The Court is satisfied that the applicants' relationship amounted to family life. The second applicant and the children are Russian nationals who were born in Russia and have been living there all their lives. From 1994 to 1996 and from 2001 to August 2003 the first applicant lawfully resided in Russia with his wife and children on the basis of a renewable work visa. In 2003 he applied for a residence permit to which he had become entitled under the new law passed in 2002 (see paragraph 32 above). However, his application was refused by reference to national security considerations and he was required to leave Russia. As he did not leave, his deportation was ordered. The deportation order is still valid and enforceable and the deportation is impending. The Court therefore concludes that the measures taken by the domestic authorities against the first applicant constituted interference with the applicants' right to respect for their family life (compare Bashir and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 65028/01, § 37, 14 June 2007, and Musa and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 61259/00, § 58, 11 January 2007).

2. Justification for the interference

52. The Court reiterates that any interference with an individual's right to respect for his private and family life will constitute a breach of Article 8, unless it was “in accordance with the law”, pursued a legitimate aim or aims under paragraph 2, and was “necessary in a democratic society” in the sense that it was proportionate to the aims sought to be achieved (see, among other authorities, Slivenko v. Latvia [GC], no. 48321/99, § 99, ECHR 2003-X).

(a) Submissions by the parties

Omissis

(b) The Court's assessment

55. The Court will first examine whether the interference was “in accordance with the law”. The domestic authorities based their decisions on two legal provisions, namely section 7 (1) of the Foreign Nationals Act providing that a residence permit could be refused if the foreign national posed a threat to the security of the Russian Federation or its citizens, and section 25.10 of the Entry Procedure Act empowering the authorities to issue a decision that a foreign national's presence on Russian territory was undesirable and to order his deportation. The Court is therefore satisfied that the refusal to grant the first applicant a residence permit and the deportation order had a basis in domestic law.

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56. The Court has consistently held that the expression “in accordance with the law” does not merely require that the impugned measure should have a basis in domestic law but also refers to the quality of the law in question, requiring that it be accessible to the persons concerned and formulated with sufficient precision to enable them – if need be, with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail. The law must be sufficiently clear in its terms to give individuals an adequate indication as to the circumstances in which and the conditions on which public authorities are entitled to resort to the impugned measures. In addition, domestic law must afford a measure of legal protection against arbitrary interference by public authorities with the rights guaranteed by the Convention. In matters affecting fundamental rights it would be contrary to the rule of law, one of the basic principles of a democratic society enshrined in the Convention, for a legal discretion granted to the executive to be expressed in terms of unfettered power. Consequently, the law must indicate the scope of any such discretion conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity, having regard to the legitimate aim of the measure in question, to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference (see Lupsa v. Romania, no. 10337/04, §§ 32 and 34, ECHR 2006-....; Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, no. 50963/99, § 119, 20 June 2002; and Malone v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 2 August 1984, Series A no. 82, §§ 67 and 68).

57. The Foreign Nationals Act and the Entry Procedure Act had been officially published and were accessible to the applicants. They define the circumstances in which an application for a residence permit can be rejected and deportation can be ordered. In particular, the Acts provide that such measures can be taken against a foreign national if he presents a national security risk or unlawfully resides in Russia. The Acts leave the authorities a wide degree of discretion in determining which acts constitute a threat to national security. However, a law which confers discretion is not in itself inconsistent with the requirement of “foreseeability” (see Olsson v. Sweden (no. 1), judgment of 24 March 1988, Series A no. 130, § 61). This requirement does not go so far as to compel States to enact legal provisions listing in detail all conduct that may prompt a decision to deport an individual on national security grounds. By the nature of things, threats to national security may vary in character and may be unanticipated or difficult to define in advance (see Al-Nashif, cited above, § 121).

58. It remains to be ascertained whether domestic law provides for sufficient safeguards to ensure that the discretion left to the executive is exercised without abuse (ibid., § 122).

59. The Court reiterates that even where national security is at stake, the concepts of lawfulness and the rule of law in a democratic society require that measures affecting fundamental human rights must be subject to some form of adversarial proceedings before an independent body competent to review the reasons for the decision and relevant evidence, if need be with appropriate procedural limitations on the use of classified information. The individual must be able to challenge the executive's assertion that national security is at stake. While the executive's assessment of what poses a threat to national security will naturally be of significant weight, the independent authority must be able to react in cases where invoking that concept has no reasonable basis in the facts or reveals an interpretation of “national security” that is unlawful or contrary to common sense and arbitrary. Failing such safeguards, the police or other State authorities would be able to encroach arbitrarily on rights protected by the Convention (see Al-Nashif, cited above, §§ 123 and 124, and Lupsa, cited above, §§ 33 and 34).

60. In the present case the first applicant's application for a residence permit was rejected by reference to national security considerations and he was required to leave Russia. The decision was taken by the local police department pursuant to the Foreign Nationals Act. The local police department did not give any reasons for the decision except the unelaborated reference to section 7 (1) of the Act.

61. It is true that domestic law provided for the possibility of challenging the decision before a court. However, the domestic courts were not in a position to assess effectively whether the decision had been justified, because the full material on which it had been based was not made available to them. The submissions by the local police department were confined to the assertion that it was in possession of information that the first applicant posed a national security risk. The content of the information was not disclosed to the applicants or to the courts on the ground that it was a State secret (see paragraphs 14 and 15 above).

62. The Court recognises that the use of confidential material may be unavoidable where national security is at stake. This does not mean, however, that the national authorities can be

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free from effective control by the domestic courts whenever they choose to assert that national security and terrorism are involved. There are techniques that can be employed which both accommodate legitimate security concerns about the nature and sources of intelligence information and yet accord the individual a substantial measure of procedural justice (see Chahal v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 15 November 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-V, § 131).

63. The failure to disclose the relevant information to the courts deprived the latter of the power to assess whether the conclusion that the first applicant constituted a danger to national security had a reasonable basis in the facts. It follows that the judicial scrutiny was limited in scope and did not provide sufficient safeguards against arbitrary exercise of the wide discretion conferred by domestic law on the Ministry of Internal Affairs in cases involving national security.

64. The Court concludes that the relevant provisions of the Foreign Nationals Act allow the Ministry of Internal Affairs to refuse residence permits and to require a foreign national to leave the country on national security grounds without giving any reasons and without effective scrutiny by an independent authority.

65. As the first applicant did not leave, his residence in Russia was found to be unlawful, his presence on Russian territory was declared undesirable on that ground and his deportation was ordered. Pursuant to the Entry Procedure Act and the Instruction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, these decisions were taken by the Federal Migration Service on the initiative of a local police department. Both of these agencies belong to the executive and take such decisions without hearing the foreign national concerned (see paragraphs 35 and 36 above). It is not clear whether there is a possibility of appealing against these decisions to a court or other independent authority offering guarantees of an adversarial procedure and competent to review the reasons for the decisions and relevant evidence. The Entry Procedure Act and the Instruction do not mention such a possibility. Nor did the Government in their observations refer to any legal provision for judicial or other independent review of the deportation order or the decision that a foreign national's presence on Russian territory was undesirable.

66. The Court further observes that the Administrative Offences Code provides for a different procedure for removal of foreign nationals unlawfully residing in Russia. This procedure is circumscribed by substantial procedural safeguards. In particular, the power to order administrative removal belongs exclusively to a judge and this order is subject to appeal to a higher court (see paragraph 34 above). It follows that Russian law establishes two parallel procedures for expulsion of foreign nationals whose residence in Russia has become unlawful. In one of these procedures deportation of a foreign national can be ordered by the executive without any form of independent review or adversarial proceedings, while the other procedure (administrative removal) provides for judicial scrutiny. Domestic law permits the executive to choose between those procedures at their discretion. The enjoyment of procedural safeguards by a foreign national is thus dependent on the executive's choice.

67. In the first applicant's case, the local police department initiated both deportation and administrative removal proceedings. In both proceedings it argued that the first applicant had to be removed from Russian territory because he was residing there unlawfully and referred to Article 18.8 of the Administrative Offences Code. After hearing the first applicant, the domestic courts found flaws in the local police department's case and refused to order the first applicant's removal. The administrative removal proceedings were later discontinued (see paragraphs 20 et seq.). At the same time, the deportation proceedings, which were triggered by the same facts and which were conducted without judicial scrutiny, ultimately resulted in an enforceable deportation order against the first applicant. The Court considers that the first applicant's deportation on the basis of section 25.10 of the Entry Procedure Act was not attended by sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness.

68. In the light of the above considerations, the Court finds that the legal provisions on the basis of which the first applicant's deportation was ordered did not provide for the adequate degree of protection against arbitrary interference.

69. The Court concludes that the interference with the applicants' family life was based on legal provisions which did not meet the Convention's “quality of law” requirements. Accordingly, in the event of the deportation order against the first applicant being enforced, there would be a violation of Article 8. In the light of this conclusion, the Court is not required

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to determine whether the interference pursued a legitimate aim or aims under paragraph 2 of Article 8 and was “necessary in a democratic society”.

II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION

70. The applicants complained under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention that the first applicant's detention from 21 November to 13 December 2005 had been unlawful. The relevant parts of Article 5 § 1 read as follows:

“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:

...

(f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.”

A. Admissibility

71. The Government claimed that the applicants had failed to exhaust domestic remedies. Following the domestic court's finding that the first applicant's detention had been unlawful, he could have filed a civil claim for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage.

72. The applicants maintained their complaint. 73. The Court notes that the Russian law of tort limits strict liability for unlawful detention

to specific procedural forms of deprivation of liberty which include, in particular, deprivation of liberty in criminal proceedings and administrative punishment, but exclude administrative arrest (see paragraphs 39 and 40 above). Since the first applicant was subject to administrative arrest, a mere finding of its unlawfulness would not be sufficient for an award of compensation; he would also have to prove that the State officials were at fault (ibid.). It follows that, in the absence of fault on the part of the arresting officer, the first applicant's claim for compensation would have no prospect of success (see, mutatis mutandis, Makhmudov v. Russia, no. 35082/04, § 104, 26 July 2007). The Court concludes that the Government's objection must be rejected.

74. The Court further observes that the second applicant was never detained and she cannot claim to be a victim of her husband's allegedly unlawful detention. Her complaint is therefore incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.

75. The first applicant's complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

76. The Government conceded that the first applicant's detention from 21 November to 13 December 2005 had been unlawful.

77. The first applicant maintained his claims. 78. The Court notes that the first applicant was detained with a view to his administrative

removal from Russia to China. Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention is thus applicable in the instant case. This provision does not require that the detention of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition be reasonably considered necessary, for example to prevent his committing an offence or absconding. In this connection, Article 5 § 1 (f) provides a different level of protection from Article 5 § 1 (c): all that is required under sub-paragraph (f) is that “action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition”. It is therefore immaterial, for the purposes of Article 5 § 1 (f), whether the underlying decision to expel can be justified under national or Convention law (see Čonka v. Belgium, no. 51564/99, § 38, ECHR 2002-I, and Chahal v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 15 November 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-V, § 112).

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79. The Court reiterates, however, that it falls to it to examine whether the applicant's detention was “lawful” for the purposes of Article 5 § 1, including whether it complied with “a procedure prescribed by law”. A period of detention will in principle be lawful if carried out pursuant to a court order. A subsequent finding that the court erred under domestic law in making the order will not necessarily retrospectively affect the validity of the intervening period of detention. For the assessment of compliance with Article 5 § 1 of the Convention the basic distinction has to be made between ex facie invalid detention orders – for example, given by a court in excess of jurisdiction or where the interested party did not have proper notice of the hearing – and detention orders which are prima facie valid and effective unless and until they have been overturned by a higher court (see Khudoyorov, cited above, §§ 128 and 129, with further references).

80. The first applicant's detention with a view to administrative removal was ordered on 21 November 2005 by the Sovetskaya Gavan Town Court. On 13 December 2005 the Khabarovsk Regional Court quashed the detention order (see paragraphs 21 and 22 above). The Court will consider whether the detention order of 21 November 2005 had constituted a lawful basis for the first applicant's detention until it was quashed on 13 December 2005.

81. It has not been alleged that on 21 November 2005 the Town Court acted in excess of its jurisdiction. Indeed, as a matter of domestic law, it had the authority to order the applicant's detention with a view to administrative removal. The detention order of 21 November 2005 was quashed because the Town Court had not given reasons to justify the necessity of holding the first applicant in custody. The Court considers that that flaw did not amount to a “gross or obvious irregularity” in the exceptional sense indicated by the case-law (compare Lloyd and Others v. the United Kingdom, nos. 29798/96 et seq., § 114, 1 March 2005).

82. The Court does not find that the Town Court acted in bad faith or that it neglected to attempt to apply the relevant legislation correctly. The fact that certain flaws in the procedure were found on appeal does not in itself mean that the detention was unlawful (see Gaidjurgis v. Lithuania (dec.), no. 49098/99, 16 January 2001; Benham v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 10 June 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-III, § 47). Therefore, it has not been established that the detention order of 21 November 2005 was ex facie invalid, or that the ensuing detention was unlawful within the meaning of Article 5 § 1.

83. There has thus been no breach of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention in respect of the first applicant's detention from 21 November to 13 December 2005.

III. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION

. Omissis

IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

85. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A. Damage

86. The applicants claimed 89,175 Russian roubles (RUB) in respect of pecuniary damage. They submitted that on 27 December 2004 the Sovetskaya Gavan Town Court had awarded them that amount, representing the administrative fines paid by the first applicant for his unlawful residence in Russia and the legal fee paid by the applicants in the court proceedings in which they had challenged those fines. That judgment had subsequently been quashed on appeal and the amount had never been paid. The applicants submitted that RUB 89,175 was equivalent to 3,313 euros (EUR) at the moment they lodged their claims. They also claimed EUR 300,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

87. The Government failed to submit their comments within the established time-limit.

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88. The Court does not discern a causal link between the violation found and the claim for pecuniary damage.

89. The Court further considers that the applicants must have suffered distress and frustration resulting from the deportation order issued in breach of Article 8 of the Convention. In these circumstances, the Court considers that the applicants' suffering and frustration cannot be compensated for by a mere finding of a violation. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards both applicants EUR 6,000 for non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on the above amount.

B. Costs and expenses

90. The applicants did not claim any costs and expenses and, accordingly, there is no need to make any award to them under this head.

C. Default interest

91. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1. Declares the complaints concerning the refusal to grant the first applicant a residence permit, the issuance of a deportation order against him and his detention from 21 November to 13 December 2005 admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;

2. Holds that in the event of the deportation order against the first applicant being enforced,

there would be a violation of Article 8 of the Convention in respect of both applicants; 3. Holds that there has been no violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention in respect of the

first applicant; 4. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 6,000 (six thousand euros) to the applicants jointly in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into Russian roubles at the rate applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount; (b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

5. Dismisses the remainder of the applicants' claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 6 December 2007, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Søren NIELSEN Christos ROZAKIS Registrar President

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CORTE EUROPEA DEI DIRITTI DELL’UOMO (GRANDE CAMERA)

CASE OF SAADI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

(Application no. 13229/03)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

29 January 2008

[Omissis]

In the case of Saadi v. the United Kingdom, The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of:

Jean-Paul Costa, President, Christos Rozakis, Nicolas Bratza, Boštjan M. Zupančič, Peer Lorenzen, Françoise Tulkens, Nina Vajić, Margarita Tsatsa-Nikolovska, Snejana Botoucharova, Anatoly Kovler, Elisabeth Steiner, Lech Garlicki, Khanlar Hajiyev, Dean Spielmann, Ineta Ziemele, Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre, Päivi Hirvelä, judges, and Michael O'Boyle, Deputy Registrar.

Having deliberated in private on 16 May and 5 December 2007, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date:

PROCEDURE

1. The case originated in an application (no. 13229/03) against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an Iraqi national, Mr Shayan Baram Saadi (“the applicant”), on 18 April 2003.

2. The applicant was represented by Messrs Wilson & Co., solicitors practising in London. The United Kingdom Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr J. Grainger, Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

3. The applicant alleged that he had been detained in breach of Articles 5 § 1 and 14 of the Convention, and that he had not been given adequate reasons for the detention, contrary to Article 5 § 2.

4. The application was allocated to the Fourth Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). On 27 September 2005 it was declared admissible by a Chamber of that Section composed of the following judges: Mr J. Casadevall, Sir Nicolas Bratza, Mr M. Pellonpää, Mr R. Maruste, Mr K. Traja, Ms L. Mijović, Mr J. Šikuta and also of Ms F. Elens-Passos, Deputy Section Registrar. On 11 July 2006 a Chamber composed of the same judges, together with Mr T.L. Early, Section Registrar, delivered a judgment in which it held, by four votes to three, that there had been no violation of Article 5 § 1 and,

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unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 5 § 2. The Chamber further held, unanimously, that it was not necessary to consider Article 14 separately, that the finding of a violation of Article 5 § 2 was sufficient just satisfaction for non-pecuniary damage, and that the respondent State should pay the applicant EUR 1,500, plus any tax that might be chargeable, for costs and expenses.

5. On 11 December 2006, pursuant to a request by the applicant, the Panel of the Grand Chamber decided to refer the case to the Grand Chamber in accordance with Article 43 of the Convention.

6. The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined according to the provisions of Article 27 §§ 2 and 3 of the Convention and Rule 24 of the Rules of Court.

7. The applicant and the Government each filed written observations on the merits. In addition, third-party comments were received jointly from the Centre for Advice on Individual Rights in Europe (“AIRE Centre”), the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (“ECRE”) and Liberty and from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”), which had been given leave by the President to intervene in the written procedure (Article 36 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 44 § 2).

8. A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 16 May 2007 (Rule 59 § 3).

There appeared before the Court:

(a) for the Government

Mr J. GRAINGER, Agent,

Mr D. PANNICK QC, Counsel,

Mr M. FORDHAM QC, Counsel,

Ms N. SAMUEL,

Mr S. BARRETT, Advisers.

(b) for the applicant

Mr R. SCANNELL,

Mr D. SEDDON, Counsel,

Mr M. HANLEY,

Ms S. GHELANI, Advisers.

The Court heard addresses by Mr Scannell and Mr Pannick, as well as their answers to questions put by Judges Costa and Spielmann.

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

9. The applicant, an Iraqi Kurd, was born in 1976 and now lives and works as a doctor in London.

A. The applicant's temporary admission to the United Kingdom

10. In December 2000 the applicant fled the Kurdish Autonomous Region of Iraq when, in the course of his duties as a hospital doctor, he treated and facilitated the escape of three fellow members of the Iraqi Workers' Communist Party who had been injured in an attack. He arrived at Heathrow airport on 30 December 2000 and immediately claimed asylum.

11. The immigration officer contacted the Oakington Reception Centre (“Oakington”: see paragraphs 23-25 below), but there was no immediate room there, so the applicant was

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granted “temporary admission” (see paragraphs 20-21 below) to stay at the hotel of his choice and return to the airport the following morning. On 31 December 2000 he reported as required and was again granted temporary admission until the following day. When the applicant again reported as required he was, for the third time, granted temporary admission, until the following day, 2 January 2001 at 10.00 a.m.

B. Detention at Oakington and the asylum proceedings

12. On this last occasion, when the applicant reported as required, he was detained and transferred to Oakington.

13. When being taken into detention, the applicant was handed a standard form, “Reasons for Detention and Bail Rights”, indicating that detention was used only where there was no reasonable alternative, and setting out a list of reasons such as risk of absconding, with boxes to be ticked by the immigration officer where appropriate. The form did not include an option indicating the possibility of detention for fast-track processing at Oakington.

14. On 4 January 2001 the applicant met at Oakington with a lawyer from the Refugee Legal Centre, who contacted the Home Office to enquire why the applicant was being detained and to request his release. On 5 January 2001, when the applicant had been detained for 76 hours, the lawyer was informed over the telephone by an immigration officer that the applicant was being detained because he was an Iraqi who fulfilled the Oakington criteria. The lawyer then wrote to the Home Office requesting the applicant's release on the ground that it was unlawful. When refused, the applicant applied for judicial review of the decision to detain him, claiming it was contrary to domestic law and Article 5 §§ 1 and 2 of the Convention.

15. The applicant's asylum claim was initially refused on 8 January. The following day he was released from Oakington and again granted temporary admission pending the determination of his appeal. On 14 January 2003 his appeal was allowed and he was granted asylum.

C. The judicial review proceedings

16. In the proceedings for judicial review of the decision to detain the applicant, Collins J on 7 September 2001 (R. (on the application of Saadi and others) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] EWHC Admin 670) found that the Secretary of State had such a power to detain under the Immigration Act 1971 (see paragraph 19 below). However, relying on the Court's judgment in Amuur v. France, (judgment of 25 June 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-III, § 43), and what he considered to be a “sensible reading” of Article 5 § 1(f), he found that it was not permissible under the Convention to detain, solely for purposes of administrative efficiency, an asylum seeker who had followed the proper procedures and presented no risk of absconding. Even if the detention did fall within Article 5 § 1(f), it was disproportionate to detain asylum seekers for the purpose of quickly processing their claims, since it had not been demonstrated that stringent conditions of residence, falling short of 24-hour detention, might not suffice. He also found (as did the Court of Appeal and House of Lords) that the applicant had not been given adequate reasons for his detention.

17. On 19 October 2001 the Court of Appeal unanimously overturned this judgment ([2001] EWCA Civ 1512). Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers MR, who gave the lead judgment, first considered whether the policy of detaining asylum seekers for fast-track processing at Oakington was irrational, such as to render it unlawful under domestic law. He observed that over recent years applications for asylum to the United Kingdom and other countries had been escalating. In the United Kingdom the average monthly number of applications from July to September 1999 was nearly 7,000; 60% higher than the previous year. Coping with huge numbers of asylum seekers posed heavy administrative problems, and it was in the interests of all asylum seekers to have their status determined as quickly as possible. He continued:

“We share the doubts expressed by Collins J as to whether detention is really necessary to ensure effective and speedy processing of asylum applications. But in expressing these

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doubts we ... are indulging in assumption and speculation. It is not in doubt that, if asylum applications are to be processed within the space of seven days, the applicants are necessarily going to have to be subjected to severe restraints on their liberty. In one way or another they will be required to be present in a centre at all times when they may be needed for interviews, which it is impossible to schedule to a pre-determined timetable. Would applicants voluntarily submit to such a regime, if not detained? Many no doubt would, but it is impossible to condemn as irrational the policy of subjecting those asylum seekers whose applications appear susceptible to rapid resolution to a short period of detention designed to ensure that the regime operates without dislocation.

This is not a conclusion that we have reached easily. Asylum seekers are detained at Oakington only if it seems likely that their applications can be resolved within a week. But they must also be persons who are not expected to attempt to abscond or otherwise misbehave. At first blush it seems extreme to detain those who are unlikely to run away simply to make it easier to process their claims. But the statistics that we have set out at the start of our judgment cannot be ignored. As [the Home Office minister] observed in debate in the House of Lords on 2 November 1999, faced with applications for asylum at the rate of nearly 7,000 per month, 'no responsible government can simply shrug their shoulders and do nothing' ... . A short period of detention is not an unreasonable price to pay in order to ensure the speedy resolution of the claims of a substantial proportion of this influx. In the circumstances such detention can properly be described as a measure of last resort. ...”

The Court of Appeal next considered whether the detention fell within the first limb of Article 5 § 1(f), and held that the right to liberty in Article 5 § 1(f) was intended to preserve the sovereign power of Member States to decide whether to allow aliens to enter their territories on any terms whatsoever and that detention of an alien would be covered by the sub-paragraph unless and until entry was authorised, subject to the proviso, derived from Chahal v. the United Kingdom (judgment of 15 November 1996, Reports 1996-V) that the asylum or deportation procedure should not be prolonged unreasonably.

18. On 31 October 2002 the House of Lords unanimously dismissed the applicant's appeal ([2002] UKHL 41). Having taken note of evidence that the applications of approximately 13,000 asylum seekers a year were processed at Oakington, which entailed scheduling up to 150 interviews a day, Lord Slynn of Hadley, with whom the other Law Lords agreed, held as follows:

“In international law the principle has long been established that sovereign states can regulate the entry of aliens into their territory. ...

This principle still applies subject to any treaty obligation of a state or rule of the state's domestic law which may apply to the exercise of that control. The starting point is thus in my view that the United Kingdom has the right to control the entry and continued presence of aliens in its territory. Article 5 § 1(f) seems to be based on that assumption. The question is therefore whether the provisions of para. 1(f) so control the exercise of that right that detention for the reasons and in the manner provided for in relation to Oakington is in contravention of the Article so as to make the detention unlawful.

In my view it is clear that detention to achieve a quick process of decision-making for asylum seekers is not of itself necessarily and in all cases unlawful. What is said however is that detention to achieve speedy process 'for administrative convenience' is not within para. 1(f). There must be some other factor which justifies the exercise of the power to detain such as the likelihood of the applicant absconding, committing a crime or acting in ways not conducive to the public good.

It is to be remembered that the power to detain is to 'prevent' unauthorised entry. In my opinion until the State has 'authorised' entry the entry is unauthorised. The State has power to detain without violating Article 5 until the application has been considered and the entry 'authorised'.

There remains the issue whether, even if detention to achieve speedy asylum decision-making does fall within Article 5 § 1(f), 'detention was unlawful on grounds of being a disproportionate response to the reasonable requirements of immigration control'.

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The need for highly structured and tightly managed arrangements, which would be disrupted by late[ness] or non-attendance of the applicant for interview is apparent. On the other side applicants not living at Oakington, but living where they chose, would inevitably suffer considerable inconvenience if they had to be available at short notice and continuously in order to answer questions.

It is regrettable that anyone should be deprived of his liberty other than pursuant to the order of a court but there are situations where such a course is justified. In a situation like the present with huge numbers and difficult decisions involved, with the risk of long delays to applicants seeking to come, a balancing exercise has to be performed. Getting a speedy decision is in the interests not only of the applicants but of those increasingly in the queue. Accepting as I do that the arrangements made at Oakington provide reasonable conditions, both for individuals and families and that the period taken is not in any sense excessive, I consider that the balance is in favour of recognising that detention under the Oakington procedure is proportionate and reasonable. Far from being arbitrary, it seems to me that the Secretary of State has done all that he could be expected to do to palliate the deprivation of liberty of the many applicants for asylum here.”

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE

[Omissis]

III. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW DOCUMENTS

[Omissis]

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION

41. The applicant alleged that he had been detained at Oakington in breach of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, which provides:

“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:

(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;

(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law;

(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;

(d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority;

(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants;

(f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.”

A. Whether the applicant was deprived of his liberty

42. It is not disputed by the Government that the applicant's detention at Oakington amounted to a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5 § 1. The Grand Chamber considers it clear that, given the degree of confinement at Oakington, Mr Saadi was deprived of his liberty within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 during the seven days he was held there (see, for example, Engel and Others v. the Netherlands, judgment of 8 June 1976, Series A no. 22, §§ 60-66).

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43. Article 5 § 1 sub-paragraphs (a) to (f) contain an exhaustive list of permissible grounds of deprivation of liberty, and no deprivation of liberty will be lawful unless it falls within one of those grounds (see, inter alia, Witold Litwa v. Poland, no. 26629/95, § 49, ECHR 2000-III). In the present case the Government's principal contention is that the detention was justified under the first limb of Article 5 § 1(f); although they argue in the alternative that it might also have been justified under the second limb of that sub-paragraph. The Court must accordingly first ascertain whether the applicant was lawfully detained “to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country”.

B. Whether the deprivation of liberty was permissible under sub-paragraph (f) of Article 5 § 1

1. The Chamber judgment

44. In its judgment of 11 July 2006 the Chamber held, by four votes to three, that the detention fell within the first limb of Article 5 § 1(f). The Chamber observed that it was a normal part of States' “undeniable right to control aliens' entry into and residence in their country” that States were permitted to detain would-be immigrants who had applied for permission to enter, whether by way of asylum or not. Until a potential immigrant had been granted leave to remain in the country, he had not effected a lawful entry, and detention could reasonably be considered to be aimed at preventing unlawful entry.

45. The Chamber continued that detention of a person was a major interference with personal liberty, and must always be subject to close scrutiny. Where individuals were lawfully at large in a country, the authorities might detain only if a “reasonable balance” was struck between the requirements of society and the individual's freedom. The position regarding potential immigrants, whether they were applying for asylum or not, was different to the extent that, until their application for immigration clearance and/or asylum had been dealt with, they were not “authorised” to be on the territory. Subject, as always, to the rule against arbitrariness, the Chamber accepted that the State had a broader discretion to decide whether to detain potential immigrants than was the case for other interferences with the right to liberty. Accordingly, there was no requirement in Article 5 § 1 (f) that the detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country be reasonably considered necessary, for example to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing. All that was required was that the detention should be a genuine part of the process to determine whether the individual should be granted immigration clearance and/or asylum, and that it should not otherwise be arbitrary, for example on account of its length.

46. It was plain that in the present case the applicant's detention at Oakington was a bona fide application of the policy on “fast-track” immigration decisions. As to the question of arbitrariness, the Chamber noted that the applicant was released once his asylum claim had been refused, leave to enter the United Kingdom had been refused, and he had submitted a notice of appeal. The detention lasted a total of seven days, which the Court found not to be excessive in the circumstances. It therefore found no violation of Article 5 § 1.

2. The parties' submissions

[Omissis]

4. The Court's assessment

a) The meaning of the phrase “... to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country”

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61. In the present case the Court is called upon for the first time to interpret the meaning of the words in the first limb of Article 5 § 1(f), “... lawful ... detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country ...” (in French: “la détention [régulière] d'une personne pour l'empêcher de pénétrer irrégulièrement dans le territoire”). In ascertaining the Convention meaning of this phrase, it will, as always, be guided by Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (paragraphs 26-28 above, and see, for example, Golder v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A no. 18, § 29; Johnston and Others v. Ireland, judgment of 18 December 1986, Series A no. 112, § 51 et seq.; Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 102, §§ 114 and 17; Witold Litwa v. Poland, cited above, §§ 57-59).

62. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Court is required to ascertain the ordinary meaning to be given to the words in their context and in the light of the object and purpose of the provision from which they are drawn (see the Golder judgment, § 29; the Johnston judgment, § 51; and Article 31 § 1 of the Vienna Convention). The Court must have regard to the fact that the context of the provision is a treaty for the effective protection of individual human rights and that the Convention must be read as a whole, and interpreted in such a way as to promote internal consistency and harmony between its various provisions (Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.) [GC], nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01, § 48, ECHR 2005-X). The Court must also take into account any relevant rules and principles of international law applicable in relations between the Contracting Parties (see Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom, cited above, § 55; Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland [GC], no. 45036/98, § 150, ECHR 2005-III; and Article 31 § 3(c) of the Vienna Convention). Recourse may also be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory works to the Convention, either to confirm a meaning determined in accordance with the above steps, or to establish the meaning where it would otherwise be ambiguous, obscure or manifestly absurd or unreasonable (Article 32 of the Vienna Convention).

63. When considering the object and purpose of the provision within its context, and the international law background, the Court has regard to the importance of Article 5 in the Convention system: it enshrines a fundamental human right, namely the protection of the individual against arbitrary interferences by the State with his right to liberty (see, inter alia, Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, judgment of 24 October 1979, Series A no. 33, § 37 and Brogan and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 29 November 1988, Series A no. 145-B, § 58).

64. Whilst the general rule set out in Article 5 § 1 is that everyone has the right to liberty, Article 5 § 1(f) provides an exception to that general rule, permitting States to control the liberty of aliens in an immigration context. As the Court has remarked before, subject to their obligations under the Convention, States enjoy an “undeniable sovereign right to control aliens' entry into and residence in their territory” (see the Amuur judgment cited above, § 41; the Chahal judgment cited above, § 73; Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 28 May 1985, Series A no. 94, §§ 67-68). It is a necessary adjunct to this right that States are permitted to detain would-be immigrants who have applied for permission to enter, whether by way of asylum or not. It is evident from the tenor of the judgment in Amuur that the detention of potential immigrants, including asylum seekers, is capable of being compatible with Article 5 § 1(f).

65. On this point, the Grand Chamber agrees with the Court of Appeal, the House of Lords and the Chamber, that until a State has “authorised” entry to the country, any entry is “unauthorised” and the detention of a person who wishes to effect entry and who needs but does not yet have authorisation to do so, can be, without any distortion of language, to “prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry”. It does not accept that, as soon as an asylum seeker has surrendered himself to the immigration authorities, he is seeking to effect an “authorised” entry, with the result that detention cannot be justified under the first limb of Article 5 § 1 (f). To interpret the first limb of Article 5 § 1(f) as permitting detention only of a person who is shown to be trying to evade entry restrictions would be to place too narrow a construction on the terms of the provision and on the power of the State to exercise its undeniable right of control referred to above. Such an interpretation would, moreover, be inconsistent with Conclusion No. 44 of the Executive Committee of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' Programme, the UNHCR's Guidelines and the Committee of Ministers' Recommendation (see paragraphs 34-35 and 37 above), all of which envisage the detention of asylum seekers in certain circumstances,

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for example while identity checks are taking place or when elements on which the asylum claim is based have to be determined.

66. While holding, however, that the first limb of Article 5 § 1(f) permits the detention of an asylum seeker or other immigrant prior to the State's grant of authorisation to enter, the Court emphasises that such detention must be compatible with the overall purpose of Article 5, which is to safeguard the right to liberty and ensure that no-one should be dispossessed of his or her liberty in an arbitrary fashion.

