Petropoulos - Omar Vrioni

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FO RMS OF COLLABO RATION WITH THE ENE

DURING THE FIRST GREEK WAR OF LIBERAT

Ja h n A. Pet TOp U los

The basic facts contained in this essay, drawn from published

na l and secondary sources, have long been known to specia list s

field of modern Greekhistory. However, almost noone has addresse

self specifically to the phenomenon ofcollaborat ion with the enem

ing the first Greek war of l iberat ion.! Itwill be the thesi s of th i

that, though limited in its numerical incidence and confined to only

types of dealings with the enemy, actual col laboration and the p

for further col laboration was a natural outgrowth of inherited at

and systems, a recurrent problem which the Greek insurgent leade

to confront, and a factor reflecting and affecting the nature of t

itself.

"Col laborat ion" i s perhaps an unfor tuna te te rm for use in a

nineteenth century context because of its close association w

events ofthe Second World War, when conditions were markedly dif

In the context of the Greek l iberat ion struggle of the 1820's, freq

used te rms for such a phenomenon were hypotage (submission) or

nesis (submission or homage), with kapok or kapaki referring to th

of submission negot ia ted by a member of the Greek rul ing e li te w

toman officialdom and buyurdi or proskyrwchartion designating

certificates ofamnesty issued to the common Greeks or their local l

Regardless o f the word used , the phenomenon is one involving

or indirect contact with the enemy and explici t or implici t ackno

ment of the enemy's authori ty.

Yet there are dis tinguishable types ofsuch behavior. Two I m

1. The notable exception is Takes Arg. Stamatopoulos in the following

limited to the Peloponnese: To Il (}o(Juvv"f j fJ .r.l ( l " 1 : o MW! /I IL. [Submission in the

the Grea t Danger of 1821J (Athens, 1953), reprinted under the title Of ToV (pwn

VrJP . i vO luill 6 KOJ.o~OTeWVrJ~ [The Submitters to the Turks a n d K o lo k o tr o ne s ] (

197ft), and "NEVbtQ< ; , 6 1 t "p o O " X\ l \I " lJ td VO t ; " T OU E b w at &VC l" ["Nenekos, the Submi

'21"J, I leMm ov v rw l U. u ~ I le w T ox e ov u l [Peloponnesian New YearJ III (1959), 18



132 J 0 h n A. Pet r 0p u losFORMS OF COLLABORATION WITH THE ENEMY

only to di spense with them. The f ir st was not unimpor tant or inf requent

and i t was completely patriot ic in intent. Itwas the act of submiss ion as

a temporary stratagem, undertaken under mil itary duress in order to gain

t ime for strengthening the resis tance. Itwas sanct ioned by representa-

tives ofthe Greek insurgent government and entered into with nointention

of carrying out its t erms. For inst ance, in September 1822, Alexander

Mavrokorda tos, pol it ical head of west Rumely, commissioned GeorgeVarnakiotes, an inf luent ia l chie fta in, t o negoti at e with Orner Vr ion i,

pasha of Yannina , in order to foresta ll an Ottoman mil ita ry campaign for

that season.t

The second type ofbehavior concerns Greek women captured by the

enemy in warfare and parceled ou t to enemy sold ie rs as concubines and

wives. Jules Mangeart, who partic ipat ed in the French mil ita ry expedi-

tion sent by the protecting powers in 1828 to evacuate Ibrahim Pasha 's

fo rces f rom the Peloponnese , expressed shock in his memoi rs tha t these

women freely chose to expatriate themselves and continue l iving under

non-Greek rule. The phenomenon repeated i tself in all the fortresses evac-

uated - Modon, Karon, Navarino, Patras, and Rion.8 Had he been fa-

mi lia r with Greek t radi ti ons and soc ia l va lues, he wou ld have real ized

that their lossof virgini ty condemned them to pariah status sofar asother

avai lable husbands were concerned and that loya lty to husband, even ifonly of the common- law varie ty, took precedence over loya lty to par-

ents or attachment to country.

