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present, for St. Petersburg is used as an analogue of the character’s mind, as its poetic or subjective correlative. This method of analysis is used throughout, and the book is really a series of city-references depicted in terms of ambivalence.

What is wrong with all this? It seems to me that the main flaw is in the basic conception or approach. The attempt to relate every city-reference to the principle of ambivalence is ultimately reductive. (This is a flaw common to many contemporary works of criticism which - perhaps for the sake of unity - employ the reductive method indiscriminantly.) By so doing, much of that which is really essential is ignored. Let us refer back to our two examples. The author notes Wordsworth’s ambivalent view of London, described as idyllic yet dead. Is this really the main point? I think not. It seems to me that the significance of Wordsworth’s city lies in the fact that it reflects the poet’s essential vision, to which the idea of ambivalence is merely incidental. Wordsworth approaches the city through the prism of Nature, and there- fore he sees it as an artifact of Nature rather than of man. The idyllic city forms a projection of Wordsworth’s Nature ideal. Similarly. the ambivalence of Dostoevsky’s St. Petersburg is not the main point. It is the poetic-cum-psychological use of the city to evoke and intensify the character’s mood which is important. After all, what is Dostoevsky if not a psychological novelist? What is Crime and Punishmenr if not a psychological thriller? Professor Pike does not eschew such observations, but they do not form the substance of his argument, which forever. and rather tediously, reverts to the idea of ambivalence.

And here we come to the next main flaw. The reading of literature in the light of its historical milieu or vice versa is certainly valid. But once the correlation has been established, is it really necessary to state it yet again? Has not modern literature been analysed ad nauseam as a reflection and product of ‘an age of uncertainty’, in terms of subjectivity, fragmentation, alienation and ambiguity? I think there is hardly room for yet another such study, even if it does approach ‘culture’ from a new perspective (the city).

Finally, I find it strange that in a study purporting to deal with the image of the city in modern literature, no mention is made of the special use of this image in the work of writers like Conrad, Joyce and Virginia Woolf - i.e. its formal and structural use (e.g. London in The Secret Agent and Heart of Darkness, Brussels in the latter, Dublin in all of Joyce’s stories and novels).

For surely, it is the formal use of the city-image (rather than its social or moral use) that gives us the image of the so-called moral disintegration of our times.

Avital Talmor

Tel-Aviv

Analisi della fede e critica della ragione nella filosofia di Pierre Bayle, Gianni Paganini (Firenze: La Nuova Italia, 1980). L. 18,000.

Since Mme E.R. Labrousse published her magisterial study of Bayle,’ many critics have concentrated on the Christian, and more particularly Calvinist elements in his thought. Italian scholars, however, have stressed the sceptical aspects of Bayle’s work and the ways in which he forms part of the tradition of French free-thought. Deregibus and Cantelli concentrated on the subversive nature of Bayle’s ideas; Corsano and Cortese investigated certain concepts fundamental to Bayle’s philosophy; Firpo illuminated Bayle’s humanism.’

Gianni Paganini’s book is a distinguished addition to Italian studies in these fields.

234 Book Reviews

He isolates four traditions of thought and argues that they are central to Bayle’s ideas - the sceptical tradition, the influence of Cartesian philosophy, Protestant critical erudition and humanism (p. VII). In general, Paganini sees Bayle as a fideistic sceptic whose rejection of metaphysics is based on the use of critical reason (p. VIII). Paganini’s greatest achievement is. perhaps, to remind the reader of the important position Bayle holds in the development of European thought: he uses his extensive knowledge of seventeenth-century French free-thought and of Enlightenment philos- ophy to construct a historical perspective in which Bayle’s place is clearly to be seen.

One of the problems involved in discussing French thought in this period lies in defining terms like ‘hCretique’, ‘libertin’ and ‘athPe’. Paganini draws comparisons between Bayle and Charron, La Mothe le Vayer and Gassendi, who may uncon- troversially be described as ‘libertins irudits’. By showing also how strongly Bayle draws on Malebranche. Nicole and Arnauld, Paganini raises questions about the essential meaning of words like free-thought. scepticism and fideism when used to describe Bayle’s work.