The Court must now consider what is meant by “freedom from arbitrariness” in the context of the first limb of Article 5 § 1(f) and whether, in all the circumstances, the applicant's detention was compatible with that provision.

b) The notion of arbitrary detention in the context of Article 5

67. It is well established in the Court's case-law under the sub-paragraphs of Article 5 § 1 that any deprivation of liberty must, in addition to falling within one of the exceptions set out in sub-paragraphs (a)-(f), be “lawful”. Where the “lawfulness” of detention is in issue, including the question whether “a procedure prescribed by law” has been followed, the Convention refers essentially to national law and lays down the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules of national law. Compliance with national law is not, however, sufficient: Article 5 § 1 requires in addition that any deprivation of liberty should be in keeping with the purpose of protecting the individual from arbitrariness (see, among many other authorities, Winterwerp, cited above § 37; Amuur, cited above, § 50; Chahal, cited above, § 118, and Witold Litwa, cited above, § 78). It is a fundamental principle that no detention which is arbitrary can be compatible with Article 5 § 1 and the notion of “arbitrariness” in Article 5 § 1 extends beyond lack of conformity with national law, so that a deprivation of liberty may be lawful in terms of domestic law but still arbitrary and thus contrary to the Convention.

68. While the Court has not previously formulated a global definition as to what types of conduct on the part of the authorities might constitute “arbitrariness” for the purposes of Article 5 § 1, key principles have been developed on a case-by-case basis. It is moreover clear from the case-law that the notion of arbitrariness in the context of Article 5 varies to a certain extent depending on the type of detention involved (see further below).

69. One general principle established in the case-law is that detention will be “arbitrary” where, despite complying with the letter of national law, there has been an element of bad faith or deception on the part of the authorities (see, for example, Bozano v. France, judgment of 18 December 1986, Series A no. 111; Čonka v. Belgium, no. 51564/99, ECHR 2002-I). The condition that there be no arbitrariness further demands that both the order to detain and the execution of the detention must genuinely conform with the purpose of the restrictions permitted by the relevant sub-paragraph of Article 5 § 1 (Winterwerp, cited above, § 39; Bouamar v. Belgium, judgment of 29 February 1988, Series A no. 129, § 50; O'Hara v. the United Kingdom, no. 37555/97, § 34, ECHR 2001-X). There must in addition be some relationship between the ground of permitted deprivation of liberty relied on and the place and conditions of detention (see the above-mentioned Bouamar judgment, § 50; Aerts v. Belgium, judgment of 30 July 1998, Reports 1998-V, § 46; Enhorn v. Sweden, no. 56529/00, § 42, ECHR 2005-I).

70. The notion of arbitrariness in the contexts of sub-paragraphs (b), (d) and (e) also includes an assessment whether detention was necessary to achieve the stated aim. The detention of an individual is such a serious measure that it is justified only as a last resort where other, less severe measures have been considered and found to be insufficient to safeguard the individual or public interest which might require that the person concerned be detained (see Witold Litwa, cited above, § 78; Hilda Hafsteinsdóttir v. Iceland, no. 40905/98, § 51, 8 June 2004; Enhorn v. Sweden, cited above, § 44). The principle of proportionality further dictates that where detention is to secure the fulfilment of an obligation provided by law, a balance must be struck between the importance in a democratic society of securing the immediate fulfilment of the obligation in question, and the importance of the right to liberty (see Vasileva v. Denmark, no. 52792/99, § 37, 25 September 2003). The duration of the detention is a relevant factor in striking such a balance (ibid., and see also McVeigh and Others v. the United Kingdom, applications nos. 8022/77, 8025/77, 8027/77, Commission decision of 18 March 1981, DR 25,

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pp. 37-38 and 42).

71. The Court applies a different approach towards the principle that there should be no arbitrariness in cases of detention under Article 5 § 1(a), where, in the absence of bad faith or one of the other grounds set out in paragraph 69 above, as long as the detention follows and has a sufficient causal connection with a lawful conviction, the decision to impose a sentence of detention and the length of that sentence are matters for the national authorities rather than for the Court under Article 5 § 1 (see T. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24724/94, § 103, ECHR 2000-I ; and also Stafford v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 46295/99, § 64, ECHR 2002-IV).

72. Similarly, where a person has been detained under Article 5 § 1(f), the Grand Chamber, interpreting the second limb of this sub-paragraph, held that, as long as a person was being detained “with a view to deportation”, that is, as long as “action [was] being taken with a view to deportation”, there was no requirement that the detention be reasonably considered necessary, for example to prevent the person concerned from committing an offence or fleeing (Chahal, cited above, § 112). The Grand Chamber further held in Chahal that the principle of proportionality applied to detention under Article 5 § 1(f) only to the extent that the detention should not continue for an unreasonable length of time; thus, it held (§ 113) that “any deprivation of liberty under Article 5 § 1(f) will be justified only for as long as deportation proceedings are in progress. If such proceedings are not prosecuted with due diligence, the detention will cease to be permissible ...” (and see also Gebremedhin [Gaberamadine] v. France, no. 25389/05, § 74, ECHR 2007-...).

73. With regard to the foregoing, the Court considers that the principle that detention should not be arbitrary must apply to detention under the first limb of Article 5 § 1(f) in the same manner as it applies to detention under the second limb. Since States enjoy the right to control equally an alien's entry into and residence in their country (see the cases cited in paragraph 63 above), it would be artificial to apply a different proportionality test to cases of detention at the point of entry than that which applies to deportation, extradition or expulsion of a person already in the country.

74. To avoid being branded as arbitrary, therefore, such detention must be carried out in good faith; it must be closely connected to the purpose of preventing unauthorised entry of the person to the country; the place and conditions of detention should be appropriate, bearing in mind that “the measure is applicable not to those who have committed criminal offences but to aliens who, often fearing for their lives, have fled from their own country” (see Amuur, § 43); and the length of the detention should not exceed that reasonably required for the purpose pursued.

c) Was the applicant's detention arbitrary?

75. Before examining whether the applicant's detention at Oakington was arbitrary in the sense outlined above, the Court observes that the national courts at three levels found that it had a basis in national law, and the applicant does not contend that this conclusion was incorrect.

76. In examining whether the applicant's detention was compatible with the criteria set out in paragraph 74 above, the Court further recalls the following findings of the Court of Appeal and House of Lords (see paragraphs 17-18 above), which it accepts. The national courts found that the purpose of the Oakington detention regime was to ensure the speedy resolution of some 13,000 of the approximately 84,000 asylum applications made in the United Kingdom per year at that time. In order to achieve this objective it was necessary to schedule up to 150 interviews a day and even small delays might disrupt the entire programme. The applicant was selected for detention on the basis that his case was suited for fast track processing.

77. In these circumstances, the Court finds that the national authorities acted in good faith in detaining the applicant. Indeed the policy behind the creation of the Oakington regime was generally to benefit asylum seekers; as Lord Slynn put it, “getting a speedy decision is in the interests not only of the applicants but of those increasingly in the queue” (see paragraph 18 above). Moreover, since the purpose of the deprivation of liberty was to enable the authorities quickly and efficiently to determine the applicant's claim to asylum, his detention was closely connected to the purpose of preventing unauthorised entry.

78. As regards the third criterion, the place and conditions of detention, the Court notes that the Oakington Centre was specifically adapted to hold asylum seekers and that various facilities, for recreation, religious observance, medical care and, importantly, legal assistance, were provided

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(see paragraph 25 above). While there was, undoubtedly, an interference with the applicant's liberty and comfort, he makes no complaint regarding the conditions in which he was held and the Court holds that the detention was free from arbitrariness under this head.

79. Finally, as regards the length of the detention, the Court recalls that the applicant was held for seven days at Oakington, and released the day after his claim to asylum had been refused at first instance. This period of detention cannot be said to have exceeded that reasonably required for the purpose pursued.

80. In conclusion, therefore, the Court finds that, given the difficult administrative problems with which the United Kingdom was confronted during the period in question, with an escalating flow of huge numbers of asylum-seekers (and see also Amuur, cited above, § 41), it was not incompatible with Article 5 § 1(f) of the Convention to detain the applicant for seven days in suitable conditions to enable his claim to asylum to be processed speedily. Moreover, regard must be had to the fact that the provision of a more efficient system of determining large numbers of asylum claims rendered unnecessary recourse to a broader and more extensive use of detention powers.

It follows that there has been no violation of Article 5 § 1 in the present case.

II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 2 OF THE CONVENTION

81. The applicant contended that he was not informed of the genuine reason for his detention until some 76 hours after his arrest, when the information was given orally to his legal representative in response to that person's enquiry. He alleged a violation of Article 5 § 2 of the Convention, which provides as follows:

“Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him.”

82. The Government pointed to the general statements of intent regarding the Oakington detention regime. They accepted that the forms in use at the time of the applicant's detention were deficient, but contended that the reasons given orally to the applicant's on-site representative (who knew the general reasons) on 5 January 2001 were sufficient to enable the applicant to challenge the lawfulness of his detention under Article 5 § 4 if he wished.

83. The applicant underlined that unsolicited reasons were not given at any stage, and that solicited reasons were given orally in the afternoon of 5 January 2001, some 76 hours after the arrest and detention. Mere reference to policy announcements could not displace the requirement to provide sufficiently prompt, adequate reasons to the applicant in relation to his detention.

84. The Chamber found a violation of this provision, on the ground that the reason for detention was not given sufficiently “promptly”. It found that general statements – such as the parliamentary announcements in the present case – could not replace the need under Article 5 § 2 for the individual to be informed of the reasons for his arrest or detention. The first time the applicant was told of the real reason for his detention was through his representative on 5 January 2001 (see paragraph 14 above), when the applicant had already been in detention for 76 hours. Assuming that the giving of oral reasons to a representative met the requirements of Article 5 § 2 of the Convention, the Chamber found that a delay of 76 hours in providing reasons for detention was not compatible with the requirement of the provision that such reasons should be given “promptly”.

85. The Grand Chamber agrees with the Chamber's reasoning and conclusion. It follows that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 2 of the Convention.

III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

86. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A. Damage

87. The Court notes that before the Chamber the applicant claimed EUR 5,000 compensation for non-pecuniary damage in respect of the seven days he spent in detention in Oakington. The

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Chamber, which, like the Grand Chamber, found a violation of Article 5 § 2 of the Convention but not of Article 5 § 1, held that the finding of the violation provided sufficient just satisfaction.

88. The applicant did not contest this award, neither in his request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber nor in his written observations before the Grand Chamber.

89. In all the circumstances, the Grand Chamber decides to maintain the Chamber's decision that the finding of a violation provided sufficient just satisfaction for the failure promptly to inform the applicant of the reasons for his detention.

B. Costs and expenses

90. The applicant claimed costs and expenses before the Grand Chamber of GBP 28,676.51 plus value-added tax (“VAT”), in addition to GBP 15,305.56 for costs incurred before the Chamber.

91. The Government endorsed the approach taken by the Chamber under Article 41. They considered the costs before the Grand Chamber to be excessive, in particular the rate of GBP 200 per hour charged by each of the two counsel and the number of hours claimed. If the Court were to find a violation of Article 5 § 1, no more than GBP 10,000 should be allowed for counsels' fees. If only a violation of Article 5 § 2 were found, only a small proportion of the costs claimed should be awarded.

92. In connection with the Chamber costs, the Grand Chamber recalls the Chamber's decision to award only EUR 1,500, since it had found a violation of only Article 5 § 2 and since the major part of the work on the case had been directed at establishing a violation of Article 5 § 1. The Grand Chamber maintains this award in respect of the costs and expenses incurred up to the delivery of the Chamber's judgment. Given that it, too, has found only a violation of Article 5 § 2, and that almost the entirety of the written and oral pleadings before it concerned Article 5 § 1, the Grand Chamber awards a further EUR 1,500 in respect of the proceedings subsequent to the Chamber's judgment of 11 July 2006, bringing the total costs and expenses awarded to EUR 3,000 plus any VAT that might be payable.

C. Default interest

93. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT

1. Holds by eleven votes to six that there has been no violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention;

2. Holds unanimously that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 2 of the Convention;

3. Holds unanimously that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant;

4. Holds unanimously

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, EUR 3,000 (three thousand euros) in respect of costs and expenses, to be converted into the national currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may be chargeable;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

5. Dismisses unanimously the remainder of the applicant's claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 29 January 2008.

[Omissis]

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CORTE EUROPEA DEI DIRITTI DELL’UOMO (GRANDE CAMERA)

CASE OF SAADI v. ITALY

(Application no. 37201/06)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

28 February 2008

[Omissis]

In the case of Saadi v. Italy, The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of:

Jean-Paul Costa, President, Christos Rozakis, Nicolas Bratza, Boštjan M. Zupančič, Peer Lorenzen, Françoise Tulkens, Loukis Loucaides, Corneliu Bîrsan, Nina Vajić, Vladimiro Zagrebelsky, Alvina Gyulumyan, Khanlar Hajiyev, Dean Spielmann, Egbert Myjer, Sverre Erik Jebens, Ineta Ziemele, Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre, judges, and V. BERGER, Jurisconsult,

Having deliberated in private on 11 July 2007 and 23 January 2008, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date:

PROCEDURE 1. The case originated in an application (no. 37201/06) against the Italian Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Tunisian national, Mr Nassim Saadi (“the applicant”), on 14 September 2006. 2. The applicant was represented by Mr S. Clementi and Mr B. Manara, lawyers practising in Milan. The Italian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr I.M. Braguglia, and their deputy Co-Agent, Mr N. Lettieri. 3. The applicant alleged that enforcement of a decision to deport him to Tunisia would expose him to the risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention and to a flagrant denial of justice (Article 6 of the Convention). In addition, the measure concerned would infringe his right to respect for his family life (Article 8 of the Convention) and had been taken in disregard of the procedural safeguards laid down in Article 1 of Protocol No. 7. 4. The application was allocated to the Third Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). On 16 October 2006 the President of that Section decided to give notice of the application to the respondent Government. By virtue of Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it was decided that the admissibility and merits of the application would be examined together and that the case would be given priority (Rule 41).

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5. On 29 March 2007 a Chamber of the Third Section, composed of the following judges: Boštjan M. Zupančič, Corneliu Bîrsan, Vladimiro Zagrebelsky, Alvina Gyuyulumyan, Egbert Myjer, Ineta Ziemele and Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre, and also of Santiago Quesada, Section Registrar, relinquished jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber, none of the parties having objected to relinquishment (Article 30 of the Convention and Rule 72). 6. The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined according to the provisions of Article 27 §§ 2 and 3 of the Convention and Rule 24 of the Rules of Court. 7. The applicant and the Government each filed a memorial on the merits. The parties replied in writing to each other's memorials. In addition, third-party comments were received from the United Kingdom Government, which had exercised its right to intervene (Article 36 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 44 § 2). 8. A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 11 July 2007 (Rule 59 § 3). There appeared before the Court: (a) for the respondent Government Mr N. LETTIERI, officer of the State legal service, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, deputy Co-Agent, Mrs E. MAZZUCO, prefect, Mr A. BELLA, senior police officer, Mr C. GALZERANO, deputy chief constable, Advisers; (b) for the applicant Mr S. CLEMENTI, lawyer, Counsel; (c) for the United Kingdom Government Mr D. WALTON, Agent, Mr J. SWIFT, barrister, Counsel, Mr S. BRAVINER-ROMAN, Home Office, Mrs A. FITZGERALD, Ministry of Justice, Mr E. ADAMS, Ministry of Justice, Advisers. The Court heard addresses by Mr Clementi, Mr Lettieri and Mr Swift and their replies to questions by the judges. THE FACTS I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 9. The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Milan. 10. The applicant, who entered Italy at some unspecified time between 1996 and 1999, held a residence permit issued for “family reasons” by the Bologna police authority (questura) on 29 December 2001. This permit was due to expire on 11 October 2002. A. The criminal proceedings against the applicant in Italy and Tunisia 11. On 9 October 2002 the applicant, was arrested on suspicion of involvement in international terrorism (Article 270 bis of the Criminal Code), among other offences, and placed in pre-trial detention. He and five others were subsequently committed for trial in the Milan Assize Court. 12. The applicant faced four charges. The first of these was conspiracy to commit acts of violence (including attacks with explosive devices) in States other than Italy with the aim of spreading terror. It was alleged that between December 2001 and September 2002 the applicant had been one of the organisers and leaders of the conspiracy, had laid down its ideological doctrine and given the necessary orders for its objectives to be met. The second charge concerned falsification “of a large number of documents such as passports, driving licences and residence permits”. The applicant was also accused of receiving stolen goods and of attempting to aid and abet the entry into Italian territory of an unknown number of aliens in breach of the immigration legislation. 13. At his trial the prosecution called for the applicant to be sentenced to thirteen years' imprisonment. The applicant's lawyer asked the Assize Court to acquit his client of international terrorism and left determination of the other charges to the court's discretion.

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14. In a judgment of 9 May 2005 the Milan Assize Court altered the legal classification of the first offence charged. It took the view that the acts of which he stood accused did not constitute international terrorism but criminal conspiracy. It sentenced the applicant to four years and six months' imprisonment for that offence, for the forgery and receiving offences. It acquitted the applicant of aiding and abetting clandestine immigration, ruling that the acts he stood accused of had not been committed. 15. As a secondary penalty the Assize Court banned the applicant from exercising public office for a period of five years and ordered that after serving his sentence he was to be deported. 16. In the reasons for its judgment, which ran to 331 pages, the Assize Court observed that the evidence against the applicant included intercepts of telephone and radio communications, witness statements and numerous false documents that had been seized. Taken together, this evidence proved that the applicant had been engaged in a conspiracy to receive and falsify stolen documents, an activity from which he derived his means of subsistence. On the other hand, it had not been established that the documents in question had been used by the persons in whose names they had been falsely made out to enter Italian territory illegally. 17. As regards the charge of international terrorism, the Assize Court first noted that a conspiracy was “terrorist” in nature where its aim was to commit violent acts against civilians or persons not actively participating in armed conflict with the intention of spreading terror or obliging a government or international organisation to perform or refrain from performing any act, or where the motive was political, ideological or religious in nature. In the present case it was not known whether the violent acts which the applicant and his accomplices were preparing to commit, according to the prosecution submissions, were to be part of an armed conflict or not. 18. In addition, the evidence taken during the investigation and trial was not capable of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had begun to put into practice their plan of committing acts of violence, or that they had provided logistical or financial support to other persons or organisations having terrorist aims. In particular, such evidence was not provided by the telephone and radio intercepts. These proved only that the applicant and his accomplices had links with persons and organisations belonging to Islamic fundamentalist circles, that they were hostile to “infidels” (and particularly those present in territories considered to be Muslim) and that their relational world was made up of “brothers” united by identical religious and ideological beliefs. 19. Using coded language the defendants and their correspondents had repeatedly mentioned a “football match”, intended to strengthen their faith in God. For the Assize Court it was quite obvious that this was not a reference to some sporting event but to an action applying the principles of the most radical form of Islam. However, it had not been possible to ascertain what particular “action” was meant or where it was intended to take place. 20. Moreover, the applicant had left Milan on 17 January 2002 and, after a stopover in Amsterdam, made his way to Iran, from where he had returned to Italy on 14 February 2002. He had also spoken of a “leader of the brothers” who was in Iran. Some members of the group to which the applicant belonged had travelled to “training camps” in Afghanistan and had procured weapons, explosives and observation and video recording equipment. In the applicant's flat and those of his co-defendants the police had seized propaganda about jihad – or holy war – on behalf of Islam. In addition, in telephone calls to members of his family in Tunisia made from the place where he was being detained in Italy, the applicant had referred to the “martyrdom” of his brother Fadhal Saadi; in other conversations he had mentioned his intention to take part in holy war. 21. However, no further evidence capable of proving the existence and aim of a terrorist organisation had been found. In particular, there was no evidence that the applicant and his accomplices had decided to channel their fundamentalist faith into violent action covered by the definition of a terrorist act. Their desire to join a jihad and eliminate the enemies of Islam could very well be satisfied through acts of war in the context of an armed conflict, that is, acts not covered by the concept of “terrorism”. It had not been established whether the applicant's brother had really died in a suicide bombing or whether that event had been the “football match” which the defendants had repeatedly referred to. 22. The applicant and the prosecution appealed. The applicant asked to be acquitted of all the charges, while the prosecution wanted him to be convicted of international terrorism and aiding and abetting clandestine immigration too.

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23. In the prosecution's appeal it was submitted that, according to the case-law of the Court of Cassation, the constituent elements of the crime of international terrorism were made out even where no act of violence had occurred, the existence of a plan to commit such an act being sufficient. In addition, an action could be terrorist in nature even if it was intended to be carried out in the context of an armed conflict, provided that the perpetrators were not members of the “armed forces of a State” or an “insurrectionary group”. In the present case, it was apparent from the documents in the file that the applicant and his associates had procured for themselves and others false documents, weapons, explosives and money in order to commit violent acts intended to affirm the ideological values of fundamentalist Islam. In addition, the accused had maintained contacts with persons and organisations belonging to the sphere of international terrorism and had planned a violent and unlawful action, due to be carried out in October 2002 as part of a “holy war” and in a country other than Italy. Only the defendants' arrest had prevented the plan being implemented. Furthermore, at that time the armed conflict in Afghanistan had ended and the one in Iraq had not yet started. 24. The prosecution further submitted that the applicant's brother, Mr Fadhal Saadi, had been detained in Iran; the applicant had visited him there in either January or February 2002. After his release Mr Fadhal Saadi had settled in France and stayed in contact with the applicant. He had then died in a suicide bombing, a fact which was a source of pride for the applicant and the other members of his family. That was revealed by the content of the telephone conversations intercepted in the prison where the applicant was being held. 25. Lastly, the prosecution requested leave to produce new evidence, namely letters and statements from a person suspected of terrorist activities and recordings transmitted by radio microphone from inside a mosque in Milan. 26. On 13 March 2006 the Milan Assize Court of Appeal asked the Constitutional Court to rule on the constitutionality of Article 593 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”). As amended by Law no. 46 of 20 February 2006, that provision permitted the defence and the prosecution to appeal against acquittals only where, after the close of the first-instance proceedings, new evidence had come to light or been discovered. The Assize Court of Appeal stayed the proceedings pending a ruling by the Constitutional Court. 27. In judgment no. 26 of 6 February 2007 the Constitutional Court declared the relevant provisions of Italian law unconstitutional in that they did not allow the prosecution to appeal against all acquittals and because they provided that appeals lodged by the prosecuting authorities before the entry into force of Law no. 46 of 20 February 2006 were inadmissible. The Constitutional Court observed in particular that Law no. 46 did not maintain the fair balance that should exist in a criminal trial between the rights of the defence and those of the prosecution. 28. The first hearing before the Milan Assize Court of Appeal was set down for 10 October 2007. 29. In the meantime, on 11 May 2005, two days after delivery of the Milan Assize Court's judgment, a military court in Tunis had sentenced the applicant in his absence to twenty years' imprisonment for membership of a terrorist organisation operating abroad in time of peace and for incitement to terrorism. He was also deprived of his civil rights and made subject to administrative supervision for a period of five years. The applicant asserted that he had not learned of his conviction until, the judgment having become final, its operative part was served on his father on 2 July 2005. 30. The applicant alleged that his family and his lawyer were not able to obtain a copy of the judgment by which the applicant had been convicted by the Tunis military court. In a letter of 22 May 2007 to the President of Tunisia and the Tunisian Minister of Justice and Human Rights, his representatives before the Court asked to be sent a copy of the judgment in question. The result of their request is not known. B. The order for the applicant's deportation and his appeals against its enforcement and for the issue of a residence permit and/or the granting of refugee status 31. On 4 August 2006, after being imprisoned uninterruptedly since 9 October 2002, the applicant was released. 32. On 8 August 2006 the Minister of the Interior ordered him to be deported to Tunisia, applying the provisions of Legislative decree no. 144 of 27 July 2005 (entitled “urgent measures to combat international terrorism” and later converted to statute law in the form of Law no. 155

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of 31 July 2005). He observed that “it was apparent from the documents in the file” that the applicant had played an “active role” in an organisation responsible for providing logistical and financial support to persons belonging to fundamentalist Islamist cells in Italy and abroad. Consequently, his conduct was disturbing public order and threatening national security. 33. The Minister made it clear that the applicant could not return to Italy except on the basis of an ad hoc ministerial authorisation. 34. The applicant was taken to a temporary holding centre (centro di permanenza temporanea) in Milan. On 11 August 2006, the deportation order was confirmed by the Milan justice of the peace. 35. On 11 August 2006 the applicant requested political asylum. He alleged that he had been sentenced in his absence in Tunisia for political reasons and that he feared he would be subjected to torture and “political and religious reprisals”. By a decision of 16 August 2006 the head of the Milan police authority (questore) declared the request inadmissible on the ground that the applicant was a danger to national security. 36. On 6 September 2006 the director of a non-governmental organisation, the World Organisation Against Torture (known by its French initials – OMCT), wrote to the Italian Prime Minister to tell him the OMCT was “extremely concerned” about the applicant's situation, and that it feared that, if deported to Tunisia, he would be tried again for the same offences he stood accused of in Italy. The OMCT also pointed out that, under the terms of Article 3 of the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, “No State Party shall expel, return or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture”. 37. On 12 September 2006 the president of another non-governmental organisation, the Collective of the Tunisian community in Europe, appealed to the Italian Government to “end its policy of mass deportation of Tunisian immigrants [who were] practising adherents of religious faiths”. He alleged that the Italian authorities were using inhuman methods and had grounded a number of decisions against Tunisians on their religious convictions. He went on to say that it was “obvious” that on arrival in Tunisia the persons concerned would be “tortured and sentenced to lengthy terms of imprisonment, on account of the fact that the Italian authorities falsely suspect them of terrorism”. The applicant's name appeared in a list of persons at imminent risk of expulsion to Tunisia which was appended to the letter of 12 September 2006. 38. The chief constable's decision of 16 August 2006 (see paragraph 35 above) was served on the applicant on 14 September 2006. The applicant did not appeal. However, on 12 September 2006 he had produced documents, including the OMCT's letter of 6 September 2006 and the reports on Tunisia by Amnesty International and the US State Department, requesting that these be passed on to the local refugee status board. On 15 September 2006 the Milan police authority informed the applicant orally that as his asylum request had been refused the documents in question could not be taken into consideration. 39. On 14 September 2006, pleading Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the applicant asked the Court to suspend or annul the decision to deport him to Tunisia. On 15 September 2006 the Court decided to ask the Italian Government to provide it with information, covering in particular the question whether the applicant's conviction by the Tunis military court was final and also whether in Tunisian law there was a remedy whereby it was possible to obtain the reopening of proceedings or a retrial. 40. The Government's reply was received at the Registry on 2 October 2006. According to the Italian authorities, in the event of a conviction in the absence of the accused, Tunisian law gave the person convicted the right to have the proceedings reopened. The Government referred in particular to a fax of 29 September 2006 from the Italian ambassador in Tunis stating that, according to the information supplied by the Director of International Cooperation at the Tunisian Ministry of Justice, the applicant's conviction was not final since a person convicted in his absence could appeal against the relevant judgment. 41. On 5 October 2006 the Court decided to apply Rule 39. It asked the Government to stay the applicant's expulsion until further notice. 42. The maximum time allowed for the applicant's detention with a view to expulsion expired on 7 October 2006 and he was released on that date. However, on 6 October 2006 a new deportation order had been issued against him. On 7 October 2006 this order was served on the applicant, who was then taken back to the Milan temporary holding centre. As the applicant had

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stated that he had entered Italy from France, the new deportation order named France as the receiving country, not Tunisia. On 10 October 2006 the new deportation order was confirmed by the Milan justice of the peace. 43. On 3 November 2006 the applicant was released because fresh information indicated that it was impossible to deport him to France. On the same day the Milan Assize Court of Appeal ordered precautionary measures, to take effect immediately after the applicant's release: he was forbidden to leave Italian territory and required to report to a police station on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays. 44. In the meantime, on 27 September 2006, the applicant had applied for a residence permit. On 4 December 2006 the Milan police authority replied that this application could not be allowed. It was explained that a residence permit could be issued “in the interests of justice” only at the request of the judicial authorities, where the latter considered that the presence of an alien in Italy was necessary for the proper conduct of a criminal investigation. The applicant had in any case been forbidden to leave Italian territory and was therefore obliged to stay in Italy. Moreover, to obtain a residence permit it was necessary to produce a passport or similar document. 45. Before the Court the applicant alleged that the Tunisian authorities had refused to renew his passport, so that all his further attempts to regularise his situation had come to nothing. 46. On a date which has not been specified the applicant also asked the Lombardy Regional Administrative Court (“the RAC”) to set aside the deportation order of 6 October 2006 and stay its execution. 47. In a decision of 9 November 2006 the Lombardy RAC held that there was no cause to rule on the application for a stay of execution and ordered the file to be transmitted to the Lazio RAC, which had the appropriate territorial jurisdiction. 48. The Lombardy RAC pointed out among other observations that the European Court of Human Rights had already requested a stay of execution of the deportation order and had consequently provided redress for any prejudice the applicant might allege. 49. According to the information supplied by the applicant on 29 May 2007, the proceedings in the Lazio RAC were still pending on that date. 50. On 18 January 2007 the applicant sent a memorial to the Milan police authority pointing out that the European Court of Human Rights had requested a stay of execution of his deportation on account of a real risk that he would be subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. He therefore asked for a hearing before the local refugee status board with a view to being granted political asylum. According to the information supplied by the applicant on 11 July 2007, there had been no reply to his memorial by that date. In a memorandum of 20 July 2007 the Italian Ministry of the Interior stated that the memorial of 18 January 2007 could not be regarded as a new asylum request or as an appeal against the refusal given by the Milan chief constable on 16 August 2006 (see paragraph 35 above). C. The diplomatic assurances requested by Italy from Tunisia 51. On 29 May 2007 the Italian embassy in Tunis sent a note verbale to the Tunisian Government requesting diplomatic assurances that if the applicant were to be deported to Tunisia he would not be subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention and would not suffer a flagrant denial of justice. 52. The note in question, written in French, reads as follows: “The Italian embassy presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, following the meeting between the Italian ambassador Mr Arturo Olivieri and his Excellency the Minister of Justice and Human Rights Mr Béchir Tekkari, on the occasion of the visit of the Italian Minister of Justice Mr Clemente Mastella, on 28 May 2007, has the honour to request the precious collaboration of the Tunisian authorities in reaching a positive development in the following case. The Tunisian national Nassim Saadi, born in Haidra (Tunisia) on 30.11.1974, was served with an order for his deportation from Italy, issued by the Ministry of the Interior on 08.08.2006. After the above order had been issued Mr Saadi lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights on 14.09.2006, requesting and obtaining the decision to stay execution of the deportation order. His application is based on the argument that after being tried in his absence he was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment for terrorist-related offences, in a judgment given by the Tunis

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military court on 11.05.2005, served on Mr Saadi's father on 02.07.2005. Because of his conviction, Mr Saadi contends that if the deportation order were to be enforced he would run the risk of being imprisoned in Tunisia on his arrival, on the basis of an unfair trial, and of being subjected to torture and inhuman and degrading treatment (please find enclosed a copy of the document by which the judgment was served supplied by Mr Saadi). In order to gather all the information necessary to assess the case, the European Court of Human Rights has asked the Italian Government to supply a copy of the judgment and wishes to ascertain whether the Italian Government intend, before deporting Mr Saadi, to seek diplomatic guarantees from the Tunisian Government. In the light of the foregoing, the Italian embassy, counting on the sensitivity of the Tunisian authorities on the question, has the honour to formulate, subject to the judicial prerogatives of the Tunisian State, the following urgent request for guarantees, as an indispensable formal prerequisite for the solution of the case now pending: - if the information given by Mr Saadi concerning the existence of a judgment of 11.05.2005 in which he was found guilty by the Tunis military court corresponds to the truth, please send a full copy of the judgment in question (before 11.07.2007, the date of the hearing before the Court) and confirm that he has the right to appeal, and to be judged by an independent and impartial tribunal, in accordance with a procedure which, taken as a whole, complies with the principles of a fair and public trial; - please give assurances that the fears expressed by Mr Saadi of being subjected to torture and inhuman and degrading treatment on his return to Tunisia are unfounded; - please give assurances that if he were to be committed to prison he would be able to receive visits from his lawyers and members of his family. In addition, the Italian embassy would be grateful if the Tunisian authorities would keep it informed of the conditions of Mr Saadi's detention if he were to be committed to prison. The way this case is determined will have significant implications for future security policy. The information mentioned above, which the European Court of Human Rights has requested from the Italian Government, are indispensable if the deportation is to go ahead. To a certain extent, this case forms a precedent (in relation to numerous other pending cases) and – we are convinced – a positive response by the Tunisian authorities will make it easier to carry out further expulsions in future. While perfectly aware of the delicate nature of the subject, the Italian embassy counts on the understanding of the Tunisian authorities, hoping that their reply will be in the spirit of effective action against terrorism, within the framework of the friendly relations between our two countries.” 53. The Italian Government observed that such assurances had never before been requested from the Tunisian authorities. 54. On 4 July 2007 the Tunisian Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a note verbale to the Italian embassy in Tunis. Its content was as follows: “The Minister of Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Italian ambassador in Tunis and, referring to the ambassador's note verbale no. 2533 of 2 July 2007 concerning Nassim Saadi, currently imprisoned in Italy, has the honour to inform the ambassador that the Tunisian Government confirm that they are prepared to accept the transfer to Tunisia of Tunisians imprisoned abroad once their identity has been confirmed, in strict conformity with the national legislation in force and under the sole safeguard of the relevant Tunisian statutes. The Minister of Foreign Affairs seizes this opportunity of expressing once again to the Italian ambassador in Tunis the assurance of his high regard.” 55. A second note verbale, dated 10 July 2007, was worded as follows: “The Minister of Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Italian ambassador in Tunis and, referring to his note verbale no. 2588 of 5 July 2007, has the honour to confirm to him the content of the Ministry's note verbale no. 511 of 4 July 2007. The Minister of Foreign Affairs hereby confirms that the Tunisian laws in force guarantee and protect the rights of prisoners in Tunisia and secure to them the right to a fair trial. The Minister would point out that Tunisia has voluntarily acceded to the relevant international treaties and conventions. The Minister of Foreign Affairs seizes this opportunity of expressing once again to the Italian ambassador in Tunis the assurance of his high regard.”

