Identità nazionale

8/9/2019 Identità nazionale

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/identita-nazionale 1/29

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

This article was downloaded by: [Centro Servizi Biblioteca Di Scienze] On: 10 July 2009 Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 912661281] Publisher Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House,37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Europe-Asia StudiesPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713414944

National Identity: Civic, Ethnic, Hybrid, and Atomised IndividualsHolley E. Hansen a; Vicki L. Hesli a

a University of Iowa,

Online Publication Date: 01 January 2009

To cite this Article Hansen, Holley E. and Hesli, Vicki L.(2009)'National Identity: Civic, Ethnic, Hybrid, and AtomisedIndividuals',Europe-Asia Studies,61:1,1 — 28

To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/09668130802532894

URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09668130802532894

Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf

This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial orsystematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply ordistribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contentswill be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug dosesshould be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss,actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directlyor indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713414944

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09668130802532894

http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf

http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09668130802532894

http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713414944



National Identity: Civic, Ethnic, Hybrid,and Atomised Individuals

HOLLEY E. HANSEN & VICKI L. HESLI

Abstract

We challenge the civic–ethnic dichotomy drawn by previous authors and propose a four-category

typology of identities based on out-group tolerance and in-group attachment. Drawing from work on

national identity formation and nation-building, we test hypotheses about the processes that cause

individuals to adopt one identity over others using survey data based on representative samples of five

ethnic groups in Ukraine. We find that the effects of socialisation processes vary greatly depending

upon ethnic group. Our results challenge some long-held assumptions about the potential destabilising

effects of ‘ethnic’ identities and the degree to which ‘civic’ identities correspond to values and

behaviours supportive of democracy.

WITH THE TRANSITIONS FROM STATE SOCIALISM IN Eastern Europe and the former

Soviet Union, considerable attention has been given to national identity formation as

a means of legitimising new regimes. States grapple with issues of who their core

citizenry are, to which populations the government is accountable, and which identity

interests the state must promote. For the states of the former Soviet Union, this

process is further complicated by the legacy of Soviet federalism, which gave the

majority ethnic groups a heightened sense of entitlement potentially at odds with the

multi-ethnic composition of these territories (Chinn & Kaiser 1996; Coppieters 1998).

A question arises as to the nature of the identities being adopted in the newly

independent countries that emerged from these multi-ethnic territories, and the long-

term consequences of the various identities for the twin goals of nation-building and

democratisation.

In this article, we differentiate categories of national identities and compare how

these identities are distributed across the major nationality groups in Ukraine. We

explore the foundations of these identities, focusing on cleavage structures and

The authors acknowledge the assistance of Volodymyr Yevtukh who supervised the interviews

conducted in Ukraine. The research was organised by Vicki Hesli, principle investigator on a grant

funded by the U.S. State Department. A previous version of this article was presented at the Midwest

Political Science Association Annual National Conference in Chicago, April 2005.

EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES

Vol. 61, No. 1, January 2009, 1–28

ISSN 0966-8136 print; ISSN 1465-3427 online/09/010001-28 ª 2009 University of Glasgow

DOI: 10.1080/09668130802532894



socialisation effects that explain individual variance. We conclude by examining the

implications of these identities for democratisation in Ukraine. Our results challenge

some rather long-held assumptions about the potential destabilising effects of certain

types of ‘ethnic’ identities and about the degree to which ‘civic’ identities correspond

to values and behaviours supportive of democratic society.

An examination of national identity at the individual level provides the advantage

of a more accurate assessment of diversity by measuring the distribution of identity

categories within a state rather than relying on country-level categorisation. Further,

by analysing individual level variation, we can examine how individual experiences

create national identities, thereby supplementing other studies of national identities in

Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet region that have focused on societal-level factors

that influence the construction of identity. In addition, a focus on the individual level

helps to overcome what Brubaker describes as ‘groupism’, the tendency in ethnic

politics research to treat ethnic groups ‘as internally homogeneous, externally

bounded’ (2004, p. 8). By examining individual variation in national identity, ethnicattachment and civic belonging become variables to measure, rather than underlying

assumptions about group dynamics.

National identity: a four-part category

Scholars have long discussed the trade-off between civic and ethnic definitions of

national identity and how this impacts on society (Geertz 1973; Landa 1995; Knack &

Keefer 1997; Gibson & Gouws 2000; Alesina & La Ferarra 2002). An early example

was Kohn’s contention that Western civic nationalism in Europe, emphasising liberal

and cosmopolitan values, was superior to the backward Eastern European‘ethnographic’ nationalism (1944, p. 329).1 The general assumption of such literature

is that civic nationalism promotes tolerant and inclusive attitudes while ethnic

nationalism is disruptive and potentially leads to violence and state disintegration

(Ignatieff 1993).

Democratic theorists have also emphasised the value of tolerant citizens as crucial

for a stable democratic state; if democratic citizens are not willing to extend rights to

groups they dislike, democracy may be threatened. While democracy is theoretically

based on recognition of individual and group rights, previous research has shown that

citizens are often unwilling to extend democratic rights to unpopular groups (Sullivan

et al. 1982; Gibson & Duch 1993; Marcus et al . 1995). Strong group loyalties have also

been linked to challenges to democracy (Lijphart 1977).

The idea of a dichotomy between inclusive civic and exclusive ethnic nationalism is

reinforced by social identity theory,2 which contends that in-group identification

1Smith also contrasts ‘Western or civic’ from ‘non-Western or ethnic’ nationalisms (1991, p. 11).

Miller distinguishes between ‘nationality’, which like civic nationalism is argued to be liberal and

tolerant, and ‘nationalism’, which is illiberal and destructive (1995, p. 8). Greenfeld’s (1992) models of

individualistic-libertarian versus collectivist-authoritarian nationalism also share many qualities with

the traditional civic–ethnic dichotomy.2In social identity theory, an individual’s self-concept is derived from membership in a social group

(Tajfel 1970; Hogg 2001).

2 HOLLEY E. HANSEN & VICKI L. HESLI



and the resultant in-group favouritism causes a reactive negative evaluation of

out-groups.3 Tajfel’s (1978) study shows that mere categorisation can produce

inter-group differentiation and, due to the desire to achieve a positive self-

definition, out-group discrimination. In surveying South Africa, Gibson and Gouws

(2000, p. 289) report that ‘stronger group attachments are associated with greater

political intolerance . . . Those who derive greater psychic benefits from their group

identity and who believe more strongly in group solidarity are more likely to be

intolerant’. Gibson and Gouws also find that the relationship between solidarity,

aspects of identity and intolerance varies depending on which sub-groups of the

population are under consideration (2000, p. 289); they demonstrate, thereby, that

the relationship between in-group attachment and out-group perceptions is more

complicated than previous work had acknowledged. The relationship depends

on group-specific and environmental factors, which vary by individuals and by

situation.

Theories based on the civic–ethnic dichotomy—which often focus on broadhistorical factors specific to continental regions—have also been criticised for being

normative, ethnocentric, and lacking a strong empirical base (McCrone 1998; Yack

1999). Authors contend that the dichotomy is unable to capture the full range of

national identities that the citizens of a state may adopt (Brown 2000). Research by

Herring et al. (1999) and Oliver and Wong (2003) challenges the assumptions of social

identity theory that in-group attachment fuels out-group hostility, further challenging

the logic behind the inclusive civic–exclusive ethnic categorisation.

To move beyond this civic–ethnic dichotomy, we may envision tolerance and

in-group attachment as existing as a four-fold category, where state citizens may vary

on whether they hold strong or weak attachments to their ethnic identity and whetherthey are tolerant or intolerant of ethnic out-groups. This categorisation reflects

Brubaker’s (1996) four models of state-building, which focus on strategies that state-

level elites can pursue in order to socialise the masses into adopting an emerging

national identity. Though this state-level focus does not specify whether the masses

adopt a national identity that the elites promote, the model is useful for inferring two

important components which define variation in national identity: first, identity may

vary in degree of attachment to a sub-state ethnic group; and second, identity may

vary in the degree of tolerance towards out-groups (members of a different ethnic

group).4 As shown in Figure 1, these two dimensions of identity, when dichotomised,

3Tajfel and Turner (1979) identify variables which contribute to the emergence of in-group

favouritism: the extent to which individuals internalise their group membership as an aspect of self-

concept, the extent to which the context provides grounds for comparison between groups, and the

relative and absolute status of the in-group. Thus, as a result of comparison, strong in-group identities

become linked with out-group tolerance.4Brubaker identifies four models a state could pursue: ‘nationalising’, which involves political

activity to promote a ‘core’ nation; ‘civic’, meaning that the state is ‘owned’ by all citizens, regardless of

ethnicity; ‘bi- or multi-national’, in which state ownership is shared by two or more dominant ethnic

groups; and ‘hybrid’, where the state is defined as belonging to a core nation, yet minority rights are

guaranteed and nationalising policies that seek to assimilate non-core ethnic groups are limited. In our

article, the hybrid identity is inspired by Brubaker’s hybrid model.

NATIONAL IDENTITY 3



yield four national identity categories: civic, ethnic, hybrid, and atomised national

identities.5

According to traditional definitions, a civic identity is an inclusive identity that lacks

a strong ethnic attachment. Civic nationals primarily base group membership on

residency, and because of this, they are relatively tolerant of other ethnic groups living

within the territorial boundaries of the state (Shulman 2002b). In contrast, ethnic

nationals place importance on the history, cultural development, and promotion of

their sub-group to the exclusion of other groups (Ignatieff 1993). Because these goals

lead them to compete with other societal groups, they also exhibit high levels of out-

group intolerance.

The hybrid identity is one where citizens exhibit inclusive attitudes towards societal

out-groups while strongly identifying with their ethnic group. Hybrid individuals

promote the political goals of their group, but accept the heterogeneous nature of their

society and recognise the importance of minority rights. The fourth category

(in addition to the civic, ethnic and hybrid identities in Figure 1) reflects Bahryet al.’s (2005, p. 528) recognition of the presence of atomised individuals, who hold

relatively negative attitudes both towards their ethnic in-group and towards societal

out-groups. Although this category is often ignored by theorists, its existence is

common in post-communist states where many people distrust and feel alienated from

government decision making (Mishler & Rose 2001; White & McAllister 2004).