The types of submission which are o fmajor concern in this essay are

those which are in some sense reprehensible from the nat ionalist point of

view. There are th ree bas ic crite ria in t erms of which to judge deg rees o f

reprehensibil ity. First , did col laboration involve mere contact with. the

enemy whi le remaining active in the Greek cause , or con tact combined

with withdrawal f rom the liberation struggle , or active partic ipat ion in

the enemy's attempt to suppress the revolt? Second, did withdrawal

f rom the Greek side take p lace when organ ized mil it ary res ist ance was

running in favor of the Greeks, in favor of the Ottomans, or not yet in

e ither di rection? Fina lly , did submission to the enemy take plac

considerations of mere survival for oneself and one's family, from

minat ion to retain the social and economic gains achieved in pr

tion times, or for reasons of self-advancement and self-agg

ment? Since persona l and family su rv iva l requi red mere withdra

hind the Greek l ines or, inthe event ofult imate fai lure ofthe Gree

migration abroad, collaboration generally stemmed from consid

of more than mere su rv iva l.On the basi s o f these cr it er ia, we can proceed to examine f

types of coll aborat ion in the insu rgent provinces . One is wi thdr

support from the Greek cause or active help to the Ottoman cau

Greek fortunes were in the ascendant. There are no notable cases

type on record. Individual spies .there were, but the evidence wo

gest that such spies were Greeks not nat ive to the l iberated provi

rather indigenous to regions where Ottoman rule prevailed.! The

ing fou r types did occu r: (1) mere withdrawal f rom the Greek cam

the mi lit ary outcome in the region was in doubt (Stournares and

kakes); (2) active help to the enemy when the military outcome

region was in doubt (Bakolas, Koutalidas, Vamakiotes, and Nene

mere acquiescence when the Ottomans reestablished control and o

f ight ing ceased (vi rtua lly a ll the chieft ains o f West Rumely in

and (4) keeping open lines of communications with the enem

whil e par tic ipa ting actively in the Greek cause , as a type of in

against the consequences of possible Greek defeat.

In some cases, col laboration involved the desire to make gain

expense of one's rivals or the attempt to ward off the inroads

rivals, but, as the four basic types suggest, all cases were at t

leas t motiva ted by a reluc tance to wi thd raw from one 's local ha

seriously risk the necessity of such withdrawal. Such reluctance w

upon a reali sti c apprai sa l of what wi thd rawal would probably

As Souliotes in west Rumely and west rumeliot re fugees in the

isl and of Kalamos d iscovered, the insurgent Greek s ta te had ne i

material resources nor the administrative capability to prov

such displaced persons. The hard-pressed and impoverished inh2. Dionvsios A. Kokkinos, ' H ' E. U 1p I 1H t) 'E n av d lJ T ao " ~ [ T he G r ee k Revolution]

(At hens, 1956-1960 ), V , 210- 213, and Thomas Gordon, H isto ry o f t he Gree k Revo -lution (London , 1832 ), I , t,55-t,,56.

3. Jules Mangeart, Souvenirs de la Moree reeue il li s pendant lesejour des Francais

dans le Peloponnese (Paris, 1830), also in Greek translation by G. Tsoukalas under the

same t it le in volume XX, 43, t ,,9-50 ,59, 68·71,77, in the ser ies ent it led' Ano!lV1JflO11BV-

flam T W V ' A Y W VI O'T W V T oV '21 [Memoirs of the Fighters of '21J, ed. Emmanuel Proto '

psa ltes , 20 vols. (Athens , 1956-1959).

4 . Re fe ren ce s t o i ndi vi dual s pi es o ccu r h aphaz ar dl y and o ft en wi thout

i dent if ic at ion i n s cat te re d o ri gi na l s ou rce s and have yet t o be col lec te d and

sys tema ti cal ly f or aut henti ca te d j udgment on t hi s poi nt . S ee , f or i ns ta nc e,

' A ex e 1o v L ll O vv O '[ ov PW fla [Histo rical A rchiv e o f D io nqsio s Ro masJ (Athens ,

199 ,231; and Geo rge C .Arnaki s and Eurydi ce Deme tra copoul ou, e ds ., Geo

(Thessaloniki, 1965), 127, 206.



13 4 J 0 h n A. Pet r 0 p U los FORMS OF COLLABORATION WITH THE ENEMY

of regions into which refugees came often resented their presence if they

were penniless or fleeced them if they were not .s Even when th is was not

the case, the cond iti on o fmost refugees meant dependence on others and

a st ruggle for su rvival . As for the e li te groups, withdrawal th reatened to

deprive them oftheir privi leged status, which depended on the possession

o f a te rr it or ia l base providing both dependent s and resources for sup-

por ti ng these dependen ts , or i t p laced them in a posit ion o f tot al depen-

dence on the nat ional Greek government for pay, posit ion, and power.