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D. The applicant's family situation 56. According to the applicant, in Italy he lives with an Italian national, Mrs V., whom he married in a Muslim marriage ceremony. They have an eight-year-old child (born on 22 July 1999), an Italian national, who attends school in Italy. Mrs V. is unemployed and is not at present in receipt of any family allowance. She suffers from a type of ischaemia. 57. According to a memorandum of 10 July 2007 from the Ministry of the Interior, on 10 February 2007 the applicant married, in a Muslim marriage ceremony, a second wife, Mrs G. While officially resident in via Cefalonia, Milan, at the address occupied by Mrs V., the applicant is said to be separated de facto from both his wives. Since the end of 2006 he has been habitually resident in via Ulisse Dini, Milan, in a flat which he apparently shares with other Tunisians.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW

[Omissis]

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION

95. The applicant submitted that enforcement of his deportation would expose him to the risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, which provides:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

96. The Government rejected that argument.

A. Admissibility

97. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

1. Arguments of the parties

(a) The applicant

98. The applicant submitted that it was “a matter of common knowledge” that persons suspected of terrorist activities, in particular those connected with Islamist fundamentalism, were frequently tortured in Tunisia. He had lodged a request for political asylum which had been refused by the Milan police authority without his being interviewed by the Italian refugee status board. His attempts to obtain a residence permit had failed because the Tunisian consulate had refused to renew his passport, a document which the Italian authorities had asked him to produce. In the aggregate these circumstances amounted to “persecution”.

99. In addition, the investigations conducted by Amnesty International and by the US State Department showed that torture was practised in Tunisia and that some persons deported there had quite simply disappeared. The numerous press articles and witness accounts he had produced condemned the treatment of political prisoners and their families.

100. The applicant's family had received a number of visits from the police and was constantly subject to threats and provocations. His sister had twice tried to kill herself because of this.

101. In view of the serious risks to which he would be exposed if he were to be deported, the applicant considered that a mere reminder of the treaties signed by Tunisia could not be regarded as sufficient.

(b) The Government

102. The Government considered it necessary in the first place to provide an account of the background to the case. After the attacks of 11 September 2001 on the “twin towers” in New York the Italian police, having been tipped off by intelligence services, uncovered an international network of militant Islamists, mainly composed of Tunisians, and placed it under surveillance. In May 2002 one of the leaders of this network, Mr Faraj Faraj Hassan, was arrested in London. The applicant had in the meantime left Milan for Iran, where he had spent time in an al-Qaeda training camp. He then returned to Italy, from where he

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frequently travelled to the Côte d'Azur. There, with the help of another Tunisian living in San Remo, Mr Imed Zarkaoui, he met his brother, Mr Fadhal Saadi.

103. Mr Zarkaoui had been given the job of finding fulminate of mercury to make detonators, while in Italy another accomplice was seeking information about night-filming cameras. Contact was established with Malaysia, where the group which was to carry out the attacks were standing by, and weapons were distributed to some militants. The Islamist cell to which the applicant belonged had embarked on a large-scale enterprise involving the production of false identity papers and their distribution to its members. The Government rejected the applicant's argument that the offence – forgery – of which he had been convicted in Italy was not linked to the activity of terrorist groups; in that connection they pointed out that although the applicant and one of his co-defendants held legal residence permits they had provided themselves with false papers.

104. In that context, in October 2002, a number of European police forces launched “Operation Bazar”, as a result of which the applicant, Mr Zarkaoui and three other persons were arrested in Italy. Mr Fadhal Saadi managed to evade an attempt by the French police to arrest him. He was later to die in a suicide bombing in Iraq. When the applicant's family informed him of this he was delighted to learn that his brother had died a “martyr” in the war against “the infidel”. In the criminal proceedings against the applicant in Italy the prosecution was convinced of three things: that the cell he belonged to was associated with al-Qaeda, that it was preparing an attack against an unidentified target and that it was receiving instructions from abroad.

105. The Government next observed that a danger of death or the risk of being exposed to torture or to inhuman and degrading treatment must be corroborated by appropriate evidence. However, in the present case the applicant had neither produced precise information in that regard nor supplied detailed explanations, confining himself to describing an allegedly general situation in Tunisia. The “international sources” cited by the applicant were indeterminate and irrelevant. The same was true of the press articles he had produced, which came from unofficial circles with a particular ideological and political slant. As this information had not been checked, nor had an explanation been requested from the Tunisian Government, it had no probative value. The provocations that the applicant's family had allegedly suffered at the hands of the Tunisian police had nothing to do with what the applicant sought to prove before the Court.

106. The Amnesty International report cited three isolated cases, connected to the prevention of terrorism, which did not disclose “anything to be concerned about” (certain persons had been convicted of terrorism or were awaiting trial). Regarding the allegations of ill-treatment, the report used the conditional tense or expressions such as “it seems”. There was therefore no certainty as to what had happened. The superficial nature of the report was “obvious” in the passages concerning Italy, which described as a human rights violation the deportation to Syria of Muhammad Al-Shari, whose application to the Court had been rejected as manifestly ill-founded (see Al-Shari and Others v. Italy (dec.), no. 57/03, 5 July 2005).

107. The report by the US State Department cited (a) the case of Moncef Louhici or Ouahichi, in which the investigation into a complaint by the family of a person allegedly killed by the police was still in progress; (b) the case of Badreddine Rekeii or Reguii, which concerned crimes without a political motivation, and about which the Tunisian authorities had provided complete and reassuring details; (c) the case of the “Bizerte” group, in which five of the eleven defendants had been acquitted on appeal and the sentences of the other six had been considerably reduced; and (d) imprecisely identified cases to which vague reference was made or cases involving offences without political motivation or concerning freedom of expression or association.

108. The Government argued that these documents did not portray Tunisia as a kind of “hell”, the term used by the applicant. The situation in the country was, by and large, not very different from that in certain States which had signed the Convention.

109. The misfortunes of Mr Hichem Ben Said Ben Frej, cited by the applicant (see paragraph 94 above), were not relevant in the present case, since he had committed suicide.

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110. The Government further observed that in numerous cases concerning expulsion to countries (Algeria in particular) where subjection to ill-treatment as a regular practice seemed much more alarming than in Tunisia, the Court had rejected the applicants' allegations.

111. The Government also noted that Tunisia had ratified numerous international instruments for the protection of human rights, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, all adopted by the United Nations. Under Article 32 of the Tunisian Constitution, international treaties took precedence over statute law. In addition, Italy and Tunisia had signed bilateral agreements on the question of emigration and combating transnational crime, including terrorism (see paragraph 61 above). That presupposed a common basis of respect for fundamental rights. The effectiveness of the agreements concerned would be jeopardised if the Court were to assert as a principle that Tunisians could not be deported.

112. Tunisia had also signed an association agreement with the European Union. A precondition for implementation of that agreement was respect for fundamental freedoms and democratic principles (see paragraph 62 above). The European Union was an international organisation which, according to the Court's case-law, was presumed to provide a level of protection of fundamental rights “equivalent” to that provided by the Convention. Moreover, the Tunisian authorities permitted the International Red Cross and “other international bodies” to visit prisons (see paragraphs 80 and 81 above). In the Government's submission, it could be presumed that Tunisia would not default on its obligations under international treaties.

113. In Tunisia the terrorist danger was a grim reality, as shown by the explosion on Djerba on 11 April 2002, for which al-Qaeda had claimed responsibility. To meet that danger the Tunisian authorities had, like some European States, enacted a law for the prevention of terrorism.

114. In these circumstances, the “benefit of the doubt” should be given to the State which intended to deport the applicant and whose national interests were threatened by his presence. In that connection, account had to be taken of the scale of the terrorist threat in the world of today and of the objective difficulties of combating it effectively, regard being had not only to the risks in the event of deportation but also to those which would arise in the absence of deportation. In any event, the Italian legal system provided safeguards for the individual – including the possibility of obtaining refugee status – which made expulsion contrary to the requirements of the Convention “practically impossible”.

115. At the hearing before the Court the Government had agreed in substance with the arguments of the third-party intervener (see paragraphs 117-123 below), observing that, before the order for the applicant's deportation was made, the applicant had neither mentioned the risk of ill-treatment in Tunisia, although he must have been aware of it, nor requested political asylum. His allegations had accordingly come too late to be credible.

116. Lastly, the Government observed that, even though there was no extradition request or a situation raising concern regarding respect for human rights (like, for example, the one described in the Chahal v. the United Kingdom judgment of 15 November 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-V), Italy had sought diplomatic assurances from Tunisia (see paragraphs 51 and 52 above). In response, Tunisia had given an undertaking to apply in the present case the relevant Tunisian law (see paragraphs 54 and 55 above), which provided for severe punishment of acts of torture or ill-treatment and extensive visiting rights for a prisoner's lawyer and family.

2. The third-party intervener

117. The United Kingdom Government observed that in the Chahal case (cited above, § 81) the Court had stated the principle that in view of the absolute nature of the prohibition of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, the risk of such treatment could not be weighed against the reasons (including the protection of national security) put forward by the respondent State to justify expulsion. Yet because of its rigidity that principle had

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caused many difficulties for the Contracting States by preventing them in practice from enforcing expulsion measures. The Government observed in that connection that it was unlikely that any State other than the one of which the applicant was a national would be prepared to receive into its territory a person suspected of terrorist activities. In addition, the possibility of having recourse to criminal sanctions against the suspect did not provide sufficient protection for the community.

118. The individual concerned might not commit any offence (or else, before a terrorist attack, only minor ones) and it could prove difficult to establish his involvement in terrorism beyond a reasonable doubt, since it was frequently impossible to use confidential sources or information supplied by intelligence services. Other measures, such as detention pending expulsion, placing the suspect under surveillance or restricting his freedom of movement provided only partial protection.

119. Terrorism seriously endangered the right to life, which was the necessary precondition for enjoyment of all other fundamental rights. According to a well-established principle of international law, States could use immigration legislation to protect themselves from external threats to their national security. The Convention did not guarantee the right to political asylum. This was governed by the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, which explicitly provided that there was no entitlement to asylum where there was a risk for national security or where the asylum seeker had been responsible for acts contrary to the principles of the United Nations. Moreover, Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention authorised the arrest of a person “against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation...”, and thus recognised the right of States to deport aliens.

120. It was true that the protection against torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment provided by Article 3 of the Convention was absolute. However, in the event of expulsion, the treatment in question would be inflicted not by the signatory State but by the authorities of another State. The signatory State was then bound by a positive obligation of protection against torture implicitly derived from Article 3. Yet in the field of implied positive obligations the Court had accepted that the applicant's rights must be weighed against the interests of the community as a whole.

121. In expulsion cases the degree of risk in the receiving country depended on a speculative assessment. The level required to accept the existence of the risk was relatively low and difficult to apply consistently. Moreover, Article 3 of the Convention prohibited not only extremely serious forms of treatment, such as torture, but also conduct covered by the relatively general concept of “degrading treatment”. And the nature of the threat presented by an individual to the signatory State also varied significantly.

122. In the light of the foregoing considerations, the United Kingdom argued that, in cases concerning the threat created by international terrorism, the approach followed by the Court in the Chahal case (which did not reflect a universally recognised moral imperative and was in contradiction with the intentions of the original signatories of the Convention) had to be altered and clarified. In the first place, the threat presented by the person to be deported must be a factor to be assessed in relation to the possibility and the nature of the potential ill-treatment. That would make it possible to take into consideration all the particular circumstances of each case and weigh the rights secured to the applicant by Article 3 of the Convention against those secured to all other members of the community by Article 2. Secondly, national-security considerations must influence the standard of proof required from the applicant. In other words, if the respondent State adduced evidence that there was a threat to national security, stronger evidence had to be adduced to prove that the applicant would be at risk of ill-treatment in the receiving country. In particular, the individual concerned must prove that it was “more likely than not” that he would be subjected to treatment prohibited by Article 3. That interpretation was compatible with the wording of Article 3 of the United Nations Convention against Torture, which had been based on the case-law of the Court itself, and took account of the fact that in expulsion cases it was necessary to assess a possible future risk.

123. Lastly, the United Kingdom Government emphasised that Contracting States could obtain diplomatic assurances that an applicant would not be subjected to treatment contrary to the Convention. Although, in the above-mentioned Chahal case, the Court had considered it

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necessary to examine whether such assurances provided sufficient protection, it was probable, as had been shown by the opinions of the majority and the minority of the Court in that case, that identical assurances could be interpreted differently.

3. The Court's assessment

(a) General principles

i. Responsibility of Contracting States in the event of expulsion

124. It is the Court's settled case-law that as a matter of well-established international law, and subject to their treaty obligations, including those arising from the Convention, Contracting States have the right to control the entry, residence and removal of aliens (see, among many other authorities, Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 28 May 1985, Series A no. 94, § 67, and Boujlifa v. France, judgment of 21 October 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VI, § 42). In addition, neither the Convention nor its Protocols confer the right to political asylum (see Vilvarajah and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 30 October 1991, Series A no. 215, § 102, and Ahmed v. Austria, judgment of 17 December 1996, Reports 1996-VI, § 38).

125. However, expulsion by a Contracting State may give rise to an issue under Article 3, and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if deported, faces a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3. In such a case Article 3 implies an obligation not to deport the person in question to that country (see Soering v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A no. 161, §§ 90-91; Vilvarajah and Others, cited above, § 103; Ahmed, cited above, § 39; H.L.R. v. France, judgment of 29 April 1997, Reports 1997 III, § 34; Jabari v. Turkey, no. 40035/98, § 38, ECHR 2000-VIII; and Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, no. 1948/04, § 135, 11 January 2007).

126. In this type of case the Court is therefore called upon to assess the situation in the receiving country in the light of the requirements of Article 3. Nonetheless, there is no question of adjudicating on or establishing the responsibility of the receiving country, whether under general international law, under the Convention or otherwise. In so far as any liability under the Convention is or may be incurred, it is liability incurred by the Contracting State, by reason of its having taken action which has as a direct consequence the exposure of an individual to the risk of proscribed ill-treatment (see Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, § 67, ECHR 2005-I).

127. Article 3, which prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, enshrines one of the fundamental values of democratic societies. Unlike most of the substantive clauses of the Convention and of Protocols Nos. 1 and 4, Article 3 makes no provision for exceptions and no derogation from it is permissible under Article 15, even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation (see Ireland v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 8 January 1978, Series A no. 25, § 163; Chahal, cited above, § 79; Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803/94, § 95, ECHR 1999-V; Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 35763/97, § 59, ECHR 2001-XI; and Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia, no. 36378/02, § 335, ECHR 2005-III). As the prohibition of torture and of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is absolute, irrespective of the victim's conduct (see Chahal, cited above, § 79), the nature of the offence allegedly committed by the applicant is therefore irrelevant for the purposes of Article 3 (see Indelicato v. Italy, no. 31143/96, § 30, 18 October 2001, and Ramirez Sanchez v. France [GC], no. 59450/00, §§ 115-116, 4 July 2006).

ii. Material used to assess the risk of exposure to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention

128. In determining whether substantial grounds have been shown for believing that there is a real risk of treatment incompatible with Article 3, the Court will take as its basis all the material placed before it or, if necessary, material obtained proprio motu (see H.L.R. v. France, cited above, § 37, and Hilal v. the United Kingdom, no. 45276/99, § 60, ECHR 2001-II). In cases such as the present the Court's examination of the existence of a real risk must necessarily be a rigorous one (see Chahal, cited above, § 96).

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129. It is in principle for the applicant to adduce evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if the measure complained of were to be implemented, he would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 (see N. v. Finland, no. 38885/02, § 167, 26 July 2005). Where such evidence is adduced, it is for the Government to dispel any doubts about it.

130. In order to determine whether there is a risk of ill-treatment, the Court must examine the foreseeable consequences of sending the applicant to the receiving country, bearing in mind the general situation there and his personal circumstances (see Vilvarajah and Others, cited above, § 108 in fine).

131. To that end, as regards the general situation in a particular country, the Court has often attached importance to the information contained in recent reports from independent international human-rights-protection associations such as Amnesty International, or governmental sources, including the US State Department (see, for example, Chahal, cited above, §§ 99-100; Müslim v. Turkey, no.o53566/99, § 67, 26 April 2005; Said v. the Netherlands, no. 2345/02, § 54, 5 July 2005; and Al-Moayad v. Germany (dec.), no.o35865/03, §§ 65-66, 20 February 2007). At the same time, it has held that the mere possibility of ill-treatment on account of an unsettled situation in the receiving country does not in itself give rise to a breach of Article 3 (see Vilvarajah and Others, cited above, § 111, and Fatgan Katani and Others v. Germany (dec.), no. 67679/01, 31 May 2001) and that, where the sources available to it describe a general situation, an applicant's specific allegations in a particular case require corroboration by other evidence (see Mamatkulov and Askarov, cited above, § 73, and Müslim, cited above, § 68).

132. In cases where an applicant alleges that he or she is a member of a group systematically exposed to a practice of ill-treatment, the Court considers that the protection of Article 3 of the Convention enters into play when the applicant establishes, where necessary on the basis of the sources mentioned in the previous paragraph, that there are serious reasons to believe in the existence of the practice in question and his or her membership of the group concerned (see, mutatis mutandis, Salah Sheekh, cited above, §§ 138-149).

133. With regard to the material date, the existence of the risk must be assessed primarily with reference to those facts which were known or ought to have been known to the Contracting State at the time of expulsion. However, if the applicant has not yet been extradited or deported when the Court examines the case, the relevant time will be that of the proceedings before the Court (see Chahal, cited above, §§ 85 and 86, and Venkadajalasarma v. the Netherlands, no. 58510/00, § 63, 17 February 2004). This situation typically arises when, as in the present case, deportation or extradition is delayed as a result of an indication by the Court of an interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (see Mamatkulov and Askarov, cited above, § 69). Accordingly, while it is true that historical facts are of interest in so far as they shed light on the current situation and the way it is likely to develop, the present circumstances are decisive.

iii. The concepts of “torture” and “inhuman or degrading treatment”

134. According to the Court's settled case-law, ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum level of severity is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, among other authorities, Price v. the United Kingdom, no..33394/96, § 24, ECHR 2001-VII; Mouisel v. France, no. 67263/01, § 37, ECHR 2002-IX; and Jalloh v. Germany [GC], no. 54810/00, § 67, 11 July 2006).

135. In order for a punishment or treatment associated with it to be “inhuman” or “degrading”, the suffering or humiliation involved must in any event go beyond that inevitable element of suffering or humiliation connected with a given form of legitimate treatment or punishment (see Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 120, ECHR 2000-IV).

136. In order to determine whether any particular form of ill-treatment should be qualified as torture, regard must be had to the distinction drawn in Article 3 between this notion and that of inhuman or degrading treatment. This distinction would appear to have been embodied in the Convention to allow the special stigma of “torture” to attach only to

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deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering (see Aydin v. Turkey, judgment of 25 September 1997, Reports 1997-VI, § 82, and Selmouni, cited above, § 96).

(b) Application of the above principles to the present case

137. The Court notes first of all that States face immense difficulties in modern times in protecting their communities from terrorist violence (see Chahal, cited above, § 79, and Shamayev and Others, cited above, § 335). It cannot therefore underestimate the scale of the danger of terrorism today and the threat it presents to the community. That must not, however, call into question the absolute nature of Article 3.

138. Accordingly, the Court cannot accept the argument of the United Kingdom Government, supported by the respondent Government, that a distinction must be drawn under Article 3 between treatment inflicted directly by a signatory State and treatment that might be inflicted by the authorities of another State, and that protection against this latter form of ill-treatment should be weighed against the interests of the community as a whole (see paragraphs 120 and 122 above). Since protection against the treatment prohibited by Article 3 is absolute, that provision imposes an obligation not to extradite or expel any person who, in the receiving country, would run the real risk of being subjected to such treatment. As the Court has repeatedly held, there can be no derogation from that rule (see the case-law cited in paragraph 127 above). It must therefore reaffirm the principle stated in the Chahal judgment (cited above, § 81) that it is not possible to weigh the risk of ill-treatment against the reasons put forward for the expulsion in order to determine whether the responsibility of a State is engaged under Article 3, even where such treatment is inflicted by another State. In that connection, the conduct of the person concerned, however undesirable or dangerous, cannot be taken into account, with the consequence that the protection afforded by Article 3 is broader than that provided for in Articles 32 and 33 of the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (see Chahal, cited above, § 80 and paragraph 63 above). Moreover, that conclusion is in line with points IV and XII of the guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on human rights and the fight against terrorism (see paragraph 64 above).

139. The Court considers that the argument based on the balancing of the risk of harm if the person is sent back against the dangerousness he or she represents to the community if not sent back is misconceived. The concepts of “risk” and “dangerousness” in this context do not lend themselves to a balancing test because they are notions that can only be assessed independently of each other. Either the evidence adduced before the Court reveals that there is a substantial risk if the person is sent back or it does not. The prospect that he may pose a serious threat to the community if not returned does not reduce in any way the degree of risk of ill treatment that the person may be subject to on return. For that reason it would be incorrect to require a higher standard of proof, as submitted by the intervener, where the person is considered to represent a serious danger to the community, since assessment of the level of risk is independent of such a test.

140. With regard to the second branch of the United Kingdom Government's arguments, to the effect that where an applicant presents a threat to national security, stronger evidence must be adduced to prove that there is a risk of ill-treatment (see paragraph 122 above), the Court observes that such an approach is not compatible with the absolute nature of the protection afforded by Article 3 either. It amounts to asserting that, in the absence of evidence meeting a higher standard, protection of national security justifies accepting more readily a risk of ill-treatment for the individual. The Court therefore sees no reason to modify the relevant standard of proof, as suggested by the third-party intervener, by requiring in cases like the present that it be proved that subjection to ill-treatment is “more likely than not”. On the contrary, it reaffirms that for a planned forcible expulsion to be in breach of the Convention it is necessary – and sufficient – for substantial grounds to have been shown for believing that there is a real risk that the person concerned will be subjected in the receiving country to treatment prohibited by Article 3 (see paragraphs 125 and 132 above and the case-law cited in those paragraphs).

141. The Court further observes that similar arguments to those put forward by the third-party intervener in the present case have already been rejected in the Chahal judgment cited

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above. Even if, as the Italian and United Kingdom Governments asserted, the terrorist threat has increased since that time, that circumstance would not call into question the conclusions of the Chahal judgment concerning the consequences of the absolute nature of Article 3.

142. Furthermore, the Court has frequently indicated that it applies rigorous criteria and exercises close scrutiny when assessing the existence of a real risk of ill-treatment (see Jabari, cited above, § 39) in the event of a person being removed from the territory of the respondent State by extradition, expulsion or any other measure pursuing that aim. Although assessment of that risk is to some degree speculative, the Court has always been very cautious, examining carefully the material placed before it in the light of the requisite standard of proof (see paragraphs 128 and 132 above) before indicating an interim measure under Rule 39 or finding that the enforcement of removal from the territory would be contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. As a result, since adopting the Chahal judgment it has only rarely reached such a conclusion.

143. In the present case the Court has had regard, firstly, to the reports of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch on Tunisia (see paragraphs 65-79 above), which describe a disturbing situation. The conclusions of those reports are corroborated by the report of the US State Department (see paragraphs 82-93 above). In particular, these reports mention numerous and regular cases of torture and ill-treatment meted out to persons accused under the 2003 Prevention of Terrorism Act. The practices reported – said to be often inflicted on persons in police custody with the aim of extorting confessions – include hanging from the ceiling, threats of rape, administration of electric shocks, immersion of the head in water, beatings and cigarette burns, all of these being practices which undoubtedly reach the level of severity required by Article 3. It is reported that allegations of torture and ill-treatment are not investigated by the competent Tunisian authorities, that they refuse to follow up complaints and that they regularly use confessions obtained under duress to secure convictions (see paragraphs 68, 71, 73-75, 84 and 86 above). Bearing in mind the authority and reputation of the authors of these reports, the seriousness of the investigations by means of which they were compiled, the fact that on the points in question their conclusions are consistent with each other and that those conclusions are corroborated in substance by numerous other sources (see paragraph 94 above), the Court does not doubt their reliability. Moreover, the respondent Government have not adduced any evidence or reports capable of rebutting the assertions made in the sources cited by the applicant.

144. The applicant was prosecuted in Italy for participation in international terrorism and the deportation order against him was issued by virtue of Legislative decree no. 144 of 27 July 2005 entitled “urgent measures to combat international terrorism” (see paragraph 32 above). He was also sentenced in Tunisia, in his absence, to twenty years' imprisonment for membership of a terrorist organisation operating abroad in time of peace and for incitement to terrorism. The existence of that sentence was confirmed by Amnesty International's statement of 19 June 2007 (see paragraph 71 above).

145. The Court further notes that the parties do not agree on the question whether the applicant's trial in Tunisia could be reopened. The applicant asserted that it was not possible for him to appeal against his conviction with suspensive effect, and that, even if he could, the Tunisian authorities could imprison him as a precautionary measure (see paragraph 154 below).

146. In these circumstances, the Court considers that in the present case substantial grounds have been shown for believing that there is a real risk that the applicant would be subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention if he were to be deported to Tunisia. That risk cannot be excluded on the basis of other material available to the Court. In particular, although it is true that the International Committee of the Red Cross has been able to visit Tunisian prisons, that humanitarian organisation is required to maintain confidentiality about its fieldwork (see paragraph 80 above) and, in spite of an undertaking given in April 2005, similar visiting rights have been refused to the independent human-rights-protection organisation Human Rights Watch (see paragraphs 76 and 90 above). Moreover, some of the acts of torture reported allegedly took place while the victims were

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in police custody or pre-trial detention on the premises of the Ministry of the Interior (see paragraphs 86 and 94 above). Consequently, the visits by the International Committee of the Red Cross cannot exclude the risk of subjection to treatment contrary to Article 3 in the present case.

147. The Court further notes that on 29 May 2007, while the present application was pending before it, the Italian Government asked the Tunisian Government, through the Italian embassy in Tunis, for diplomatic assurances that the applicant would not be subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention (see paragraphs 51 and 52 above). However, the Tunisian authorities did not provide such assurances. At first they merely stated that they were prepared to accept the transfer to Tunisia of Tunisians detained abroad (see paragraph 54 above). It was only in a second note verbale, dated 10 July 2007 (that is, the day before the Grand Chamber hearing), that the Tunisian Ministry of Foreign Affairs observed that Tunisian laws guaranteed prisoners' rights and that Tunisia had acceded to “the relevant international treaties and conventions” (see paragraph 55 above). In that connection, the Court observes that the existence of domestic laws and accession to international treaties guaranteeing respect for fundamental rights in principle are not in themselves sufficient to ensure adequate protection against the risk of ill-treatment where, as in the present case, reliable sources have reported practices resorted to or tolerated by the authorities which are manifestly contrary to the principles of the Convention.

148. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that even if, as they did not do in the present case, the Tunisian authorities had given the diplomatic assurances requested by Italy, that would not have absolved the Court from the obligation to examine whether such assurances provided, in their practical application, a sufficient guarantee that the applicant would be protected against the risk of treatment prohibited by the Convention (see Chahal, cited above, § 105). The weight to be given to assurances from the receiving State depends, in each case, on the circumstances prevailing at the material time.

149. Consequently, the decision to deport the applicant to Tunisia would breach Article 3 of the Convention if it were enforced.

II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION

[Omissis] 160. The Court recalls its finding that the deportation of the applicant to Tunisia would constitute a violation of Article 3 of the Convention (see paragraph 149 above). Having no reason to doubt that the respondent Government will comply with the present judgment, it considers that it is not necessary to decide the hypothetical question whether, in the event of expulsion to Tunisia, there would also be a violation of Article 6 of the Convention.

III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION

[Omissis] 170. The Court recalls its finding that the deportation of the applicant to Tunisia would constitute a violation of Article 3 of the Convention (see paragraph 149 above). Having no reason to doubt that the respondent Government will comply with the present judgment, it considers that it is not necessary to decide the hypothetical question whether, in the event of expulsion to Tunisia, there would also be a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.

IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 7

[Omissis]

180. The Court recalls its finding that the deportation of the applicant to Tunisia would constitute a violation of Article 3 of the Convention (see paragraph 149 above). Having no reason to doubt that the respondent Government will comply with the present judgment, it

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considers that it is not necessary to decide the hypothetical question whether, in the event of expulsion to Tunisia, there would also be a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 7.

V. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

181. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A. Damage

182. The applicant requested in the first place 20,000 euros (EUR) for loss of income. He observed that the deportation order had caused him to fall into an irregular situation, that he had been detained unlawfully in the Milan temporary holding centre for three months and that this had prevented him from carrying on his occupation.

183. In respect of non-pecuniary damage, the applicant claimed EUR 50,000 and suspension and/or annulment of the deportation order.

184. The Government observed that the deportation had not been enforced, so that the applicant, an alien who had contravened the laws of the Italian State and had been lawfully detained after 9 October 2002, was not entitled to claim for any pecuniary damage or loss of income.

185. On the question of non-pecuniary damage, the Government submitted that there was no causal link between the conduct of the Italian authorities and the sufferings and inconvenience alleged by the applicant. In any event, the applicant had not indicated what criteria had been used for the calculation of the sum claimed.

186. The Court reiterates that it is able to make awards by way of the just satisfaction provided for in Article 41 where the loss or damage on which a claim is based has been caused by the violation found, but that the State is not required to make good damage not attributable to it (see Perote Pellon v. Spain, no. 45238/99, § 57, 25 July 2002).

187. In the present case, the Court has found that enforcement of the applicant's deportation to Tunisia would breach Article 3 of the Convention. On the other hand, it has not found any violations of the Convention on account of the deprivation of the applicant's liberty or the fact that his presence in Italy was unlawful. Consequently, it can see no causal link between the violation found in the present judgment and the pecuniary damage alleged by the applicant.

188. With regard to the non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant, the Court considers that the finding that his deportation, if carried out, would breach Article 3 of the Convention constitutes sufficient just satisfaction.

B. Costs and expenses

189. The applicant did not request reimbursement of the costs and expenses incurred during the domestic proceedings. He did, however, request reimbursement of his costs relating to the proceedings before the Court, which, according to a bill from his lawyer, amounted to EUR 18,179.57.

190. The Government considered that amount excessive. 191. According to the Court's established case-law, an award can be made in respect of costs

and expenses incurred by the applicant only in so far as they have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum (see Belziuk v. Poland, judgment of 25 March 1998, Reports 1998-II, § 49).

192. The Court considers the amount claimed for the costs and expenses relating to the proceedings before it excessive and decides to award EUR 8,000 under that head.

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C. Default interest

193. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1. Declares the application admissible; 2. Holds that, if the decision to deport the applicant to Tunisia were to be enforced, there would

be a violation of Article 3 of the Convention; 3. Holds that it is not necessary to examine whether enforcement of the decision to deport the

applicant to Tunisia would also be in breach of Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 7;

4. Holds that the finding of a violation constitutes sufficient just satisfaction for the non-

pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant; 5. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, EUR 8,000 (eight thousand euros) in respect of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant; (b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

6. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 28 February 2008.

Vincent BERGER Jean-Paul COSTA Jurisconsult President

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CORTE DI GIUSTIZIA DELLE COMUNITA EUROPEE (Quarta S ezione)

29 gennaio 2009 «Diritto d’asilo – Regolamento (CE) n. 343/2003 – Ripresa in carico da parte di uno Stato membro di un richiedente asilo la cui domanda è stata respinta e che si trova in un altro Stato membro dove ha proposto una nuova domanda d’asilo – Dies a quo del termine di

esecuzione del trasferimento del richiedente asilo – Procedura di trasferimento che costituisce oggetto di un ricorso che può avere effetto sospensivo»

Nel procedimento C-19/08, avente ad oggetto la domanda di pronuncia pregiudiziale proposta alla Corte, ai sensi dell’art. 68, n. 1, CE e dell’art. 234 CE, dal Kammarrätten i Stockholm, Migrationsöverdomstolen (Svezia), con decisione 17 gennaio 2008, pervenuta in cancelleria il 21 gennaio 2008, nella causa Migrationsverket contro Edgar Petrosian, Nelli Petrosian, Svetlana Petrosian, David Petrosian, Maxime Petrosian,

LA CORTE (Quarta Sezione),

[Omissis]

ha pronunciato la seguente

Sentenza

1 La domanda di pronuncia pregiudiziale riguarda l’interpretazione dell’art. 20, nn. 1, lett. d), e 2, del regolamento (CE) del Consiglio 18 febbraio 2003, n. 343, che stabilisce i criteri e i meccanismi di determinazione dello Stato membro competente per l’esame di una domanda d’asilo presentata in uno degli Stati membri da un cittadino di un paese terzo (GU L 50, pag. 1).

2 Detta domanda è stata presentata nel contesto di una controversia che vede il sig. e la sig.ra Petrosian, nonché i loro tre figli (in prosieguo, congiuntamente: i «membri della famiglia Petrosian»), cittadini di nazionalità armena (fatta eccezione per la sig.na Nelli Petrosian, di nazionalità ucraina), contrapposti al Migrationsverket (Ufficio nazionale dell’immigrazione), responsabile delle questioni relative all’immigrazione e incaricato di istruire la domanda d’asilo degli interessati, in merito alla decisione di detta autorità che dispone il loro trasferimento verso un altro Stato membro in cui essi avevano già subìto il rigetto di una loro prima domanda d’asilo.

Contesto normativo

La normativa comunitaria

3 Il quarto ‘considerando’ del regolamento n. 343/2003 enuncia quanto segue:

«[Il meccanismo per determinare con chiarezza e praticità lo Stato membro competente per l’esame di una domanda di asilo] dovrebbe essere fondato su criteri oggettivi ed equi sia per gli Stati membri sia per le persone interessate. Dovrebbe, soprattutto, consentire di determinare con rapidità lo Stato membro competente al fine di garantire l’effettivo accesso alle procedure volte al riconoscimento dello status di rifugiato e non dovrebbe pregiudicare l’obiettivo di un rapido espletamento delle domande d’asilo».