In-groups and out-groups in Ukraine

In Ukraine, the focus of scholarly study has primarily been on relations between

Ukrainians and Russians, but in defining both civic and ethnic identities other relevant‘in-groups’ and ‘out-groups’ need to be recognised. Challenges to national integration

may come not only from Ukrainians and Russians, but also from groups such as the

Crimean Tatars or from groups geographically concentrated in western Ukraine, such

as Hungarians.

Dawson describes the Tatars as a ‘potentially explosive factor in Crimean politics’

(1997, p. 441). They comprise just 0.5% of the population of Ukraine, but are

concentrated geographically with 98% living in the Crimean peninsula, which is

FIGURE 1. TYPOLOGY OF IDENTITY CATEGORIES

5Others have employed alternative names for identity categories in Ukraine. Taras et al. (2004)

discuss the emergence of the transnational identity, while Shulman (2004) proposes competing Ethnic

Ukrainian and Ethnic Eastern Slavic identities. We consider the transnational identity as a

sub-category of civic identity, while Ethnic Ukrainian and Eastern Slavic ethnic identities are sub-

sets of our ‘ethnic’ identity category. Since our research goal is to explain the socialisation processes

that lead to the adoption of the four broader identity categories, as well as the outcomes of these

identities, we chose not to further sub-divide Figure 1.




viewed as their ethnic homeland. Most Crimean Tatars speak a language of the Turkic

group and are Sunni Muslims. Some harbour historical grievances associated with

their deportation by Stalin during World War II, and their low economic status and

high differentiation from other groups in Ukraine have raised concerns about the

potential destabilising effect of this ethnic group (Shanghina 2002).6

The western parts of Ukraine also contain geographically concentrated minority

groups that may exhibit low levels of integration into the Ukrainian state. Western

Ukraine was historically part of the Austro–Hungarian Empire and between World

Wars I and II, some sections were part of Poland, Romania, Hungary and

Czechoslovakia. In our research we report on the Hungarians in Ukraine, who live

primarily in Zakarpatska oblast’, where a movement for autonomy emerged in the

early 1990s.7 The Hungarians are members of the Calvinist or the Roman or Greek

Catholic churches, which sets them apart from the Orthodox Slavic populations.8

Hungarians are more likely than Russians and Ukrainians to live in rural areas, and

their lower education levels have been cited for their higher unemployment rates.9

In addition to analysing identities among Crimean Tatars and Hungarians, another

group that we consider, and which is often neglected in studies of national integration,

is the Roma, who are scattered throughout Ukraine. The Roma are traditionally

excluded from nation-building attempts. The 2001 census estimated that around

47,600 Roma live in Ukraine but evidence suggests that some Roma select a different

nationality when filling out the census, making their actual number difficult to judge.

As in most of Eastern Europe, the Roma in Ukraine are an ethnic group of the lowest

socio-economic status. Although attempts have been made to improve the status of the

Roma minority, institutionalised discrimination remains an issue.

Research on the Crimean Tatar and Hungarian populations (Solchanyk 1994;Dawson 1997) suggests that both these groups have strong ethnic attachments and

weaker attachments to the Ukrainian state. Although similar research on the Roma

does not exist, if an attachment does exist, one might predict that it would be primarily

towards their ethnic group. Previous research assuming the civic–ethnic dichotomy has

found relations between the Ukrainian and Russian populations to be generally

positive, resulting in statements and findings that identify most of the Russian and

Ukrainian populations as having a civic identity (Smith et al. 1998; Shulman 2004).

To examine the distribution of the hypothesised identity categories across ethnic

groups, we use data from a 2004 survey of representative samples within the major

ethnic populations of Ukraine.10 Our analyses focus on five groups: the majority

Ukrainian population, and the Russian, Crimean Tatar, Hungarian and Roma

6Furthermore, Shanghina (2002) notes that a demographic shift favouring the Tatar population is

occurring in the Crimea, as two thirds of children born in this region are Tatar.7Also a part of this movement were the Ruthenians, who are found primarily in the Carpathians and

consider themselves distinct from Ukrainians. The Society of Carpathian Ruthenians rejected the

Soviet annexation of Subcarpathian Ruthenia and its integration into Ukraine (Solchanyk 1994).8Cultural Association of Hungarians in Subcarpathian (Ka rpa taljai Magyar Kultura lis Szo ¨ vetse g),

‘Religion’, 2001, available at: http://www.karpatok.uzhgorod.ua/index3.html, accessed 25 January

2006.9Minorities in Europe, ‘Hungarians in the Ukraine’, 25 October 2005, available at: http://

www.minority2000.net/Gr-75/t87gb.htm, accessed 10 July 2006.10Detailed information on the sampling and interview procedures is available from the authors.

A summary of these procedures is given in Appendix A.

NATIONAL IDENTITY 5

http://www.karpatok.uzhgorod.ua/index3.html

http://www.minority2000.net/Gr-75/t87gb.htm




http://www.karpatok.uzhgorod.ua/index3.html



minority populations.11 Based on the dimensions identified in Figure 1, we construct

two indicators: one measures how strongly individuals are attached to their ethnic

group; and the other assesses tolerance towards ethnic out-groups.12 A rationale for

our procedure for measuring the strength of ethnic identification can be found in the

work of Connor (1994), who argues that belonging to an ethnic nation is determined

largely by psychological attachment rather than objective criteria such as language,

race or religion. After respondents had self-classified themselves according to their

ethnic group,13 we asked a series of follow-up questions to assess the value and

significance of their ethnic identities.14 Respondents were asked about their level of

interest in the history of their nation and in inter-ethnic relations in Ukraine, as well as

how often they discussed these things with friends and colleagues. Respondents who

on average answered that they were interested in these topics and discussed them

frequently, were coded as having a strong ethnic attachment.15

When studying political tolerance—defined as ‘a willingness to permit the

expression of ideas or interests one opposes’ (Sullivan et al. 1982, p. 2)—researchersgenerally ask questions about social or political groups. Given our focus on citizenship

identity and its role in nation-building, we asked respondents to rank their attitudes

toward nine different ethnic groups found in Ukraine. In rating these ethnicities,

respondents were asked to indicate whether they would agree to accept a member of

the group in a range from most to least close, as members of their family, close friends,

neighbours, colleagues at work, citizens of Ukraine or foreign tourists, or if they

preferred to completely exclude the group from Ukraine. In line with work by Sullivan

et al. (1979; 1982), we used a respondent’s score on their ‘least-liked’ group (the group

they rank lowest) as their tolerance measure.16 Since civic and hybrid nationals are

defined as inclusive, meaning that they must at the bare minimum be willing to accepttheir least-liked group as fellow citizens, we grouped respondents that said they would

be willing to accept their least-liked group as a citizen of Ukraine as ‘tolerant’, while

those who would only accept them as tourists or who wanted to exclude them

completely as ‘intolerant’ towards out-groups.

11The two other ethnic populations that were sampled were the Poles and the Jews. Information on

identity distributions within these groups is available from the authors. We selected to report on only

five groups as these adequately represent five theoretically distinct categories: (1) the titular nationality

group (the majority group): Ukrainians; (2) the colonisers: Russians; (3) neighbours (nationality

groups that correspond to the titular nationality of a neighbouring country): Hungarians and Poles; (4)a stateless indigenous group: Crimean Tatars; and (5) diaspora groups: Jews and Roma.

12Appendix B provides a full discussion of the coding involved.13Respondents are sorted into ethnic groups according to their response to the question: ‘Which

national [ethnic] group do you consider yourself to be a member of?’14We prefer this indirect method of measurement over the direct approach used by Gibson and

Gouws (2000, p. 281), who asked respondents ‘to rate the degree of importance of their social

identities’.15To test whether the questions that comprise the index of ethnic attachment load on a scale, we ran

a reliability analysis. The Cronbach’s alpha was 0.92, well above the 0.8 cut-off often used in the social

sciences. Furthermore, this alpha score for the scale as used herein was greater than the score for a

scale if any item was deleted.16Respondents were not asked to indicate which nationality group they were least willing to accept,

but we take the group to which they gave the lowest rank as their least-liked.




Coding on the two dimensions (strength of ethnic attachment and ethnic tolerance)

reflects the categorisation in Figure 1: civic nationals are defined as those with a weak

ethnic attachment and a relatively high tolerance towards out-groups; ethnic nationals

have a strong ethnic attachment and are intolerant of out-groups; hybrid nationals

have a strong ethnic attachment and are tolerant towards out-groups; and atomised

nationals have a weak ethnic attachment and are intolerant of out-groups. The

distribution of these identity categories, by ethnic group, is displayed in Table 1.

Our results challenge to some degree previous survey research by Shulman (2004),

Taras et al. (2004) and Hagendoorn et al. (2001) who argue that civic identities are

common in Ukrainian politics.17 Neither do our findings reinforce Brubaker’s (1996)

belief that civic and binational–multinational models have little chance of being

established in Eastern Europe and the former USSR.18 We find that the proportion in

the ‘civic’ identity category varies dramatically by ethnic group. Among Ukrainians,

about 15% hold a civic identity; Russians are only slightly below this. Least likely to

hold a civic identity are Crimean Tatars, while nearly a quarter of Hungarians andaround 40% of the Roma exhibit a civic identity. The high proportion of people with a

civic identity among Roma can be attributed to the fact that about 90% of Roma lack

a strong ethnic attachment. Also, negative evaluations of the Roma given by other

ethnic groups in the state, serve to decrease the scores of members of these other

groups on the tolerance measure (leaving the Roma with comparatively higher

tolerance scores).

An ‘ethnic’ identity (second column of Table 1) is more common than a civic

identity for Ukrainians, Russians, and Crimean Tatars, though less common for

Hungarians and Roma. Noteworthy is the finding that an ethnic identity is more

prevalent in the Ukrainian and Russian populations than among the Hungarian andRoma minority groups. An ethnic identity is held by approximately a quarter of both

TABLE 1DISTRIBUTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY CATEGORIES WITHIN MAJOR ETHNIC GROUPS (%)

Ethnic group Civic Ethnic Hybrid Atomised Number of cases

Ukrainians 15.5% 25.1% 8.0% 51.3% 187 (100%)Russians 13.82% 27.7% 4.8% 53.7% 188 (100%)Crimean Tatars 9.0% 41.2% 26.1% 23.6% 199 (100%)

Hungarians 26.5% 14.0% 6.5% 53.0% 200 (100%)Roma 40.7% 7.6% 2.3% 49.4% 172 (100%)Proportion in the groups combined 20.7% 23.5% 9.8% 46.0% 946 (100%)

Note: Values represent the percentage of respondents within each ethnic group who belong to that national

identity category.