In to these calcula tions en te red what I be lieve to have been the tra-

dit ional not ions of freedom, conceived either as the possession of privi-

lege and immunity from the impositions of a central government or as

the appropriation ofthe central government i tself. Tokeep central author-

ity at a distance or appropriate it for one's group often depended on an

independent power base in one's region. All the col laborators referred to

in thi s essay ini tia lly served in the Greek cause , bu t most fought mainly

in their home districts or served elsewhere only when their home districts

were unthreatened. They, aswell as many non-col laborators , were much

readie r to r isk thei r own lives than they were to mor tgage the ir pat rimo-

nies and compromise the future of their famil ies.

Suppor t or lack o f support for the l ibera tion s truggle depended , for

them, on how one answered two basic quest ions: (1) Did the revol t, givenobjective fac to rs , s tand a reasonab le chance of success, and (2 ) would it

advance the major goal of less rather than more control by an outside

pol it ical center, whether that center was Greek, Ottoman, or indigenous

to the particul ar di str ict ? Another facto r making the poss ibi li ty o f col -

laborat ion a real one was a rather consistent Ottoman policy ofpromising

to let bygones be bygones, offering in return for submission a rein-

s ta temen t of the status quo ante.6 With such attitudes and under such

condit ions, what i s surpri sing is no t that coll aborato rs exi st ed but tha t

there were not more of them.

The behavior ofmany Greek leaders reflects a keen awareness ofthe

danger. The primate Kanel los Delegiannes openly admits in his memoirs

that he del iberately had the Turkish populat ion of Langadia massacred so

as to convince the peasan try that the return of Ottoman ru le wou ld br ing

merciless retaliation. 7 False news about non-exis tent vic tor ies

imminence of foreign aid were officially sponsored to convince t

popu la tion that the odds were in favo r o f success . Fellow-Gre

pressed into the l iberat ion struggle by threats to deprive them o

things tha t collabo rat ion with the enemy might be intended to

The amount of military aid dispatched by the centre to hard

areas was of ten de te rmined, not by what mil it ary victory requ

by the calcul ated minimum for e lic it ing the resolve of the indig

habitants to resis t through their own resources.

Having said all this, one still has to contend with a basic

fact that the highest incidence of col laboration took place among

itary chieftains ofwest Rumely, whereas the Peloponnese produ

one notable instance of collaboration, and even then for onl

period," West Rumely joined the Greek war of liberation

months after its initial outbreak in the Peloponnese. From th

July 1822, when the di sast rous battl e o f Peta tu rned the milit ar

decis ively against the Greeks, the major chieftains contributed

to Greek success in the region.

The first wave ofdefect ions took place between July and S

of that year , in ant ic ipat ion of an expec ted enemy campaign s

toward Messo longi. As a p rel iminary to milit ary activity, Omea native Albanian now serving as pasha of Yannina and p

famil ia r with the Greek insurgen t chief tains s ince the days of

service to Ali Pasha, pursued a policy of conciliation toward

return for their submission, he offered them not only amnesty but

mation in the Ot toman servi ce as armatoloi of the ir dis tr ic ts. U

themselves to p reven t the ir d ist ric ts f rom being overrun and n

5. For instance, Kokkinos, op . cit., VI, t.16.

6.For the policy ofKiutahi Pasha in Rumely after the fall ofMessolongi in 1826 ,

for instance, see Kokkinos, op, cit., X, 213-232. For other instances, see Spyromelios,

• A n0 fl -V "r J{ .w ve vf .l ar :a . .. [ Me mo ir s o f t he S ec on d S ie ge o f Messolongi ...] (Athens 1926) and

reprinted in volume XIX of [M em oirs o f the F ig hte rs o f'2 1], o p. cit., 119 , HO.

7. Kanellos Delegiannes , ' Ano f l- VY jf .WVev f. la T a [Memo i rs ] , in [Memo irs

F ig hte rs o f '21], op . cit., XVI, 169-170.

8. Because of the time limits imposed on the length of the original s

presentation, this essay does not treat the celebrated case of collaborati

chieftain Odysseus Androutsos, which would be necessary for a full study o

ation during the first war ofliberation. Suffice ittos ay here tha t, in the v ie

writer, Androutsos' behavior was the outcome of internal rivalries within

camp for power in east Rumely, more especially between him and suchhismilitary proteg~ John Gouras and hiscivilian rival John Kolettes, a cas

to the Ottomans in the desperation ofa losing struggle against his r ivals a

stance ofhisrivals' cleverexploitation ofhiscollaboration todestroy him. O

tsos, see, for instance, Karpos Papadopoulos, 'Or5vO"O'sv,;'Avr5eoiil"O"ol;' in [M em

F ig hte rs o f '21], op . cit., XII; Takes Lappas, ' O r5V( I " o " sV, "Avoeoiir:(I"oi;' (Athe

and Kokkinos, o p . c it ., VIII, 351-372.