4 Il quindicesimo ‘considerando’ di tale regolamento così recita:

«Il presente regolamento rispetta i diritti fondamentali e osserva i principi che sono riconosciuti, segnatamente, dalla Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell’Unione europea [proclamata a Nizza il 7 dicembre 2000 (GU C 364, pag. 1)]. In particolare, il presente regolamento intende assicurare il pieno rispetto del diritto d’asilo garantito dall’articolo 18».

5 L’art. 1 del regolamento n. 343/2003 così dispone:

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«Il presente regolamento stabilisce i criteri e i meccanismi di determinazione dello Stato membro competente per l’esame di una domanda d’asilo presentata in uno degli Stati membri da un cittadino di un paese terzo».

6 L’art. 3, n. 1, di detto regolamento così prevede:

«Gli Stati membri esaminano la domanda di asilo di un cittadino di un paese terzo presentata alla frontiera o nel rispettivo territorio. Una domanda d’asilo è esaminata da un solo Stato membro, che è quello individuato come Stato competente in base ai criteri enunciati al capo III».

7 L’art. 4 di detto regolamento enuncia quanto segue:

«1. Il procedimento volto a determinare lo Stato membro competente ai sensi del presente regolamento è avviato non appena una domanda d’asilo è presentata per la prima volta in uno Stato membro.

(...)

5. Lo Stato membro nel quale è stata presentata la domanda d’asilo è tenuto, alle condizioni di cui all’articolo 20 e al fine di portare a termine il procedimento di determinazione dello Stato membro competente per l’esame della domanda, a riprendere in carico il richiedente asilo che si trova in un altro Stato membro e ha presentato colà una nuova domanda d’asilo dopo aver ritirato la domanda di asilo durante il procedimento volto a determinare lo Stato membro competente.

(...)».

8 Nel contesto del capo V del regolamento n. 343/2003, che è dedicato all’obbligo di prendere o riprendere in carico il richiedente asilo, l’art. 16 di detto regolamento è così formulato:

«1. Lo Stato membro competente per l’esame di una domanda d’asilo in forza del presente regolamento è tenuto a:

(…)

e) riprendere in carico, alle condizioni di cui all’articolo 20, il cittadino di un paese terzo del quale ha respinto la domanda e che si trova nel territorio di un altro Stato membro senza esserne stato autorizzato.

(...)».

9 L’art. 20 del regolamento n. 343/2003 così prevede:

«1. La ripresa in carico di un richiedente asilo in conformità dell’articolo 4, paragrafo 5, e dell’articolo 16, paragrafo 1, lettere c), d) ed e), è effettuata con le seguenti modalità:

a) la richiesta in tal senso deve contenere indicazioni che permettano allo Stato membro richiesto di verificare se è competente;

b) lo Stato membro richiesto è tenuto a procedere alle verifiche necessarie e rispondere a tale richiesta quanto prima e senza comunque superare il termine di un mese dalla data in cui è investito della questione. Quando la richiesta è basata su dati ottenuti dal sistema Eurodac, tale termine è ridotto a due settimane;

c) se lo Stato membro richiesto non comunica la propria decisione entro il termine di un mese o di due settimane di cui alla lettera b), si ritiene che abbia accettato di riprendere in carico il richiedente asilo;

d) lo Stato membro che accetta di riprendere in carico il richiedente asilo è tenuto a riammetterlo nel suo territorio. Il trasferimento avviene conformemente al diritto nazionale dello Stato membro richiedente, previa concertazione tra gli Stati membri interessati, non appena ciò sia materialmente possibile e, al più tardi, entro sei mesi dall’accettazione della richiesta di presa in carico da parte di un altro Stato membro o della decisione su un ricorso o una revisione in caso di effetto sospensivo;

e) lo Stato membro richiedente notifica al richiedente asilo la decisione relativa alla richiesta allo Stato membro competente di riprenderlo in carico. Detta decisione è

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motivata. Essa è corredata dei termini relativi all’esecuzione del trasferimento e contiene, se necessario, le informazioni relative al luogo e alla data in cui il richiedente deve presentarsi, nel caso si rechi nello Stato membro competente con i propri mezzi. La decisione può formare oggetto di ricorso o revisione. Il ricorso o la revisione della decisione non ha effetto sospensivo ai fini dell’esecuzione del trasferimento eccetto quando il giudice o l’organo giurisdizionale competente decida in tal senso caso per caso se la legislazione nazionale lo consente.

Se necessario, lo Stato membro richiedente rilascia al richiedente asilo un lasciapassare conforme al modello adottato con la procedura di cui all’articolo 27, paragrafo 2.

Lo Stato membro competente informa lo Stato membro richiedente dell’arrivo a destinazione del richiedente asilo o, eventualmente, del fatto che il medesimo non si è presentato nei termini prescritti.

2. Se il trasferimento non avviene entro sei mesi, la competenza ricade sullo Stato membro nel quale è stata presentata la domanda d’asilo. Questo termine può essere prorogato fino a un massimo di un anno se non è stato possibile effettuare il trasferimento o l’esame della domanda a causa della detenzione del richiedente asilo, o fino a un massimo di diciotto mesi qualora il richiedente asilo si sia reso irreperibile.

(...)».

La normativa nazionale

10 L’art. 9, capo 1, della legge 2005/716 in materia di immigrazione [utlänningslagen (2005/716)] enuncia che le disposizioni riguardanti l’allontanamento dei richiedenti asilo previste da detta legge si applicano anche mutatis mutandis alle decisioni di trasferimento adottate ai sensi del regolamento n. 343/2003.

11 L’art. 6 del capo 4 nonché gli artt. 4 e 7 del capo 8 di detta legge prevedono che le decisioni relative al riconoscimento della qualità di rifugiato politico e all’allontanamento dei richiedenti asilo vengano adottate dal Migrationsverket.

12 Secondo l’art. 3 del capo 14 di detta legge, la decisione del Migrationsverket può essere oggetto di ricorso in primo grado dinanzi al migrationsdomstol (tribunale amministrativo dipartimentale che statuisce in materia di immigrazione), in particolare, se tale decisione prevede l’allontanamento del richiedente asilo.

13 L’art. 9, nn. 1 e 3, del capo 16 della medesima legge prevede che le sentenze del migrationsdomstol possono costituire oggetto di ricorso in appello dinanzi al Migrationsöverdomstol (corte amministrativa d’appello competente a statuire in materia di immigrazione), le cui sentenze non possono a loro volta essere impugnate.

14 L’art. 28 della legge 1971/291 sul procedimento amministrativo [förvaltningsprocesslagen (1971/291)] prevede che il giudice adito per il ricorso possa, da un lato, disporre che la decisione impugnata, se è immediatamente esecutiva, non si applichi fino a nuovo ordine e, dall’altro, adottare altri provvedimenti provvisori relativi alla controversia.

Causa principale e questione pregiudiziale

15 I membri della famiglia Petrosian hanno proposto il 22 marzo 2006 determinate domande di asilo in Svezia, in cui si trovavano all’epoca.

16 L’esame di dette domande ha rivelato che gli interessati avevano già presentato altre domande, in particolare in Francia. Il Migrationsverket ha quindi chiesto alle autorità francesi di riprendere in carico i membri della famiglia Petrosian, ai sensi dell’art. 16, n. 1, lett. e), del regolamento n. 343/2003.

17 Dette autorità non hanno risposto al Migrationsverket nel termine previsto all’art. 20, n. 1, lett. b), del regolamento n. 343/2003. Il Migrationsverket ha quindi indicato loro che, in conformità dell’art. 20, n. 1, lett. c), di detto regolamento, si poteva ritenere che la Repubblica francese avesse acconsentito a riprendere in carico i membri della famiglia Petrosian.

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18 In un secondo momento, le autorità francesi hanno confermato al Migrationsverket che esse accettavano di riprendere in carico gli interessati. In tali circostanze, il Migrationsverket ha deciso, il 1º agosto 2006, il trasferimento dei membri della famiglia Petrosian verso la Francia, sulla base dell’art. 20, n. 1, lett. d) ed e), del regolamento n. 343/2003.

19 I membri della famiglia Petrosian hanno proposto, contro la decisione 1º agosto 2006 che ordina detto trasferimento, ricorso dinanzi al länsrätten i Skåne län, migrationsdomstolen (Tribunale amministrativo dipartimentale della Scania competente a statuire in materia di immigrazione), e hanno chiesto che le loro domande d’asilo fossero esaminate in Svezia.

20 Il 23 agosto 2006, detto giudice ha deciso di sospendere l’esecuzione del trasferimento in Francia dei membri della famiglia Petrosian, in attesa di una decisione finale nel merito o fino a diversa decisione. L’8 maggio 2007, detto giudice ha emesso una sentenza di merito, con cui ha respinto il ricorso dei membri della famiglia Petrosian e ha, in tal modo, posto fine alla sospensione del trasferimento di questi ultimi verso la Francia.

21 I membri della famiglia Petrosian hanno proposto ricorso in appello contro la sentenza del länsrätten i Skåne län, migrationsdomstolen, dinanzi al Kammarrätten i Stockholm, Migrationsöverdomstolen (Corte amministrativa d’appello di Stoccolma competente a statuire in materia di immigrazione), per vizio procedurale, chiedendo l’annullamento della decisione che dispone il loro trasferimento verso la Francia e, in subordine, il rinvio della controversia dinanzi al lansrätten i Skåne län.

22 Il 10 maggio 2007, il Kammarrätten i Stockholm, Migrationsöverdomstolen, ha deciso la sospensione del trasferimento dei membri della famiglia Petrosian verso la Francia, in attesa di una decisione finale nel merito o fino a diversa decisione.

23 Il 16 maggio 2007, tale giudice ha emesso una sentenza definitiva che ha annullato la sentenza del länsrätten i Skåne län, migrationsdomstolen, e ha rinviato la causa dinanzi a quest’ultimo, accogliendo un motivo di natura procedurale vertente sull’irregolarità della composizione del collegio giudicante che aveva statuito sulla controversia. Il Kammarrätten i Stockholm, Migrationsöverdomstolen, ha del pari ordinato la sospensione dell’esecuzione della decisione che dispone il trasferimento della famiglia Petrosian verso la Francia, fino alla pronuncia nel merito del länsrätten i Skåne län, migrationsdomstolen, o fino a diversa decisione.

24 Quest’ultimo giudice ha giudicato di nuovo la causa il 29 giugno 2007 ed ha annullato la decisione del Migrationsverket che dispone il trasferimento dei membri della famiglia Petrosian verso la Francia. Esso ha rinviato la controversia dinanzi al Migrationsverket ai fini di un riesame. Nella motivazione della sua sentenza, il länsrätten i Skåne län, migrationsdomstolen, si è riferito ad una sentenza di principio del Kammarrätten i Stockholm, Migrationsöverdomstolen, del 14 maggio 2007, in cui quest’ultimo ha giudicato che l’art. 20, n. 1, lett. d), del regolamento n. 343/2003, in forza del quale il trasferimento deve essere realizzato, al più tardi, nel termine di sei mesi a partire dall’accettazione della richiesta di presa in carico da parte di un altro Stato membro o della decisione su un ricorso o una revisione in caso di effetto sospensivo, deve essere interpretato nel senso che il termine di esecuzione del trasferimento deve decorrere a partire dalla decisione provvisoria che sospende l’esecuzione del trasferimento.

25 Poiché il länsrätten i Skåne län, migrationsdomstolen, ha disposto detta sospensione il 23 agosto 2006, il termine di esecuzione del trasferimento era pertanto, a suo avviso, scaduto il 24 febbraio 2007, data a partire dalla quale, da una parte, la competenza ad esaminare le domande di asilo dei membri della famiglia Petrosian spettava al Regno di Svezia in forza dell’art. 20, n. 2, del regolamento n. 343/2003 e, dall’altra, gli interessati non potevano più essere trasferiti in Francia.

26 Il Migrationsverket ha proposto ricorso in appello contro la sentenza del länsrätten i Skåne län, migrationsdomstolen, dinanzi al Kammarrätten i Stockholm, Migrationsöverdomstolen, il 9 luglio 2007. Esso ha sostenuto dinanzi a tale giudice che, in seguito all’adozione di una decisione sospensiva, il termine di esecuzione del trasferimento era sospeso cosicché esso decorre per un periodo di sei mesi a partire dal giorno in cui la decisione sospesa sia nuovamente esecutiva.

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27 In tale contesto, il Kammarrätten i Stockholm, Migrationsöverdomstolen, ha deciso di sospendere il giudizio e di sottoporre alla Corte la seguente questione pregiudiziale:

«Se l’art. 20, nn. 1, lett. d), e 2, del regolamento (…) n. 343/2003 (…) debba essere interpretato nel senso che la competenza ad esaminare la domanda di asilo spetta allo Stato membro in cui la domanda è stata presentata se il trasferimento non è stato eseguito entro sei mesi a decorrere da una decisione provvisoria che sospenda l’esecuzione del trasferimento e indipendentemente dalla data in cui viene emessa la decisione definitiva riguardante la questione se occorra procedere al trasferimento».

Sulla questione pregiudiziale

28 Con la sua questione, il giudice del rinvio chiede, sostanzialmente, se l’art. 20, nn. 1, lett. d), e 2, del regolamento n. 343/2003 debba essere interpretato nel senso che, qualora, nel contesto della procedura di trasferimento del richiedente asilo, la normativa dello Stato membro richiedente preveda l’effetto sospensivo del ricorso, il termine di esecuzione del trasferimento decorra già a partire dalla decisione giurisdizionale provvisoria che sospende l’esecuzione del procedimento di trasferimento, oppure soltanto a partire dalla decisione giurisdizionale che statuisce sulla fondatezza del procedimento e che non può più ostacolare tale esecuzione.

Osservazioni presentate alla Corte

29 Gli otto governi che hanno presentato le loro osservazioni scritte nella presente controversia, nonché la Commissione delle Comunità europee, ritengono che l’art. 20, nn. 1, lett. d), e 2, del regolamento n. 343/2003 debba essere interpretato nel senso che, in caso di effetto sospensivo del ricorso diretto contro la decisione di trasferimento, il termine di sei mesi entro il quale tale trasferimento deve essere eseguito decorra soltanto a partire dalla decisione adottata nel merito su tale ricorso e non a partire dalla decisione che dispone la sospensione del trasferimento.

30 Secondo tali governi e la Commissione, risulta dai lavori preparatori del regolamento n. 343/2003 che il legislatore comunitario ha inteso attuare un regime in cui il trasferimento non deve essere eseguito prima che si statuisca sul merito del ricorso. La soluzione contraria, infatti, equivarrebbe ad imporre ai giudici e alle autorità competenti un termine massimo per statuire sui ricorsi relativi alle decisioni di trasferimento, cosa che non spetterebbe al legislatore comunitario stabilire, e ciò benché l’esame delle situazioni individuali che ricadono nell’ambito di applicazione di tale regolamento richieda pronunce basate su valutazioni complesse che soltanto difficilmente potrebbero essere effettuate entro un termine in sei mesi.

31 Alcuni di questi governi fanno, inoltre, valere che, dal punto di vista pratico, imporre ai giudici nazionali di statuire nel termine di sei mesi favorirebbe la proposizione abusiva di ricorsi da parte dei richiedenti asilo, in quanto, negli Stati membri in cui tali giudici sono sovraccarichi di lavoro, detto termine verrebbe frequentemente superato e, per questa ragione, lo Stato membro richiedente diverrebbe sistematicamente lo Stato competente per la domanda d’asilo.

Soluzione della Corte

32 In forza dell’art. 20, n. 1, lett. d), del regolamento n. 343/2003, il trasferimento di un richiedente asilo verso lo Stato membro che è tenuto a riammetterlo viene effettuato a partire da quando ciò è materialmente possibile e, al più tardi, entro sei mesi dall’accettazione della richiesta di presa in carico da parte di un altro Stato membro o della decisione su un ricorso o una revisione in caso di effetto sospensivo. Secondo il n. 2 dello stesso articolo, se il trasferimento non avviene entro tale termine di sei mesi, la competenza ricade sullo Stato membro nel quale è stata presentata la domanda d’asilo.

33 La formulazione di tali disposizioni non consente di per sé di determinare se il termine di esecuzione del trasferimento decorra già a partire da una decisione giurisdizionale provvisoria che sospende l’esecuzione di un procedimento di trasferimento oppure esclusivamente a partire da una decisione giurisdizionale che statuisce sulla fondatezza di detto procedimento.

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34 Occorre ricordare, tuttavia, che, secondo una giurisprudenza costante, ai fini dell’interpretazione di una norma di diritto comunitario si deve tener conto non soltanto della lettera della stessa, ma anche del suo contesto e degli scopi perseguiti dalla normativa di cui essa fa parte (v., in particolare, sentenze 18 maggio 2000, causa C-301/98, KVS International, Racc. pag. I-3583, punto 21, nonché 23 novembre 2006, causa C-300/05, ZVK, Racc. pag. I-11169, punto 15).

35 Ai sensi dell’art. 20, n. 1, lett. d), del regolamento n. 343/2003, in combinato disposto con il n. 1, lett. c), dello stesso articolo, tre eventi sono idonei, secondo le circostanze, a far scattare il termine di sei mesi di cui lo Stato membro richiedente dispone per effettuare il trasferimento del richiedente asilo. Si può trattare, in primo luogo, della decisione dello Stato membro richiesto di accettare la ripresa in carico del richiedente asilo, in secondo luogo, della scadenza infruttuosa del termine di un mese assegnato allo Stato membro richiesto per pronunciarsi sulla domanda dello Stato membro richiedente ai fini della ripresa in carico del richiedente asilo e, in terzo luogo, della decisione sul ricorso ovvero della revisione in caso di effetto sospensivo nello Stato membro richiedente.

36 Questi tre eventi devono essere analizzati in funzione dell’esistenza o meno, nella normativa dello Stato membro richiedente, di un ricorso che può avere effetto sospensivo, tenendo conto dell’obiettivo per il quale il regolamento n. 343/2003 prevede un termine di esecuzione del trasferimento.

37 Al riguardo, occorre distinguere due ipotesi.

38 Come deriva dalla formulazione dell’art. 20, n. 1, lett. d), del regolamento n. 343/2003, in una prima ipotesi, qualora non sia previsto alcun ricorso idoneo ad avere effetto sospensivo, il termine di esecuzione del trasferimento decorre a partire dalla decisione, esplicita o presunta, mediante la quale lo Stato membro richiesto ha accettato la ripresa in carico dell’interessato, indipendentemente dall’alea cui è soggetto il ricorso che il richiedente asilo ha, eventualmente, proposto contro la decisione che ha disposto il suo trasferimento dinanzi ai giudici dello Stato membro richiedente.

39 Rimane, quindi, soltanto da disciplinare le modalità della realizzazione del trasferimento e, in particolare, da fissare la data di quest’ultimo.

40 È in tale contesto che l’art. 20, n. 1, lett. d), del regolamento n. 343/2003 concede allo Stato membro richiedente un termine di sei mesi per effettuare il trasferimento. Detto termine ha quindi lo scopo, in considerazione della complessità pratica e delle difficoltà organizzative che si ricollegano all’esecuzione del trasferimento, di consentire ai due Stati membri interessati di accordarsi ai fini della realizzazione di quest’ultimo e, più in particolare, di consentire allo Stato membro richiedente di disciplinare le modalità di realizzazione del trasferimento, che viene effettuato secondo la legislazione nazionale di quest’ultimo Stato.

41 Risulta, peraltro, dall’esposizione dei motivi allegati alla proposta di regolamento del Consiglio che fissa i criteri e i meccanismi di determinazione dello Stato membro competente per l’esame di una domanda d’asilo presentata in uno degli Stati membri da parte del cittadino di un paese terzo, depositata dalla Commissione il 26 luglio 2001 [COM(2001) 447 def., pagg. 5, 19 e 20] che è proprio per tenere conto delle difficoltà pratiche incontrate dagli Stati membri nella realizzazione del trasferimento che la Commissione ha proposto di protrarre il termine di esecuzione del trasferimento. Detto termine, fissato ad un mese nella convenzione sulla determinazione dello Stato competente per l’esame di una domanda d’asilo presentata in uno degli Stati membri delle Comunità europee, firmata a Dublino il 15 giugno 1990 (GU 1997, C 254, pag. 1), alla quale si è sostituito il regolamento n. 343/2003, è stato poi portato, in conformità alla detta proposta di regolamento, a sei mesi dall’art. 20, n. 1, lett. d), dello stesso regolamento.

42 In una seconda ipotesi, qualora lo Stato membro ricorrente preveda un ricorso idoneo ad avere effetto sospensivo e il giudice di detto Stato membro accordi tale effetto alla sua decisione, l’art. 20, n. 1, lett. d), del regolamento n. 343/2003 stabilisce che il termine di esecuzione del trasferimento decorre a partire dalla «decisione su un ricorso o una revisione».

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43 In questa seconda situazione, anche se il dies a quo del termine di esecuzione del trasferimento è diverso da quello che è fissato nella prima situazione ipotizzata, è nondimeno vero che ciascuno dei due Stati membri interessati, per poter organizzare il trasferimento, deve affrontare le stesse difficoltà pratiche e, conseguentemente, deve disporre dello stesso termine di sei mesi per realizzarlo. Nulla, infatti, nella formulazione dell’art. 20, n. 1, lett. d), del regolamento n. 343/2003 indica che il legislatore comunitario abbia avuto l’intenzione di disciplinare in modo diverso le due ipotesi.

44 Ne deriva che, nella seconda ipotesi, alla luce dell’obiettivo perseguito mediante la fissazione di un termine per gli Stati membri, il dies a quo di quest’ultimo deve essere determinato in modo tale che gli Stati membri dispongano, come nella prima ipotesi, di un termine di sei mesi che si presume essi sfruttino a pieno per disciplinare le modalità tecniche della realizzazione del trasferimento.

45 Pertanto, il termine di esecuzione del trasferimento può cominciare a decorrere soltanto quando la realizzazione futura del trasferimento è in linea di principio concertata e garantita e ne rimangono da disciplinare soltanto le modalità. Orbene, detta realizzazione non può essere considerata garantita se il giudice di uno Stato membro richiedente, adito con un ricorso, non ha statuito nel merito della questione, ma si è limitato a pronunciarsi su una domanda di sospensione dell’esecuzione della decisione impugnata.

46 Ne deriva che, nella seconda ipotesi prospettata, per garantire l’effetto utile delle disposizioni dell’art. 20, n. 1, lett d), del regolamento n. 343/2003, che fissa il termine di esecuzione del trasferimento, tale termine deve decorrere non già a partire dalla decisione giurisdizionale provvisoria che sospende l’esecuzione del procedimento di trasferimento, bensì soltanto a partire dalla decisione giurisdizionale che statuisce sulla fondatezza del procedimento e che non può più ostacolare detta esecuzione.

47 Una tale conclusione è corroborata da due altre serie di considerazioni vertenti, la prima, sul rispetto della tutela giurisdizionale garantita da uno Stato membro e, la seconda, sul rispetto del principio di autonomia procedurale degli Stati membri.

48 In primo luogo, è giocoforza constatare che il legislatore comunitario non ha inteso sacrificare all’esigenza di celerità nel trattamento delle domande d’asilo la tutela giurisdizionale garantita dagli Stati membri, i cui giudici possono sospendere l’esecuzione di una decisione di trasferimento, permettendo così al richiedente asilo di contestare utilmente le decisioni di cui è oggetto.

49 Infatti, gli Stati membri che hanno voluto istituire mezzi di impugnazione idonei a concludersi con decisioni dotate di effetto sospensivo nel contesto della procedura di trasferimento non possono, in nome del rispetto dell’esigenza di celerità, essere posti in una situazione meno favorevole di quella in cui si trovano quegli Stati membri che non lo hanno considerato necessario.

50 Pertanto, lo Stato membro che, nel contesto della procedura di trasferimento, abbia deciso di istituire mezzi di impugnazione eventualmente accompagnati da effetto sospensivo e che, per questo motivo, vedrebbe il termine di cui dispone per procedere all’allontanamento del richiedente asilo ridotto del tempo necessario ai giudici nazionali per statuire sul merito della controversia sarebbe posto in una situazione scomoda, in quanto, a meno che non riesca ad organizzare il trasferimento del richiedente asilo nel brevissimo periodo che separa la decisione del giudice di merito dalla scadenza del termine di esecuzione del trasferimento, detto Stato correrebbe – in applicazione dell’art. 20, n. 2, del regolamento n. 343/2003, in forza del quale, una volta scaduto il termine di esecuzione del trasferimento, l’accettazione della competenza emessa dallo Stato membro richiesto perde efficacia – il rischio di essere da ultimo designato come competente a trattare la domanda d’asilo.

51 Ne consegue che l’interpretazione delle disposizioni di cui all’art. 20, n. 1, lett. d), del regolamento n. 343/2003, che stabilisce il dies a quo del termine assegnato allo Stato membro richiedente per procedere al trasferimento del richiedente asilo, non può portare alla conclusione che, in nome del rispetto del diritto comunitario, lo Stato richiedente debba ignorare l’effetto sospensivo della decisione giurisdizionale provvisoria adottata

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nell’ambito di un ricorso che si presta a tale effetto, che esso aveva tuttavia inteso istituire nel suo diritto interno.

52 Per quanto riguarda, in secondo luogo, il rispetto del principio di autonomia procedurale degli Stati membri, va osservato che, qualora fosse accolta l’interpretazione dell’art. 20, n. 1, lett. d), del regolamento n. 343/2003 secondo cui il termine di esecuzione del trasferimento decorre già a partire dalla decisione provvisoria dotata di effetto sospensivo, il giudice nazionale che volesse conciliare l’osservanza di tale termine con quello di una decisione giurisdizionale provvisoria dotata di effetto sospensivo sarebbe indotto a dover statuire sulla fondatezza del procedimento di trasferimento anteriormente alla scadenza di tale termine, mediante una decisione che, per mancanza del tempo necessario concesso ai giudici, potrebbe non aver preso in considerazione in modo soddisfacente la complessità della controversia. Come giustamente sottolineano taluni governi e la Commissione nelle loro osservazioni presentate alla Corte, tale interpretazione sarebbe in contrasto con detto principio, come sancito dalla giurisprudenza comunitaria (v., in tal senso, sentenze 11 settembre 2003, causa C-13/01, Safalero, Racc. pag. I-8679, punto 49, e 13 marzo 2007, causa C-432/05, Unibet, Racc. pag. I-2271, punto 39).

53 Alla luce di tutte le considerazioni che precedono, occorre risolvere la questione pregiudiziale dichiarando che l’art. 20, nn. 1, lett. d), e 2, del regolamento n. 343/2003 deve essere interpretato nel senso che, qualora la normativa dello Stato membro ricorrente preveda l’effetto sospensivo di un ricorso, il termine di esecuzione del trasferimento decorre non già a partire dalla decisione giurisdizionale provvisoria che sospende l’esecuzione del procedimento di trasferimento, bensì soltanto a partire dalla decisione giurisdizionale che statuisce sulla fondatezza del procedimento e che non può più ostacolare detta esecuzione.

Sulle spese

54 Nei confronti delle parti nella causa principale il presente procedimento costituisce un incidente sollevato dinanzi al giudice nazionale, cui spetta quindi statuire sulle spese. Le spese sostenute da altri soggetti per presentare osservazioni alla Corte non possono dar luogo a rifusione.

Per questi motivi, la Corte (Quarta Sezione) dichiara:

L’art. 20, nn. 1, lett. d), e 2, del regolamento (CE) del Consiglio 18 febbraio 2003, n. 343, che stabilisce i criteri e i meccanismi di determinazione dello Stato membro competente per l’esame di una domanda d’asilo presentata in uno degli Stati membri da un cittadino di un paese terzo, deve essere interpretato nel senso che, qualora la normativa dello Stato membro ricorrente preveda l’effetto sospensivo di un ricorso, il termine di esecuzione del trasferimento decorre non già a partire dalla decisione giurisdizionale provvisoria che sospende l’esecuzione del procedimento di trasferimento, bensì soltanto a partire dalla decisione giurisdizionale che statuisce sulla fondatezza del procedimento e che non può più ostacolare detta esecuzione.

Firme

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CORTE DI GIUSTIZIA DELLE COMUNITA EUROPEE (Grande S ezione)

17 febbraio 2009

«Direttiva 2004/83/CE – Norme minime sulle condizioni per il riconoscimento dello status di rifugiato o dello status di protezione sussidiaria – Persona ammissibile alla protezione sussidiaria – Art. 2, lett. e) – Rischio effettivo di subire un grave danno –

Art. 15, lett. c) – Minaccia grave e individuale alla vita o alla persona di un civile derivante dalla violenza indiscriminata in situazioni di conflitto armato – Prova»

Nel procedimento C-465/07,

avente ad oggetto la domanda di pronuncia pregiudiziale proposta alla Corte, ai sensi degli artt. 68 CE e 234 CE, dal Raad van State (Paesi Bassi) con decisione 12 ottobre 2007, pervenuta in cancelleria il 17 ottobre 2007, nella causa

Meki Elgafaji,

Noor Elgafaji,

contro

Staatssecretaris van Justitie,

LA CORTE (Grande Sezione),

[Omissis]

Sentenza

1 La domanda di pronuncia pregiudiziale verte sull’interpretazione dell’art. 15, lett. c), della direttiva del Consiglio 29 aprile 2004, 2004/83/CE, recante norme minime sull’attribuzione, a cittadini di paesi terzi o apolidi, della qualifica di rifugiato o di persona altrimenti bisognosa di protezione internazionale, nonché norme minime sul contenuto della protezione riconosciuta (GU L 304, pag. 12; in prosieguo: la «direttiva»), in combinato disposto con l’art. 2, lett. e), di questa stessa direttiva.

2 Tale domanda è stata presentata nell’ambito di una controversia tra il sig. e la sig.ra Elgafaji (in prosieguo: i «coniugi Elgafaji»), entrambi cittadini iracheni, e lo Staatssecretaris van Justitie in merito al rigetto da parte di quest’ultimo delle loro domande dirette al rilascio di un permesso di soggiorno temporaneo nei Paesi Bassi.

Contesto normativo

La Convenzione europea per la salvaguardia dei diritti dell’uomo e delle libertà fondamentali

3 La Convenzione europea per la salvaguardia dei diritti dell’uomo e delle libertà fondamentali, firmata a Roma il 4 novembre 1950 (in prosieguo: la «CEDU»), all’art. 3, intitolato «Divieto della tortura», prevede quanto segue:

«Nessuno può essere sottoposto alla tortura né a pene o trattamenti inumani o degradanti».

La normativa comunitaria

4 Ai sensi del primo ‘considerando’ della direttiva:

«Una politica comune nel settore dell’asilo, che preveda un regime europeo comune in materia di asilo, costituisce uno degli elementi fondamentali dell’obiettivo dell’Unione europea relativo all’istituzione progressiva di uno spazio di libertà, sicurezza e giustizia aperto a quanti, spinti dalle circostanze, cercano legittimamente protezione nella Comunità».

5 Il sesto ‘considerando’ della direttiva è così formulato:

«Lo scopo principale della presente direttiva è quello, da una parte, di assicurare che gli Stati membri applichino criteri comuni per identificare le persone che hanno

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effettivamente bisogno di protezione internazionale e, dall’altra, di assicurare che un livello minimo di prestazioni sia disponibile per tali persone in tutti gli Stati membri».

6 Il decimo ‘considerando’ della direttiva precisa quanto segue:

«La presente direttiva rispetta i diritti fondamentali e osserva i principi riconosciuti segnatamente nella Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell’Unione europea [proclamata a Nizza il 7 dicembre 2000 (GU C 364, pag. 1)]. Essa mira in particolare ad assicurare il pieno rispetto della dignità umana, il diritto di asilo dei richiedenti asilo e dei familiari al loro seguito».

7 I ‘considerando’ ventiquattresimo - ventiseiesimo della direttiva hanno il seguente tenore:

«(24) Inoltre occorre stabilire le norme minime per la definizione e gli elementi essenziali della protezione sussidiaria. La protezione sussidiaria dovrebbe avere carattere complementare e supplementare rispetto alla protezione dei rifugiati sancit[a] dalla Convenzione di Ginevra [relativa allo status dei rifugiati, firmata a Ginevra il 28 luglio 1951].

(25) È necessario introdurre i criteri per l’attribuzione, alle persone richiedenti protezione internazionale, della qualifica di beneficiari della protezione sussidiaria. Tali criteri dovrebbero essere elaborati sulla base degli obblighi internazionali derivanti da atti internazionali in materia di diritti dell’uomo e sulla base della prassi seguita negli Stati membri.

(26) I rischi a cui è esposta in generale la popolazione o una parte della popolazione di un paese di norma non costituiscono di per sé una minaccia individuale da definirsi come danno grave».

8 L’art. 1 della direttiva così dispone:

«La presente direttiva stabilisce norme minime sull’attribuzione, a cittadini di paesi terzi o apolidi, della qualifica di rifugiato o di persona altrimenti bisognosa di protezione internazionale, nonché norme minime sul contenuto della protezione riconosciuta».