17We acknowledge that the frequency of different identity categories cannot be strictly compared as

the indicators that we use for assessing different types of identity are different from the indicators used

by these other authors.18Brubaker is not alone. Kolsto ¨ (2000, p. 24) asserts that in Eastern Europe the civic concept has few

adherents, while Snyder (2000) argues that civic nationalism is likely to be weak in ‘ineffective’ states.

See also Schopflin (1996, p. 153).

NATIONAL IDENTITY 7



Russians and Ukrainians, and this identity is the most common identity among

Crimean Tatars. A hybrid identity is the least common identity for all groups

considered, except the Crimean Tartars where over a quarter of this group are in this

identity category.

The most common identity found overall is an atomised identity. Over half the

Ukrainians, Russians, and Hungarians, and nearly half of the Roma, are atomised,

while considerably fewer Tatars have an atomised identity (23.6%). The finding that a

large proportion of the population has an atomised identity may be potentially

disturbing to both scholars and politicians, as it suggests that over half of Ukraine’s

citizens lack both a sense of attachment and a reservoir of tolerance. The high

frequency of this identity in the two largest population groups in Ukraine—the

Ukrainians and Russians—calls for further study, as it requires both theoretical and

empirical differentiation from the previous discussions which have focused heavily on

civic and ethnic identities.

Explaining identity: socialisation and discrimination

Distinguishing which types of identities are predominant among different groups in a

given state is a first step to appreciating the challenges of nation building. Under-

standing can be further deepened with exploration of the foundations of these identities

at the individual level. If identity, especially ethnic identity, is socially constructed

(Anderson 1991) and dependent upon social triggers, individual socialisation

experiences are likely to have a significant impact on which identities come to the fore.

Previous studies lend insight into which socialisation factors operating at the

individual level are likely to affect propensities to adopt one identity over another.Although Shulman (2002a, p. 5) focuses primarily on societal level factors that affect

identity formation within groups—such as the age and effectiveness of the state, what

discourse dominates at the national level, and whether the state pursues nationalising

policies that legitimise one culture over others—he also considers the demography of a

given ethnic group. Bremmer’s (1994) notions of ethnic attachment and schism also

lend insight into how attachment to an ethnic identity forms.19 According to

Bremmer, when groups are more distinct, individuals are less likely to integrate and

will instead maintain their ethnic identity. From this, we may theorise that individuals

who do exhibit those characteristics that differentiate their ethnic group from others

will be more likely to feel a strong attachment to their ethnic group, and therefore be

more likely to develop ethnic or hybrid national identities.20

One such group-differentiating characteristic is religion. Orthodoxy is a central

element of Slavic identity, while groups such as the Hungarians are distinguished by

association with Calvinism and Catholicism. The Crimean Tatars generally identify

themselves as Muslims. Nonetheless, the level of adherence to these major religious

traditions varies from person to person. We hypothesise that individuals from

19Bremmer’s (1994, p. 264) list of relevant group-level factors includes size, length of time living in

the area, political and economic clout, and proximity to homeland.20For Bremmer, such factors include race, language, religion and culture, though there may be

others (1994, p. 264).




minority populations who are religious believers and who adhere to the religion

associated with their group (for example, Ukrainians and Russians who report being

Orthodox, and Tatars who report being Muslim) are more likely to feel a sense of

belonging to their group and more likely to develop attachment to their ethnic

identity, and thus hold an ethnic or a hybrid national identity rather than a civic one.

Researchers have also long noted the link between language and ethno-nationalism

(Rosenblatt 1964; Shabad & Gunther 1982; Rahman 1997; Fournier 2002). Linguistic

heterogeneity captures ‘the degree of cultural difference between ethnic groups’ (Laitin

2000, p. 143). Language, therefore, is hypothesised to be an instrument of socialisation

that raises attachment to an ethnic identity. We expect that those who more frequently

use the language of their ethnic group are more likely to develop an ethnic or a hybrid

identity than a civic or atomised identity.21

Region of residence, although key whenever territorially concentrated groups are

studied, has particular importance as a foundation for political cleavages in Ukraine

(Hesli 1995; Arel & Khmelko 1996; Kubicek 2000). The dispersion of our sample allowsus to explore the effect of regionalism on the identities of Russians and Ukrainians. We

expect that among Ukrainian residents of Ukraine’s eastern provinces, historical rule

by the Russian Empire and Soviet Union has left a weak sense of ‘ownership’ to the idea

of an independent Ukraine (Taras et al. 2004, p. 839). Thus, we expect that Ukrainians

living in the east are predisposed to develop a civic identity. Among the Russian

population in eastern Ukraine, historical patterns lead Russians to consider themselves

an indigenous group with a high attachment to their place of residence (Bremmer 1994),

suggesting higher levels of ethnic attachment among Russians in the east.22

In addition to religion, language and region, we also consider age. Different age

cohorts are exposed to different socialising experiences. Not only do elite discoursesregarding national identity change over time, political institutions which shape

expectations and help determine the salience of competing identities also evolve over

time (Weldon 2006). For analytical purposes, we divide elite discourse and

institutional design into four defining historical periods—early Soviet (prior to

1940), mid-Soviet (1940–1982), post-Brezhnev (1983–1990), and independence (1991–

present)—each of which is anticipated to shape the identities of its age cohort. Because

period effects have been described by other researchers (Roeder 1992; Kaiser 1994;

Melvin 1995; Laitin 1998), we mention only a few key differences between these eras in

their treatment of the nationality issue.

Following the 1917 revolution, official policies initially tolerated national cultures

and promoted korenizatsiya (‘indigenisation’), an official policy that encouraged

linguistic development and education in the native languages along with the

promotion of local ethnic elite into positions of regional power. Yet, this was also

the time when Ukraine was being forcefully incorporated into the Soviet Union (Pipes

1964). Thus, we expect that those who became politically aware during this early

21While Fournier (2002) contends that the Russian population of Ukraine has become ethnically

mobilised to restore the status of Russian as an official language, 85% of the population in Ukraine is

bilingual in Russian and Ukrainian, and in eastern Ukraine most citizens, regardless of ethnicity, speak

Russian in their daily lives.22We acknowledge that regional differentiation in Ukrainian politics is more complex than a simple

east–west distinction (Barrington & Herron 2004).

NATIONAL IDENTITY 9



Soviet period may have ambivalent, atomised identities, compared with those who

came of age in later periods.

Early policies that were relatively light on forced assimilation were later reversed by

Stalin; decision making was increasingly centralised in Moscow, reducing the power to

titular elites; and linguistic Russification was pursued, leaving Ukraine a bi-lingual

state. Taras et al. (2004) cite the influence of the Russian and Soviet Empires, which

were predominantly internationalist, and encouraged ‘strong multinationalising and

multiculturalising tendencies’ (p. 839) as a reason why Ukrainians in general have been

predisposed to develop a more inclusive civic identity. Yet, many ethnic groups

experienced a decline in their status and were pressured to adopt a definition of

themselves as Soviet, not national citizens, which could have created a form of reactive

nationalism. Thus, both civic and ethnic identities could arise from the mid-Soviet

period.

During the post-Brezhnev era, republics became increasingly autonomous and

pursued policies promoting the status of the titular ethnic group. Some Russians mayreasonably have seen this as a threat to their previous status. Thus, we might expect

Russians socialised in this period to be more likely to adopt an ethnic identity as

compared to Russians socialised in the mid-Soviet or early eras. For the Crimean

Tatars, the period under Gorbachev’s rule marked increased migration to Crimea, and

around 260,000 have immigrated since the late 1980s. This increase in status,

combined with the lifting of some previous institutionalised discrimination against this

group, might increase the tendency of these individuals to identify as civics or hybrids.

Since independence, state policies on citizenship have privileged a territorial rather

than ethnic definition of membership, yet nationalist parties have promoted the idea

that Ukrainians hold a special status as the rightful population of Ukraine andminorities have voiced concern about the status of their language and culture. Given

the dramatic changes of the post-independence period, the current official discourse

that promotes tolerance, and internal and external pressures to cooperate with both

Russia and Europe, we propose that those most recently socialised will be more likely

than other age cohorts to have a civic identity.

In addition to age cohort socialisation effects, we recognise that individuals with

higher levels of education are exposed to different stimuli, taught particular norms,

and are often more tolerant of out-groups (Tuch 1987; Bobo & Licari 1989; Weldon

2006). Conversely, individuals with lower education levels are less likely to express

these attitudes, and are therefore less likely to adopt a civic or a hybrid identity.

Researchers have also noted the link between ethnic identity, socio-economic status,

and self-esteem (Katz 1940; Phinney & Chavira 1992). According to Horowitz, both

individual and collective self-esteem is ‘achieved through social recognition’ (2000,

p. 185). Horowitz notes that for groups that occupy a low status, ethnic identity can be

an alternative way of ‘measuring worth’ (2000, p. 186), helping to overcome negative

esteem. We expect that individuals facing economic hardship—individuals who are

unemployed or have lower levels of income—will be more likely than employed

persons or those with higher incomes to perceive themselves in competition with

groups such as minorities or immigrants and thus more likely to exhibit intolerant

attitudes towards out-groups (Bobo & Kluegel 1993; Betz 1994). Thus, individuals

experiencing economic difficulty will exhibit either an ethnic identity, if they have a




positive in-group evaluation, or an atomised identity, if they are distrustful of fellow

members of their ethnic group (Bahry et al. 2005).23

In addition to socio-demographic characteristics, we also gathered information on

personal experiences with discrimination. According to the literature, individuals who

have experienced discrimination based on ethnicity are more likely to perceive a

common interest with their co-members of the same ethnic group and may be more

strongly attached to an ethnic identity (Harff & Gurr 2004; Schock 1996; Dudley &

Miller 1998). However, Kerbo (1982), in describing incentives for mobilising groups,

proposes clear differences in the motivations of high-status and low-status groups.

More disadvantaged groups are motivated primarily by grievances, which ethnically-

based discrimination may fuel, while high status groups often have alternative

motivations. Therefore, we may expect that experiences of discrimination will have

greater impact on the more low-status minority groups, such as the Tatars,

Hungarians, and the Roma than on the majority Ukrainian population or on the

high-status Russian minority. Among the low-status groups, we may expect that thosewith personal experiences of ethnically based discrimination will have a lower

incidence of either civic or atomised identities—identities with low ethnic attachment.