136 J 0 h n A . P et r 0 p u .l 0 srORMS OF COLLABORATION WITH THE ENEMY

ab le to count on a un it ed Greek effor t t o defend the ir di str ict s, t hey knew

tha t cont inued par tic ipat ion in the Greek camp wou ld mean abandon-

ment of thei r d is tr ic ts and leave them totally dependen t on the good will

of Mavrokorda tos and the Greek cente r, whereas the ret ention of the ir

dis tricts would guarantee them some degree of autonomy even vis-a-vis

Orner Vrioni himself.

Shortly after the battle of Peta, Gogos Bakolas and John Kouta-

lidas, chie fta ins of the dis tr ic t o f Radov ist i, were the f ir st to defect, fol-lowed in September by George Varnakiotes , who control led the dis trict

of Xeromeron. Into the enemy camp of Orner Vrioni, Varnakiotes

brought others, including the chieftains John Rangos and Andreas Iskos

aswell as the primate George Valtinos. Others, from districts lying within

the administrative sphere of Trikala, made their kapak with Soultsa

Gordza, an Albanian holding the office of deroen-aga there. Of these , the

most notable were Nicholas Stournares, armato l o s ofthe district ofAspro-

potamos, and George Karaiskakes, who had recently entrenched himself

as head of the dis tr ic t o fAgrapha.

From th is group, Kou ta lidas, Bakolas , and h is son Metros afte r h im

remained permanent ly within the enemy camp, wh il e Varnakiot es re-

turned to the Greek side only in 1828when the success o f the Greek cause

in some form was virtually assured. All had decided, as early as July

1822, that the Greek liberation struggle could not succeed, at least in

west Rumely. All had stayed incontact with the enemy and were suspected

of bet rayal to the Turks, even before they made their formal kapaks. All

a tt empted to protect themselves aga ins t the faint cont ingency of an ul-

t imate Greek victory by communicating with the Greek camp, suggest ing

tha t they would eventually return and meanwhile o ffe ring valuable in-

telligence concerning Turko-Albanian activities. All actively accompanied

the enemy in his military campaigns against their fellow-Greeks, at

least when cal led upon to do so. Yet, whi le Kouta lidas and Bako las kep t

the ir servi ce to the Ottoman war effor t t o a minimum, Varnakio tes was

much more act ive in i ts beha lf both in fight ing and in a tt empt ing to fos-

ter further defections. In part, his behavior isexplained byhis ant ipathy

toward the cent ral iz ing tendencies and poli tical ambit ions of Mavro-

kordatos, which he held accountable for the failure of the liberationst ruggle to catapu lt him into the pos it ion of semi -au tonomous rul er of

all west Rumely under the umbrella of a wider Greek state. In part, his

behavior refl ec ted the fac t tha t, for some t ime afte r the failure o f the f ir st

s iege ofMessolongi (January 1823) and the withdrawal of Ottoman forces

to the ir bases in Ar ta and Yann ina , Varnakio tes was fo rced to wi thdraw

from his territorial base in Xeromeron and was, therefore, mu

dependent on the Ottoman administrat ion than Koutalidas and

who remained firmly entrenched in their dis tricts ."

Qu it e d if fe ren t were the te rms of col laborat ion in the case

skakesand Stou rnares . With thei r d ist ric ts lying a t the border

liberated west Rumely and Ottoman-held Thessaly, they n

kapaks which ensu red both the ir autonomy and neut ra lit y. In r

withholding military assistance to the Greek cause and preventing

of any outside Greek forces into their dis tricts , the Ottoman ad

tion of Trika la guaran teed to keep i ts forces outs ide these di st

gave Kara iskakes and Stournares the exc lus ive r igh t to col lect

levied by the Ottoman administrat ion there. Through this arran

these two chieftains managed to achieve what was probably the

goal of all west Rumeliot chieftains, whether they were deali

Greek, Albanian , or Turki sh over lords. From roughly the begi

1822 to August 1823 Karai skakes and Stournares en joyed the

posi tion of keeping a foot in bo th camps , hold ing simu ltaneously

fice of armatolos f rom the Ot toman admini strati on and office of

arms (archegos armaton) from the Greek administrat ion, fight ing

Greek and Turko-Albanian troops a ttempting to en te r the ir

This rather unique posit ion came to an end the summer of 18Mustai Pasha, bey of Skodra, undertook from Trika la tha t year