9 Ai sensi dell’art. 2, lett. c), e) e g), della direttiva, si considerano come:

«(…)

c) “rifugiato”: cittadino di un paese terzo il quale, per il timore fondato di essere perseguitato per motivi di razza, religione, nazionalità, opinione politica o appartenenza ad un determinato gruppo sociale, si trova fuori dal paese di cui ha la cittadinanza e non può o, a causa di tale timore, non vuole avvalersi della protezione di detto paese (…)

(…)

e) “persona ammissibile alla protezione sussidiaria”: cittadino di un paese terzo o apolide che non possiede i requisiti per essere riconosciuto come rifugiato ma nei cui confronti sussistono fondati motivi di ritenere che, se ritornasse nel paese di origine, o, nel caso di un apolide, se ritornasse nel paese nel quale aveva precedentemente la dimora abituale, correrebbe un rischio effettivo di subire un grave danno come definito all’articolo 15 (…) e il quale non può o, a causa di tale rischio, non vuole avvalersi della protezione di detto paese;

(…)

g) “domanda di protezione internazionale”: una richiesta di protezione rivolta ad uno Stato membro da parte di un cittadino di un paese terzo o di un apolide di cui si può ritenere che intende ottenere lo status di rifugiato o lo status di protezione sussidiaria (…)»

10 Ai sensi dell’art. 4, nn. 1, 3 e 4, della direttiva, contenuto nel capo II della stessa, intitolato «Valutazione delle domande di protezione internazionale»:

– gli Stati membri possono ritenere che il richiedente sia tenuto a produrre tutti gli elementi necessari a motivare la domanda di protezione internazionale;

– l’esame della domanda di protezione internazionale deve essere effettuato su base individuale e prevede la valutazione di vari elementi che riguardano il paese

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d’origine al momento dell’adozione della decisione in merito alla domanda e le circostanze personali del richiedente, e

– il fatto che un richiedente abbia già subìto danni gravi o minacce dirette di siffatti danni costituisce un serio indizio del rischio effettivo di subire danni gravi, a meno che vi siano buoni motivi per ritenere che tali danni gravi non si ripeteranno.

11 L’art. 8, n. 1, contenuto nel detto capo II, dispone quanto segue:

«Nell’ambito dell’esame della domanda di protezione internazionale, gli Stati membri possono stabilire che il richiedente non necessita di protezione internazionale se in una parte del territorio del paese d’origine egli non abbia fondati motivi di temere di essere perseguitato o non corra rischi effettivi di subire danni gravi e se è ragionevole attendere dal richiedente che si stabilisca in quella parte del paese».

12 L’art. 15 della direttiva, contenuto nel capo V della stessa, intitolato «Requisiti per poter beneficiare della protezione sussidiaria», così dispone sotto il titolo «Danno grave»:

«Sono considerati danni gravi:

a) la condanna a morte o all’esecuzione; o

b) la tortura o altra forma di pena o trattamento inumano o degradante ai danni del richiedente nel suo paese di origine; o

c) la minaccia grave e individuale alla vita o alla persona di un civile derivante dalla violenza indiscriminata in situazioni di conflitto armato interno o internazionale».

13 L’art. 18 della direttiva prevede che gli Stati membri riconoscono lo status di protezione sussidiaria a un cittadino di un paese terzo ammissibile a beneficiare della protezione sussidiaria in conformità dei capi II e V.

La normativa nazionale

14 L’art. 29, n. 1, lett. b) e d), della legge olandese sugli stranieri del 2000 (Vreemdelingenwet 2000; in prosieguo: la «Vw 2000») così dispone:

«Un permesso di soggiorno temporaneo, ai sensi dell’art. 28, può essere concesso allo straniero

(…)

b) che ha fornito fondati motivi per ritenere che, in caso di espulsione, correrebbe un rischio effettivo di essere sottoposto a tortura, ovvero a pene o a trattamenti inumani o degradanti;

(…)

d) il cui ritorno nel paese di origine, a giudizio del Ministro, sarebbe una misura di particolare gravità in considerazione della situazione generale nel paese in questione».

15 La Circolare sugli stranieri del 2000 (Vreemdelingencirculaire 2000), nella versione vigente il 20 dicembre 2006, così dispone al paragrafo C1/4.3.1:

«Ai sensi dell’art. 29, n. 1, lett. b), della [Vw 2000], può essere concesso un permesso di soggiorno se lo straniero ha dimostrato in modo sufficiente che ha fondati motivi per ritenere che, in caso di espulsione, correrebbe un rischio effettivo di essere sottoposto a tortura, ovvero a pene o a trattamenti inumani o degradanti.

Tale disposizione deriva dall’art. 3 [della CEDU]. Il rimpatrio di una persona in un paese dove essa corra il rischio effettivo («real risk») di essere sottoposto a un siffatto trattamento costituisce una violazione di tale articolo. Ove la sussistenza del rischio sia stata o venga provata, in linea di principio un permesso di soggiorno temporaneo (a titolo di asilo) deve essere concesso.

(…)».

16 Nel decreto sugli stranieri del 2000 (Vreemdelingenbesluit 2000) è stato inserito un nuovo art. 3.105 quater al fine di trasporre esplicitamente, con effetto a partire dal 25 aprile 2008, l’art. 15, lett. c), della direttiva.

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Causa principale e questioni pregiudiziali

17 In data 13 dicembre 2006, i coniugi Elgafaji hanno presentato ai Paesi Bassi domande di permesso di soggiorno temporaneo, corredate di elementi diretti a provare il rischio effettivo al quale sarebbero esposti in caso di espulsione verso il loro paese d’origine, nella fattispecie l’Irak. A sostegno delle proprie argomentazioni essi hanno invocato, in particolare, circostanze relative alla loro situazione individuale.

18 Essi hanno segnatamente affermato che il sig. Elgafaji, musulmano di origine sciita, aveva lavorato dall’agosto 2004 al settembre 2006 al servizio di un’impresa britannica che garantisce la sicurezza del trasporto del personale dell’aeroporto verso la cosiddetta zona «verde». Essi hanno fatto valere che lo zio del sig. Elgafaji, impiegato dalla stessa impresa, era stato ucciso dalle milizie, come risulta dall’atto di decesso, che riferisce che la sua morte è avvenuta a seguito di un attacco terroristico. Poco tempo più tardi, una lettera con la minaccia di «morte ai collaboratori» sarebbe stata affissa alla porta dell’abitazione che il sig. Elgafaji divideva con la sig. Elgafaji, sua moglie musulmana di rito sunnita.

19 Con decisioni del 20 dicembre 2006, il Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie (Ministro per l’Immigrazione e l’Integrazione; in prosieguo: il «Ministro»), competente fino al 22 febbraio 2007, quando lo Staatssecretaris van Justitie è diventato competente per le questioni relative all’immigrazione, ha negato la concessione del permesso di soggiorno temporaneo ai coniugi Elgafaji. Egli ha in particolare ritenuto che essi non avessero provato in modo sufficiente le circostanze invocate e, pertanto, non avessero dimostrato il rischio effettivo di minaccia grave e individuale alla quale essi asserivano di essere esposti nel loro paese d’origine. Ne ha dedotto che la loro situazione non rientrasse nella sfera di applicazione dell’art. 29, n. 1, lett. b), della Vw 2000.

20 Secondo il Ministro, l’onere della prova è identico ai fini della protezione accordata dall’art. 15, lett. b), della direttiva e ai fini di quella concessa in applicazione della lett. c) del medesimo articolo. Le due disposizioni in oggetto, come l’art. 29, n. 1, lett. b), della Vw 2000, imporrebbero ai richiedenti di dimostrare in modo sufficiente l’effettività, peculiare alla loro situazione individuale, del rischio di minaccia grave ed individuale alla quale essi verrebbero esposti se dovessero essere rimpatriati nel loro paese d’origine. Non avendo fornito tale prova nell’ambito dell’art. 29, n. 1, lett. b), della Vw 2000, i coniugi Elgafaji non potrebbero quindi avvalersi utilmente dell’art. 15, lett. c), della direttiva.

21 In seguito al rigetto delle loro domande di permesso di soggiorno temporaneo, i coniugi Elgafaji hanno proposto un ricorso dinanzi al Rechtbank te’s-Gravenhage, accolto da tale giudice.

22 Il giudice in questione ha dichiarato, in particolare, che l’art. 15, lett. c), della direttiva, che fa riferimento alla circostanza di un conflitto armato nel paese di origine del richiedente la protezione, non richiede l’alto grado di individualizzazione della minaccia richiesto dalla lett. b) dello stesso articolo e dall’art. 29, n. 1, lett. b), della Vw 2000. Così, la prova dell’esistenza di una minaccia individuale e grave a carico delle persone che sollecitano la protezione potrebbe essere fornita più agevolmente ai fini dell’art. 15, lett. c), della direttiva che non ai fini della lett. b) dello stesso articolo.

23 Di conseguenza, il Rechtbank te’s-Gravenhage ha annullato le decisioni del 20 dicembre 2006 di diniego della concessione del permesso di soggiorno temporaneo ai coniugi Elgafaji, in quanto la prova richiesta ai fini dell’art. 15, lett. c), della direttiva era stata uniformata a quella richiesta ai fini dell’applicazione della lett. b) dello stesso articolo, come ripreso all’art. 29, n. 1, lett. b), della Vw 2000.

24 Secondo tale giudice, il Ministro avrebbe dovuto verificare l’esistenza di motivi per il rilascio ai coniugi Elgafaji di un permesso di soggiorno temporaneo ai sensi dell’art. 29, n. 1, lett. d), della Vw 2000 in ragione dei gravi danni di cui all’art. 15, lett. c), della direttiva.

25 In sede di appello, il Raad van State ha giudicato che le disposizioni pertinenti della direttiva presentavano difficoltà interpretative. Inoltre, esso ha affermato che in data 20 dicembre 2006, quando le controverse decisioni del Ministro sono state adottate, l’art. 15, lett. c), della direttiva non era stato recepito nella normativa dei Paesi Bassi.

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26 Ciò premesso, il Raad van State ha deciso di sospendere il giudizio e di sottoporre alla Corte le seguenti questioni pregiudiziali:

«1) Se l’art. 15, (…) lett. c), della direttiva (…) debba essere interpretato nel senso che tale disposizione offre protezione esclusivamente in una situazione contemplata anche dall’art. 3 della [CEDU], nell’interpretazione ad esso attribuita dalla giurisprudenza della Corte europea per i diritti dell’uomo, ovvero se la menzionata disposizione offra una tutela sussidiaria o diversa da quella di cui all’art. 3 della [CEDU];

2) Qualora l’art. 15, (…) lett. c), della direttiva offra una tutela sussidiaria o diversa da quella di cui all’art. 3 della [CEDU], quali siano in tal caso i criteri idonei a valutare se una persona che afferma di essere ammissibile allo status di protezione sussidiaria corra un rischio effettivo di minaccia grave ed individuale in conseguenza di violenza indiscriminata, ai sensi dell’art. 15, (…) lett. c), in combinato disposto con l’art. 2, (…) lett. e), della direttiva».

Sulle questioni pregiudiziali

27 Preliminarmente, si deve constatare che il giudice del rinvio desidera chiarimenti in merito alla protezione garantita dall’art. 15, lett. c), della direttiva rispetto a quella assicurata dall’art. 3 della CEDU come interpretato dalla Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo nella sua giurisprudenza (v., in particolare, Corte eur. D. U., sentenza NA. c. Regno Unito del 17 luglio 2008, non ancora pubblicata nel Recueil des arrêts et décisions, § 115-117, nonché giurisprudenza ivi citata).

28 A tale proposito, occorre rilevare che, benché il diritto fondamentale garantito dall’art. 3 della CEDU faccia parte dei principi generali del diritto comunitario di cui la Corte assicura il rispetto e la giurisprudenza della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo venga presa in considerazione nell’interpretare la portata di tale diritto nell’ordinamento giuridico comunitario, tuttavia è l’art. 15, lett. b), della direttiva che sostanzialmente corrisponde al detto art. 3. Per contro, l’art. 15, lett. c), della direttiva è una disposizione con un contenuto diverso da quello dell’art. 3 della CEDU e deve pertanto essere interpretato autonomamente, salvo restando però il rispetto dei diritti fondamentali come garantiti dalla CEDU.

29 Le questioni sollevate, che occorre esaminare congiuntamente, vertono quindi sull’interpretazione dell’art. 15, lett. c), della direttiva, in combinato disposto con il suo art. 2, lett. e).

30 A seguito di tali osservazioni preliminari e in considerazione delle circostanze della causa principale, il giudice del rinvio chiede, essenzialmente, se l’art. 15, lett. c), della direttiva, in combinato disposto con il suo art. 2, lett. e), debba essere interpretato nel senso che l’esistenza di minaccia grave e individuale alla vita o alla persona del richiedente la protezione sussidiaria sia subordinata alla condizione che quest’ultimo fornisca la prova che egli è interessato in modo specifico a motivo di elementi peculiari della sua situazione. In caso di risposta negativa, il detto giudice intende sapere sulla base di quale criterio si possa ritenere dimostrata l’esistenza di una siffatta minaccia.

31 Per risolvere tali questioni occorre esaminare comparativamente i tre tipi di «danni gravi» definiti all’art. 15 della direttiva, che costituiscono le condizioni che devono essere soddisfatte perché una persona possa essere considerata ammissibile alla protezione sussidiaria, qualora sussistano, conformemente all’art. 2, lett. e), di tale direttiva, fondati motivi di ritenere che il richiedente incorra in «un rischio effettivo di subire un [tale] danno» nel caso di rientro nel paese interessato.

32 A tale proposito, si deve osservare che i termini «la condanna a morte», «l’esecuzione» nonché «la tortura o altra forma di pena o trattamento inumano o degradante ai danni del richiedente», impiegati all’art. 15, lett. a) e b), della direttiva, riguardano situazioni in cui il richiedente della protezione sussidiaria è esposto in modo specifico al rischio di un danno di un tipo particolare.

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33 Per contro, il danno definito all’art. 15, lett. c), della direttiva, consistendo in una «minaccia grave e individuale alla vita o alla persona» del richiedente, riguarda il rischio di un danno più generale.

34 Infatti, viene considerata in modo più ampio una «minaccia (…) alla vita o alla persona» di un civile, piuttosto che determinate violenze. Inoltre, tale minaccia è inerente ad una situazione generale di «conflitto armato interno o internazionale». Infine, la violenza in questione all’origine della detta minaccia viene qualificata come «indiscriminata», termine che implica che essa possa estendersi ad alcune persone a prescindere dalla loro situazione personale.

35 Ciò premesso, si deve intendere il termine «individuale» nel senso che esso riguarda danni contro civili a prescindere dalla loro identità, qualora il grado di violenza indiscriminata che caratterizza il conflitto armato in corso, valutato dalle autorità nazionali competenti impegnate con una domanda di protezione sussidiaria o dai giudici di uno Stato membro ai quali viene deferita una decisione di rigetto di una tale domanda, raggiunga un livello così elevato che sussistono fondati motivi di ritenere che un civile rientrato nel paese in questione o, se del caso, nella regione in questione correrebbe, per la sua sola presenza sul territorio di questi ultimi, un rischio effettivo di subire la minaccia grave di cui all’art. 15, lett. c), della direttiva.

36 Tale interpretazione, che può assicurare una propria sfera di applicazione all’art. 15, lett. c), della direttiva, non viene esclusa dal tenore letterale del suo ventiseiesimo ‘considerando’, secondo il quale «[i] rischi a cui è esposta in generale la popolazione o una parte della popolazione di un paese di norma non costituiscono di per sé una minaccia individuale da definirsi come danno grave».

37 Infatti, anche se tale ‘considerando’ comporta che la sola dichiarazione oggettiva di un rischio legato alla situazione generale di un paese non è sufficiente, in linea di principio, a provare che le condizioni menzionate all’art. 15, lett. c), della direttiva sono soddisfatte in capo ad una determinata persona, la sua formulazione fa salva, utilizzando il termine «di norma», l’ipotesi di una situazione eccezionale, che sia caratterizzata da un grado di rischio a tal punto elevato che sussisterebbero fondati motivi di ritenere che tale persona subisca individualmente il rischio in questione.

38 Il carattere eccezionale di tale situazione è confermato anche dal fatto che la protezione in parola è sussidiaria e dal sistema dell’art. 15 della direttiva, dato che i danni definiti alle lett. a) e b) di tale articolo presuppongono una chiara misura di individualizzazione. Anche se certamente è vero che elementi collettivi svolgono un ruolo importante ai fini dell’applicazione dell’art. 15, lett. c), della direttiva, nel senso che la persona interessata fa parte, come altre persone, di una cerchia di potenziali vittime di una violenza indiscriminata in caso di conflitto armato interno o internazionale, cionondimeno tale disposizione deve formare oggetto di un’interpretazione sistematica rispetto alle altre due situazioni ricomprese nel detto art. 15 della direttiva e deve essere interpretata quindi in stretta relazione con tale individualizzazione.

39 A tale proposito, si deve precisare che tanto più il richiedente è eventualmente in grado di dimostrare di essere colpito in modo specifico a motivo di elementi peculiari della sua situazione personale, tanto meno elevato sarà il grado di violenza indiscriminata richiesto affinché egli possa beneficiare della protezione sussidiaria.

40 Si deve inoltre aggiungere che, al momento dell’esame individuale di una domanda di protezione sussidiaria, previsto dall’art. 4, n. 3, della direttiva, si può, in particolare, tenere conto:

– dell’estensione geografica della situazione di violenza indiscriminata, nonché dell’effettiva destinazione del richiedente in caso di ritorno nel paese interessato, come risulta dall’art. 8, n. 1, della direttiva, e

– dell’esistenza, se del caso, di un serio indizio di un rischio effettivo come quello menzionato all’art. 4, n. 4, della direttiva, indizio in considerazione del quale il requisito di una violenza indiscriminata richiesto per poter beneficiare della protezione sussidiaria può essere meno elevato.

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41 Infine, nella causa principale occorre osservare che, anche se l’art. 15, lett. c), della direttiva è stato trasposto esplicitamente nell’ordinamento giuridico nazionale solo dopo i fatti all’origine della controversia pendente dinanzi al giudice del rinvio, spetta a quest’ultimo cercare di procedere ad un’interpretazione del diritto nazionale, in particolare dell’art. 29, n. 1, lett. b) e d), della Vw 2000, che sia conforme a tale direttiva.

42 Invero, secondo una giurisprudenza consolidata, nell’applicare il diritto nazionale, a prescindere dal fatto che si tratti di norme precedenti o successive alla direttiva, il giudice nazionale chiamato a interpretare tale diritto deve procedere per quanto più possibile alla luce della lettera e dello scopo della direttiva onde conseguire il risultato perseguito da quest’ultima e conformarsi pertanto all’art. 294, terzo comma, CE (v., in particolare, sentenze 13 novembre 1990, causa C-106/89, Marleasing, Racc. pag. I-4135, punto 8, e 24 giugno 2008, causa C-188/07, Commune de Mesquer, non ancora pubblicata nella Raccolta, punto 84).

43 Tenuto conto dell’insieme delle considerazioni che precedono, si deve rispondere alle questioni sollevate che l’art. 15, lett. c), della direttiva, in combinato disposto con l’art. 2, lett. e), della stessa direttiva, deve essere interpretato nel senso che:

– l’esistenza di una minaccia grave e individuale alla vita o alla persona del richiedente la protezione sussidiaria non è subordinata alla condizione che quest’ultimo fornisca la prova che egli è interessato in modo specifico a motivo di elementi peculiari della sua situazione personale;

– l’esistenza di una siffatta minaccia può essere considerata, in via eccezionale, provata qualora il grado di violenza indiscriminata che caratterizza il conflitto armato in corso, valutato dalle autorità nazionali competenti impegnate con una domanda di protezione sussidiaria o dai giudici di uno Stato membro ai quali viene deferita una decisione di rigetto di una tale domanda, raggiunga un livello così elevato che sussistono fondati motivi di ritenere che un civile rientrato nel paese in questione o, se del caso, nella regione in questione correrebbe, per la sua sola presenza sul territorio di questi ultimi, un rischio effettivo di subire la detta minaccia.

44 Occorre, infine, aggiungere che l’interpretazione dell’art. 15, lett. c), della direttiva, in combinato disposto con il suo art. 2, lett. e), che risulta dai punti che precedono, è pienamente compatibile con la CEDU, ivi compresa la giurisprudenza della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo relativa all’art. 3 della CEDU (v., in particolare, sentenza NA. c. Regno Unito, cit., § 115-117 nonché giurisprudenza ivi citata).

Sulle spese

45 Nei confronti delle parti nella causa principale il presente procedimento costituisce un incidente sollevato dinanzi al giudice nazionale, cui spetta quindi statuire sulle spese. Le spese sostenute da altri soggetti per presentare osservazioni alla Corte non possono dar luogo a rifusione.

Per questi motivi, la Corte (Grande Sezione) dichiara:

L’art. 15, lett. c), della direttiva del Consiglio 29 aprile 2004, 2004/83/CE, recante norme minime sull’attribuzione, a cittadini di paesi terzi o apolidi, della qualifica di rifugiato o di persona altrimenti bisognosa di protezione internazionale, nonché norme minime sul contenuto della protezione riconosciuta, in combinato disposto con l’art. 2, lett. e), della stessa direttiva, deve essere interpretato nel senso che:

– l’esistenza di una minaccia grave e individuale alla vita o alla persona del richiedente la protezione sussidiaria non è subordinata alla condizione che quest’ultimo fornisca la prova che egli è interessato in modo specifico a motivo di elementi peculiari della sua situazione personale;

– l’esistenza di una siffatta minaccia può essere considerata, in via eccezionale, provata qualora il grado di violenza indiscriminata che caratterizza il conflitto armato in corso, valutato dalle autorità nazionali competenti impegnate con una domanda di protezione sussidiaria o dai giudici di uno Stato membro ai quali viene deferita una decisione di rigetto di una tale domanda, raggiunga un livello così

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elevato che sussistono fondati motivi di ritenere che un civile rientrato nel paese in questione o, se del caso, nella regione in questione correrebbe, per la sua sola presenza sul territorio di questi ultimi, un rischio effettivo di subire la detta minaccia.

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CORTE EUROPEA DEI DIRITTI DELL’UOMO

AFFAIRE BEN KHEMAIS c. ITALIE

(Requête no 246/07)

ARRÊT

STRASBOURG

24 février 2009

En l'affaire Ben Khemais c. Italie, La Cour européenne des droits de l'homme (deuxième section), siégeant en une chambre

composée de : Françoise Tulkens, présidente, Ireneu Cabral Barreto, Vladimiro Zagrebelsky, Danut÷ Jočien÷, Dragoljub Popović, András Sajó, Işıl Karakaş, juges, et de Sally Dollé, greffière de section,

Après en avoir délibéré en chambre du conseil le 3 février 2009, Rend l'arrêt que voici, adopté à cette date :

PROCÉDURE

1. A l'origine de l'affaire se trouve une requête (no 246/07) dirigée contre la République italienne et dont un ressortissant tunisien, M. Essid Sami Ben Khemais (« le requérant »), a saisi la Cour le 3 janvier 2007 en vertu de l'article 34 de la Convention de sauvegarde des droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales (« la Convention »).

2. Le requérant est représenté par Mes S. Clementi et B. Manara, avocats à Milan. Le gouvernement italien (« le Gouvernement ») est représenté par son agente, Mme E. Spatafora, et par son co-agent adjoint, M. N. Lettieri.

3. Le requérant allègue en particulier que son expulsion vers la Tunisie l'a exposé à un risque de mort, de torture et de déni flagrant de justice. Il considère également que la mise à exécution de la décision de l'expulser a enfreint son droit de recours individuel.

4. Le 20 février 2007, la Cour a déclaré la requête partiellement recevable et a décidé de communiquer au Gouvernement les griefs tirés des articles 2, 3 et 6 de la Convention. Comme le permet l'article 29 § 3 de la Convention, il a en outre été décidé que seraient examinés en même temps la recevabilité et le fond de l'affaire. Le 1er juillet 2008, la Cour a décidé de traiter la requête par priorité (article 41 in fine du règlement de la Cour) et de communiquer au Gouvernement un nouveau grief du requérant, tiré de la mise à exécution de la décision de l'expulser. Comme le permet l'article 29 § 3 de la Convention, il a en outre été décidé que seraient examinés en même temps la recevabilité et le fond de ce grief.

EN FAIT

I. LES CIRCONSTANCES DE L'ESPÈCE

5. Le requérant est né en 1968 et est actuellement détenu en Tunisie.

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A. Les condamnations du requérant en Italie et en Tunisie

6. A une date indéterminée, le requérant fut accusé d'appartenance à une association de malfaiteurs ayant pour objet le recel, la falsification de documents et l'assistance à l'immigration clandestine.

7. Par un jugement du 22 février 2002, le juge de l'audience préliminaire (« GUP ») de Milan le condamna à cinq années d'emprisonnement et 9 810 euros (EUR) d'amende.

8. Le requérant interjeta appel. Il demanda ensuite l'application d'une peine négociée avec le parquet (quatre ans et six mois d'emprisonnement).

9. Par un arrêt du 11 décembre 2002, la cour d'appel de Milan accepta d'appliquer la peine sollicitée par le requérant. Ce dernier ne se pourvut pas en cassation et sa condamnation acquit force de chose jugée le 29 décembre 2002.

10. Le requérant purgea entièrement sa peine ; puis, à une date non précisée, de nouvelles poursuites furent ouvertes à son encontre, et il fut placé en détention provisoire.

11. A cet égard, le requérant a précisé que son placement en détention provisoire aurait pu être révoqué à tout moment, ce qui l'eût exposé au risque d'une expulsion immédiate.

12. Par un jugement du 21 mars 2006, dont le texte fut déposé au greffe le 4 avril 2006, le tribunal de Côme condamna le requérant à deux ans et deux mois d'emprisonnement pour coups et blessures, et précisa que l'intéressé devrait être expulsé du territoire italien après avoir purgé sa peine.

13. Le requérant interjeta appel de ce jugement. Par un arrêt du 14 décembre 2006, dont le texte fut déposé au greffe le 7 février 2007, la cour d'appel de Milan réduisit la peine infligée au requérant à un an et huit mois d'emprisonnement.

14. Le requérant se pourvut en cassation. L'issue de ce recours n'est pas connue. 15. Entre-temps, par un jugement du 30 janvier 2002, le tribunal militaire de Tunis avait

condamné le requérant par contumace à dix années d'emprisonnement pour appartenance, en temps de paix, à une organisation terroriste. Cette condamnation reposerait exclusivement sur les déclarations d'un coïnculpé.

16. Le requérant n'aurait appris sa condamnation en Tunisie que lorsque l'un de ses coaccusés (M. Khammoun Mehdi) y fut expulsé. A cette occasion, les membres de la famille de M. Mehdi auraient informé le requérant que son coaccusé avait été torturé et incarcéré au pénitencier de Tunis et qu'il n'avait pas eu la possibilité de contacter un avocat.

17. Le requérant précise que les autorités tunisiennes refusent de renouveler son passeport.

B. L'expulsion du requérant vers la Tunisie

18. Le 29 mars 2007, la présidente de la deuxième section de la Cour a décidé, à la demande du requérant, d'indiquer au gouvernement italien, en vertu de l'article 39 du règlement de la Cour, que dans l'intérêt des parties et du bon déroulement de la procédure, il était souhaitable de ne pas expulser le requérant vers la Tunisie jusqu'à nouvel ordre. Elle a appelé l'attention du Gouvernement sur le fait que l'inobservation par un Etat contractant d'une mesure indiquée en vertu de l'article 39 du règlement peut emporter violation de l'article 34 de la Convention (voir Mamatkulov et Askarov c. Turquie [GC], nos 46827/99 et 46951/99, §§ 128-129 et point 5 du dispositif, CEDH 2005-I).

19. Le 28 février 2008, dans l'affaire Saadi c. Italie (no 37201/06), la Grande Chambre a conclu que la mise à exécution de la décision d'expulser M. Saadi vers la Tunisie constituerait une violation de l'article 3 de la Convention. Par un courrier du 6 mars 2008, la greffière de la deuxième section a appelé l'attention du Gouvernement sur le contenu de cet arrêt et noté que certaines affaires pendantes devant la Cour, parmi lesquelles celle du requérant, présentaient d'étroites similitudes avec l'affaire Saadi. Elle a dès lors invité le Gouvernement à indiquer, avant le 24 avril 2008, s'il envisageait la possibilité de conclure des règlements amiables et s'il souhaitait, le cas échéant, faire des propositions à cet égard. Le Gouvernement a demandé une prorogation de ce délai, qui a été accordée jusqu'au 19 septembre 2008.

20. Le 2 juin 2008, le représentant du requérant a informé le greffe de la Cour que son client avait été conduit à l'aéroport de Milan en vue de l'exécution de son expulsion vers la Tunisie.

21. Le même jour, la greffière adjointe de la deuxième section a envoyé à la représentation permanente de l'Italie à Strasbourg ainsi qu'aux ministères des Affaires intérieures (Bureau UCARLI et Direction centrale de l'immigration et de la police frontalière) et de la Justice

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(Bureau de l'extradition et des commissions rogatoires), par télécopie et par courrier, le message suivant :

« Me référant à la conversation téléphonique de M. Tamietti [membre du greffe] avec M. Lettieri [co-agent adjoint du Gouvernement] concernant la requête citée en marge, je vous confirme que le greffe de la Cour a été informé en fin de matinée que le requérant a aujourd'hui été transféré à l'aéroport de Milan en vue de son expulsion vers la Tunisie. En particulier, par un appel téléphonique reçu vers 11h55, le représentant du requérant, Me Clementi, a déclaré que les autorités italiennes s'apprêtaient à donner exécution à l'expulsion de son client sur la base d'un arrêté d'expulsion émis récemment. Me Clementi a ensuite confirmé cette circonstance par e-mail. Le greffe de la Cour a aussitôt essayé de prendre contact avec la représentation italienne à Strasbourg, sans toutefois y parvenir en raison de la fermeture des bureaux à l'occasion de la fête de la République. M. Lettieri a donc été contacté directement.

Par une lettre du 29 mars 2007 (ci-annexée), votre Gouvernement avait été informé que la présidente de la deuxième section de la Cour avait décidé de lui indiquer, en application de l'article 39 du règlement de la Cour, qu'il était souhaitable, dans l'intérêt des parties et du bon déroulement de la procédure devant la Cour, de ne pas expulser le requérant vers Tunisie jusqu'à nouvel ordre. Cette mesure provisoire n'a jamais été levée. La présidente, informée des nouvelles circonstances, a confirmé que cette indication était toujours en vigueur nonobstant le fait que cette expulsion se fonderait sur un nouvel arrêté.

J'attire votre attention sur le jugement Saadi c. Italie du 28 février 2008 dans lequel la Grande Chambre a considéré, dans une affaire similaire que, dans l'éventualité de la mise à exécution de la décision d'expulser le requérant vers la Tunisie, il y aurait violation de l'article 3 de la Convention. »

22. Le 4 juin 2008, le juge désigné comme rapporteur, se fondant sur l'article 49 § 3 a) du règlement de la Cour, a invité le Gouvernement à indiquer, dans un délai échéant le 11 juin 2008, si le requérant avait été expulsé vers la Tunisie.

23. Par une télécopie en date du 11 juin 2008, le Gouvernement a informé la Cour qu'un arrêté d'expulsion avait été pris le 31 mai 2008 à l'encontre du requérant en raison du rôle que celui-ci avait joué dans le cadre des activités menées par des extrémistes islamistes nourrissant des projets terroristes, et que le tribunal de Milan avait donné son accord (nulla osta) à l'expulsion en observant que l'intéressé représentait une menace pour la sécurité de l'Etat car il était en mesure de renouer des contacts visant à la reprise d'activités terroristes, y compris au niveau international.

24. Dans cette télécopie, le Gouvernement précisait également que l'arrêté du 31 mai avait été notifié au requérant et validé par le juge de paix le 2 juin, et que l'intéressé avait été expulsé vers la Tunisie le 3 juin ; et il soulignait « qu'en tout état de cause, il ne s'[était] pas désintéressé du requérant et de la nécessité que sa santé et son bien-être soient assurés de manière adéquate dans le pays de destination aussi ».

25. Dans une télécopie du 13 juin 2008, le représentant du requérant a estimé que le gouvernement italien avait montré sa volonté de ne pas respecter la mesure provisoire indiquée par la présidente de la deuxième section de la Cour, et que cette conduite constituait une entrave au bon déroulement de la procédure devant la Cour et violait les articles 2 et 3 de la Convention.

C. Les assurances diplomatiques obtenues par les autorités italiennes

26. Le 6 août 2008, l'Ambassade d'Italie à Tunis adressa au ministère tunisien des Affaires étrangères la note verbale (no 2911) suivante :

« L'Ambassade d'Italie présente ses compliments au ministère des Affaires Etrangères et se réfère à ses propres notes verbales no 2738 du 21 juillet et no 2118 du 5 juin dernier et à la visite en Tunisie de la délégation technique des représentants des ministères italiens de l'Intérieur et de la Justice, tenue le 24 juillet dernier, concernant un examen des procédures à suivre au sujet des recours pendants auprès de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme, se rapportant à des citoyens tunisiens faisant l'objet de décrets d'expulsion.

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Les autorités italiennes ont beaucoup apprécié le grand esprit de coopération qui a animé ladite réunion et la documentation déjà fournie à cette occasion. Conformément à ce qui avait été convenu, elles ont l'honneur de soumettre par voie diplomatique leur requête d'éléments additionnels spécifiques qui sont indispensables dans la procédure auprès de la Cour de Strasbourg concernant le citoyen tunisien Essid Sami Ben Khemais.

A cet effet, l'Ambassade d'Italie a l'honneur de demander au ministère des Affaires Etrangères de bien vouloir saisir les autorités tunisiennes compétentes pour qu'elles puissent fournir par la voie diplomatique les assurances spécifiques suivantes, relatives à M. Essid Sami Ben Khemais :

- que le susnommé, détenu dans les prisons tunisiennes, n'est pas soumis à des tortures ni à des peines ou traitements inhumains ou dégradants ;

- qu'il puisse être jugé par un tribunal indépendant et impartial, selon des procédures qui, dans l'ensemble, soient conformes aux principes d'un procès équitable et public ;

- qu'il puisse, durant sa détention, recevoir les visites de la part de ses avocats et de l'avocat italien qui le représente dans le jugement devant la Cour de Strasbourg, des membres de sa famille, d'un médecin aussi bien que de l'Ambassadeur d'Italie à Tunis ou [de l']un de ses collaborateurs délégués.