Individual characteristics, socialisation, and national identity: an empirical test

Together these propositions lead to a multivariate model for explaining how

individual characteristics and socialisation experiences lead to the adoption of one

national identity over others. To test which factors operate as expected, we begin by

examining relationships with the two component dimensions of our identity

categories: ethnic attachment and tolerant attitudes. First, we briefly describe theoperationalisation of the seven factors that we have identified as predisposing

individuals to adopt one of the four identities.24

Respondents who have experienced religious socialisation belong to the religion that

typifies and unites their ethnic group. For Ukrainians and Russians, this religion is

Orthodoxy,25 for the Tatars, it is Islam, and for the Hungarians it is a non-Orthodox

Christian denomination (often Catholicism). We created a dichotomous variable,

coding respondents as a ‘1’ if they stated that they were a religious believer and if they

were members of the religion ‘typical’ of their ethnic group.

To determine the frequency of language use, respondents are asked which language

they use ‘at home’, ‘with neighbours’, and ‘at work’. With these responses, we created

a four-point scale, in which respondents reporting that they used the language of their

23For Bremmer (1994) and Shulman (2002a), however, members of ethnic groups with high status

are more likely to have a strong attachment to their ethnic identity.24For further details, see Appendix B. In earlier versions, we included a control variable for gender.

However, since it failed to reach significance in any of our statistical models, we elected to remove this

variable from the current tests.25We acknowledge that many Ukrainians of western Ukraine adhere to Uniate Catholicism (also

referred to as the Greek Catholic Church of Ukraine). Over 10% of ethnic Ukrainians identify

themselves as Greek Catholic. Nonetheless, the Orthodox Church (Kievan Patriarchate) is the most

common religious affiliation among Ukrainians in Ukraine so we use Orthodoxy as the ‘typical’

religion of the group.

NATIONAL IDENTITY 11



ethnic group most frequently in all three environments received a ‘3’, while those that

responded that they did not use the language of their group in any of the three

environments received a ‘0’. A dummy variable for residence in Donetsk, one of the

eastern oblasti of Ukraine, is included in the models that examine extent of ethnic

attachment and degree of tolerance among Ukrainians and Russians only.26 Because

the other nationality groups are more regionally concentrated in their residence, we

cannot test for regional variation in identity among them.

To measure age cohort socialisation effects, we divide respondents into four groups

based on the four historical periods identified above and create dichotomous variables

to represent when they became politically aware (those who were 8–18 years of age

during the relevant ‘socialisation period’). In the analysis, the largest group, those

socialised during the mid-Soviet period, is the excluded category.

The measure of education level has seven categories, which range from no education

to higher (university or college) education. In addition, two socio-economic status

variables are included. The first is an indicator of whether the respondent wasunemployed at the time of the survey and the second is a measure of financial situation

of the family. Higher scores indicate the most economic hardship reported by the

respondent. Respondents were asked a number of questions regarding whether they

had experienced discrimination in their jobs or by the government. Responses to these

questions were tallied to create an 11-point ‘experiences with discrimination’ scale, in

which respondents who receive a ‘0’ have no history of discrimination, while

respondents with a ‘10’ have multiple past experiences with discrimination.

Although not discussed previously, we also include a dichotomous variable that we

call ‘family homogeneity’ that codes whether both of the respondent’s parents

were from the same ethnic group. Research on American racial politics has shown thatbi-racial individuals often experience very different socialisation experiences that are

subsequently reflected in their identification (Root 1992; Williams 1996), and that the

identity of multi-ethnic individuals is often more fluid and dependent upon the setting

in which the individual is interacting (Jime ´ nez 2004). In Ukraine, a society in which

inter-ethnic marriage is common (particularly among the Ukrainian and Russian

populations), we may expect that an ethnic attachment is weaker for bi-ethnic

individuals and stronger for those in an ethnically homogeneous family.

Table 2 presents the estimated coefficients for an ordinary least squares regression

model that evaluates variation in ethnic attachment (the degree of interest in and

discussion about the history, culture and problems of one’s own ethnic group).

Beginning with the country-wide model (all groups in the sample), we find that

respondents who have been socialised in the religion of their ethnic group, who have

experienced past discrimination, and who have parents from the same ethnic group, all

have a higher attachment to their ethnic identity. We also find that the unemployed

26Donetsk is the oblast’ that was selected to represent east Ukraine (which also includes Luganska

oblast’) when the sampling frame was constructed. Thus, by including this dummy variable in our

analysis, we test the degree to which Ukrainians or Russian residents of east Ukraine differ significantly

from Ukrainians or Russians living in other regions of Ukraine, including the south, west or central

parts of the country. For more on the regional classification of Ukraine’s oblasti see Hesli et al . (1998).




and those who have a low educational level are significantly less attached to their

ethnic group than their comparative counterparts.

Since we expect to observe differential effects of the explanatory factors based on the

‘context’ of ethnic group belonging, we also conducted this analysis within ethnic

groups. We note that religious socialisation is significantly associated with variation in

ethnic attachment among all groups, except the Hungarians. We see this as being a

robust finding and the lack of significance of the coefficient among Hungarians can be

explained by our inability to clearly tie one religion with this ethnic group. The effect

of experiences of discrimination on degree of ethnic attachment is also exactly as

expected among the Crimean Tatars, Hungarians, and Roma—all low-status

minorities. In contrast, experience of ethnically based discrimination is not significant

for the Ukrainians (the dominant majority) and Russians (a high-status minority).27

This provides solid empirical support for the argument by Harff and Gurr (2004),

TABLE 2ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES (OLS) REGRESSION: PREDICTORS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF A STRONG

ETHNIC ATTACHMENT

Country-wide Ukrainians Russians Crimean Tatars Hungarians Roma

Religioussocialisation

0.488***(0.054)

0.217*(0.121)

0.253**(0.111)

0.435***(0.115)

0.020(0.097)

–

Frequentlanguage use

70.015(0.024)

0.054(0.054)

0.016(0.070)

0.042(0.053)

70.039(0.056)

0.056(0.085)

Experiences withdiscrimination

0.049***(0.016)

70.018(0.073)

70.004(0.053)

0.061*(0.033)

0.263***(0.078)

0.078***(0.024)

Age cohortIndependence 70.042

(0.086)0.137

(0.170)70.403**

(0.196)70.097(0.133)

70.664***(0.193)

70.074(0.217)

Post-Brezhnevperiod

70.097(0.083)

70.110(0.183)

70.277*(0.159)

70.189(0.165)

70.003(0.144)

0.398**(0.187)

Early Soviet 0.002

(0.108)

0.102

(0.203)

70.615***

(0.192)

0.370

(0.234)

0.026

(0.225)

70.001

(0.293)

Education level 0.136***(0.021)

0.155***(0.048)

0.009(0.047)

0.047(0.049)

70.011(0.048)

0.225***(0.068)

Unemployed 70.228***(0.057)

70.036(0.119)

0.165(0.126)

70.343***(0.110)

0.060(0.109)

70.075(0.138)

Economichardship

0.032(0.032)

70.079(0.074)

70.076(0.074)

0.251***(0.057)

70.139*(0.074)

70.054(0.062)

Familyhomogeneity

0.164**(0.066)

70.058(0.131)

70.222*(0.114)

0.992***(0.314)

0.033(0.113)

70.075(0.210)

Region (East) – 70.162(0.156)

70.388***(0.107)

– – –

Constant 1.733***(0.126)

1.933***(0.286)

2.826***(0.271)

1.255***(0.375)

2.460***(0.281)

1.476***(0.319)

N 959 194 194 197 197 177R2 0.179 0.117 0.158 0.366 0.128 0.185Adjusted R2 0.170 0.064 0.107 0.331 0.081 0.141

* p5 0.10, ** p5 0.05, *** p5 0.01.

Note: Values represent the regression coefficient, while numbers in parentheses are the standard error.

27Ethnic Russians are in many ways a privileged minority, and often have higher socio-economic

status than even ethnic Ukrainians (Hagendoorn et al . 2001).




among others, that institutionalised discrimination against members of minority

ethnic groups can intensify a sense of shared fate with their own ethnic group.

With regard to generational differences, we find significant effects for the Russian,

Hungarian and Roma populations. Russians and Hungarians socialised in the

independence period tend to have less attachment to their ethnic identity, which is in

line with our argument that policies in the independence period have privileged a

territorial rather than an ethnic definition of citizenship, and thereby have reduced

attachment to an ethnic identity. Actually, Russians socialised during any period other

than the mid-Soviet period are less attached to their ethnic identity. Roma socialised

during the post-Brezhnev period show higher levels of ethnic attachment than Roma

socialised in other periods.

Low education is negatively associated with ethnic attachment among Ukrainians

and Roma. Among these two groups, those with more education are more likely to

have a stronger sense of attachment. Unemployed Tatars are less attached to their

ethnic identity. However, a complicating factor is the finding that among CrimeanTatars, the worse the financial straits of one’s family, the stronger one’s ethnic

attachment. The opposite relationship is found among Hungarians.

Counter to our findings from the country-wide model, Russians from homogenous

families have less of an attachment to their ethnic identity. As expected, Crimean

Tatars whose parents are both Tatars are more likely than Tatars from mixed

marriages to have a strong ethnic attachment. Surprisingly, and given the importance

placed in the literature on language and ethnicity in Ukraine, we find no significant

relationship between frequent language use and ethnic attachment for any of the

ethnic groups in our study. With regard to regional effects, Russians who live in

the east are less likely to exhibit higher levels of ethnic attachment. This finding for theRussians is counter to Bremmer (1994), who predicts that among Russians, those in

the east hold a stronger attachment.

In Table 3 we present the estimated coefficients for an ordinary least squares

regression model that evaluates variation in tolerance towards ethnic out-groups.

Noteworthy here is the significant relationship between language use and degree of

tolerance. Among Russians, more frequent Russian language use is related to more

tolerance, while among all lower status minority ethnic groups more frequent native

language use is related to less tolerance. This different effect is unsurprising as the use

of Russian, as a language of international communication, gives it a different meaning

than using minority languages among the three other ethnic groups. Furthermore, for

the Tatars, Hungarians and Roma, frequent use of their native language may also

indicate that these respondents are in environments where they have lower levels of

interethnic interaction, which may be less conducive to interethnic empathy (Fearon &

Laitin 1996).

With regard to experiences of discrimination, in the country-wide model, we find a

significant relationship between ethnically based discrimination and level of tolerance,

though this is the opposite direction from what we might assume and appears to be

driven by the experiences of Russians only. Russians who have experienced more

discrimination are more tolerant than those who have experienced less discrimination.