man campaign against west Rumely. To do so, he had to pass

the dis tricts ofAgrapha and Aspropotamos and violate the kapa

wi th Kara iskakes and Stou rnares . As a resu lt, both chie ft ains w

and joined the Greek camp in Messolongi, but both retained thei

ing in thei r former d ist ric ts and , th rough local agen ts, cont inued

laborat eind irec tly with the Ot toman admin is tration a t Tr ikal a,

advan tage of Kara iskakes' absence af te r the wi thd rawal of Mu

at the end of 1823, John Ranges, who had long contested Kara

leadersh ip in Agrapha , took over there through the suppor t o

9. Concerning the general course of events and the individuals descr i

above paragraphs, see Kokkinos, op. cit., V, 162-165, 183-230, 20,*-228

Kasomoules,'EvBv ,u~,ua t ' a !1l'(!anron~(hij,•E n av a !1 l 'a O 'e r op w v • E .u 1 jv w JI

1821-itary R em in is ce nc es o f t he R eo o lu ti on o f the Greeks 1821-1832], ed. Gianne

giannes, (Athens, 1939), I, 38-40, 1?7-186, 220-221; and Spyromelios, op.

pass im. More particularly on Varnakiotes, see Karpos Papadopoulos, T

B!lQJIa~lcbT1JV ~al ~ d l la~1JO ' I~ Tev M 6l ]o t. oy yl ov [ Co n ce rn in g V ar na ki ot ee a

c o n qu e st o f M e ss o lo n g i] (Messolongi,1861) reprinted in [M em oi rs o f the F

'21], op. cit., XII, 161-269.



Job n A. Pet r o p u. lo s38 F OR MS OF C OL LAB OR AT IO N W ITH THE EN EM Y

Gordza, the same man who had or igina lly made the kapak with Karai-

skakes. At the very moment when Mavrokordatos was staging, in Anato-

liko, a tr ia l o f Kara iskakes fo r col laboration with the enemy, hi s c lient

Rangos was doing the same and Mavrokordatos knew it.lo

Most of the remain ing cap ta ins returned to the Greek camp either

during or after the first (unsuccessful) Ottoman siege ofMessolongi . Once

the Ottoman forces withdrew to their original bases in Arta and Yannina,

re tent ion o f thei r dis tr ic ts no longer depended On Ot toman goodwi ll,

especi al ly now tha t Orner Vrioni was too invo lved with di ssident Alba-

nian chieftains inhis home district to engage in further campaigns against

the Greeks. Once again patriot ic impulse and polit ical interest were com-

patible.P

The failure of the first siege of Messolongi demonstrated that, so

long as the Greek administrat ion possessed one mil itary base accessible to

suppor t f rom other part s of insurgent Greece , the reg ion be tween it and

and such Turko-Albanian bases as Ar ta , Yannina, and Tr ika la would be

polarized be tween the two sides . This was confi rmed by the fall o fMes-

solongi in April 1826, which led to the col lapse oforganized Greek resis-

t ance in west Rumely . With the excep tion o f west Rumel iot ch ie ft ains

who withdrew to the Peloponnese and Demetrios Makres and Demo-

t se lio s, who took refuge within west Rumely, the west Rumeliot chi ef-

tains made their kapoks with the Ot toman adminis tration by the begin-

ning of 1827.12

Only the mi lit ary campaign of Richard Church in 1828 gradual ly

won them over once again, one by one. The establishment of a new toe-

ho ld in west Rumely , this time at Dragomeste, se rved asa ra llying poin t

and demonstrated the renewal of outside support . Aided by the interven-

t ion o f the European powers in beha lf of the Greeks and by the e lect ion

of John Kapodistrias as president , both rendering the success ofthe G

cause more than l ike ly , Church pursued a pol icy of pa ti ent nego tia t

with chieftain after chieftain , offering amnesty and reinstatement to

s iti ons within the Greek servi ce , guaran teeing money and suppli es

once mil itary power grew, threatening the use of force against remain

defectors. Tha t west Rumely would be included in the new Greek s

remained problematic, however, a fact that left some chieftains disincli

to risk returning to the Greek carnp but persuaded the majoritytheir renewed participation might make the difference.P