This is particularly evident in the first section, ‘Ragione e Religione’ (pp. 3-221). The first chapter deals with Bayle’s critique of superstition, and draws mainly on the Penstes diverses and the Commentaire philosophique. Paganini compares the Penstes with La Mothe’s Des oracles (p. 28). but goes on to suggest that the Commentateur’s ideas are often those of Malebranche (pp. 62-3). This means that in the interval between the two books Bayle changed from a position that may broadly be described as sceptical to one that may with similar qualification be defined as rationalistic. Paganini argues (p. 34) that the insistence in both the Pertsees and the Commentaire that decisions about morality are more certain than those of rational speculation links the two books and forms the basis of Bayle’s theory of toleration. This interpretation hinges on whether Paganini is right to criticise Mme Labrousse (p. 44) for not seeing Bayle’s relativism as sceptical and libertine.

Paganini’s second chapter (on the Dictionnaire-sic-) draws considerable attention to Bayle’s scepticism in that work. Paganini argues (p, 7.5) that the first phase of Bayle’s thought closes with the Commentaire, and that the second opens with the Dicrionaire. Bayle’s emphasis moves from the practical application of moral reason to the contradictory nature of theology in a theoretical plane. Once again (p. W), La Mothe’s scepticism is offered as a model for Bayle’s. In Bayle’s view (p. 92). although natural reason can postulate the existence of God, it cannot describe his essence. The argument (p. 95) that Bayle wishes to establish a criterion of faith on psychological rather than theoretical grounds is an attractive formulation. In Calvinism. to an even greater extent than in most theologies strongly influenced by Augustinianism, the only criterion the Christian had for judging whether he had been chosen by God to receive Grace was psychological. not to say illuministic. Calvinists distinguish between histor- ical faith - belief in Scripture as an historical account - and justifying faith, which changed hearts.’ Historical faith is achieved by those who by proper use of critical reason come to believe that Scripture is historically true. Justifying faith is God’s free gift: it cannot be achieved by man’s unaided efforts. although it alone brings salvation.

There is an extremely interesting analysis of the Dicrionaire article ‘Rimini’ at pp. 1Olff. Paganini stresses the radical nature of Bayle’s critique of theology, and on p. 132 argues that the use of ‘croyance populaire’ in ‘Pomponace‘ F indicates that Bayle’s efforts accentuate the fideistic and irrational nature of religious belief (p. 133). Paga- nini shows (pp. 136ff.) that Bayle’s discussion of theodicy draws heavily both on Malebranche and Saint Augustine, and argues (p. 161) that Bayle‘s usual method is to propose an a priori truth as indubitable. and then to demonstrate that it cannot be true by reducing it to an absurdity. Three interpretations of this process are possible. First.

Book Reviews 235

the writer’s object might be to deride a priori reason. Second, it might be to show that critical reason is ineffectual. Third, his purpose might be to prove that the conclusion he apparently presents as absurd is in fact true. Paganini argues that Bayle was not a Manichean, that he had no faith in theological speculation, and that therefore he is a sceptic (pp. 162-4). But he also argues (p. 160) that Bayle discovers the laws of morality by reflection, independently of theology and the Bible. In other words, Bayle is confident in the power of sceptical enquiry to reach the truth. Paganini’s conclusion is close to that of James: A Bayle is like the later deists in some ways, but not in that he accepts the mysteries, original sin and eternal punishment. But unlike James, Paganini represents Bayle’s belief in these dogmas as fideistic.

Chapter four, ‘Religione e Storia’, shows that Bayle’s defence of toleration is as anti-Calvinist as it is anti-Catholic (pp. 206-7). Religion, because based on personal persuasion, must be controlled by the state, which is governed by laws deriving from authority rather than from the nature of things. Bayle, it is claimed (p. 209), appar- ently argues that atheists have no conscience.