The idea of empathy may also be relevant here, but it is worth mentioning that the

finding applies to the higher-status minority group only.




It is also noteworthy that age cohort socialisation does not affect level of tolerance

among any ethnic group, and higher levels of education are associated with higher

levels of tolerance among Crimean Tatars only. Among the Tatars, the relationship

between education and tolerance is as hypothesised. Family homogeneity significantly

affects tolerance among Ukrainians only. Ukrainians from homogenous families are

more tolerant of out-groups, counter to our presumption.

For the Russians, beyond language use and experiences with discrimination, we find

that those who reside in the east are significantly more tolerant than Russians in other

parts of the country. A possible explanation is that Russians in eastern Ukraine are

more likely to consider themselves an indigenous group, due to their long period of

residence and intermarriage (Fournier 2002), and so their attachment to the territory is

high. This territorial attachment helps create cross-cutting cleavages (Hagendoorn

et al. 2001) which improve tolerance towards other territorial groups, easing the

formation of a civic identity. Among Tatars, those who have been socialised in the

religion of their ethnic group, Islam, are less tolerant of out-groups than those who are

not Muslims.

TABLE 3ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES (OLS) REGRESSION: PREDICTORS OF TOLERANCE TOWARDS LEAST-LIKED

ETHNIC OUT-GROUP

Country-wide Ukrainians Russians Crimean Tatars Hungarians Roma


70.098(0.103)

0.232(0.239)

0.062(0.220)

70.889**(0.342)

70.105(0.172)

–


70.266***(0.046)

70.037(0.114)

0.250*(0.142)

70.327**(0.159)

70.320***(0.100)

70.486***(0.151)

Experiences withdiscrimination

0.065**(0.031)

70.135(0.170)

0.251**(0.105)

0.009(0.100)

0.159(0.139)

70.026(0.041)

Age cohortIndependence 70.031

(0.163)70.266(0.334)

0.117(0.383)

70.399(0.398)

70.065(0.344)

0.119(0.382)

Post-Brezhnevperiod

70.260(0.159)

70.087(0.353)

0.190(0.313)

70.489(0.494)

70.410(0.258)

70.529(0.356)

Early Soviet 70.021(0.204)

70.364(0.399)

70.231(0.379)

1.002(0.701)

0.490(0.402)

0.224(0.514)

Education level 70.005(0.041)

70.152(0.097)

70.069(0.096)

0.274*(0.145)

0.092(0.086)

0.158(0.118)

Unemployed 70.074(0.109)

70.300(0.236)

0.169(0.249)

0.235(0.331)

70.203(0.195)

70.003(0.246)

Economichardship

70.142**(0.060)

70.091(0.150)

70.045(0.145)

0.076(0.172)

70.138(0.132)

70.168(0.104)

Familyhomogeneity

0.135(0.126)

0.463(0.278)

0.023(0.227)

0.869(0.849)

70.230(0.203)

70.048(0.356)

Region (East) – 0.219(0.311)

0.460**(0.211)

– – –

Constant 2.930***(0.241)

2.603***(0.582)

1.377***(0.545)

1.693(1.026)

2.844***(0.502)

3.623***(0.547)

N 919 182 187 198 197 155R2 0.053 0.062 0.087 0.094 0.146 0.246Adjusted R2 0.043 0.001 0.029 0.045 0.100 0.200

* p5 0.10, ** p5 0.05, *** p5 0.01.

Note: Values represent the regression coefficient, while numbers in parentheses are the standard error.




Now that we have identified the factors that influence the component parts of the

identity categories, we can conduct an analysis of which individuals are more likely to

develop one identity type over another. We carried out two tests using logistic

regression: the first model predicts the likelihood of having an ethnic, rather than a

civic identity, while the second model predicts the likelihood of having an atomised

identity, rather than a civic one. Because it has been argued that a civic identity is the

identity category to which states should aspire, we set civic as the baseline category for

our models. We do not examine the development of a hybrid as opposed to a civic

identity, as hybrid individuals account for less than 10% of our country-wide sample,

and constitute less than 5% of Russians and Roma. Instead, we focus on the

characteristics of those with ethnic and atomised identities. By comparing the ethnic as

opposed to the civic identities, we are able to comment on the literature contrasting

these two highly distinct identities and we provide empirical evidence of the

characteristics and experiences that give rise to the predominance of one over the

other. Furthermore, given the sheer number of individuals with an atomised identity inour sample, around half of our sample for all groups except the Tatars, it is important

to identify what factors give rise to ‘atomisation’ in the population.

When evaluating these identity categories, we limit our analyses to what may be

considered ‘pure types’—individuals who are clearly distinct from other identities in our

analysis. Because the tolerance measure was constructed from questions about how close

a relationship one would be willing to have with members of ‘out-groups’, the measure

contains an inherent and theoretically grounded cut-off that reflects the difference

between the civic as opposed to ethnic identity as defined in the literature—civic

individuals must at a bare minimum be willing to accept out-groups as citizens of the state.

Those categorised as having an ‘ethnic’ (or an atomised) identity, in contrast, will notaccept a member of their least liked group as a citizen of Ukraine. Making a clear

theoretical distinction between someone who is strongly interested in their ethnic history

and someone who is slightly interested, however, is less obvious. For this reason, only

those who scored in the top quartile of the ethnic attachment scale are categorised as

having an ethnic identity in this analysis, and only those who scored in the bottom quartile

on the ethnic attachment scale are categorised as having civic or atomised identities.28

Focusing our attention on ‘pure’ types, however, reduces the number of cases in the

analyses, making it impossible to run the same test separately for each ethnic group in

the study. Instead, we run a country-wide model and include two control variables,

which distinguish the ethnic groups: ‘High Status Minority’ indicates an ethnic

Russian respondent, and ‘Low Status Minority’ indicates a Tatar, Hungarian, or

Roma respondent (Ukrainians are the excluded category). Given that we have already

determined that certain predictor variables are differently associated with tolerance

within different ethnic groups, we create interaction terms for use in a second model.

In the second model, ethnic group controls are related to discrimination experiences

and frequent language use, two factors that we found previously that have significantly

different influences depending on ethnic group membership.

The first columns of Table 4 contrast an ethnic identity (low tolerance, high ethnic

attachment) with a civic identity (high tolerance, low ethnic attachment). We find in

28The exact cut-off for our coding can be found in Appendix B.




Model 1 that those who have been socialised in the religion of their ethnic group and

those with more frequent native language use are more likely to hold an ethnic rather

than a civic identity, while respondents who are unemployed are more likely to exhibit

civic rather than ethnic identities. When the interactive variables are included in Model

2, we find that, compared with other ethnic groups in Ukraine, Russians are more

likely to exhibit an ethnic identity, but that frequent Russian language use among

Russians (the high status group) works against the likelihood of having an ethnic

identity. Experiences of discrimination among low status groups significantly increases

the probability of having an ethnic rather than a civic identity. Low status minorities

who have experienced a greater amount of discrimination in the past are more likely to

hold an ethnic identity. Noteworthy also are the findings from Model 2 that economic

hardship in the family is associated with a greater likelihood of having an ethnic

identity, as are higher levels of education.

Turning to the factors that lead to an atomised identity as opposed to a civic

identity (the second set of columns in Table 4), we see in Model 1 that religious

TABLE 4LOGITISTIC REGRESSION: PREDICTORS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF ETHNIC OR ATOMISED

IDENTITIES VS. A CIVIC IDENTITY (‘PURE’ TYPES)

Ethnic Atomised

Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2


2.051*** (0.398) 2.043*** (0.415) 0.864** (0.381) 0.473 (0.408)


0.511** (0.212) 0.763* (0.413) 0.515*** (0.170) 70.482 (0.335)

Discriminationexperiences

0.077 (0.093) 70.622* (0.354) 70.120 (0.094) 70.487** (0.247)

Age cohortIndependence 70.331 (0.565) 70.332 (0.590) 0.468 (0.479) 0.640 (0.502)Post-Brezhnev 70.879 (0.695) 70.854 (0.710) 0.175 (0.510) 0.200 (0.532)Early Soviet 0.623 (0.860) 0.891 (0.887) 0.499 (0.664) 70.145 (0.730)

Education level 0.275 (0.169) 0.407** (0.185) 70.196 (0.131) 70.142 (0.145)Unemployed 70.740* (0.392) 70.922** (0.420) 70.126 (0.355) 70.196 (0.380)Economic hardship 0.278 (0.218) 0.404* (0.243) 0.374* (0.164) 0.358* (0.174)Family homogeneity 70.173 (0.514) 0.140 (0.546) 70.411 (0.406) 70.425 (0.433)High status minority 0.461 (0.736) 13.738* (7.709) 0.874 (0.659) 7.966 (5.174)Low status minority 0.025 (0.582) 0.360 (0.882) 70.407 (0.431) 72.078*** (0.653)Low status*

discrimination – 0.793** (0.375) – 0.310 (0.268)

High status* frequentlanguage use

– 74.808* (2.613) – 72.203 (1.791)

Low status* frequentlanguage use

– 70.171 (0.502) – 1.549*** (0.404)

Constant 71.890 (1.170) 73.202** (1.356) 0.290 (0.823) 1.593 (1.005)

N Log-likelihood 213 213 261 261Likelihood ratio 7104.545 798.181 7142.525 7130.490w2 79.01*** 91.74*** 47.21*** 71.28***

* p5 0.10, ** p5 0.05, *** p5 0.01.

Note: The baseline category for the dependent variable in each of these models is civic. Values represent the

regression coefficient, while numbers in parentheses are the standard error.




socialisation and frequent language use are associated with a greater likelihood of

exhibiting an atomised identity than a civic identity. In Model 2 we see that the

driving factor is frequency of language use among low status ethnic groups: more

use of the minority language is related to a greater likelihood of not having a civic

identity. In general, low status minorities are less likely than Russians and

Ukrainians to have an atomised identity (and more likely to have a civic identity).

A robust finding is that a negative financial situation also pulls one away from a

civic identity.