Why, then the high inc idence of co llaboration in west Rumely

i ts relat ive absence in the Peloponnese? I bel ieve the answer l ies ma

in the struc tua l dif fe rences of each reg ion. To begin with, west Rum

lay much closer to enemy cen ters of power than the Peloponnese . A

Yannina , and Tr ika la const itu ted not only the advanced bases of im

rial expedit ions southward but alsothose centers that mobil ized the m

ey, arms, and men of Epirus, Albania, and Thessaly against the Gr

insurgents. West Rumely was, therefore, bound to feel the ini tial imp

of each Ottoman expedition. To be sure, the Ottomans retained a

strategic footholds in the Peloponnese throughout the war (Modon,

ron, Pa tras, and i lion) , but these were most of the time essent ia lly de

sive enclaves, unable to generate their own sources ofsupply and depe

ing on the Ottoman fleet for survival. Even between 1825 and 1828, w

Ibrahim Pasha used Modon and Koran as offensive bases and secu

control over Tripolis in the interior, he too was dependent on regions o

side the Peloponnese for reinforcements.

Second, in the western part of mainland Greece, constituting

core of Al i Pasha 's semi- independent st at e unti l the beginn ing of 1

the admini strati ve and demographic st ructure had remained basica

int ac t. Poli tically , the Greeks of west Rumely opera ted not mere ly a

separat e en tit y, compr is ing one component of an insurgent Greece

conflict with the Ottoman empire. They also operated as a part of

Pasha 's former s ta te , caught in the o rb it o fc lashing Greek and Ot tom

centers lying outs ide the reg ion. They had to take into accoun t a stro

Albanian element with which they shared certain local interests runni

counter to those outside centers, whether Greek orTurkish. The ease ofc

10. For the case of Karaiskakes and Stournaras and the military campaign of

Mustai Pasha, see Kokkinos, op . eit., V, 229-230, IV, 411-457, VIl , 210·240; and Kaso-

moules, op . oii., I , 253-259, 274-283. More par ticularly on Karaiskakes , see Constantine

Paparregopoulos, Tew ( ! Y lo q K a ( ! at r J~ d~ 7J< ;. . (Athens , 1867) ; D. Ainian, 'H Bloy ( !arp ta

'r oi l r 'r (! o'r 7J yo il T eo so vl o» K ae ai (J ~d U1 ) . .. [ Th e B io gr ap hy o f G en er al G eo rg e K ar ai sk a-

kes" .] , 2d ed. (Athens , 1903 ), r ep rin te d i n [M em oirs o f the F ig ht er s o f '21], op . cit.,

VII; and Elias Papasteriopoulos, 'HL 1l U 1) ro il K C lQ a fc r~ d ~ [ T he T r ia l o f K a ra is ka ke s](Athens, 1961).

11. Kokkinos, op . cit., V, 250-254.

12. Kokkinos, o p. c it ., X, 71, 231-234, 316; Kasomoules, op . cit., 11,333·334,

586·587; Stephan os I.Papadopoulos, ' H •E :n a vd r J 'r aC1 'r /t n f J A vn X? ) B r: e(! ed • EM d 6a . ..

1826-1832 [The R evo lu tio n in W este rn M ain la nd Greec e . . . ] (ThessaJoniki, 19(2),

32-40; and Phi lip J. Green, S ke tc hes o f th e W ar in G re ec e (London, 1827), 251-252.

13. The revival of insurgency in west Rumely has received systematic study

two excellent monographs: Papadopoulos, op . cit., especially ch. IV, and Domna

Dontas, Th e Last P ha se o f t he W ar o f In dep en den ce in W est er n G re ec e (D ec em be r 1

to M ay 1829) [Thessa loniki , 1966) . See also Kokkinos, o p . c it ., XI, 316-318.



14 0 J 0 h n A. Pet r 0p u l 0 8 FORM S OF COLLABORATION WITH THE ENEMY

tact between Greek and Albanian chieftains,. developed in common asso-

ciation with the court ofAli Pasha, persisted, even when the war oflibera-

t ion made them ostensible enemies. In terms oftheir pol it ical ambit ions,

t here was the lure p rovided by Ottoman as well as Greek insu rgen t poli -

tical structures. It was difficult for Greek polit ical rivalries in west Ru-

mely not to become enmeshed with Albanian polit ical rivalries in Epirus

and thus involved inwhat , inthe context ofconfl ict between Greek and Ot-

toman centers, amounted to collaboration.The Peloponnese, on the other hand, tended to think of itself as a