Compte tenu que l'échéance pour la présentation des observations du gouvernement italien à Strasbourg pour le cas de M. Ben Khemais est le 1er septembre prochain, l'Ambassade d'Italie saurait gré au ministère des Affaires Etrangères de bien vouloir lui faire parvenir dans les plus brefs délais les éléments requis et fondamentaux pour la stratégie de défense du gouvernement italien et suggère que Mme Costantini, Premier secrétaire de [l']ambassade, puisse se rendre au ministère de la Justice et des droits de l'homme pour donner tout éclaircissement estimé utile.

L'Ambassade d'Italie saurait aussi gré au ministère des Affaires Etrangères de saisir les instances tunisiennes compétentes sur l'éventualité que le gouvernement tunisien intervienne devant la Cour de Strasbourg, en tant que tiers à la requête de la partie italienne, et ce conformément aux articles 36 [de la Convention], 44 du règlement de la Cour, [et] A1 paragraphe 2 de l'annexe au règlement. Le gouvernement italien attache une grande importance à cette participation tunisienne.

L'Ambassade d'Italie remercie d'avance le ministère des Affaires Etrangères et saisit l'occasion pour lui renouveler les assurances de sa haute considération. »

27. Le 26 août 2008, les autorités tunisiennes firent parvenir leur réponse, signée par l'avocat général à la direction générale des services judiciaires. En ses parties pertinentes, cette réponse se lit comme suit :

« (...). Il convient, au préalable, de rappeler que l'intéressé a été condamné par contumace, entre autres, pour sa participation, dans le cadre de son appartenance, en tant que chef de cellule de la branche européenne du réseau du groupe terroriste El Qaida, au soutien logistique aux réseaux liés audit groupe notamment par le recrutement et l'entraînement des personnes en vue de commettre des actes terroristes.

Après sa remise aux autorités tunisiennes, il a exercé son droit [d']opposition contre les jugements rendus à son encontre, étant entendu que l'opposition a pour effet d'anéantir les jugements rendus par contumace et de lui permettre d'être jugé à nouveau et de présenter les moyens de défense qu'il jugerait utiles.

Les précisions suivantes constituent la réponse aux différents points susmentionnés.

I. La garantie du respect de la dignité du détenu Sami Essid :

Le détenu Sami Ben Khemais Essid n'a jamais été soumis à une quelconque forme de torture, peine ou traitement inhumain ou dégradant. Le respect de la dignité dudit détenu découle du principe du respect de la dignité de toute personne quel que soit l'état dans lequel elle se trouve, principe fondamental reconnu par le droit tunisien et garanti pour toute personne notamment les détenus, et ce en raison [de leur] statut particulier.

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Il est utile à cet égard de rappeler que l'article 13 de la Constitution tunisienne dispose dans son alinéa 2 que « tout individu ayant perdu sa liberté est traité humainement, dans le respect de sa dignité. »

La Tunisie a par ailleurs ratifié sans aucune réserve la Convention des Nations Unies contre la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants. Elle a ainsi reconnu la compétence du comité contre la torture pour recevoir et examiner les communications présentées par ou pour le compte des particuliers relevant de sa juridiction qui prétendent être victimes de violation des dispositions de la Convention [ratification par la loi no 88-79 du 11 juillet 1988. Journal Officiel de la République tunisienne no 48 du 12-15 juillet 1988, page 1035 (annexe no 1)].

Les dispositions de ladite Convention ont été transposées en droit interne, l'article 101 bis du code pénal définit la torture comme étant « tout acte par lequel une douleur ou des souffrances aiguës, physiques ou mentales, sont intentionnellement infligées à une personne aux fins notamment d'obtenir d'elle ou d'une tierce personne des renseignements ou des aveux, de la punir d'un acte qu'elle ou une tierce personne a commis ou est soupçonnée d'avoir commis, de l'intimider ou de faire pression sur elle ou d'intimider ou de faire pression sur une tierce personne, ou lorsque la douleur ou les souffrances aiguës sont infligées pour tout autre motif fondé sur une forme de discrimination quelle qu'elle soit. »

Le législateur a prévu des peines sévères pour ce genre d'infractions, ainsi l'article 101 bis suscité dispose qu'« est puni d'un emprisonnement de huit ans le fonctionnaire ou assimilé qui soumet une personne à la torture et ce, dans l'exercice ou à l'occasion de l'exercice de ses fonctions. »

Il est à signaler que la garde à vue est, selon l'article 12 de la Constitution, soumise au contrôle judiciaire et qu'il ne peut être procédé à la détention préventive que sur ordre juridictionnel. Il est interdit de soumettre quiconque à une garde à vue ou à une détention arbitraire. Plusieurs garanties accompagnent la procédure de la garde à vue et tendent à assurer le respect de l'intégrité physique et morale du détenu dont notamment :

- Le droit de la personne gardée à vue dès son arrestation d'informer les membres de sa famille.

- Le droit de demander au cours du délai de la garde à vue ou à son expiration d'être soumis à un examen médical. Ce droit peut être exercé le cas échéant par les membres de la famille.

- La durée de la détention préventive est réglementée, son prolongement est exceptionnel et doit être motivé par le juge.

Il y a lieu également de noter que [la] loi du 14 mai 2001 relative à l'organisation des prisons dispose dans son article premier qu'elle a pour objectif de régir « les conditions de détention dans les prisons en vue d'assurer l'intégrité physique et morale du détenu, de le préparer à la vie libre et d'aider à sa réinsertion. »

Ce dispositif législatif est renforcé par la mise en place d'un système de contrôle destiné à assurer le respect effectif de la dignité des détenus. Il s'agit de plusieurs types de contrôles effectués par divers organes et institutions :

- Il y a d'abord un contrôle judiciaire assuré par le juge d'exécution des peines tenu, selon les termes de l'article 342-3 du code de procédure pénale tunisien, [de] visiter l'établissement pénitentiaire relevant de son ressort pour prendre connaissance des conditions des détenus, ces visites sont dans la pratique effectuées en moyenne à raison de deux fois par semaine.

- Il y a ensuite le contrôle effectué par le comité supérieur des droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales, le président de cette institution nationale indépendante peut effectuer des visites inopinées aux établissements pénitentiaires pour s'enquérir de l'état et des conditions des détenus.

- Il y a également le contrôle administratif interne effectué par les services de l'inspection générale du ministère de la Justice et des droits de l'homme et l'inspection générale relevant

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de la direction générale des prisons et de la rééducation. Il est à noter dans ce cadre que l'administration pénitentiaire relève du ministère de la Justice et que les inspecteurs dudit ministère sont des magistrats de formation ce qui constitue une garantie supplémentaire d'un contrôle rigoureux des conditions de détention.

- Il faut enfin signaler que le comité international de la Croix-Rouge est habilité depuis 2005 à effectuer des visites dans les lieux de détention, prisons et locaux de la police habilités à accueillir des détenus gardés à vue. A l'issue de ces visites des rapports détaillés sont établis et des rencontres sont organisées avec les services concernés pour mettre en œuvre les recommandations formulées par le comité sur l'état des détenus.

Les autorités tunisiennes rappellent qu'elles n'hésitent point à enquêter sur toutes les allégations de torture chaque fois qu'il y a des motifs raisonnables laissant croire qu'un acte de mauvais traitements a été commis. On citera en illustration deux exemples : le premier concerne trois agents de l'administration pénitentiaire qui ont maltraité un détenu, suite à une enquête ouverte à ce sujet les trois agents ont été déférés devant la justice et ont été condamnés chacun à quatre ans d'emprisonnement par un arrêt de la cour d'appel de Tunis rendu le 25 janvier 2002. Le deuxième exemple concerne un agent de police qui a été poursuivi pour coups et blessures volontaires et qui a été condamné à 15 ans d'emprisonnement par un arrêt rendu par la cour d'appel de Tunis le 2 avril 2002.

Les quelques cas de condamnation pour mauvais traitements ont été signalés dans le rapport présenté par la Tunisie devant le Conseil des droits de l'homme (annexe 2) et devant le Comité des droits de l'homme (annexe 3) dénotant ainsi de la politique volontariste de l'Etat à poursuivre et réprimer tout acte de torture ou de mauvais traitements ce qui est de nature à réfuter toute allégation de violation systématique des droits de l'homme.

En conclusion, il faut [souligner] que :

- Le détenu Sami Essid bénéficie de toutes les garanties que lui offre la législation tunisienne et qui le protègent de toutes formes de tortures ou de mauvais traitements.

- Qu'après consultation des registres du parquet de Tunis et ceux de la prison de la Mornaguia, lieu de sa détention, il apparaît qu'aucune plainte n'a été déposée par l'intéressé, ses avocats ou les membres de sa famille.

II. La garantie d'un procès équitable au détenu Sami Essid :

Le détenu Sami Essid est poursuivi pour sa participation, dans le cadre de son appartenance, en tant que chef de cellule de la branche européenne du réseau du groupe El Qaida, au soutien logistique aux réseaux liés au dit groupe notamment par le recrutement et l'entraînement des personnes en vue de commettre des actes terroristes.

Les procédures de poursuite, d'instruction et de jugement de ces infractions sont entourées de toutes les garanties nécessaires à un procès équitable dont notamment :

- Le respect du principe de la séparation entre les autorités de poursuite, d'instruction et de jugement.

- L'instruction en matière de crimes est obligatoire. Elle obéit au principe du double degré de juridiction (juge d'instruction et chambre d'accusation).

- Les audiences de jugement sont publiques et respectent le principe du contradictoire.

- Toute personne soupçonnée de crime a obligatoirement droit à l'assistance d'un ou plusieurs avocats. Il lui en est, au besoin, commis un d'office et les frais sont supportés par l'Etat. L'assistance de l'avocat se poursuit pendant toutes les étapes de la procédure : instruction préparatoire et phase de jugement.

- L'examen des crimes est de la compétence des cours criminelles qui sont formées de cinq magistrats, cette formation élargie renforce les garanties du prévenu.

- Le principe du double degré de juridiction en matière criminelle est consacré par le droit tunisien. Le droit de faire appel des jugements de condamnation est donc un droit fondamental pour le prévenu.

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- Aucune condamnation ne peut être rendue que sur la base de preuves solides ayant fait l'objet de débats contradictoires devant la juridiction compétente. Même l'aveu du prévenu n'est pas considéré comme une preuve déterminante. Cette position a été confirmée par l'arrêt de la Cour de cassation tunisienne no 12150 du 26 janvier 2005 par lequel la Cour a affirmé que l'aveu extorqué par violence est nul et non avenu et ce, en application de l'article 152 du code de procédure pénale qui dispose que : « l'aveu, comme tout élément de preuve, est laissé à la libre appréciation des juges ». Le juge doit donc apprécier toutes les preuves qui lui sont présentées afin de décider de la force probante à conférer aux dites preuves d'après son intime conviction.

- [Il faut] rappeler que Sami Essid a bénéficié de toutes les garanties légales d'un procès équitable objet de la première affaire réexaminée sur opposition présentée par son conseil contre l'un des jugements rendus à son encontre par contumace. En effet la première audience devant la chambre criminelle du tribunal de première instance de Tunis a eu lieu le 28 juin 2008 et a été reportée, suite à la demande de sa défense, à deux reprises (2 juillet 2008 et 5 juillet 2008). Le 22 juillet 2008, la chambre criminelle a condamné l'intéressé à 8 ans d'emprisonnement lors d'une audience tenue publiquement en présence de journalistes et observateurs nationaux et étrangers.

III. La garantie du droit de recevoir des visites :

La loi du 14 mai 2001 relative à l'organisation des prisons consacre le droit de tout prévenu à recevoir la visite de l'avocat chargé de sa défense, sans la présence d'un agent de la prison ainsi que la visite des membres de sa famille. Le détenu Sami Essid jouit de ce droit conformément à la réglementation en vigueur et sans restriction aucune.

a) visite de l'avocat

A ce jour, chaque fois que Maître Samir Ben Amor, avocat de l'intéressé, a demandé une autorisation de visite de son client, il y a été autorisé par l'autorité compétente comme le démontre le tableau suivant :

Nombre de visites Dates des visites

1 09/06/2008

2 01/07/2008

3 17/07/2008

4 30/07/2008

Ci-joint des photocopies des autorisations de visites (annexe 4).

b) Visite des membres de la famille

A ce jour, à chaque fois que les membres de la famille de Sami Essid ont demandé une autorisation de visite, il leur a été répondu favorablement par l'autorité compétente selon le tableau suivant :

Nombre de visites

Qualité et nom du visiteur Dates de visites

1 La sœur Lilia 07/06/2008

2 Le père Khémais

Le frère Mounir

La sœur Samira

10/06/2008

3 Le père Khémais 17/06/2008

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Le frère Souhail

La sœur Samira

4 La sœur Samira

La sœur Lilia

24/06/2008

5 Le père Khémais 01/07/2008

6 La sœur Samira

La sœur Lilia

08/07/2008

7 Le père Khémais

La sœur Samira

La sœur Lilia

15/07/2008

8 La sœur Samira

La sœur Lilia

22/07/2008

9 La sœur Samira 29/07/2008

10 La sœur Samira

La sœur Lilia

05/08/2008

11 Le père Khémais

La sœur Samira

La sœur Lilia

13/08/2008

12 La sœur Samira

La sœur Lilia

20/08/2008

c) Visite des autorités diplomatiques et consulaires et des avocats étrangers

Les autorités tunisiennes ne peuvent donner suite à la demande de visite au citoyen tunisien Sami Essid [formulée] par son excellence l'ambassadeur de la République italienne en Tunisie ou son représentant, les autorités consulaires ne sont admises, en application de la loi relative aux prisons, qu'à rendre visite à leurs ressortissants.

De même, la demande de visite de Sami Essid par l'avocat qui le représente dans la procédure en cours devant la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme, ne peut être autorisée en l'absence de convention ou de cadre légal interne qui l'autoriserait.

En effet la loi relative aux prisons détermine les personnes habilitées à exercer ce droit : il s'agit notamment des membres de la famille du détenu et de son avocat tunisien.

La Convention d'entraide judiciaire conclue entre la Tunisie et l'Italie le 15 novembre 1967 ne prévoit pas la possibilité pour les avocats italiens de rendre visite à des détenus tunisiens. Toutefois Sami Essid peut, s'il le souhaite, charger un avocat tunisien de son choix [de] lui rendre visite et de procéder, avec son homologue italien, à la coordination de leur action dans la préparation des éléments de sa défense devant la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme.

IV. La garantie du droit de bénéficier des soins médicaux :

La loi précitée relative à l'organisation des prisons dispose que tout détenu a droit à la gratuité des soins et des médicaments à l'intérieur des prisons et, à défaut, dans les

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établissement hospitaliers. En outre, l'article 336 du code de procédure pénale autorise le juge d'exécution des peines à soumettre le condamné à examen médical.

C'est dans ce cadre que le détenu Sami Essid a été soumis à l'examen médical de première admission dans l'unité pénitentiaire le 5 juin 2008, le rapport du médecin ne relève rien de particulier à son égard. Ledit détenu a, d'autre part, bénéficié ultérieurement d'un suivi médical dans le cadre d'examens périodiques (ci-joint une copie du dernier rapport médical de l'intéressé – annexe no 5). En conclusion, l'intéressé bénéficie d'un suivi médical régulier à l'instar de tout détenu et il n'y a pas lieu de ce fait d'autoriser son examen par un autre médecin.

Les autorités tunisiennes réitèrent leur volonté de coopérer pleinement avec la partie italienne en lui fournissant toutes les informations et les données utiles à sa défense dans la procédure en cours devant la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme et suggère à la partie italienne de demander, si elle le juge utile, le report de l'affaire à une date ultérieure pour s'enquérir de l'évolution de la procédure en cours à l'encontre de Sami Essid devant les tribunaux tunisiens. »

28. Le rapport médical annexé à la réponse des autorités tunisiennes (annexe no 5), est ainsi libellé :

« Le détenu Sami Khemais Salah Essid, âgé de 40 ans, écrou : 11271 est pris en charge au dispensaire de la prison de Mornaguia depuis le 04/06/2008. Le détenu a consulté l'infirmerie à trois reprises :

- Le 05/06/2008, il a bénéficié d'une visite d'entrée, il n'a pas d'antécédents médicaux particuliers, il n'a aucune trace de violence.

- Le 19/06/2008, il a consulté pour migraine, ayant cédé sous traitement médical.

- Le 25/08/2008, le détenu a été vu dans le cadre d'une consultation périodique, l'examen médical de ce jour note un bon état général, bon état de conscience. Il n'a pas de plaintes fonctionnelles. »

D. Les autres documents produits par le Gouvernement italien

29. Le Gouvernement a également produit trois messages signés par l'ambassadeur d'Italie à Tunis. En ses parties pertinentes, le premier message (no 2483, 3 juillet 2008) se lit ainsi :

« (...) Le 2 juillet dernier était prévue la comparution devant le tribunal militaire de Tunis, pour connexions avec des milieux terroristes, du citoyen tunisien Essid Sami Ben Khemais, alias Saber, expulsé d'Italie le 3 juin dernier. L'intéressé avait précédemment été condamné en Tunisie à 115 années d'emprisonnement.

Le procès (...) devant le tribunal militaire devait porter sur le réexamen des peines que la juridiction militaire tunisienne avait précédemment infligées par contumace, et qui s'élevaient au total à 100 années d'emprisonnement. Toutefois, comme l'ont relaté les agences de presse internationales, le procès a été repoussé au 15 octobre 2008.

D'après Samir Ben Amor, avocat du prévenu, celui-ci n'était pas présent au tribunal militaire car il se trouvait le même jour devant un tribunal ordinaire de Tunis qui devait statuer sur une autre peine prononcée par contumace, à savoir 15 années d'emprisonnement, pour deux chefs d'inculpation également liés à la participation supposée de l'intéressé à des activités terroristes.

Ces peines avaient été prononcées par contumace en Tunisie entre 2000 et 2007, période pendant laquelle Saber séjournait en Italie, où, comme on le sait, il a été condamné en 2002 à six ans et deux mois d'emprisonnement pour association de malfaiteurs en relation avec une entreprise terroriste. Il est aujourd'hui détenu au pénitencier de Mornaguia (ouest de Tunis) dans l'attente de l'issue de ses recours contre les jugements tunisiens précités.

Il convient de rappeler qu'au cours des jours qui ont suivi l'expulsion, le ministre de la Justice et des droits de l'homme, Bechir Tekkari, avait assuré que le prévenu serait jugé à

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nouveau dans le cadre d'un procès équitable et public et avait écarté les craintes de traitements inhumains.

Je saisis l'occasion pour signaler que la correspondante de [l'agence de presse] ANSA, Mme Angela Virdò, a rencontré au cours des dernières semaines Maître Ben Amor, qui a indiqué que son client n'avait pas dénoncé de mauvais traitements au cours de la détention qui a suivi son expulsion. »

30. Le deuxième message (no 2652, 15 juillet 2008) contient, entre autres, l'extrait d'un communiqué de presse de l'agence ANSA que voici :

« Tunis, 7 JUIN – « Je l'ai vu cet après-midi, il va bien, il se trouve dans la prison de Moraguia, près de Tunis ; il est encore surpris et déçu que l'Italie, qui est un Etat de droit, ait violé les règles européennes qui faisaient obstacle à son expulsion ». Celui qui s'exprime ainsi est Samir Ben Amor, l'avocat du Tunisien Essid Sami Ben Khemais, dit Saber, expulsé d'Italie le soir du 2 juin après avoir purgé une peine de prison de six ans et demi pour terrorisme.

« On lui a donné ses effets personnels » rapporte l'avocat. « Alors qu'il se croyait libre, trois agents l'ont pris et l'ont emmené d'abord au centre de permanence temporaire de Milan, puis à l'aéroport de la Malpensa. De là, toujours escorté par les policiers, il est parti pour Rome, où il a embarqué le soir même sur un vol à destination de Tunis. »

Selon Ben Amor, Saber faisait partie du groupe connu sous le nom de « réseau de Milan », un groupe de musulmans qui, vers 1990, est parti s'entraîner en Afghanistan et a combattu en Bosnie et en Tchétchénie. « Ben Khemais ne risque pas la peine de mort en Tunisie » a expliqué l'avocat « mais l'infraction pour laquelle il a déjà été jugé en Italie lui a valu ici 115 années d'emprisonnement, cinq condamnations par les tribunaux militaires et deux [condamnations] par les [tribunaux] civils ».

Le 2 juillet, Saber comparaîtra devant le tribunal militaire à Tunis, et le ministre de la Justice a assuré aujourd'hui au cours d'une conférence de presse que le procès sera équitable et public. « Cela aura lieu à sa demande » a expliqué Ben Amor « car il a introduit un recours ; en effet, selon le code de procédure pénale, la même personne ne peut pas être jugée deux fois pour la même infraction, auquel cas l'on aurait neuf procès : deux en Italie et sept en Tunisie ».

« Non, il n'a pas été torturé » dit l'avocat « mais tout le monde sait que dans les prisons tunisiennes, la torture est une pratique courante : les coups, l'électricité, et le « balanco », dans lequel le détenu est soulevé par les bras et ensuite battu à l'aide de bâtons. Une autre pratique est celle du « rôti » : un bâton passé sous les genoux et les bras tient le prisonnier suspendu entre deux chaises, ce qui lui fait perdre toute sensibilité dans l'ensemble du corps. »

31. Le dernier message (no 2767, 25 juillet 2008) relate une réunion qui s'est tenue le 24 juillet 2008 au ministère tunisien de la Justice et des droits de l'homme et à laquelle ont participé des hauts fonctionnaires italiens. Au cours de cette réunion, les autorités tunisiennes se sont déclarées disposées à fournir des assurances diplomatiques similaires à celles formulées dans la missive parvenue le 26 août 2008 (voir le paragraphe 27 ci-dessus).

II. LES DROITS INTERNES PERTINENTS

32. Les recours qu'il est possible de former contre un arrêté d'expulsion en Italie et les règles régissant la réouverture d'un procès par défaut en Tunisie sont décrits dans Saadi c. Italie ([GC], no 37201/06, §§ 58-60, 28 février 2008).

III. TEXTES ET DOCUMENTS INTERNATIONAUX

33. On trouve dans l'arrêt Saadi précité une description des textes, documents internationaux et sources d'informations suivants : l'accord de coopération en matière de lutte contre la criminalité signé par l'Italie et la Tunisie et l'accord d'association entre la Tunisie, l'Union

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européenne et ses Etats membres (§§ 61-62) ; les articles 1, 32 et 33 de la Convention des Nations unies de 1951 relative au statut des réfugiés (§ 63) ; les lignes directrices du Comité des Ministres du Conseil de l'Europe (§ 64) ; les rapports relatifs à la Tunisie d'Amnesty International (§§ 65-72) et de Human Rights Watch (§§ 73-79) ; les activités du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge (§§ 80-81) ; le rapport du Département d'Etat américain relatif aux droits de l'homme en Tunisie (§§ 82-93) ; les autres sources d'informations relatives au respect des droits de l'homme en Tunisie (§ 94).

34. Après l'adoption de l'arrêt Saadi, Amnesty International a publié son rapport annuel 2008. En ses parties pertinentes, la section consacrée à la Tunisie se lit ainsi :

« Les performances économiques de la Tunisie et les avancées législatives ont amélioré l'image du pays au niveau international. Ceci dissimulait toutefois une réalité plus sombre dans laquelle les garanties juridiques étaient souvent violées, les personnes arrêtées pour des motifs politiques torturées alors que les auteurs des sévices étaient impunis, et les défenseurs des droits humains harcelés. Des restrictions sévères continuaient de peser sur la liberté d'expression et d'association. De nombreuses personnes poursuivies pour activités terroristes ont été condamnées à de lourdes peines d'emprisonnement à l'issue de procès inéquitables, qui se sont notamment déroulés devant des tribunaux militaires. Plusieurs centaines d'autres, condamnées les années précédentes à l'issue de procès iniques, étaient maintenues en détention, dans certains cas depuis plus de dix ans. Certains de ces détenus étaient susceptibles d'être considérés comme des prisonniers d'opinion.

Évolutions sur le plan juridique et institutionnel

En juillet, la composition du [comité supérieur des droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales], l'organe chargé de recueillir les plaintes pour violation des droits humains, a été modifiée par décret. Le nombre de membres du Comité a été accru, mais celui-ci n'incluait pas d'organisations indépendantes de défense des droits fondamentaux.

« Guerre contre le terrorisme »

Abdellah al Hajji et Lotfi Lagha, deux des 12 Tunisiens détenus par les autorités américaines à Guantánamo Bay (Cuba), ont été renvoyés en Tunisie en juin. Arrêtés à leur arrivée, ils ont été placés en détention dans les locaux de la Direction de la sûreté de l'Etat du ministère de l'Intérieur, où ils auraient été torturés et contraints de signer des déclarations. Abdellah al Hajji s'est plaint d'avoir été privé de sommeil et frappé au visage. Il a ajouté que des agents de la Direction de la sûreté de l'Etat avaient menacé de violer sa femme et ses filles. Déclaré coupable, en octobre, d'appartenance à une organisation terroriste opérant à l'étranger, Lotfi Lagha a été condamné à trois ans d'emprisonnement. Abdellah al Hajji, qui avait interjeté appel d'une condamnation à dix ans d'emprisonnement prononcée par contumace en 1995, a été rejugé par un tribunal militaire de Tunis. Déclaré coupable, en novembre, d'appartenance, en temps de paix, à une organisation terroriste opérant à l'étranger, il a été condamné à sept ans d'emprisonnement. Neuf Tunisiens renvoyés d'Egypte en janvier et en mars auraient été détenus aux fins d'interrogatoire, dans certains cas pendant plusieurs semaines. La plupart d'entre eux ont été libérés, mais deux au moins – Ayman Hkiri et Adam Boukadida – étaient maintenus en détention à la fin de l'année dans l'attente de leur procès. Ces hommes avaient été arrêtés en Egypte en novembre 2006 avec d'autres étudiants égyptiens et étrangers. Ils auraient été torturés alors qu'ils étaient interrogés à propos d'un complot présumé en vue de recruter des personnes en Egypte et de les envoyer en Irak combattre les troupes de la coalition emmenée par les Etats-Unis.

Système judiciaire

Les procès des suspects accusés d'activités terroristes, dont certains se sont déroulés devant des tribunaux militaires, étaient le plus souvent inéquitables et débouchaient généralement sur des condamnations à de lourdes peines d'emprisonnement. Parmi les accusés figuraient des personnes arrêtées en Tunisie ainsi que des Tunisiens renvoyés contre leur gré par les autorités d'autres pays, notamment de France, d'Italie et des Etats-Unis, alors qu'ils risquaient d'être victimes d'actes de torture. Les condamnations étaient souvent fondées sur des « aveux » obtenus durant la période de détention provisoire et que les accusés avaient rétractés à l'audience en affirmant qu'ils avaient été extorqués sous la

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torture. Les juges d'instruction et les tribunaux s'abstenaient systématiquement d'ordonner une enquête sur ce type d'allégations. Seize civils au moins auraient été traduits devant le tribunal militaire de Tunis et condamnés à des peines allant jusqu'à onze ans d'emprisonnement. La plupart ont été déclarés coupables de liens avec des organisations terroristes opérant à l'étranger. Dans ces procès, non conformes aux normes internationales d'équité, le droit des accusés de se pourvoir en appel n'a pas été intégralement respecté.

En novembre, 30 hommes ont comparu devant le tribunal de première instance de Tunis dans le cadre de l'affaire dite « de Soliman ». Ils étaient accusés de toute une série d'infractions, notamment de complot en vue de renverser le gouvernement, utilisation d'armes à feu et appartenance à une organisation terroriste. Tous avaient été arrêtés en décembre 2006 et janvier 2007 à la suite d'affrontements armés entre les forces de sécurité et des membres présumés des Soldats d'Assad ibn al Fourat, un groupe armé. Ils se sont plaints d'avoir été torturés et maltraités durant leur garde à vue, qui s'est prolongée bien au-delà de la durée maximale légale de six jours. Leurs avocats ont demandé au juge d'instruction et au tribunal d'ordonner des examens médicaux de leurs clients en vue de constater des traces de torture, mais ces demandes ont été rejetées. Le 30 décembre, deux des accusés ont été condamnés à mort, huit à la détention à perpétuité et les autres à des peines allant de cinq à trente ans d'emprisonnement.

Libération de prisonniers politiques

Cent soixante-dix-neuf prisonniers politiques ont été remis en liberté. Selon les informations recueillies, une quinzaine avaient été maintenus en détention provisoire car on les soupçonnait d'appartenir au Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le combat (GSPC), un groupe armé qui serait lié à Al Qaïda. Les autres étaient, pour la plupart, incarcérés depuis le début des années 1990 pour appartenance à l'organisation islamiste interdite Ennahda (Renaissance).

Torture et mauvais traitements

Comme les années précédentes, des cas de torture et de mauvais traitements infligés par des membres des forces de sécurité, et notamment de la Direction de la sûreté de l'État, ont été signalés. Les prisonniers maintenus au secret risquaient tout particulièrement d'être victimes de telles pratiques. Il n'était pas rare que les forces de sécurité ne respectent pas la durée maximale de la garde à vue, fixée à six jours, et maintiennent des personnes au secret pendant plusieurs semaines. De nombreux détenus se sont plaints d'avoir été torturés pendant leur garde à vue. Parmi les méthodes le plus souvent signalées figuraient les coups, la suspension dans des positions contorsionnées, les décharges électriques, la privation de sommeil, le viol et les menaces de viol de parentes des détenus. Les autorités n'ont pratiquement jamais mené d'enquête ni pris une quelconque mesure pour traduire en justice les tortionnaires présumés.

Mohamed Amine Jaziri, l'un des accusés dans « l'affaire de Soliman » (voir plus haut), a été arrêté le 24 décembre à Sidi Bouzid, au sud de Tunis. Il a été détenu au secret, dans un premier temps au poste de police de cette localité puis dans les locaux de la Direction de la sûreté de l'Etat à Tunis, jusqu'au 22 janvier. Les proches de cet homme se sont régulièrement enquis de son sort, mais les autorités ont nié le détenir jusqu'à sa remise en liberté. Mohamed Amine Jaziri a affirmé que pendant sa garde à vue il avait été frappé sur tout le corps et suspendu au plafond durant plusieurs heures, et qu'on lui avait administré des décharges électriques. Il a ajouté qu'on l'avait aspergé d'eau froide et privé de sommeil et qu'on lui avait recouvert la tête d'une cagoule sale durant les interrogatoires. Cet homme a été condamné en décembre à trente ans d'emprisonnement.

Conditions de détention

Selon certaines informations, de nombreux prisonniers politiques étaient victimes de discrimination et subissaient des conditions de détention très pénibles. Certains ont observé une grève de la faim pour protester contre les sévices infligés par les gardiens, la privation de soins médicaux, l'interruption des visites de leur famille ainsi que la dureté des conditions carcérales, tout particulièrement le maintien prolongé à l'isolement.

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En octobre, Ousama Abbadi, Ramzi el Aifi, Oualid Layouni et Mahdi Ben Elhaj Ali auraient été frappés à coups de poing et de pied et ligotés par des surveillants de la prison de Mornaguia. Lorsque l'avocat d'Ousama Abbadi lui a rendu visite, il a constaté que son client était grièvement blessé à l'œil et présentait une blessure ouverte profonde à la jambe ; il était dans un fauteuil roulant, incapable de se tenir debout. D'autres détenus de la prison de Mornaguia auraient été entièrement dévêtus par des gardiens et traînés dans un couloir le long des cellules. Aucune enquête n'a semble-t-il été effectuée, malgré les plaintes déposées par les avocats des détenus. (...).

Défenseurs des droits humains

Les autorités ont fortement entravé les activités des organisations de défense des droits humains. Les lignes téléphoniques et les connexions Internet de ces organisations étaient régulièrement interrompues ou perturbées, ce qui les empêchait de communiquer avec des personnes en Tunisie et à l'étranger. Des défenseurs des droits humains ont été harcelés et intimidés. Certains d'entre eux, de même que leur famille, étaient soumis à une surveillance constante de membres des forces de sécurité qui, dans certains cas, les brutalisaient.

En mai, Raouf Ayadi, avocat et défenseur des droits humains, a été agressé par un policier alors qu'il allait entrer dans une salle d'audience pour assurer la défense d'une personne accusée d'activités terroristes. Sa voiture a été saccagée au mois de juin. En novembre, Raouf Ayadi a été insulté, jeté par terre et traîné par des policiers qui voulaient l'empêcher de rendre visite à un militant des droits humains et à un journaliste qui observaient une grève de la faim pour protester contre le refus des autorités de leur délivrer un passeport. Les autorités n'ont pris aucune mesure contre les responsables des agressions dont cet avocat a été victime.

(...). »

35. Dans sa résolution 1433(2005), relative à la légalité de la détention de personnes par les Etats-Unis à Guantánamo Bay, l'Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l'Europe a demandé au gouvernement américain, entre autres, « de ne pas renvoyer ou transférer les détenus en se fondant sur des « assurances diplomatiques » de pays connus pour recourir systématiquement à la torture et dans tous les cas si l'absence de risque de mauvais traitement n'est pas fermement établie ».

EN DROIT

I. SUR LA VIOLATION ALLÉGUÉE DES ARTICLES 2 ET 3 DE LA CONVENTION

36. Le requérant allègue que son expulsion vers la Tunisie met sa vie en danger et l'expose au risque d'être torturé. Il invoque les articles 2 et 3 de la Convention.

Ces dispositions se lisent ainsi :

Article 2 § 1

« 1. Le droit de toute personne à la vie est protégé par la loi. La mort ne peut être infligée à quiconque intentionnellement, sauf en exécution d'une sentence capitale prononcée par un tribunal au cas où le délit est puni de cette peine par la loi. »

Article 3

« Nul ne peut être soumis à la torture ni à des peines ou traitements inhumains ou dégradants. »

37. Le Gouvernement s'oppose à cette thèse.

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A. Sur la recevabilité

1. L'exception de non-épuisement des voies de recours internes soulevée par le Gouvernement

38. Le Gouvernement excipe tout d'abord du non-épuisement des voies de recours internes, au motif que le requérant n'a pas contesté devant les juridictions internes la mesure d'éloignement du territoire italien prononcée par le tribunal de Côme et confirmée par la cour d'appel de Milan (voir les paragraphes 12 et 13 ci-dessus).