Chapter five is ‘II Problema della Conoscenza Historica’. Historical criticism is applied in the fens&es to show that the peoples of the world do not agree on an innate idea of God. Paganini’s analyses here coincide with those of Labrousse and Barber.5 He argues that Bayle contents himself with probable and useful knowledge - phenomenological knowledge. This knowledge increases as time passes. Evidence is

the perfect congruity of the subjective-objective relationship (p. 255). The sixth chapter, ‘Storia e Dialettica dei Problemi Fillosofici’. deals with Bayle’s

understanding of atheism. and in particular with the problems of atheist epistemology (p. 294). Bayle believed that matter could not have existed eternally, without a first cause. This principle is necessarily true, and is accepted even by atheists. The difficulty in understanding Bayle on this point arises from his arguments about the Creation. In the Continuation des ye&es diverses, Chapter XXI. we learn that not all philosophers agree that God created the world. Yet in ‘Epicure’ S. Bayle points out that unless one accepts that God is the creator, one is led into inconsistency. (See also RPponse aux questions d’un provincial’ which is referred to on p. 371. n. 66. This passage indicates clearly that it is easy philosophically to discover that God is a ‘cause premih.) Bayle held that atheists did believe in a first cause (‘Epicure’ S and T, ‘Ovide’ G): but the (atheistic) belief that God acted on existing matter is refuted in ‘Epicure’s, Epicurean atheism is allowed by Bayle to be consistent, but not an atheism that denies God and creation.

From pp. 327-43 we have a discussion of Bayle’s probabilism: in his work we see a meeting of Protestantism and scepticism (p. 327). Bayle’s is a moderate scepticism (p. 329). ‘Liberfinage’ is (a) a habit of caution, (b) loose morals (p. 340). or (c) true intellectual freedom (p. 341). Is Bayle’s fideism sincere or feigned? The answer, we read, is not clear (p. 343).

The final chapter is ‘I Compiti e i Limiti dell’indagine Filosofica’. Bayle’s scepticism is too radical to be described as empiricism (p. 388). The cogiro can lead to solipsism (p. 409). Paganini’s conclusion (p. 426) that because in ‘Rorarius’ B. Bayle uses arguments from Cartesianism, Aristotelianism, Leibniz and scholasticism severally to contradict each other without saying clearly which system he prefers he is therefore a sceptic, is a carefully balanced summary of his thesis.

Paganini and his publishers are to be congratulated on the presentation of the book: the misprints are rare indeed and are of a kind that will not bother the reader.

Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge

Sean O’Cathasaigh

236 Book Reviews

NOTES

1. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963-4. 2. A. Deregibus, ‘Motivi religiosi ed aspetti metafisici dello scetticismo di Bayie’. I/

Saggiatore (Torino, 1964): G. Cantelli, Teologia e ateismo: Saggio sul pensiero filosofico e religioso di Pierre Bayle (Firenze, 1969); A. Corsano. ‘Bayle e Spi- noza’, Giornale Critic0 della Filosofia Italiana 8 (July - December 1977), 319-26; K. Cortese, ‘Pierre Bayle: La ragione alla ricerca di nuove certezze’. Filosofia XXIX (4) (October 1978), 559-76; M. Firpo, ‘Pierre Bayle, gli eretici italiani del Cinyuecento e la tradizione sociniana’, &vista storica ituliana 85 (1973), 612-66.

3. See Pens&es diverses, section CL, ed. A. Prat, Vol. 2 (Paris, 1912). 4. E.D. James. ‘Scepticism and fideism in Bayle’s ~~cr~on~a~re’, French Studies XV1

(1962). 307-23. 5. W.H. Barber ‘Pierre Bayle: faith and reason’, in Will Moore, ed., Tlze French

Mind: Studies in Honour of Gustave Rudler (Oxford, 1952), pp. 109-25. 6. In Euvres diverses 3, p. 937b.