se lf -conta ined unit , though one of severa l componen ts making up in-

surgent Greece . There, i n the f ir st year of the war and by the de liberate

pol icy of the Peloponnesian Greek leadership, the Ottoman populat ion,

constituting no more than 10% of the who le , had been dec imated and the

Ottoman administrat ive structure had been completely smashed. By de-

sign, leaders l ike Kolokotrones and Delegiannes had made col laboration

structurally impossible. As a resul t, there were virtual ly no Turks on the

spot to col laborate with and no Ottoman administrat ion to lure dissident

Greeks. Leaders and people alike hardly expected or could hope to expect

mercy f rom the Turks aft er having decimated the Ot toman popu la tion

of the Peloponnese and violated so many capitulat ion agreements. Pol i-

tical ri va lr ies between Peloponnesi an Greeks assumed the form of c ivi l

war rather than that of col laboration.Third, t he soc ia l basis of power s trugg les dif fe red in each reg ion. In

west Rumely, the power struggle was mainly one between mil itary chief-

tains , virtual ly all ofwhom had obtained their influence in Ottoman times

through accommodat ion wi th non-Greek offic ialdom. Accommoda-

tion was no t an accusa tion they could use aga inst each o ther in vying for

the a llegi ance o f the peop le . In the Peloponnese, the power struggle , a t

the beginning at least , was between klephtic types who had been expel led

from the Peloponnese in 1806, and the primates, who had fol lowed a policy

of accommodat ion with the Ottomans . When the Peloponnesian chief-

ta ins sought to di splace the pr imates as a ruling e li te , they cou ld effec-

tively use the charge of accommodation aga ins t the pr imates and d id so .

This tended to place a restraint on any form of collaboration either by

one con tending group or the other.

Fina lly , in the Peloponnese, one chief tain - Theodoros Kolokot ro -nes - managed to prevail over all others, in terms of gaining popular

suppor t and commanding an army, whereas, in wes t Rumely, the ch ie f-

ta ins tended to more equa lly divide effective mi li ta ry power. There was

no one in wes t Rumely st rong and inf luenti al enough to curb

t ion, as there was in the Peloponnese when it ult imately occurre

The one notable examhle of coll aborat ion on the Pelopon

serve as an excellent test case for the kind of explanation I h

This case was largely confined to the year 1827, and, at its he

widespread in the north Peloponnesian provinces of Patras, K

and Vostitsa. It took place under the leadership of Demetrios

cap ta in of the vi llage o fZoumpata in the eparchy of Patras , whotic ipat ed in the war of l iberat ion f rom the beg inn ing under the

of Aohaia and had shown bravery in many mil itary engagemen

In the first place, the phenomenon took place in regions

Patras, which was an Ottoman forti fied base. Since the civil war

1824, the Greco-Turkish military conflict in the area had ab

had allowed for some fraternization between Greeks and th

especially inthe economic sphere. Nenekos, weknow, was in con

the enemy in Patras, even before his decis ion to defect, fol lowing

the common wes t Rumelio t pat te rn of keeping a foot in bo th c

Second , the Albanian e lement p layed a prominent role in

nomenon. The villages where submission originated, Zoumpata,

and others, were Arvanitoohoria whose inhabitants were Greco

pasto ral ist s. The in te rmediary who got Nenekos in touch wi th

Pasha was CafeI ' Fida, ch ie fta in of the Albanian Laliot s who hrefuge in Patras since the ir wi thdrawal from the ir home dis tr ic

in 1821.

Third, the prominence of pr iva te loca l inte res t, combined

sinking fortunes of the Greek insurrect ion, prompted submissio

out the protect ion oforganized Greek forces and prey to the dep

of enemy troops, these Greco-Albanians found their movements

ed, a fata l occur rence for the livel ihood of pas toralis ts. Wi th

of thei r fami lies held cap tive by Ibrahim Pasha, they pressed N

negot ia te the ir re lease . They a lso l earned tha t submission wo

economic ga in, such as a lucrative marke t for thei r p roduc ts i

grazing land in the pla ins wh ich in te rmi ttent warfa re had long

low, and, in the case of some, employment in enemy military

Once amnestied, other villagers, some purely Greek, followed th

ple , not simp ly fo r secur ity against enemy pressu re but a lso tthemselves aga inst the fi rst submit te rs, who were using the ir

immunit ies to take the land and goods of non-submitters.