39. La Cour relève que l'expulsion du requérant n'a pas été exécutée sur la base de l'arrêt de la cour d'appel de Milan, mais sur le fondement d'un arrêté ministériel adopté le 31 mai 2008 (voir les paragraphes 23 et 24 ci-dessus). Le Gouvernement n'a pas indiqué quelles voies de recours efficaces auraient pu être exercées contre cet arrêté validé le 2 juin 2008 et exécuté le lendemain.

40. Il s'ensuit que l'exception préliminaire du Gouvernement ne saurait être retenue.

2. Autres motifs d'irrecevabilité

41. La Cour constate que ce grief n'est pas manifestement mal fondé au sens de l'article 35 § 3 de la Convention et qu'il ne se heurte à aucun autre motif d'irrecevabilité. Il convient donc de le déclarer recevable.

B. Sur le fond

1. Arguments des parties

[Omissis]

2. Appréciation de la Cour

53. Les principes généraux relatifs à la responsabilité des Etats contractants en cas d'expulsion, aux éléments à retenir pour évaluer le risque d'exposition à des traitements contraires à l'article 3 de la Convention et à la notion de « torture » et de « traitements inhumains et dégradants » sont résumés dans l'arrêt Saadi (précité, §§ 124-136), dans lequel la Cour a également réaffirmé l'impossibilité de mettre en balance le risque de mauvais traitements et les motifs invoqués pour l'expulsion afin de déterminer si la responsabilité d'un Etat est engagée sur le terrain de l'article 3 (§§ 137-141).

54. La Cour rappelle les conclusions auxquelles elle est parvenue dans l'affaire Saadi précitée (§§ 143-146), qui étaient les suivantes :

- les textes internationaux pertinents font état de cas nombreux et réguliers de torture et de mauvais traitements infligés en Tunisie à des personnes soupçonnées ou reconnues coupables de terrorisme ;

- ces textes décrivent une situation préoccupante ; - les visites du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge dans les lieux de détention tunisiens

ne peuvent dissiper le risque de soumission à des traitements contraires à l'article 3 de la Convention.

55. La Cour ne voit en l'espèce aucune raison de revenir sur ces conclusions, qui se trouvent d'ailleurs confirmées par le rapport 2008 d'Amnesty International relatif à la Tunisie (voir le paragraphe 34 ci-dessus). Elle note de surcroît que le requérant a été condamné en Tunisie à de lourdes peines d'emprisonnement pour appartenance, en temps de paix, à une organisation terroriste. L'existence de ces condamnations, prononcées par contumace par des tribunaux militaires, a été confirmée par les autorités tunisiennes (voir le paragraphe 27 ci-dessus), par l'ambassadeur d'Italie à Tunis (voir le paragraphe 29 ci-dessus) et par l'avocat tunisien de l'intéressé (voir le paragraphe 30 ci-dessus).

56. Dans ces conditions, la Cour estime qu'en l'espèce, des faits sérieux et avérés justifient de conclure à un risque réel de voir le requérant subir des traitements contraires à l'article 3 de la Convention en Tunisie (voir, mutatis mutandis, Saadi, précité, § 146). Il reste à vérifier si les assurances diplomatiques fournies par les autorités tunisiennes suffisent à écarter ce risque et si les renseignements relatifs à la situation du requérant après son expulsion ont confirmé l'avis du gouvernement défendeur quant au bien-fondé des craintes du requérant.

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57. A cet égard, la Cour rappelle, premièrement, que l'existence de textes internes et l'acceptation de traités internationaux garantissant, en principe, le respect des droits fondamentaux ne suffisent pas, à elles seules, à assurer une protection adéquate contre le risque de mauvais traitements lorsque, comme en l'espèce, des sources fiables font état de pratiques des autorités – ou tolérées par celles-ci – manifestement contraires aux principes de la Convention (Saadi, précité, § 147 in fine). Deuxièmement, il appartient à la Cour d'examiner si les assurances données par l'Etat de destination fournissent, dans leur application effective, une garantie suffisante quant à la protection du requérant contre le risque de traitements interdits par la Convention (Chahal, précité, § 105). Le poids à accorder aux assurances émanant de l'Etat de destination dépend en effet, dans chaque cas, des circonstances prévalant à l'époque considérée (Saadi, précité, § 148 in fine).

58. En la présente espèce, l'avocat général à la direction générale des services judiciaires a assuré que la dignité humaine du requérant serait respectée en Tunisie, qu'il ne serait pas soumis à la torture, à des traitements inhumains ou dégradants ou à une détention arbitraire, qu'il bénéficierait de soins médicaux appropriés et qu'il pourrait recevoir des visites de son avocat et des membres de sa famille. Outre les lois tunisiennes pertinentes et les traités internationaux signés par la Tunisie, ces assurances reposent sur les éléments suivants :

- les contrôles pratiqués par le juge d'exécution des peines, par le comité supérieur des droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales (institution nationale indépendante) et par les services de l'inspection générale du ministère de la Justice et des Droits de l'homme ;

- deux cas de condamnation d'agents de l'administration pénitentiaire et d'un agent de police pour mauvais traitements ;

- la jurisprudence interne, aux termes de laquelle un aveu extorqué sous la contrainte est nul et non avenu (voir le paragraphe 27 ci-dessus).

59. La Cour note, cependant, qu'il n'est pas établi que l'avocat général à la direction générale des services judiciaires était compétent pour donner ces assurances au nom de l'Etat (voir, mutatis mutandis, Soldatenko c. Ukraine, no 2440/07, § 73, 23 octobre 2008). De plus, compte tenu du fait que des sources internationales sérieuses et fiables ont indiqué que les allégations de mauvais traitements n'étaient pas examinées par les autorités tunisiennes compétentes (Saadi, précité, § 143), le simple rappel de deux cas de condamnation d'agents de l'Etat pour coups et blessures sur des détenus ne saurait suffire à écarter le risque de tels traitements ni à convaincre la Cour de l'existence d'un système effectif de protection contre la torture, en l'absence duquel il est difficile de vérifier que les assurances données seront respectées. A cet égard, la Cour rappelle que dans son rapport 2008 relatif à la Tunisie, Amnesty International a précisé notamment que, bien que de nombreux détenus se soient plaints d'avoir été torturés pendant leur garde à vue, « les autorités n'ont pratiquement jamais mené d'enquête ni pris une quelconque mesure pour traduire en justice les tortionnaires présumés » (voir le paragraphe 34 ci-dessus).

60. De plus, dans l'arrêt Saadi précité (§ 146), la Cour a constaté une réticence des autorités tunisiennes à coopérer avec les organisations indépendantes de défense des droits de l'homme, telles que Human Rights Watch. Dans son rapport 2008 précité, Amnesty International a par ailleurs noté que bien que le nombre de membres du comité supérieur des droits de l'homme ait été accru, celui-ci « n'incluait pas d'organisations indépendantes de défense des droits fondamentaux ». L'impossibilité pour le représentant du requérant devant la Cour de rendre visite à son client emprisonné en Tunisie confirme la difficulté d'accès des prisonniers tunisiens à des conseils étrangers indépendants même lorsqu'ils sont parties à des procédures judiciaires devant des juridictions internationales. Ces dernières risquent donc, une fois un requérant expulsé en Tunisie, de se trouver dans l'impossibilité de vérifier sa situation et de connaître d'éventuels griefs qu'il pourrait soulever quant aux traitements auxquels il est soumis. Pareilles vérifications semblent également impossibles au gouvernement défendeur, dont l'ambassadeur ne pourra pas voir le requérant dans son lieu de détention.

61. Dans ces circonstances, la Cour ne saurait souscrire à la thèse du Gouvernement selon laquelle les assurances données en la présente espèce offrent une protection efficace contre le risque sérieux que court le requérant d'être soumis à des traitements contraires à l'article 3 de la Convention (voir, mutatis mutandis, Soldatenko, précité, §§ 73-74). Elle rappelle au contraire le principe affirmé par l'Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l'Europe dans sa résolution 1433(2005), selon lequel les assurances diplomatiques ne peuvent suffire lorsque l'absence de danger de mauvais traitement n'est pas fermement établie (voir le paragraphe 35 ci-dessus).

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62. Pour ce qui est, enfin, des informations fournies par le Gouvernement quant à la situation du requérant en Tunisie, il convient de rappeler que si, pour contrôler l'existence d'un risque de mauvais traitements, il faut se référer en priorité aux circonstances dont l'Etat en cause avait ou devait avoir connaissance au moment de l'expulsion, cela n'empêche pas la Cour de tenir compte de renseignements ultérieurs, qui peuvent servir à confirmer ou infirmer la manière dont la Partie contractante concernée a jugé du bien-fondé des craintes d'un requérant (Mamatkulov et Askarov, précité, § 69 ; Vilvarajah et autres c. Royaume-Uni, 30 octobre 1991, § 107, série A no 215 ; Cruz Varas et autres c. Suède, 20 mars 1991, §§ 75-76, série A no 201).

63. La Cour relève que les autorités tunisiennes ont fait savoir que le requérant avait reçu de nombreuses visites des membres de sa famille et de son avocat tunisien. Ce dernier a précisé que son client n'avait pas allégué avoir subi de mauvais traitements (voir les paragraphes 29 et 30 ci-dessus), ce qui semble confirmé par le rapport médical annexé aux assurances diplomatiques (voir le paragraphe 28 ci-dessus).

64. De l'avis de la Cour, ces éléments peuvent démontrer que le requérant n'a pas subi de traitements contraires à l'article 3 de la Convention au cours des semaines ayant suivi son expulsion, mais ils ne présagent en rien du sort de l'intéressé à l'avenir. A cet égard, la Cour ne peut que réitérer ses observations quant à l'impossibilité pour le représentant du requérant devant elle et pour l'ambassadeur d'Italie à Tunis de le visiter en prison et de vérifier le respect effectif de son intégrité physique et de sa dignité humaine.

65. Partant, la mise à exécution de l'expulsion du requérant vers la Tunisie a violé l'article 3 de la Convention.

66. Cette conclusion dispense la Cour d'examiner la question de savoir si l'expulsion a également violé l'article 2 de la Convention.

II. SUR LA VIOLATION ALLÉGUÉE DE L'ARTICLE 6 DE LA CONVENTION

67. Le requérant se plaint d'un manque d'équité des procédures pénales dirigées contre lui en Tunisie et invoque l'article 6 de la Convention. Le Gouvernement conteste ce grief.

68. La Cour considère que ce grief est recevable (Saadi, précité, § 152). Cependant, au vu de son constat selon lequel l'expulsion du requérant vers la Tunisie a constitué une violation de l'article 3 de la Convention (voir le paragraphe 65 ci-dessus), elle n'estime pas nécessaire de trancher les questions de savoir si les procédures pénales dirigées contre le requérant en Tunisie étaient conformes à l'article 6 de la Convention et si elles s'analysent en un déni flagrant de justice (voir, mutatis mutandis, Saadi, précité, § 160).

III. SUR LA VIOLATION ALLÉGUÉE DE L'ARTICLE 34 DE LA CONVENTION

69. Dans son message télécopié du 13 juin 2008, le représentant du requérant a dénoncé le non-respect par le gouvernement italien de la mesure provisoire indiquée en vertu de l'article 39 du règlement de la Cour par la présidente de la deuxième section (voir le paragraphe 18 ci-dessus).

70. Le Gouvernement estime ne pas avoir manqué à ses obligations. 71. La Cour estime que ce grief se prête à être examiné sous l'angle de l'article 34 de la

Convention, qui se lit ainsi :

« La Cour peut être saisie d'une requête par toute personne physique, toute organisation non gouvernementale ou tout groupe de particuliers qui se prétend victime d'une violation par l'une des Hautes Parties contractantes des droits reconnus dans la Convention ou ses protocoles. Les Hautes Parties contractantes s'engagent à n'entraver par aucune mesure l'exercice efficace de ce droit. »

A. Sur la recevabilité

72. La Cour constate que ce grief n'est pas manifestement mal fondé au sens de l'article 35 § 3 de la Convention. Elle relève par ailleurs qu'il ne se heurte à aucun autre motif d'irrecevabilité. Il convient donc de le déclarer recevable.

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B. Sur le fond

1. Arguments des parties

[Omissis]

2. Appréciation de la Cour

a) Principes généraux

80. La Cour rappelle que l'article 39 du règlement habilite les chambres ou, le cas échéant, leur président à indiquer des mesures provisoires. De telles mesures n'ont été indiquées que lorsque cela était strictement nécessaire et dans des domaines limités, en principe en présence d'un risque imminent de dommage irréparable. Dans la grande majorité des cas, il s'agissait d'affaires d'expulsion et d'extradition. Les affaires dans lesquelles les Etats ne se sont pas conformés aux mesures indiquées sont rares (Mamatkulov et Askarov, précité, §§ 103-105).

81. Dans des affaires telles que la présente, où l'existence d'un risque de préjudice irréparable à la jouissance par le requérant de l'un des droits qui relèvent du noyau dur des droits protégés par la Convention est alléguée de manière plausible, une mesure provisoire a pour but de maintenir le statu quo en attendant que la Cour se prononce sur la justification de la mesure. Dès lors qu'elle vise à prolonger l'existence de la question qui forme l'objet de la requête, la mesure provisoire touche au fond du grief tiré de la Convention. Par sa requête, le requérant cherche à protéger d'un dommage irréparable le droit énoncé dans la Convention qu'il invoque. En conséquence, le requérant demande une mesure provisoire, et la Cour l'accorde, en vue de faciliter « l'exercice efficace » du droit de recours individuel garanti par l'article 34 de la Convention, c'est-à-dire de préserver l'objet de la requête lorsqu'elle estime qu'il y a un risque que celui-ci subisse un dommage irréparable en raison d'une action ou omission de l'Etat défendeur (Mamatkulov et Askarov, précité, § 108).

82. Dans le cadre du contentieux international, les mesures provisoires ont pour objet de préserver les droits des parties, en permettant à la juridiction de donner effet aux conséquences de la responsabilité engagée dans la procédure contradictoire. En particulier, dans le système de la Convention, les mesures provisoires, telles qu'elles ont été constamment appliquées en pratique, se révèlent d'une importance fondamentale pour éviter des situations irréversibles qui empêcheraient la Cour de procéder dans de bonnes conditions à un examen de la requête et, le cas échéant, d'assurer au requérant la jouissance pratique et effective du droit protégé par la Convention qu'il invoque. Dès lors, dans ces conditions, l'inobservation par un Etat défendeur de mesures provisoires met en péril l'efficacité du droit de recours individuel, tel que garanti par l'article 34, ainsi que l'engagement formel de l'Etat, en vertu de l'article 1, de sauvegarder les droits et libertés énoncés dans la Convention. De telles mesures permettent également à l'Etat concerné de s'acquitter de son obligation de se conformer à l'arrêt définitif de la Cour, lequel est juridiquement contraignant en vertu de l'article 46 de la Convention (Mamatkulov et Askarov, précité, §§ 113 et 125).

83. Il s'ensuit que l'inobservation de mesures provisoires par un Etat contractant doit être considérée comme empêchant la Cour d'examiner efficacement le grief du requérant et entravant l'exercice efficace de son droit et, partant, comme une violation de l'article 34 (Mamatkulov et Askarov, précité, § 128).

b) Application de ces principes au cas d'espèce

84. En l'occurrence, l'Italie ayant expulsé le requérant vers la Tunisie, le niveau de protection des droits énoncés dans les articles 2 et 3 de la Convention que la Cour pouvait garantir à l'intéressé a été amoindri de manière irréversible. Peu importe que l'expulsion ait été exécutée après l'échange d'observations entre les parties : elle n'en a pas moins ôté toute utilité à l'éventuel constat de violation de la Convention, le requérant ayant été éloigné vers un pays qui n'est pas partie à la Convention, où il alléguait risquer d'être soumis à des traitements contraires à celle-ci.

85. En outre, l'efficacité de l'exercice du droit de recours implique aussi que la Cour puisse, tout au long de la procédure engagée devant elle, continuer à examiner la requête selon sa procédure habituelle. Or, en l'espèce, le requérant a été expulsé. Ainsi, ayant perdu tout contact

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avec son avocat, il a été privé de la possibilité de susciter, dans le cadre de l'administration des preuves, certaines recherches propres à étayer ses allégations sur le terrain des articles 2, 3 et 6 de la Convention, recherches qui auraient pu être menées même après l'échange d'observations. Les autorités tunisiennes ont par ailleurs confirmé que le représentant du requérant devant la Cour ne pourra pas être autorisé à visiter son client en prison.

86. De plus, la Cour note que le Gouvernement défendeur, avant d'expulser le requérant, n'a pas demandé la levée de la mesure provisoire adoptée aux termes de l'article 39 du règlement de la Cour, qu'il savait être toujours en vigueur, et a procédé à l'expulsion avant même d'obtenir les assurances diplomatiques qu'il invoque dans ses observations.

87. Les faits de la cause, tels qu'ils sont exposés ci-dessus, montrent clairement qu'en raison de son expulsion vers la Tunisie, le requérant n'a pu développer tous les arguments pertinents pour sa défense et que l'arrêt de la Cour risque d'être privé de tout effet utile. En particulier, le fait que le requérant a été soustrait à la juridiction de l'Italie constitue un obstacle sérieux qui pourrait empêcher le Gouvernement de s'acquitter de ses obligations (découlant des articles 1 et 46 de la Convention) de sauvegarder les droits de l'intéressé et d'effacer les conséquences des violations constatées par la Cour. Cette situation a constitué une entrave à l'exercice effectif par le requérant de son droit de recours individuel garanti par l'article 34 de la Convention, droit que son expulsion a réduit à néant.

c) Conclusion

88. Compte tenu des éléments en sa possession, la Cour conclut qu'en ne se conformant pas à la mesure provisoire indiquée en vertu de l'article 39 de son règlement, l'Italie n'a pas respecté les obligations qui lui incombaient en l'espèce au regard de l'article 34 de la Convention.

IV. SUR L'APPLICATION DE L'ARTICLE 41 DE LA CONVENTION

89. Aux termes de l'article 41 de la Convention,

« Si la Cour déclare qu'il y a eu violation de la Convention ou de ses Protocoles, et si le droit interne de la Haute Partie contractante ne permet d'effacer qu'imparfaitement les conséquences de cette violation, la Cour accorde à la partie lésée, s'il y a lieu, une satisfaction équitable. »

A. Dommage

90. Dans sa demande de satisfaction équitable du 14 mai 2007, le requérant sollicite 50 000 EUR au titre du préjudice moral qu'il estime avoir subi. Dans sa demande du 3 octobre 2008, formulée après l'exécution de son expulsion, il sollicite 500 000 EUR.

91. Le Gouvernement s'oppose à l'octroi de toute somme à titre de satisfaction équitable, estimant que le requérant aurait dû savoir que la commission de crimes liés au terrorisme l'exposait à être expulsé vers la Tunisie.

92. La Cour estime que le requérant a subi un tort moral certain en raison de la mise à exécution de la décision de l'expulser. Statuant en équité, comme le veut l'article 41 de la Convention, elle lui octroie 10 000 EUR à ce titre.

B. Frais et dépens

93. Dans sa demande de satisfaction équitable du 14 mai 2007, le requérant sollicite également 15 266,13 EUR au titre des frais et dépens engagés devant la Cour. Dans sa demande du 3 octobre 2008, il sollicite l'octroi de 8 722,89 EUR pour le traitement ultérieur de son affaire.

94. Le Gouvernement estime que les frais réclamés sont excessifs. 95. Selon la jurisprudence constante de la Cour, l'allocation des frais et dépens exposés par

le requérant ne peut intervenir que dans la mesure où se trouvent établis leur réalité, leur nécessité et le caractère raisonnable de leur taux (Belziuk c. Pologne, 25 mars 1998, § 49, Recueil 1998-II).

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96. La Cour juge excessif le montant sollicité pour les frais et dépens afférents à la procédure devant elle, et décide d'octroyer 5 000 EUR de ce chef.

C. Intérêts moratoires

97. La Cour juge approprié de calquer le taux des intérêts moratoires sur le taux d'intérêt de la facilité de prêt marginal de la Banque centrale européenne majoré de trois points de pourcentage.

PAR CES MOTIFS, LA COUR, À L'UNANIMITÉ,

1. Déclare la requête recevable ; 2. Dit que la mise à exécution de la décision d'expulser le requérant vers la Tunisie a violé

l'article 3 de la Convention ; 3. Dit qu'il n'y a pas lieu d'examiner également si la mise à exécution de la décision d'expulser

le requérant vers la Tunisie a également violé les articles 2 et 6 de la Convention ; 4. Dit qu'il y a eu violation de l'article 34 de la Convention ; 5. Dit

a) que l'Etat défendeur doit verser au requérant, dans les trois mois à compter du jour où l'arrêt sera devenu définitif conformément à l'article 44 § 2 de la Convention, les sommes suivantes :

i. 10 000 EUR (dix mille euros), plus tout montant pouvant être dû à titre d'impôt, pour dommage moral ; ii. 5 000 EUR (cinq mille euros), plus tout montant pouvant être dû à titre d'impôt par le requérant, pour frais et dépens ;

b) qu'à compter de l'expiration dudit délai et jusqu'au versement, ces montants seront à majorer d'un intérêt simple à un taux égal à celui de la facilité de prêt marginal de la Banque centrale européenne applicable pendant cette période, augmenté de trois points de pourcentage ;

6. Rejette la demande de satisfaction équitable pour le surplus.

Fait en français, puis communiqué par écrit le 24 février 2009, en application de l'article 77 §§ 2 et 3 du règlement.

Sally Dollé Françoise Tulkens Greffière Présidente

Au présent arrêt se trouve joint, conformément aux articles 45 § 2 de la Convention et 74 § 2 du règlement, l'exposé de l'opinion séparée du Juge Cabral Barreto.

OPINION CONCORDANTE DU JUGE CABRAL BARRETO

Je suis pleinement d'accord avec les constats de violation. J'aimerais seulement préciser ce qui suit en ce qui concerne la violation de l'article 34 de la

Convention. Dans le paragraphe 87 de l'arrêt, il me semble qu'on ne fait pas parfaitement la distinction

entre les obligations de l'Etat découlant des articles 1 et 46 de la Convention et celles qui sont

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imposées par l'article 34 ; ceci pourrait provoquer des doutes quant à la façon de la Cour d'interpréter ces dispositions.

Ainsi, en suivant de près l'arrêt Mamatkulov et Askarov, précité, j'aurai aimé que les paragraphes 87 et 88 de l'arrêt soient remplacés par les paragraphes suivants :

« 87. Les faits de la cause, tels qu'ils sont exposés ci-dessus, montrent clairement qu'en

raison de l'expulsion du requérant vers la Tunisie, l'arrêt de la Cour risque d'être privé de tout effet utile. En particulier, le fait que le requérant a été soustrait à la juridiction de l'Italie constitue un obstacle sérieux qui pourrait empêcher le Gouvernement de s'acquitter de ses obligations découlant des articles 1 et 46 de la Convention de sauvegarder les droits de l'intéressé et d'effacer les conséquences des violations constatées par la Cour.

88. Et il est manifeste que la dite expulsion a empêché le requérant de développer tous les arguments pertinents pour sa défense, ce qui a constitué une entrave à l'exercice effectif, par le requérant, de son droit de recours individuel garanti par l'article 34 de la Convention, droit que l'expulsion litigieuse a réduit à néant.

c) Conclusion

89. Compte tenu des éléments en sa possession, la Cour conclut qu'en ne se conformant pas aux mesures provisoires indiquées en vertu de l'article 39 de son règlement, l'Italie n'a pas respecté les obligations qui lui incombaient en l'espèce au regard de l'article 34 de la Convention (Mamatkulov et Askarov, précité, § 129) ».

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CORTE EUROPEA DEI DIRITTI DELL’UOMO

AFFAIRE CHERIF ET AUTRES c. ITALIE

(Requête no 1860/07)

ARRÊT

STRASBOURG

7 avril 2009

[Omissis]

En l'affaire Cherif et autres c. Italie, La Cour européenne des droits de l'homme (deuxième section), siégeant en une chambre

composée de : Françoise Tulkens, présidente, Ireneu Cabral Barreto, Vladimiro Zagrebelsky, Danut÷ Jočien÷, Dragoljub Popović, András Sajó, Nona Tsotsoria, juges, et de Françoise Elens-Passos, greffière adjointe de section,

Après en avoir délibéré en chambre du conseil le 10 mars 2009, Rend l'arrêt que voici, adopté à cette date :

PROCÉDURE

1. A l'origine de l'affaire se trouve une requête (no 1860/07) dirigée contre la République italienne et dont deux ressortissants tunisiens, MM. Foued Ben Fitouri Cherif et Kais Cherif, et une ressortissante italienne, Mme Sonia Brusadelli (« les requérants »), ont saisi la Cour le 10 janvier 2006 en vertu de l'article 34 de la Convention de sauvegarde des droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales (« la Convention »).

2. Les requérants sont représentés par Me A. Ballerini, avocate à Gênes. Le gouvernement italien (« le Gouvernement ») est représenté par son agent, Mme E. Spatafora et par son co-agent adjoint, M. N. Lettieri.

3. Les requérants invoquent une violation de leur droit de recours individuel et allèguent que la mise à exécution de la décision d'expulser le premier requérant a méconnu les articles 3, 6, 8, 13 et 34 de la Convention et l'article 1 du Protocole no 7.

4. Le 13 mars 2007, la présidente de la deuxième section a décidé de communiquer la requête au Gouvernement. Comme le permet l'article 29 § 3 de la Convention, il a en outre été décidé que la chambre se prononcerait en même temps sur la recevabilité et sur le fond de l'affaire.

EN FAIT

I. LES CIRCONSTANCES DE L'ESPÈCE

5. Le premier requérant est un ressortissant tunisien né en 1970 et résidant actuellement en Tunisie. La requérante est l'épouse du premier requérant. Ressortissante italienne, elle est née en

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1964 et réside à Dazio (Sondrio). Le deuxième requérant est le frère du premier requérant. C'est un ressortissant tunisien. Sa date de naissance et son lieu de résidence ne sont pas connus.

A. L'expulsion du premier requérant

6. En janvier 1993, le premier requérant s'installa en Italie. Il emménagea avec la requérante, qu'il épousa le 24 mai 1996, et eut avec elle trois enfants, nés respectivement le 11 décembre 1996, le 28 août 2001 et le 21 juin 2004. Il obtint un permis de séjour régulier.

7. Les requérants affirment que le premier requérant n'a jamais été accusé d'aucune infraction pénale en Italie. Il aurait en revanche été condamné par contumace à huit années d'emprisonnement par le tribunal militaire de Tunis. Les requérants n'ont pas produit de copie de ce jugement.

8. Le 13 juillet 2005, des agents de la préfecture (Questura) de Sondrio perquisitionnèrent la demeure du premier requérant. Il ressort du procès-verbal de la perquisition qu'une « source confidentielle crédible » avait donné des indices amenant à croire que l'intéressé détenait illégalement des armes, des munitions ou des matières explosives. Toutefois, aucun de ces objets ne fut trouvé à son domicile.

9. Par un arrêté du 4 janvier 2007, le ministre des Affaires intérieures ordonna l'expulsion du premier requérant vers la Tunisie, en application des dispositions du décret-loi no 144 du 27 juillet 2005 (décret intitulé « mesures urgentes pour combattre le terrorisme international », et converti en la loi no 155 du 31 juillet 2005). Observant qu'il « ressortait des actes » que le premier requérant entretenait des relations suivies avec des éléments de premier plan de l'intégrisme islamiste en Italie qui avaient joué un rôle dans des projets terroristes, le ministre expliqua que compte tenu du « contexte actuel du terrorisme de type islamiste », il avait des raisons de penser que par sa présence en Italie, le premier requérant pouvait prêter assistance à des organisations ou des activités terroristes.

10. Le ministre précisa que le premier requérant ne pourrait revenir en Italie que sur la base d'une autorisation ministérielle ad hoc et que la préfecture de Sondrio était chargée de l'exécution de l'arrêté d'expulsion. Il indiqua en outre que cet arrêté pouvait être attaqué devant le tribunal administratif (« TAR ») du Latium dans un délai de soixante jours.

11. Le 4 janvier 2007, vers 16 heures, le premier requérant fut interpellé par la police et conduit à la préfecture (Questura) de Milan, où il se vit notifier l'arrêté d'expulsion ainsi qu'une ordonnance par laquelle le préfet de Sondrio révoquait le permis de séjour qui lui avait été octroyé le 19 janvier 2000 pour une durée indéterminée. Cette décision pouvait être contestée devant le TAR du Latium dans un délai de soixante jours.

12. Avant d'être conduit à la préfecture, le premier requérant aurait téléphoné à la requérante, l'informant que la police l'avait interpellé. Celle-ci aurait essayé par la suite à plusieurs reprises de le contacter, mais sans succès. Elle n'aurait pu lui parler que le soir, alors qu'il était en route vers l'aéroport en vue de son rapatriement.

13. Selon le récit fait par la requérante de cette communication téléphonique, le premier requérant aurait supplié qu'on ne le rapatriât pas, expliquant qu'il craignait pour sa vie, et aurait demandé à contacter un avocat. Quelqu'un lui aurait répondu que rien ne pouvait être fait, puis la ligne aurait été coupée.

14. Cette version des faits est contestée par le Gouvernement, qui a produit une note de la préfecture de Sondrio datée du 3 juillet 2007. Selon cette note, après avoir notifié au premier requérant l'arrêté d'expulsion, le personnel de la préfecture lui aurait demandé s'il souhaitait contacter quelqu'un avant que l'expulsion fût mise à exécution. L'intéressé aurait téléphoné à deux reprises à la requérante. On lui aurait alors demandé s'il avait besoin d'autre chose, et il aurait répondu par la négative, ajoutant seulement que certains de ses effets personnels et une certaine somme d'argent devaient être donnés à sa femme. Enfin, une fois arrivé à l'aéroport de Milan, il aurait téléphoné une troisième fois à la requérante.

15. Vers 21h10, la requérante aurait présenté une demande d'asile politique au nom de son mari. Cette demande ne fut pas examinée car le premier requérant avait déjà embarqué sur un vol à destination de Tunis, qui décollait à 21h20. Cependant, son nom ne figurait pas sur la liste des passagers de ce vol, et aucun laissez-passer ne lui avait été octroyé. A cet égard, les requérants soulignent que le passeport du premier requérant n'était plus valable, les autorités tunisiennes refusant depuis longtemps de le renouveler.

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16. Selon les requérants, la police de Milan aurait exercé des pressions sur le premier requérant, l'invitant à « collaborer ».

17. Le 5 janvier 2007, un agent de la préfecture de Sondrio aurait déclaré à la requérante : « pour nous, Madame, votre mari est libre ; la Digos de Milan lui a demandé de collaborer et il n'a pas donné la réponse souhaitée ».

18. Le premier requérant arriva à Tunis en compagnie d'un autre ressortissant tunisien, dont le nom n'est pas connu. Celui-ci ne fut pas privé de sa liberté. Selon les requérants, M. Cherif, en revanche, fut incarcéré et torturé jusqu'au 15 janvier 2007 dans les locaux du ministère des Affaires intérieures de Tunis.

19. Le 22 janvier 2007, les requérants ont indiqué que le premier requérant était détenu au pénitencier civil de Tunis, où il avait été placé « sous la responsabilité » des autorités militaires ; et que les membres de sa famille n'avaient aucun contact avec lui.

20. La famille du premier requérant aurait nommé un avocat pour le représenter en Tunisie. Cependant, cet avocat ne pourrait pas obtenir de copie des actes de la procédure ni connaître de manière précise les accusations portées contre son client.

21. Entre-temps, le 11 janvier 2007, la requérante et le deuxième requérant avaient présenté à la Cour une demande de mesure provisoire en vertu de l'article 39 du règlement. Ils demandaient que l'Italie fût invitée à produire des garanties quant au respect de la vie et de l'intégrité physique du premier requérant et à s'efforcer d'obtenir sa remise en liberté immédiate, son retour en Italie, ainsi que la possibilité pour lui de nommer un avocat de son choix en Tunisie et de communiquer avec sa famille. Le 12 janvier 2007, les avocats des requérants furent informés que leur demande avait été rejeté. Des nouvelles demandes visant à obtenir la mesure d'urgence de la suspension de l'arrêté d'expulsion, introduites le 23 mai et 2 juillet 2007, furent considérées comme se situant hors du champ d'application de l'article 39 et ne furent dès lors pas soumises pour décision au président de la chambre.

22. A une date non précisée, la requérante saisit le tribunal régional administratif (« TAR ») du Latium afin d'obtenir l'annulation de l'arrêté d'expulsion et de la révocation du permis de séjour de son mari. Elle demanda en outre la suspension de l'exécution des décisions litigieuses. Par une ordonnance du 26 avril 2007, le TAR du Latium rejeta la demande de suspension. Il observa d'abord que la requérante ne semblait pas avoir le locus standi pour attaquer des actes concernant son mari et que ce dernier n'avait pas nommé un avocat pour le représenter ; ensuite que le premier requérant était détenu à Tunis, ce qui rendait impossible, en l'état, son retour en Italie ; et enfin que l'intérêt de l'Etat à protéger la sécurité nationale semblait destiné à prévaloir sur l'intérêt particulier des requérants. L'issue du recours en annulation devant le TAR n'est pas connue.