In summary, our findings provide solid empirical support for some established

theoretical positions and qualifications to others. Noteworthy is that relations between

the socialisation factors and the components of the different identity categories can

vary across ethnic groups. Discrimination has no effect on ethnic attachment for the

two dominant ethnic groups in Ukraine—the Ukrainians and Russians—but it is

significant for minority groups that are of lower status—the Crimean Tatars,

Hungarians, and Roma. In an unexpected finding, frequency of language use is not asignificant predictor of ethnic attachment (given controls of religious socialisation and

discrimination experience), though we do find that language impacts on tolerance

towards out-groups, and the directional impact depends on whether the respondent is

a member of a high status (Russian) or low status (Tatar, Hungarian or Roma) group.

Regional effects on the ethnic attachment and tolerance of Russians are significant, as

expected, but the analysis reveals a lower likelihood of ethnic attachment in eastern

Ukraine.

National identity and political outcomes

In addition to exploring the foundations of different identities, it is also necessary to

explore their political ramifications. Prospects for national integration arguably

depend upon the strength of sub-state or ethnic identities which may compete with

nation-building programmes. Furthermore, conceptions of the self and other within

the state shape the political realities in which groups interact (Gilbert 2000),

influencing individual preferences towards the distribution of resources and values in

a society (Aleinikoff & Klusmeyer 2001; Weldon 2006).

Civic identities are often assumed to be necessary for the development of democratic

values while ethno-nationalism is seen as a destabilising force. These claims, however,

are often made without testing to see whether civic identities are indeed associated

with democratic values. Do the different national identities lead citizens to differ in

their attitudes towards democracy, policy preferences, or voting behaviour? To answer

these questions, we return to the identity category typology presented in Figure 1 and

the concurrent grouping of the sample into each of these categories as presented in

Table 1. In Table 5, we report the percentage within each identity category that prefers

the establishment of a Western-style democracy in Ukraine (third column) and the

percentage that prefers a return to the Soviet system as it was before perestroika (first

column). Thus, to gauge attitudes towards democracy, respondents were asked which

political system they believed would be best for Ukraine. Over half of our respondents,

regardless of their identity, favour a Western-style democracy (the totals are in the last

row of Table 5). Those with an atomised identity are least likely to favour Western




democracy. When comparing the civic and ethnic identity, it is not possible to argue

that individuals with ethnic identities are ‘less democratic’ than those with civic

identities. A larger percentage of individuals with a civic identity than with ethnic

identity favour a return to the Soviet system. This challenges the assumption under

the civic–ethnic dichotomy approach that civic nationals are more democratic

(Kohn 1944; Smith 1991; Ignatieff 1993). Those with a hybrid identity, the other

identity category with a strong ethnic attachment, rank as the most supportive of

democracy for Ukraine. On the other hand, those with an atomised identity are

least in favour of a Western-style democracy and most in favour of returning to the

Soviet system.

In Table 6, we present the relationship between identities and attitudes towards a

major issue for post-communist countries, market reforms. When asked about their

attitudes towards these reforms, respondents could select from five possible responses

reflecting whether they favoured a planned or a free-market economy, and how

quickly they believed Ukraine should implement those changes. The full spectrum of answers can be found in Table 6. For our discussion we will focus on the respondents

TABLE 6DISTRIBUTION OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS MARKET REFORM: ‘PLEASE TELL, IN WHAT DIRECTION, IN YOUR

OPINION, THE ECONOMY OF UKRAINE SHOULD DEVELOP?’

Return tothe planned economy of the Soviet

Period

Toward increasing the

centralised control . . .

Move towardsa marketeconomy with

some stateregulation

Move more graduallytowards a

free, marketeconomy

Move morequickly towardsa free, market

economy N

Civic 5.2% 16.3% 20.0% 22.2% 36.3% 135Ethnic 7.4% 7.9% 14.7% 46.3% 23.7% 190Hybrid 0.0% 12.9% 24.2% 24.2% 38.7% 62Atomised 11.7% 15.3% 23.0% 27.6% 22.4% 326Total 8.2% 13.3% 20.3% 31.3% 26.8% 713

Pearson w2¼52.57***.

* p5 0.10, ** p5 0.05, *** p5 0.01.

Note: Non-responses and respondents who answered ‘difficult to say’ were excluded from this analysis.

TABLE 5DISTRIBUTION OF POLITICAL SYSTEM PREFERENCES: ‘WHICH POLITICAL SYSTEM, IN YOUR OPINION,

WOULD BE THE BEST FOR UKRAINE?’

The Soviet system, as itwas before Perestroika

The political systemwhich exists today

A Western-styledemocracy N

Civic 33.1% 6.6% 60.3% 121Ethnic 20.1% 22.0% 57.9% 164

Hybrid 13.2% 25.0% 61.8% 76Atomised 34.9% 13.6% 51.5% 295Total 28.4% 15.7% 56.0% 656

Pearson w2¼33.06***.

* p5 0.10, ** p5 0.05, *** p5 0.01.

Note: Non-responses and respondents who answered ‘difficult to say’ were excluded from this analysis.




who are in favour of market reform: those who answered that Ukraine should ‘move

more gradually’ or ‘move more quickly towards a free, market economy’.Those with an ethnic identity are most in favour of moving towards a free market,

with 70% responding that Ukraine should either move quickly or move gradually

toward a free market economy. This group is followed by those with a hybrid identity,

almost 63% of whom supported movement towards a free market economy. The least

likely to support a free market economy are individuals with an atomised identity.

Atomised individuals are the least comfortable with both a Western-style democracy

and market reform.

In Table 7, we examine whether national identity is related to the likelihood of

voting. The figures in this table represent respondents’ self-reporting of voting in the

2002 parliamentary election. Overall, 57% reported that they had voted. Those withcivic identities, however, were less likely to vote than those with other identities. Those

with hybrid (77%) or ethnic identities (64%) were most likely to participate, while

individuals with atomised and civic identities were significantly less likely to vote. This

is another finding which challenges the notion that civic identities underlay ‘good’

democratic citizenship while ethnic identities undermine democracy. What our findings

suggest, and this supports similar claims by Birnir (2007), is that ethnic attachment may

have a positive influence by mobilising citizens in democracies in transition. In fact, we

find that respondents with an ethnic identity tend to be more supportive of democracy

and more likely to participate in elections than civic or atomised individuals: a trend

that is even stronger for hybrid individuals. Overall, this challenges traditional

assumptions that ethnic identity is inherently dangerous for a democratic society.

Conclusion

In this article, we follow recent calls to move beyond the civic–ethnic dichotomy for

understanding national identity, and propose four identity variants that can be found

at the mass level: civic, ethnic, hybrid and atomised. These variants are categorised by

degree of attachment towards one’s own ethnic in-group and level of tolerance

towards ethnic out-groups. After conceptualising these categories, we examined their

distribution across five ethnic groups in Ukraine and tested how individual level

socialisation shapes the adoption of national identities. We also examined the

TABLE 7DISTRIBUTION OF PARTICIPATION IN 2002 RADA ELECTIONS

Voted Did not vote/do not remember N

Civic 46.2% 53.9% 195Ethnic 64.0% 36.0% 222Hybrid 77.4% 22.6% 93Atomised 54.4% 45.6% 434Total 57.2% 42.8% 944

Pearson w2¼ 30.810***.

* p5 0.10, ** p50.05, *** p5 0.01.

Note: Non-responses were excluded from this analysis.




relationship between national identity categories and attitudes that may either support

or disrupt democratic development in Ukraine.

We find that the effects of socialisation differ depending on whether we are

evaluating the formation of ethnic attachment or the level of out-group tolerance; this

supports the claim by Herring et al. (1999) and Oliver and Wong (2003) that out-group

intolerance is caused by factors other than in-group identification. Furthermore, we

find that socialisation experiences have different effects dependent upon which ethnic

group is under consideration, suggesting that ethnicity serves as a contextualising

factor that influences how individuals perceive their experiences. Having said this, we

further note that those who have been socialised in the religion of their ethnic group

and those who more frequently use their native language are more likely to hold an

ethnic rather than a civic identity. In addition, experiences of discrimination among

low status groups significantly increase the probability of having an ethnic rather than

a civic identity. These findings provide substantial empirical support for theories of

identity formation.Our evidence shows, contrary to recent work, that civic identity is not the most

common identity in Ukraine. It also challenges the arguments of authors who focus on

the divergent effects of civic as opposed to ethnic national identity, since we do not

find that those with ethnic identities are less likely to support a Western-style

democracy or less likely to participate in a democratic society. ‘Ethnic’ and ‘hybrid’

citizens are actually more likely than ‘civic’ citizens to vote—supporting the idea that

mobilisation in a political system is facilitated by a sense of belonging to a relevant

identity group. In line with recent work by Birnir (2007), our findings suggest that

ethnicity and ethnic attachment can provide this necessary sense of belonging to a

newly democratic citizenry. Indeed, the unprecedented mass political involvement of the people in the Orange Revolution demonstrations throughout Ukraine—in

Yanukovych-supporting as well as Yushchenko-supporting regions—reveals the

mobilisation potential of ethnic as well as hybrid identities.

The Orange Revolution confirmed that although a political divide prevails in

Ukraine, the country continues toward democratic consolidation. Viktor Yushchenko

carried 52% of the vote in the re-run of the second round of the 2004 presidential

election (Hesli 2006). This number is strikingly similar to the percentage in Table 5

who believe that a Western-style democracy is best for Ukraine. Polling data from

after the Orange Revolution also confirms the continued existence of a solid minority

of Ukrainian citizens (nearly 30%) who prefer the old Soviet system, as it was before

the perestroika reforms introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev. In fact, the differentiated

identity terrain of Ukraine has served as a brake on the lofty ambitions of the leaders

of the Orange Revolution (Hesli 2007, p. 505).

The hybrid identity group is one of the more interesting identities to consider in the

context of a state in transition. Like those with an ethnic identity, they have a strong

attachment to their in-group, helping them to navigate a complex political situation

and fuelling their political activity. Furthermore, they share tolerant attitudes towards

out-groups, the central characteristic that is valued in a civic identity. Of the four

identity groups under study, those with a hybrid identity are consistently the most

supportive of democracy and the most likely to participate in elections. While the

Crimean Tatars are a small number of our total sample size, and are a traditionally




discriminated and disenfranchised group, the fact that over a quarter of them in our

sample exhibit a hybrid identity offers some hope that this identity may help low-status

minorities to become socialised into a new democracy.

At the same time, the prevalence of atomised identities suggests that alienation, not

ethnic antagonism, is perhaps the most serious challenge to democracy in Ukraine.