Final ly, the behavior of Nenekos and other chieftains is e

not mere ly by the ir ambit ion to ga in power and pos iti on throug



14 2 J o h n A. Pet r ° p u losFORMS OF COLLABORATION WITH THE ENEMY

oration, but by the pol it ical rivalries within the Greek camp itself. With-

in hi s vil lage , Nenekos , a c lient of Ven izelos Rouphos , was engaged in

riva lry with his cous in Athanasios Sagias , a cl ient of Kolokot rones who

eventually carried out Kolokotrones' decree for Nenekos ' execution. On

the regional level , with the influence of the Achaia primates undermined

by the second civil war, Nenekos and his fel low-chieftains lost their t ra-

diti ona l sou rce of suppor t a t t he very moment when the ir ri va ls, the Pet -

mezas ', were strengthened by the pa tronage o f John Kole tt es. In a sense,therefore, Nenekos and his fol lowers resor ted to the enemy as an al te r-

native source of support.

Because these vital factors were, to some extent, operative elsewhere

in the Peloponnese , there was a g rave danger tha t the movement of sub-

mission and collaboration would spread, especially in those regions where

Ibrahim had established his mil itary strongholds, l ike Messenia and Tri-

polis. That the movement aborted is due, in part, to the international

s ituation, which increasingly favored Greek statehood in one form or an-

other. But far more decisive, it seems to me, was the behavior of Ko loko-

trones and the resources he commanded. It is in this area that a major

d if ference between west Rumely and the Peloponnese is evident . Like

Church during his west Rumeliot campaign of 1828, Kolokotrones com-

bined a policy of conciliation and fire. He executed a few of the minor

col laborators as a warning to the rest, whi le at the same t ime he offe red

generous terms to the major defectors soasto lure them back into the fold.

But, most of all, he turned the tide by reorganizing a resistance that

would, On t he one hand, protect those faithful to the Greek cause from

retaliation by the enemy and, on the other, threaten the waverers with

Greek retal iation if they defected. His abi li ty to renew an organized resis-

tance with only minimal government support was due to the fact that

he, unl ike any Rumeliot chi ef tain, commanded a preponderance of mil-

i ta ry inf luence, a t l east in tha t par t of the Peloponnese which lay under

the inte rmi ttent control of Ibrahim Pasha . In 1827, when he was vigo r-

ously a ttempting to f ight down col laborationism, he commanded a mil-

i ta ry fo rce est imated to reach 8,000 men, a ll under mi lit ary chie fta ins

who recognized h is author ity and fol lowed his commands . He centered

hi s activi ty in those very regions where col laboration had its grea test

s trength. The activity of h is son Gennaios, with hi s base in the for tres s

of Karytaina, wiped out col laboration in Elis and Phanari and forestalled

i t i n Tr ipo lis . The Messenian refusa l to col laborate wi th Ibrahim even

though the presence there of his main bases made col laboration possible

and res ist ance easily puni shable , owed as much to the mil ita ry activ ity

of Niketas Stamatelopoulos, Kolokotrones' fai thful l ieutenant,

to the fact that relations between the surviving Turks and th

local populat ion had never been good.14

~ollaboration was not viewed by anyone with the same c

and intole rance tha t i s typical in twent ie th-cen tury Europe and

ca. It was accepted, at the very least, as an understandable fac

to be ~arded aga ins t. by c~ncerted, even ruthl es s, e ffor t, to be e

for national purposes If possible, and to be forgiven if one could oi t t hrough the same fac tors tha t p rompted it and the same inst

that made i t possible. To have declared total war Oncollaborators

by threat en ing thei r surviva l, have pressed them permanently

enemy camp and, once Greek independence was achieved, have

an already fragmented nat ion eyen more. To raise the quest ion o

oration may be regarded as reflecting badly on those Greeks w

cumbed to it . 'What i t should ref lec t, however , i s the vir tue of tho

prompted by the same considerations and circumstances, did no

orate, the r~m~rkable ability of men like Karaiskakes to outg

early parochialism and atone for it with his life, and the skill

leaders in handling the kind of si tua tion which emerged natu ra lly

the tradi tional Ottoman heritage.

14. On the case of Nenekos and collaboration in the Peloponnese, see

the studies of Takes Stamatopoulos (cited in n. 1 above), Kokkinos, op.

167-190; Photios Chrysanthopoulos or Photakos, Blot ll8Aonowt7'1lwv

[Lives o f Peloponnesian Men . .. ], ed. Stavros Andropoulos, (Athens, 1888

and the same Photakos, ' A n :0 f .t I! 1 J !- ' ov 8 v p a T a ; rr ;e ( ! i T i jt ; ' E AAT } V tK i j ,' E x o s a a ra a e o » ;

concerning the Greek Revolution], ed. Stavros Andropoulos, (Athens 1900),I 1

418-4M, or in a new edition (Athens, 1960), 585-589, 601-619.

Petropoulos - Omar Vrioni

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