23. Dans une note du 2 juillet 2007, le ministère des Affaires intérieures précisa que, contrairement à ce qui avait été affirmé par les requérants (voir le paragraphe 7 ci-dessus), le premier requérant avait de nombreux antécédents judiciaires en Italie. En particulier, par un jugement du 11 avril 1996, qui avait ensuite acquis la force de la chose jugée, le tribunal de Milan l'avait condamné à dix mois d'emprisonnement pour possession de stupéfiants ; le 22 mars 1999, ce même tribunal avait prononcé une condamnation pour possession et vente de stupéfiants à un an et un mois d'emprisonnement. Cette dernière condamnation était devenue définitive le 17 janvier 2004, et le sursis de l'exécution de la peine, octroyé lors de la première condamnation, avait été révoqué. De plus, en juin 1999 et en juillet 2001, le requérant avait été arrêté et poursuivi pour outrage et résistance à un officier public ; en 1997 et 2002, des poursuites avaient été entamées à son encontre pour rixe, coups et blessures, dégradation de chose d'autrui et port prohibé d'un objet pouvant être utilisé comme une arme.

24. Dans une note du 4 juillet 2007, le même ministère indiqua que la dangerosité du premier requérant avait été déduite du fait qu'il fréquentait, depuis 2002, de nombreux ressortissants étrangers impliqués dans des affaires faisant l'objet d'enquêtes judicaires.

B. Les assurances diplomatiques obtenues par les autorités italiennes

25. Le 29 août 2008, l'Ambassade d'Italie à Tunis adressa au ministère tunisien des Affaires étrangères une note verbale (no 3124) dans laquelle elle sollicita des assurances diplomatiques. Le contenu de cette note se trouve dans l'arrêt Soltana c. Italie, no 37336/06, § 19, 24 mars 2009.

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26. Le 5 novembre 2008, les autorités tunisiennes firent parvenir leur réponse, signée par l'avocat général à la direction générale des services judiciaires. En ses parties pertinentes, cette réponse se lit comme suit :

« Dans sa note verbale en date du 29 août 2008, telle que complétée par sa note verbale datée du 4 septembre 2008, l'ambassade d'Italie à Tunis a sollicité, des autorités tunisiennes, les assurances, ci-après énumérées, concernant les citoyens tunisiens (...) Foued CHERIF [et autres] s'ils venaient à être expulsés vers la Tunisie. (...)

II. S'agissant du dénommé Foued CHERIF, les autorités tunisiennes soulignent que suite à son expulsion vers la Tunisie, il a été traduit en justice du chef d'infractions terroristes portant sur son adhésion, hors du territoire de la république tunisienne, à une entente en rapport avec des infractions terroristes et la collecte de fonds dont il [sait] qu'ils sont destinés à financer des personnes, des organisations et des activités terroristes.

L'intéressé a bénéficié d'un procès équitable au cours duquel il a pu faire valoir tous ses moyens de défense. Il a été reconnu coupable d'octroi de contributions pécuniaires aux membres d'une bande de malfaiteurs et condamné, de ce chef, à un an d'emprisonnement et [il] a bénéficié d'un non-lieu pour l'infraction d'adhésion à une organisation terroriste.

Foued CHERIF a été libéré au cours du mois de janvier 2008, après [avoir purgé sa peine]. Il est à noter qu'il a bénéficié, dans l'établissement pénitentiaire, d'un programme de soutien psychologique et d'un programme de réhabilitation qui lui a permis d'apprendre un métier de manière à faciliter sa réinsertion dans la société.

(...)

La garantie du droit de recevoir des visites :

Si l'arrestation des intéressés [est] décidée par l'autorité judiciaire compétente, ils bénéficieront des droits garantis aux détenus par la loi du 14 mai 2001 relative à l'organisation des prisons. Cette loi consacre le droit de tout prévenu à recevoir la visite de l'avocat chargé de sa défense, sans la présence d'un agent de la prison ainsi que la visite des membres de leurs familles. Si leur arrestation [est] décidée, les intéressés jouiront de ce droit conformément à la réglementation, en vigueur et sans restriction aucune.

Concernant la demande de visite des intéressés par les avocats qui les représentent dans la procédure en cours devant la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme, les autorités tunisiennes observent qu'une telle visite ne peut être autorisée en l'absence de convention ou de cadre légal interne qui l'autoriserait.

En effet la loi relative aux prisons détermine les personnes habilitées à exercer ce droit : il s'agit notamment des membres de la famille du détenu et de son avocat tunisien.

La Convention d'entraide judiciaire conclue entre la Tunisie et l'Italie le 15 novembre 1967 ne prévoit pas la possibilité pour les avocats italiens de rendre visite à des détenus tunisiens. Toutefois les intéressés pourront, s'ils le souhaitent, charger des avocats tunisiens de leur choix [de] leur rendre visite et de procéder, avec leurs homologues italiens, à la coordination de leurs actions dans la préparation des éléments de leur défense devant la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme.

(...) ».

C. La représentation des requérants devant la Cour

27. Au moment de l'introduction de leur requête (10 janvier 2007), la requérante et le deuxième requérant avaient signé une procuration en faveur de deux avocats du barreau de Milan, Mes S. Clementi et B. Manara. Aucune procuration n'avait été signée par le premier requérant, qui à cette époque venait d'être expulsé vers la Tunisie. Le formulaire de requête était signé par Mes Clementi et Manara.

28. Par une télécopie du 2 avril 2007, Me A. Ballerini informa la Cour qu'elle était la nouvelle représentante des requérants, et que toute correspondance relative à la présente requête devait être adressée à son cabinet à Gênes. Par une lettre du 13 avril 2007, le greffe de la Cour

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transmit à Me Ballerini un formulaire de procuration, l'invitant à le faire parvenir à la Cour, dûment rempli, dans les meilleurs délais. Dans le même temps, le greffe informa Mes Clementi et Manara de la télécopie de Me Ballerini et précisa que, sauf indication contraire de leur part, il serait estimé que seule cette dernière représentait les requérants. Aucune réponse ne fut reçue de Mes Clementi et Manara.

29. Par une télécopie du 27 avril 2007, Me Ballerini fit parvenir au greffe de la Cour une procuration en sa faveur signée par la requérante. Les premier et deuxième requérants ne signèrent aucune procuration semblable.

30. Par la suite, Me Ballerini produisit le document suivant, daté du 9 février 2007, et au bas duquel figure une signature illisible :

« Je soussigné Foued Ben Fitouri Cherif, né à Tunis le 31 mai 1970, nomme en tant qu'avocat de mon choix Me Alessandra Ballerini du barreau de Gênes afin qu'elle me représente et me défende devant le TAR [du] Latium par rapport à la révocation de [mon] permis de séjour et [à mon] expulsion d'Italie. J'élis domicile dans son cabinet à Gênes, Salita Viale no 5-2. »

EN DROIT

I. SUR LA REQUÊTE INTRODUITE AU NOM DU PREMIER REQUÉRANT

31. La Cour observe d'emblée que le formulaire de requête a été rempli également au nom du premier requérant, qui soutiendrait que la mise à exécution de la décision de l'expulser a violé les articles 3, 6, 8, 13 et 34 de la Convention et 1 du Protocole no 7.

32. Le Gouvernement conteste les griefs susmentionnés. 33. Il argue tout d'abord que le premier requérant n'a jamais mandaté d'avocat pour le

représenter devant la Cour, la présente requête ayant été introduite uniquement par son épouse et par son frère (la requérante et le deuxième requérant), qui n'avaient pas le pouvoir de le représenter. Il indique ensuite que le jour de l'expulsion, la notification de l'arrêté ministériel a eu lieu à 16 heures, alors que le vol pour Tunis où le premier requérant a été embarqué ne décollait qu'à 21h20 : l'intéressé aurait donc disposé de plus de cinq heures pour faire appel aux services d'un avocat.

34. Les requérants affirment que le premier requérant a été emmené de force à la préfecture de Milan, où il n'a pas eu la possibilité de contacter un avocat de son choix. Il aurait ensuite été conduit à l'aéroport en vue de l'exécution de son expulsion. Une personne se présentant comme un inspecteur de police aurait par ailleurs téléphoné à la requérante, et lui aurait dit qu'il était inutile d'appeler un avocat, le premier requérant ayant été expulsé. La représentante des requérants devant la Cour aurait demandé aux autorités tunisiennes l'autorisation de visiter le premier requérant au pénitencier de Tunis, mais cette autorisation lui aurait été refusée, de même qu'aux fonctionnaires de l'ambassade d'Italie à Tunis. Seule la requérante aurait pu voir son mari en Tunisie, et ce serait ainsi qu'elle aurait obtenu une procuration signée par l'intéressé en sa présence. La teneur de cette procuration figure au paragraphe 30 ci-dessus.

35. La Cour rappelle qu'aux termes de l'article 36 § 1 de son règlement, « [l]es personnes physiques (...) peuvent initialement soumettre des requêtes en agissant soit par [elles]-mêmes, soit par l'intermédiaire d'un représentant ». En outre, une fois la requête notifiée à la Partie contractante défenderesse, tout requérant doit, sauf décision contraire du président de la chambre, être représenté par un conseil habilité à exercer dans l'une quelconque des Parties contractantes et résidant sur le territoire de l'une d'elles (voir les paragraphes 2 et 4 a) de l'article 36 précité). Enfin, toute requête formulée en vertu de l'article 34 de la Convention doit être présentée par écrit et signée par le requérant ou son représentant ; lorsqu'un requérant est représenté, son ou ses représentants doivent produire une procuration ou un pouvoir écrit (article 45 §§ 1 et 3 du règlement de la Cour).

36. En la présente espèce, aucun des requérants n'a présenté sa requête en agissant par lui-même ; les intéressés sont en effet passés par l'intermédiaire d'un ou plusieurs représentants, à savoir initialement Mes Clementi et Manara, et ensuite, à partir d'avril 2007, Me Ballerini. Dès

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lors, lesdits représentants étaient tenus de produire une procuration ou un pouvoir écrit signés par leurs clients.

37. Or, les seules procurations écrites concernant la procédure devant la Cour qui sont parvenues au greffe ont été signées par la requérante et par le deuxième requérant (ce dernier s'étant borné à nommer Mes Clementi et Manara). Aucune procuration semblable n'a été produite au nom du premier requérant (voir les paragraphes 27 et 29 ci-dessus).

38. La Cour ne saurait souscrire à la thèse du Gouvernement selon laquelle l'intéressé disposait du temps et des facilités nécessaires pour chercher et nommer un représentant dans les quelques heures qui ont suivi son interpellation et précédé la mise à exécution de la décision de l'expulser. A cet égard, elle rappelle que le 4 janvier 2007, le premier requérant a été conduit à la préfecture de Milan vers 16 heures (voir le paragraphe 11 ci-dessus), et qu'il a été embarqué sur un vol à destination de Tunis qui a décollé à 21h20 (voir le paragraphe 15 ci-dessus). Dans la mesure où il s'est alors trouvé dans une situation qu'il devait percevoir comme dramatique et où il n'était pas rompu aux arcanes des procédures judiciaires, on ne saurait lui faire grief de ne pas avoir songé, dans un délai aussi bref, à entreprendre les démarches juridiques lui permettant d'être représenté par un conseil devant la Cour.

39. Il en va autrement, cependant, pour la période qui a suivi la mise à exécution de l'expulsion. Il ressort en effet des assurances diplomatiques données par les autorités tunisiennes qu'en prison, M. Foued Cherif aurait eu la possibilité de recevoir des visites de son avocat et des membres de sa famille (voir le paragraphe 26 ci-dessus). En effet, la requérante elle-même admet avoir pu rencontrer son mari au pénitencier de Tunis. Elle aurait également obtenu, le 9 février 2007, une procuration signée par l'intéressé. Cette procuration ne concerne cependant que la procédure devant le TAR, et ne mentionne pas la procédure devant la Cour (voir le paragraphe 30 ci-dessus).

40. De plus, comme cela a été indiqué par les autorités tunisiennes sans que les requérants ne le contestent, le premier requérant a été libéré en janvier 2008 (voir le paragraphe 26 ci-dessus). A partir de cette date, rien ne l'empêchait de contacter sa femme ou l'avocate italienne qui la représentait et de leur faire parvenir, par courrier ou par télécopie, une procuration écrite.

41. La Cour attache également de l'importance au fait que, dès avril 2007, le greffe de Strasbourg avait invité Me Ballerini à produire une procuration dûment remplie et signée par ses clients (voir le paragraphe 28 ci-dessus). En outre, Me Ballerini a reçu une copie des observations du Gouvernement, qui excipait de l'absence de procuration concernant le premier requérant. Elle n'a cependant pas produit une telle procuration, mais s'est bornée à faire parvenir au greffe le document du 9 février 2007, non valide aux fins de la représentation devant la Cour (voir les paragraphes 30 et 39 ci-dessus).

42. Dans ces circonstances, la Cour considère que le premier requérant n'entend plus maintenir sa requête et/ou qu'il ne se justifie pas d'en poursuivre l'examen au sens de l'article 37 § 1 a) et/ou c) de la Convention (voir, mutatis mutandis, Fitzmartin et autres (déc.), no 34953/97 et autres, 21 janvier 2003). Par ailleurs, le respect des droits de l'homme garantis par la Convention et ses Protocoles n'exige pas la poursuite de l'examen de ladite requête. A cet égard, il convient de noter que les questions qu'elle soulève ont déjà été abordées par la Grande Chambre dans l'affaire Saadi c. Italie (no 37201/06, 28 février 2008) et par des arrêts de chambre dans plusieurs affaires similaires (voir, par exemple, Ben Khemais c. Italie, no 246/07, 24 février 2009).

43. Il s'ensuit qu'aux termes de l'article 37 § 1 a) et/ou c) de la Convention, il y a lieu de rayer l'affaire du rôle dans la mesure où elle a été introduite par le premier requérant.

II. SUR LA VIOLATION ALLÉGUÉE DES ARTICLES 3, 6, 13 ET 34 DE LA CONVENTION ET 1 DU PROTOCOLE No 7

44. La requérante et le deuxième requérant allèguent que l'expulsion du premier requérant a été exécutée en dépit des risques de traitements inhumains auxquels l'intéressé serait exposé en Tunisie. De plus, ils allèguent que le premier requérant a été victime en Tunisie d'un déni de justice ; ils contestent la motivation de l'arrêté d'expulsion du 4 janvier 2007 ; et ils soutiennent qu'il était impossible pour le premier requérant d'attaquer la décision de l'expulser devant les tribunaux internes. Enfin, ils estiment que les modalités de l'exécution de l'expulsion ont porté atteinte à leur droit de recours individuel.

45. Ils invoquent les articles 3, 6, 13 et 34 de la Convention et 1 du Protocole no 7.

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46. Le Gouvernement conteste ces griefs. 47. La Cour rappelle que pour pouvoir former une requête en vertu de l'article 34, une

personne physique, une organisation non gouvernementale ou un groupe de particuliers doit se prétendre « victime d'une violation (...) des droits reconnus dans la Convention (...) ». L'article 34 exige qu'un individu requérant se prétende effectivement lésé par la violation qu'il allègue (Irlande c. Royaume-Uni, 18 janvier 1978, §§ 239-240, série A no 25, et Klass et autres c. Allemagne, 6 septembre 1978, § 33, série A no 28) ; cet article n'institue pas au profit des particuliers une sorte d'actio popularis pour l'interprétation de la Convention et ne les autorise pas non plus à se plaindre d'une loi au seul motif qu'elle leur semble enfreindre la Convention (Norris c. Irlande, série A no 142, § 31, 26 octobre 1988, et Sanles Sanles c. Espagne (déc.), no 48335/99, CEDH 2000-XI). Ce principe s'applique aussi aux événements ou décisions qui seraient contraires à la Convention (Fairfield c. Royaume-Uni, (déc.) no 24790/04, CEDH 2005-VI, et Ada Rossi et autres c. Italie (déc.), nos 55185/08 et autres, 16 décembre 2008).

48. La Cour réaffirme également que l'existence d'une victime, c'est-à-dire d'un individu qui est personnellement touché par la violation alléguée d'un droit garanti par la Convention, est nécessaire pour que soit enclenché le mécanisme de protection prévu par celle-ci, bien que ce critère ne puisse être appliqué de façon rigide, mécanique et inflexible tout au long de la procédure (Karner c. Autriche, no 40016/98, § 25, CEDH 2003-IX).

49. En l'espèce, les mauvais traitements et le déni de justice pouvant avoir lieu en Tunisie ne touchent personnellement que le premier requérant. Il en va de même en ce qui concerne la procédure ayant conduit à l'adoption et à l'exécution de l'arrêté d'expulsion. Il convient en effet de rappeler que seul le premier requérant a fait l'objet d'une telle procédure.

50. Dans ces circonstances, la requérante et le deuxième requérant ne sauraient se prétendre « victimes » des violations des articles 3, 6, 13 et 34 de la Convention et 1 du Protocole no 7 qu'ils allèguent.

51. Il s'ensuit que cette partie de la requête est incompatible ratione personae avec les dispositions de la Convention et doit être rejetée en application de l'article 35 §§ 3 et 4 de la Convention.

III. SUR LA VIOLATION ALLÉGUÉE DE L'ARTICLE 8 DE LA CONVENTION

52. La requérante et le deuxième requérant allèguent que l'expulsion du premier requérant vers la Tunisie a violé leur droit au respect de leur vie familiale. Ils invoquent l'article 8 de la Convention, ainsi libellé dans sa partie pertinente :

« 1. Toute personne a droit au respect de sa vie (...) familiale, (...).

2. Il ne peut y avoir ingérence d'une autorité publique dans l'exercice de ce droit que pour autant que cette ingérence est prévue par la loi et qu'elle constitue une mesure qui, dans une société démocratique, est nécessaire (...), à la sûreté publique, (...) à la défense de l'ordre et à la prévention des infractions pénales, (...). »

53. Le Gouvernement s'oppose à cette thèse.

A. Sur la recevabilité

54. La Cour observe tout d'abord que, dans la mesure où ils se plaignent des répercussions négatives que l'expulsion du premier requérant a eues sur leur vie familiale, la requérante et le deuxième requérant peuvent alléguer avoir été personnellement touchés par les faits qu'ils dénoncent. Ils ont donc locus standi pour soulever ce grief en leur nom propre. Elle constate ensuite que celui-ci n'est pas manifestement mal fondé au sens de l'article 35 § 3 de la Convention et qu'il ne se heurte à aucun autre motif d'irrecevabilité. Il convient donc de le déclarer recevable (voir, mutatis mutandis, Saadi, précité, § 163).

B. Sur le fond

1. Arguments des parties

[Omissis]

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2. Appréciation de la Cour

a) Principes généraux

58. La Cour réaffirme que la Convention ne garantit pas le droit pour un étranger d'entrer ou de résider dans un pays particulier et que dans l'exercice de leur mission de maintien de l'ordre public, les Etats contractants ont la faculté d'expulser un étranger délinquant. Toutefois, leurs décisions en la matière, dans la mesure où elles porteraient atteinte à un droit protégé par le paragraphe 1 de l'article 8, doivent se révéler nécessaires dans une société démocratique, c'est-à-dire justifiées par un besoin social impérieux et, notamment, proportionnées au but légitime poursuivi (Mehemi c. France, Recueil des arrêts 1997-VI, § 34, 26 septembre 1997 ; Dalia c. France, Recueil des arrêts 1998-I, § 52, 19 février 1998 ; Boultif c. Suisse, no 54273/00, § 46, CEDH 2001-IX ; Slivenko c. Lettonie [GC], no 48321/99, § 113, CEDH 2003-X).

59. Même si un ressortissant étranger possède un statut non précaire de résident et a atteint un haut degré d'intégration, sa situation ne peut être mise sur le même pied que celle d'un ressortissant de l'Etat lorsqu'il s'agit du pouvoir précité des Etats contractants d'expulser des étrangers (Moustaquim c. Belgique, 18 mai 1991, § 49, série A no 193) pour une ou plusieurs des raisons énumérées au paragraphe 2 de l'article 8 de la Convention. Les Etats contractants ont le droit de prendre à l'égard des personnes ayant été condamnées pour des infractions pénales des mesures de nature à protéger la société. Semblables mesures administratives doivent être considérées comme revêtant un caractère préventif plutôt que punitif (Maaouia c. France [GC], no 39652/98, § 39, CEDH 2000-X).

60. La Cour a énuméré les critères devant être utilisés pour l'appréciation de la question de savoir si une mesure d'expulsion était nécessaire dans une société démocratique et proportionnée au but légitime poursuivi (Boultif, précité, § 40, et Üner c. Pays-Bas [GC], no 46410/99, §§ 57-58, CEDH 2006-..). Ces critères sont les suivants :

– la nature et la gravité de l'infraction commise par le requérant ; – la durée du séjour de l'intéressé dans le pays dont il doit être expulsé ; – le laps de temps qui s'est écoulé depuis l'infraction, et la conduite du requérant pendant

cette période ; – la nationalité des diverses personnes concernées ; – la situation familiale du requérant, et notamment, le cas échéant, la durée de son mariage,

et d'autres facteurs témoignant de l'effectivité d'une vie familiale au sein d'un couple ; – la question de savoir si le conjoint avait connaissance de l'infraction à l'époque de la

création de la relation familiale ; – la question de savoir si des enfants sont issus du mariage et, dans ce cas, leur âge ; – la gravité des difficultés que le conjoint risque de rencontrer dans le pays vers lequel le

requérant doit être expulsé ; – l'intérêt et le bien-être des enfants, en particulier la gravité des difficultés que les enfants

du requérant sont susceptibles de rencontrer dans le pays vers lequel l'intéressé doit être expulsé ; et

– la solidité des liens sociaux, culturels et familiaux avec le pays hôte et avec le pays de destination.

b) Application de ces principes au cas d'espèce

61. En l'espèce, l'expulsion du premier requérant s'analyse en une ingérence dans le droit au respect de la vie familiale de la requérante et du deuxième requérant. Il n'est pas contesté que cette ingérence était prévue par la loi, à savoir le décret-loi no 144 du 27 juillet 2005 (voir le paragraphe 9 ci-dessus).

62. La Cour estime également que l'ingérence litigieuse poursuivait des buts légitimes, à savoir la protection de la sûreté publique, la défense de l'ordre et la prévention des infractions pénales.

63. A cet égard, elle note que selon les informations fournies par le ministère des Affaires intérieures, le premier requérant a été condamné en Italie à deux reprises à des peines privatives de liberté pour possession et vente de stupéfiants ; en outre, en juin 1999 et en juillet 2001, il a été arrêté et poursuivi pour outrage et résistance à un officier public et des poursuites ont été

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entamées à son encontre pour des nombreuses autres infractions, parmi lesquelles rixe et coups et blessures (voir le paragraphe 23 ci-dessus). De plus, le ministre des Affaires intérieures a indiqué être en possession d'éléments amenant à penser que le premier requérant avait entretenu des relations suivies avec des éléments de premier plan de l'intégrisme islamiste en Italie, qui avaient participé à des projets terroristes (voir le paragraphe 9 ci-dessus). Au demeurant, la Cour observe que la thèse de l'implication du premier requérant dans des activités susceptibles de troubler l'ordre public est également corroborée par le fait que l'intéressé a été accusé, en Tunisie, d'adhésion à une organisation terroriste et de collecte de fonds destinés à financer des personnes, des organisations et des activités terroristes. Même s'il a bénéficié d'un non-lieu pour l'infraction d'adhésion à une organisation terroriste, l'intéressé a été reconnu coupable d'octroi de contributions pécuniaires aux membres d'une bande de malfaiteurs et condamné, de ce chef, à un an d'emprisonnement (voir le paragraphe 26 ci-dessus).

64. L'ensemble de ces éléments pouvait raisonnablement amener les autorités italiennes à croire que la présence du premier requérant sur le territoire de l'Etat représentait un danger pour la sûreté publique.

65. En ce qui concerne la vie familiale du premier requérant en Italie, la Cour observe que l'intéressé est marié avec la requérante et que les trois filles du couple sont nées, respectivement, en 1996, 2001 et 2004 (voir le paragraphe 6 ci-dessus). A l'époque de l'expulsion, elles étaient donc encore jeunes et capables de s'adapter. Nées d'une Italienne, elles possèdent la nationalité de cet Etat. Elles pourraient donc, si elles suivaient leur père en Tunisie, revenir en Italie régulièrement pour rendre visite aux membres de leur famille dans ce pays (voir, mutatis mutandis, Üner, précité, § 64).

66. La Cour ne sous-estime pas les difficultés d'ordre pratique qu'impliquerait pour la requérante le fait de suivre son mari en Tunisie. Elle observe cependant que rien ne prouve que la maladie dont est atteinte Mme Brusadelli ne pourrait pas être soignée d'une manière efficace dans ce pays. Par ailleurs, celle-ci a pu rencontrer son mari lorsqu'il était détenu à Tunis. En tout état de cause, dans les circonstances particulières de l'espèce, les exigences de protection de l'ordre public et de la sécurité nationale l'emportent sur les intérêts de la famille. Quant au deuxième requérant, il est de nationalité tunisienne et il n'a pas été allégué qu'un obstacle quelconque s'opposerait à ce qu'il se rende en Tunisie.

67. Il n'a pas non plus été allégué que le premier requérant n'avait aucun lien social ou culturel avec la société tunisienne. Il semblerait au contraire qu'il ait passé l'essentiel de sa vie dans ce pays, et que la langue locale soit sa langue maternelle.

68. Certes, le premier requérant ne peut, sans autorisation ministérielle, effectuer aucune visite, même de courte durée, en Italie. Toutefois, eu égard à la nature et à la gravité des infractions pour lesquelles il a été condamné, ainsi qu'à la gravité des soupçons qui pèsent sur lui, la Cour ne peut conclure que l'Etat défendeur a fait trop largement prévaloir l'intérêt public sur l'intérêt particulier lorsqu'il a décidé d'imposer cette mesure.

69. A la lumière de ce qui précède, la Cour estime que l'expulsion du premier requérant n'a pas rompu le juste équilibre devant être ménagé en la matière entre les exigences du respect de la vie familiale de la requérante et du deuxième requérant et les buts légitimes poursuivis par les autorités. La mesure incriminée était donc nécessaire dans une société démocratique.

70. Il s'ensuit que la mise à exécution de l'expulsion du premier requérant vers la Tunisie n'a pas violé l'article 8 de la Convention.

PAR CES MOTIFS, LA COUR

1. Décide, à l'unanimité, de rayer la requête du rôle dans la mesure où elle a été introduite par le premier requérant ;

2. Déclare, à l'unanimité, la requête recevable quant au grief de la requérante et du deuxième

requérant tiré de l'article 8 de la Convention et irrecevable pour le surplus ; 3. Dit, par quatre voix contre trois, que la mise à exécution de la décision d'expulser le premier

requérant vers la Tunisie n'a pas violé l'article 8 de la Convention.

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Fait en français, puis communiqué par écrit le 7 avril 2009, en application de l'article 77 §§ 2 et 3 du règlement.

Françoise Elens-Passos Françoise Tulkens Greffière adjointe Présidente

Au présent arrêt se trouve joint, conformément aux articles 45 § 2 de la Convention et 74 § 2 du règlement, l'exposé de l'opinion concordante du juge Sajó et de l'opinion partiellement dissidente commune des juges Tulkens, Jočiené et Popović.

F.T. F.E.P.

OPINION CONCORDANTE DU JUGE SAJÓ (Traduction)

J'ai voté comme la majorité mais souhaite ajouter quelques mots afin d'expliquer certains points du raisonnement de la Cour tels que je le conçois.

Le premier requérant a été expulsé pour des raisons de sécurité nationale mais conformément

à la loi. La Cour devait donc examiner les effets de l'expulsion au regard de l'article 8 et à la lumière des critères énoncés dans les arrêts Boultif et Üner. Dans les affaires de ce type, elle doit trouver entre ces critères le juste équilibre compte tenu des circonstances propres à l'affaire. Les motifs de l'expulsion sont ici dénués de pertinence. Le cas d'espèce porte sur l'impact de l'expulsion du requérant sur les droits de celui-ci et de son épouse en vertu de l'article 8. Les critères Boultif/Üner ont trait notamment à la nature de l'infraction. Pour cette raison, les condamnations passées du premier requérant doivent être appréciées à la lumière d'éléments actuels touchant à la sécurité nationale : la nature des condamnations passées est telle qu'elle a un poids considérable vu les faits récents qui pèsent sur la sécurité nationale. S'appuyer sur des considérations de sécurité nationale sans rapport avec la nature judiciairement établie de la condamnation serait aller au-delà des critères Boultif/Üner.

J'estime que le comportement du premier requérant après les condamnations pose également

problème, même s'il n'y a eu aucune décision judiciaire à cet égard. A mon sens, pareille décision n'est pas requise par la jurisprudence actuelle de la Cour, même si le besoin pourrait un jour s'en faire sentir. Enfin, le premier requérant et son épouse ont plusieurs possibilités pour maintenir leur vie familiale. Je pense qu'à ce stade il serait prématuré de se prononcer sur les conditions de retour (paragraphe 68 de l'arrêt) appliquées au requérant.

OPINION PARTIELLEMENT DISSIDENTE COMMUNE DES JUGES TULKENS,

JOCIENE ET POPOVIĆ

Contrairement à la majorité, nous pensons que la mise à exécution de la décision d'expulser le premier requérant vers la Tunisie, laissant derrière lui une femme et trois enfants, a violé l'article 8 de la Convention qui garantit le droit au respect de la vie privée et familiale. Nos raisons sont les suivantes.

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1. Si les Etats ont en effet « le droit, en vertu d'un principe de droit international bien établi, de contrôler l'entrée, le séjour et l'éloignement des non-nationaux »8, en exerçant ce droit, ils doivent prendre en considération les droits protégés par la Convention. Les droits protégés par la Convention sont également « bien établis » et aucune hiérarchie ne permet de les placer à un niveau inférieur9.

2. Concernant l'expulsion des étrangers délinquants, dans les arrêts Boultif c. Suisse du 2

août 2001 et Üner c. Pays-Bas du 18 octobre 2006 [GC], la Cour a énuméré les critères qui doivent être appliqués pour apprécier si une mesure d'expulsion est nécessaire dans une société démocratique et proportionnée au but légitime poursuivi. Ceux-ci ne nous semblent pas réunis en l'espèce.

3. En ce qui concerne la durée du séjour de l'intéressé dans le pays dont il doit être expulsé,

il convient de noter que le requérant est arrivé en Italie en 1993 et qu'il est titulaire d'un permis de séjour régulier. Au moment de son expulsion en janvier 2007, le requérant avait donc vécu en Italie quatorze ans, ce qui est une durée significative.

4. En ce qui concerne la nature et la gravité des infractions commises par le requérant, il

n'est pas contesté que celui-ci a été condamné en 1996 à dix mois d'emprisonnement avec sursis pour possession de stupéfiants et en 1999 à un an et un mois d'emprisonnement pour possession et vente de stupéfiants. Par ailleurs, il a été poursuivi en 1997, 1999, 2001 et 2002 pour outrage et coups mais sans être condamné. Par comparaison avec d'autres affaires dont la Cour a été saisie, on ne peut raisonnablement soutenir que le parcours délinquant du requérant soit d'une gravité telle que « les exigences de protection de l'ordre public et de la sécurité nationale l'emportent sur les intérêts de la famille » (paragraphe 66). En outre, la dernière condamnation du requérant date de 1999 et son expulsion a eu lieu seulement en 2007. Enfin, l'allégation du requérant au moment de son expulsion et manifestement dans le but d'éviter celle-ci, selon laquelle il aurait été condamné par contumace à huit ans d'emprisonnement par le tribunal militaire de Tunis, n'est pas établie en l'espèce par une copie du jugement (paragraphe 7) et est sans pertinence en l'espèce.

En fait, ce ne sont pas les condamnations du requérant mais bien les soupçons qui pèsent sur

lui qui constituent, aux yeux de la majorité, la véritable justification de son expulsion, lui permettant de conclure que l'Etat n'a pas trop largement fait prévaloir l'intérêt public sur l'intérêt particulier lorsqu'il a décidé d'imposer cette mesure (paragraphe 68). Il s'agit là, dans la jurisprudence de la Cour, d'un critère entièrement nouveau qui est susceptible de toutes les interprétations, risquant d'ouvrir la voie à l'arbitraire.

En l'espèce, ces soupçons se fondent sur des données fragiles et relatives. Il s'agit, d'une part,

de la note du ministère de l'Intérieur indiquant que la dangerosité du requérant était déduite du fait qu'il fréquentait des ressortissants étrangers impliqués dans des affaires faisant l'objet d'enquêtes judiciaires (paragraphe 24). Il s'agit, d'autre part, du fait que, expulsé en Tunisie, le requérant a été reconnu coupable dans ce pays de l'octroi de contributions pécuniaires aux membres d'une bande de malfaiteurs et condamné de ce chef à un an d'emprisonnement alors même qu'il a bénéficié d'un non-lieu pour l'infraction d'adhésion à une organisation terroriste (paragraphe 26).

5. Enfin, en ce qui concerne la situation familiale du requérant, nous savons que celui-ci

s'est marié en 1996 avec une ressortissante italienne et que, de cette union, sont issus trois enfants nés respectivement en 1996, 2001 et 2004 et qui possèdent la nationalité italienne. Au moment de l'expulsion du requérant en 2007, les enfants avaient 10, 7 et 3 ans, elles étaient scolarisées en Italie et y avaient toutes leurs attaches familiales et sociales. A titre de comparaison, dans l'arrêt Üner, les deux enfants étaient âgés respectivement de 6 ans et de 18

8. Cour eur. D.H., arrêt Vilvarajah et autres c. Royaume-Uni du 30 octobre 1991, § 102. 9. S. SAROLEA, Droits de l’homme et migrations. De la protection du migrant aux droits de la personne migrante, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2006, p. 475.

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mois. Dans ces conditions, sauf à déraciner complètement la famille, un transfert de celle-ci en Tunisie ne nous paraît pas une hypothèse réaliste ni humaine.

6. L'arrêt est sensible à la nécessité d'assurer la protection contre la menace terroriste, ce que

nous comprenons parfaitement. Nous pensons cependant que la protection la plus sûre contre cette menace réside dans le respect des droits fondamentaux au rang desquels la vie familiale occupe une place prépondérante. A défaut, la violence risque d'engendrer la violence.