This concern is reinforced by our findings regarding the attitudes of atomised

individuals to key aspects of democratic citizenship—they are less in favour of

democracy and market reform than individuals with civic and ethnic identities and are

less likely to participate than those with hybrid or ethnic identities. The Ukrainian

government is still challenged by how to better respond to the needs of the atomised

section of the population. Although alienation is widespread and troubling, it is not so

predominant as to put the state in danger of disintegration as it is balanced by other

identities. Our results suggest the value of competing identities, in the absence of an

overarching identity, as a foundation for democratic society.

University of Iowa

References

Aleinikoff, T.A. & Klusmeyer, D. (2001) Citizenship Today: Testing and Interpreting Interaction(Newbury Park, Sage Publications).

Alesina, A. & La Ferrara, E. (2002) ‘Participation in Heterogeneous Communities’, The QuarterlyJournal of Economics, 115, 3, August.

Anderson, B. (1991) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism(New York, Verso).

Arel, D. & Khmelko, V. (1996) ‘The Russian Factor and Territorial Polarization in Ukraine’, The

Harriman Review, 9, 1–2, Spring.Bahry, D., Kosolapov, M., Kozyreva, P. & Wilson, R.K. (2005) ‘Ethnicity and Trust: Evidence fromRussia’, American Political Science Review, 99, 4, November.

Barrington, L.W. & Herron, E.S. (2004) ‘One Ukraine or Many? Regionalism in Ukraine and ItsPolitical Consequences’, Nationalities Papers, 32, 1.

Betz, H. (1994) Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe (New York, St. Martins Press).Birnir, J.K. (2007) Ethnicity and Electoral Politics (New York, Cambridge University Press).Bobo, L. & Kluegel, J.R. (1993) ‘Opposition to Race Targeting: Self Interest, Stratification Ideology,

or Racial Attitudes’, American Sociological Review, 58, 4, August.Bobo, L. & Licari, F.C. (1989) ‘Education and Political Tolerance: Testing the Effects of Cognitive

Sophistication and Target Group Affect’, The Public Opinion Quarterly, 53, 3, Autumn.Bremmer, I. (1994) ‘The Politics of Ethnicity: Russians in the New Ukraine’, Europe-Asia Studies,

46, 2.Brown, D. (2000) Contemporary Nationalism: Civic, Ethnocultural and Multicultural Politics (London,

Routledge).Brubaker, R. (1996) ‘Nationalizing States in the Old ‘‘New’’ Europe—and the New’, Ethnic and Racial

Studies, 19, 2.Brubaker, R. (2004) Ethnicity without Groups (Cambridge, Harvard University Press).Chinn, J. & Kaiser, R. (1996) Russians as the New Minority: Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Soviet

Successor States (Boulder, Westview Press).Connor, W. (1994) Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton, Princeton University

Press).Coppieters, B. (1998) ‘Form and Content in Soviet and Post-Soviet Nationality and Regional Policies’,

in Waller, M., Coppieters B. & Malashenko, A. (eds) (1998) Conflicting Loyalties and the State inPost-Soviet Russia and Eurasia (London, Frank Cass).

Dawson, J.I. (1997) ‘Ethnicity, Ideology, and Geopolitics in Crimea’, Communist and Post-CommunistStudies, 30, 4, December.

Dudley, R. & Miller, R.A. (1998) ‘Group Rebellion in the 1980s’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution,

42, 1, February.




Fearon, J.D. & Laitin, D.D. (1996) ‘Explaining Interethnic Cooperation’, The American Political Science Review, 90, 4, December.

Fournier, A. (2002) ‘Mapping Identities: Russian Resistance to Linguistic Ukrainisation in Centraland Eastern Ukraine’, Europe-Asia Studies, 54, 3, May.

Geertz, C. (1973) ‘The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New

States’, in Geertz, C. (ed.) (1973) The Interpretation of Cultures (New York, Basic Books).Gibson, J.L. & Duch, R.M. (1993) ‘Political Intolerance in the USSR: The Distribution and Etiology

of Mass Opinion’, Comparative Political Studies, 26, 3.Gibson, J. & Gouws, A. (2000) ‘Social Identities and Political Intolerance: Linkages within the South

African Mass Public’, American Journal of Political Science, 44, 2, April.Gilbert, P. (2000) Peoples, Cultures and Nations in Political Philosophy (Washington, DC, Georgetown

University Press).Greenfeld, L. (1992) Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University

Press).Hagendoorn, L., Linssen, H. & Tumanov, S. (2001) Intergroup Relations in States of the Former Soviet

Union (Philadelphia, Taylor & Francis).Harff, B. & Gurr, T.R. (2004) Ethnic Conflict in World Politics, 2nd edn (Boulder, Westview Press).Herring, M., Jankowski, T. & Brown, R. (1999) ‘Pro-Black Doesn’t Mean Anti-White: The Structure

of African-American Group Identity’, The Journal of Politics, 61, 2, May.

Hesli, V. (1995) ‘Public Support for the Devolution of Power in Ukraine: Regional Patterns’, Europe-Asia Studies, 47, 1.

Hesli, V. (2006) ‘The Orange Revolution: 2004 Presidential Election(s) in Ukraine’, Electoral Studies,25, 1.

Hesli, V. (2007) ‘The 2006 Parliamentary Election in Ukraine’, Electoral Studies, 26, 2.Hesli, V., Reisinger, W. & Miller, A. (1998) ‘Political Party Development in Divided Societies: The

Case of Ukraine’, Electoral Studies, 17, 2.Hogg, M.A. (2001) ‘A Social Identity Theory of Leadership’, Personality & Social Psychology Review,

5, 3.Horowitz, D.L. (2000) Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 2nd edn (Berkeley, University of California Press).Ignatieff, M. (1993) Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism (New York, Farrar,

Straus and Giroux).Jime ´ nez, T.R. (2004) ‘Negotiating Ethnic Boundaries: Multiethnic Mexican Americans and Ethnic

Identity in the United States’, Ethnicities, 4, 1, March.Kaiser, R.J. (1994) The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR (Princeton, Princeton

University Press).Katz, D. (1940) ‘The Psychology of Nationalism’, in Guilford, J.P. (ed.) (1940) Fields of Psychology

(New York, Van Nostrand).Kerbo, H.R. (1982) ‘Movements of ‘‘Crisis’’ and Movements of ‘‘Affluence’’: A Critique of

Deprivation and Resource Mobilization Theories’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 26, 4,December.

Knack, S. & Keefer, P. (1997) ‘Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-CountryInvestigation’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 4, November.

Kohn, H. (1944) The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and Background (New York,Macmillan).

Kolsto ¨ , P. (2000) Political Construction Sites: Nation-Building in Russia and the Post-Soviet States[translated by Susan Hoivik] (Boulder, CO, Westview Press).

Kubicek, P. (2000) ‘Regional Polarisation in Ukraine: Public Opinion, Voting and LegislativeBehaviour’, Europe-Asia Studies, 52, 2, March.

Laitin, D.D. (1998) Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad (Ithaca, Cornell University Press).

Laitin, D.D. (2000) ‘What is a Language Community?’, American Journal of Political Science, 44, 1,January.

Landa, J.T. (1995) Trust, Ethnicity, and Identity: Beyond the New Institutional Economics of EthnicTrading Networks, Contract Law, and Gift-Exchange (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press).

Lijphart, A. (1977) Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven, YaleUniversity Press).

Marcus, G.E., Sullivan, J.L., Theiss-Morse, E. & Wood, S. (1995) With Malice Toward Some: HowPeople Make Civil Liberties Judgements (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).

McCrone, D. (1998) The Sociology of Nationalism (London, Routledge).Melvin, N. (1995) Russians Beyond Russia: The Politics of National Identity (London, The Royal

Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House Papers).




Miller, D. (1995) On Nationality (Oxford, Oxford University Press).Mishler, W. & Rose, R. (2001) ‘What Are the Origins of Political Trust? Testing Institutional

and Cultural Theories in Post-communist Societies’, Comparative Political Studies, 34, 1,February.

Oliver, J.E. & Wong, J. (2003) ‘Intergroup Prejudice in Multiethnic Settings’, American Journal of

Political Science, 47, 4, October.Phinney, J.S. & Chavira, V. (1992) ‘Parental Ethnic Socialization and Adolescent Coping with

Problems Related to Ethnicity’, Journal of Research on Adolescence, 5, 1.Pipes, R. (1964) The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917–23

(Cambridge, Harvard University Press).Rahman, T. (1997) ‘Language and Ethnicity in Pakistan’, Asian Survey, 37, 9, September.Roeder, P.G. (1992) ‘Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization’, in Denber, R. (ed.) (1992) The Soviet

Nationality Reader: The Disintegration in Context (Boulder, Westview Press).Root, M.P.P. (ed.) (1992) Racially Mixed People in America (Newbury Park, Sage Publications,

Inc.).Rosenblatt, P.C. (1964) ‘Origins and Effects of Group Ethnocentrism and Nationalism’, Journal of

Conflict Resolution, 8, 2, June.Schock, K. (1996) ‘A Conjunctural Model of Political Conflict: The Impact of Political Opportunities

on the Relationship between Economic Inequality and Violent Political Conflict’, The Journal of

Conflict Resolution, 40, 1, March.Schopflin, G. (1996) ‘Nationalism and Ethnic Minorities in Post-Communist Europe’, in Caplan, R. &

Feffer, J. (eds) (1996) Europe’s New Nationalism (New York, Oxford University Press).Shabad, G. & Gunther, R. (1982) ‘Language, Nationalism, and Political Conflict in Spain’,

Comparative Politics, 14, 4, July.Shanghina, L. (2002) ‘The Demographic Situation in Ukraine: Present State, Tendencies, and

Predictions’, The Quarterly Journal , 1, 2.Shulman, S. (2002a) ‘Sources of Civic and Ethnic Nationalism in Ukraine’, Journal of Communist

Studies and Transition Politics, 18, 4, December.Shulman, S. (2002b) ‘Challenging the Civic/Ethnic and West/East Dichotomies in the Study of

Nationalism’, Comparative Political Studies, 35, 5.Shulman, S. (2004) ‘The Contours of Civic and Ethnic National Identification in Ukraine’, Europe-

Asia Studies, 56, 1.Smith, A. (1991) National Identity (London, Routledge).Smith, G., Law, V., Wilson, A., Bohr, A. & Allworth, E. (1998) Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet

Borderlands: The Politics of National Identities (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).Snyder, J. (2000) From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (New York, W.W.

Norton & Company).Solchanyk, R. (1994) ‘The Politics of State-Building: Centre–Periphery Relations in Post-Soviet

Ukraine’, Europe-Asia Studies, 46, 1.Sullivan, J.L., Pierson, J. & Marcus, G.E. (1979) ‘An Alternative Conceptualization of Politcal

Tolerance: Illusory Increases 1950–1970’, American Political Science Review, 73.Sullivan, J.L., Pierson, J. & Marcus, G.E. (1982) Political Tolerance and American Democracy

(Chicago, Chicago University Press).Tajfel, H. (1970) ‘Experiments in Intergroup Discrimination’, Scientific American, 22, 5, November.Tajfel, H. (1978) Differentiation between Social Groups: Studies in the Social Psychology of Intergroup

Relations, European Monographs in Social Psychology, 14 (London, Academic Press).

Tajfel, H. & Turner, J.C. (1979) ‘An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict’, in Austin, W.G. &Worchel, S. (eds) (1979) Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations (Monterey, Brooks/Cole).

Taras, R., Filippova, O. & Pobeda, N. (2004) ‘Ukraine’s Transnationals, Far-away Locals andXenophobes: The Prospects for Europeanness’, Europe-Asia Studies, 56, 6, September.

Tuch, S.A. (1987) ‘Urbanism, Region, and Tolerance Revisited: The Case of Racial Prejudice’,American Sociological Review, 52, 4, August.

Weldon, S.A. (2006) ‘The Institutional Context of Tolerance for Ethnic Minorities: A Comparative,Multilevel Analysis of Western Europe’, American Journal of Political Science, 50, 2, April.

White, S. & McAllister, I. (2004) ‘Dimensions of Disengagement in Post-Communist Russia’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 20, 1, March.

Williams, T.K. (1996) ‘Race as Process: Reassessing the ‘‘What Are You?’’ Encounters of BiracialIndividuals’, in Root, M.P.P. (ed.) 1996 The Multiracial Experience (Thousand Oaks, SagePublications, Inc).

Yack, B. (1999) ‘The Myth of the Civic Nation’, in Beiner, R. (ed.) (1999) Theorizing Nationalism

(Albany, State University of New York Press).




Appendix A: Sampling ethnic groups in Ukraine29

In addition to the largest ethnic groups in Ukrainian society (Ukrainians and

Russians), which consist of 95% of the total research population, also included in the

population are a number of traditional ethnic minorities; according to the 2001 censusthese include the Crimean Tatars (248,000), Hungarians (157,000), Poles (144,000) and

Jews (104,000); there is also a migrating ethnic group of Roma (48,000). Because of

our need to interview at least 200 members of each ethnic group (to create a

representative sample), and because the overall sample size was limited to 1,400, other

ethnic minorities in Ukraine, such as Moldavians or Romanians, had to be excluded

from the research.

At the first stage of sample formation, all administrative units (the country contains

27 administrative units—24 oblasti , the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and the

cities of Kyiv and Sebastopol) were classified into four socio-cultural regions of

Ukraine. From each of these regions, two or three administrative units were selectedfor inclusion in the sample. One oblast’ from each region was highly urbanised (more

than 75% of urban population) and the other had low urbanisation (up to 50% of

urban population). If a third was selected, it had a middle level of urbanisation

(between 51% and 75% of urban population). The selection also took into account the

fact that two of seven ethnic groups that were objects of research live compactly in one

administrative unit of Ukraine. A proportional sample was then distributed across the

selected regions of Ukraine (eight oblasti , the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and

Kyiv).

At the second stage of sample formation, an accounting was made of the number of

people in the capital, regional cities and villages. Two or three districts were selected

from every pre-selected administrative unit. Polling was carried out in the following

locations: (1) in the capital of Ukraine—Kyiv; (2) in the capital of the Autonomous

Republic of Crimea—Simferopol; (3) in the administrative centres of the oblasti of

Ukraine—Lviv, Uzhhorod, Zhytomyr, Kirovohrad, Donetsk, Kherson and Odessa;

(4) in cities with oblast’ and district status—Saki and Bilohirsk (AR Crimea),

Baranivka (Zhytomyrska oblast’), Vynogradiv and Beregove (Zakarpatska),

Znamyanka (Kirovohradska), Drohobych (Lvivska), Nova Kakhovka (Khersonska),

Bilhorod-Dnistrovsky (Odeska), Bilopillya (Sumska), Gorlivka and Yasynuvata

(Donetska); (5) in villages: in the Saky and Bilgorod districts (raion) of AR Crimea

(six villages), in Baranivska raiony, Zhytomyr oblast’ (two villages), Vynogradova,

Beregove, Mukachevo raiony, Zakarpatska oblast’ (eight villages), Znamyanka raion,Kirovohradska oblast’ (one village), Drohobych raion, Lviv oblast’ (two villages),

Novokachovka raion, Khersonska oblast’ (one village), Bilopillya raion, Sumska

oblast’ (one village), Yasynuvata raion, Donetska oblast’ (one village). In total,

interviews were carried out in 22 cities and in 22 villages of Ukraine (44 settlements of

10 administrative units), including the historical regions of settlement for the Crimean

Tatars (the region of Bilohirsk and Saki in Crimea), for Poles (the Lviv, Zhytomyr and

Baranivsk oblasti of Zhytomyr region) and for Roma (Mukachevo and Odessa).

29A complete description of the sampling and interview procedures is available from the authors.

What follows is a significantly abridged summary.




At the third stage of formation of the sample, quotas were determined in order to

create a representative sample on the basis of sex, age and educational level for all of

the targeted ethnic groups, according to the official state statistics. At the fourth stage,

a selected number of each quota was allocated to 22 cities and 22 villages of Ukraine

and interviewers were assigned to between one and five streets where they followed a

designated route. The interviewer then found respondents with the given social-

demographic characteristics for interview.

Appendix B: Questionnaire items used in scale construction30

Tolerance

To measure tolerance towards out-groups, respondents were asked to rank their

attitudes towards 24 different groups using the scale below:

I agree to accept the member of this nationality as:

(1) completely excluded from Ukraine; (2) foreign tourists; (3) citizens of Ukraine; (4) my

colleagues at work; (5) my neighbours; (6) my close friends; (7) members of my family.

To construct a scale measuring tolerance towards internal out-groups, we calculated

the respondent’s lowest score towards one of the nine ethnic groups comprising the

population of Ukraine: Belarusians, Jews, Crimean Tatars, Poles, Romanians,

Russians, Ukrainians, Roma, Moldavians and Hungarians. Respondents who, at

the bare minimum, accepted their least-liked group as citizens of Ukraine were coded

as tolerant.

Ethnic attachment

We added the scores for the following four questions and divided by four to create an

ethnic attachment index:

1. To what degree are you interested in the history and culture of your nation (ethnic

community)? (1, Not at all; 2, A little; 3, To some degree; 4, Very much.)

2. How often do you discuss with your acquaintances or work colleagues the problems of the

history and culture of your nation (ethnic community)? (1, Practically never or never; 2,

Several times a year; 3, Several times a month; 4, Practically every week or more often.)

3. To what degree are you interested in the problems of interethnic relations in Ukraine? (1, Not

at all interested; 2, A little; 3, To some degree; 4, Very much.)

4. How often do you discuss with your acquaintances or work colleagues the problems of

interethnic relations in Ukraine? (1, Practically never or never; 2, Several times a year; 3,

Several times a month; 4, Practically every week or more often.)

Respondents who on average scored 3 or above were coded as having a strong

ethnic attachment, while those with scores below 3 were considered as having a low

30What follows is a significantly abridged version of our description of survey items. A complete

questionnaire and description of recoding and scaling procedures is available from the authors.




level of attachment. When constructing our ‘pure types’ category, we set the cut-off as

above 3 (3.25 and above) for strong attachment and below 2 (1.75 and below) for weak

attachment.

Frequent language use

Respondents were asked three questions concerning language use in their daily lives:

What language do you use most frequently in your family and at home?

What language do you use most frequently with your neighbours?

What language do you use most frequently at work (or at school)?

For each question, respondents who said they used the language of their ethnic

group received a 1. These scores were added together to construct a scale ranging from

0 to 3 (frequent use of native language at home, with neighbours, and at school).

Economic hardship

How do you evaluate the financial situation in your family?

Responses include: (3) we hardly make ends meet, not enough money even for food;

(2) we have enough for food, but the procurement of clothes and footwear is

somewhat difficult; (1) in general, we have enough for life, but for the procurement of

such articles as furniture, TV, or refrigerator we don’t have enough money; and (0) we

don’t have any financial difficulties.

Past discrimination experience

Respondents were asked whether they had experienced past discrimination as a

member of their ethnic group in the each of the following work-related areas: getting a

job, salary and remuneration of labour, career promotion, and improving professional

qualifications. In addition, they were asked if they had experienced discrimination

from government authorities, including: head or officers of the local state

administration, head or officers of the municipal authority, organs of internal security

(the police), tax administration, and the courts. This was used to construct a scale,

ranging from 0 (no past experience with discrimination) to 10 (frequent past

experiences with discrimination).

Government performance evaluations

Respondents were asked a series of questions, evaluating (from very dissatisfied to

very satisfied) key issues in foreign and domestic politics in Ukraine. The

domestic spheres include industrial development, agricultural development,

interethnic relations, and educational and cultural development. Foreign policy

spheres include relations with Europe, relations with Russia, relations with other

CIS countries besides Russia, relations with the USA, and relations with the

Middle East.




Preference for market reform

To assess policy preference towards market reforms, respondents were asked:

In what direction, in your opinion, the economy of Ukraine should develop?

(1) return to the planned economy of the Soviet period; (2) towards increasing centralised

control and returning some enterprises to state ownership; (3) towards a market economy

with some state regulation; (4) more gradually towards a free, market economy; (5) more

quickly towards a free, market economy.

Respondents who did not answer or who responded with ‘difficult to say’ were

coded as missing.

Preference for Western-style democracy

To assess attitudes towards democracy, respondents were asked:

Which political system, in your opinion, would be the best for Ukraine?

(1) the Soviet system, as it was before perestroika; (2) the political system which exists today;

(3) a Western-style democracy.

Respondents who did not answer or who responded with ‘difficult to say’ were

coded as missing.

Voter participation

To measure voter participation, respondents were asked whether they had voted in the

2002 Rada elections. Those that responded ‘yes’ were coded as a 1, while those who

said ‘no’ or ‘do not remember’ received a 0.


Identità nazionale

Documents

Transcript of Identità nazionale