Consti 102714

8/10/2019 Consti 102714

1/50

8/10/2019 Consti 102714

2/50

2 | J o h a n

C O N S T I T U T I O N A L L A W 1

1 0 - 2 7 - 2 0 1 4

voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of theelection, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for atleast ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of theelection. Pia Derla, who is not even a member of CIBAC, is thus a virtual stranger to the party-list, and clearly notqualified to attest to petitioners as CIBAC nominees, or certify their nomination to the COMELEC. Petitioners cannotuse their registration with the SEC as a substitute for the evidentiary requirement to show that the nominees,

including Derla, are bona fide members of the party. Petitioners Planas and Lokin, Jr. have not even presentedevidence proving the affiliation of the so-called Board of Trustees to the CIBAC Sectoral Party that is registered withCOMELEC.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 193643 January 29, 2013

ANTONIO D. DAYAO, ROLANDO P. RAMIREZ and ADELIO R. CAPCO, Petitioners,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and LPG MARKETERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 193704

FEDERATION OF PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIES, INC., Petitioner,

vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and LPG MARKETERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

REYES, J.:

The Case

At bench are consolidated1petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with prayer for the issuance ofa temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections(COMELEC) dated August 5, 20102and September 6, 2010.3

The first assailed resolution denied the complaint filed by petitioners Antonio D. Dayao, Rolando P. Ramirez, AdelioR. Capco and Federation of Philippine Industries, Inc. (FPII) for the cancellation of the registration of privaterespondent LPG Marketers Association, Inc. (LPGMA) as a sectoral organization under the Party-List System ofRepresentation. The second assailed resolution denied reconsideration.

The Facts
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt1

8/10/2019 Consti 102714

3/50

3 | J o h a n


1 0 - 2 7 - 2 0 1 4

The individual petitioners are dealers of different brands of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)4while petitioner FPII is anassociation comprised of entities engaged in various industries in the country.5

Private respondent LPGMA is a non-stock, non-profit association of consumers and small industry players in the LPGand energy sector who have banded together in order to pursue their common objective of providing quality, safe andreasonably priced gas and oil products.6The group advocates access to reasonably priced LPG by household

consumers.7

On May 21, 2009, LPGMA sought to advance its cause by seeking party-list accreditation with the COMELEC,through a petition for registration as a sectoral organization for the purpose of participating in the May 10, 2010elections under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act. LPGMA claimed that i t has specialinterest in the LPG industry and other allied concerns. It averred that one of its programs is the promotion of fair tradepractices and prevention of re-entry of cartels and monopolies by actively pursuing the initial gains of oil deregulation,and vigilant advocacy for the curtailment of bureaucratic and regulatory procedures and governmental practicesdetrimental to the entry, development and well-being of small LPG entrepreneurs.8

After the requisite publication, verification and hearing,9and without any apparent opposition, LPGMAs petition wasapproved by the COMELEC in its Resolution dated January 5, 2010.10

Four (4) months thereafter, individual petitioners lodged before the COMELEC a complaint for the cancellation ofLPGMAs registration as a party-list organization.11They were later on joined by FPII as a complainant-in-intervention.12

The complaint was docketed as SPP No. 10-010 and it proffered in essence that LPGMA does not represent amarginalized sector of the society because its incorporators, officers and members are not marginalized orunderrepresented citizens since they are actually marketers and independent re-fillers of LPG that control 45% of thenational LPG retail market and have significant ownership interests in various LPG refilling plants. To buttress thecomplaint, FPII emphasized that the business of marketing and refilling LPG requires substantial working capital as itinvolves the purchase of LPG from importers or big oil players in the country, establishment of refilling plants andsafety auxiliary equipments, purchase or lease of thousands of LPG containers, mobilization of a marketing,distribution and delivery network. FPII also alleged that LPGMA is a mere lobby group that espouses their owninterests before the Congress and the Department of Energy.

In response, LPGMA countered that Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution does not require that party-listrepresentatives must be members of the marginalized and/or underrepresented sector of the society. It also averredthat the ground cited by the petitioners is not one of those mentioned in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 and thatpetitioners are just trying to resurrect their lost chance to oppose the petition for registration.13

In its first assailed Resolution dated August 5, 2010,14the COMELEC dismissed the complaint for two reasons. First,the ground for cancellation cited by the petitioners is not among the exclusive enumeration in Section 6 of R.A. No.7941. Second, the complaint is actually a belated opposition to LPGMAs petition for registration which has long been

approved with finality on January 5, 2010. The ruling was reiterated in the COMELEC Resolution dated September 6,201015denying the petitioners motions for reconsideration.16

Pivotal to the said resolutions are the ensuing ratiocinations of the COMELEC, viz:

LPGMAs registration was approved x x x as early as 05 January 2010. Instead of opposing said registration orintervening therein after having been constructively notified thereof by its publication, petitioners waited almost four
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt4

8/10/2019 Consti 102714

4/50

4 | J o h a n


1 0 - 2 7 - 2 0 1 4

(4) entire months before filing the instant complaint. The purpose of publication in these kinds of cases is similar tothat of land registration cases, which is "to apprise the whole world that such a petition has been filed and thatwhoever is minded to oppose it for good cause may do so." This belated filing x x x is an unfortunate attempt tocircumvent the obviously final and executory nature of the Resolution dated 05 January 2010. Granting the presentcomplaint will only reward petitioners inaction x x x.17(Citations omitted)

The petitioners must be reminded that the matter has already been ruled upon. In the Resolution promulgated onJanuary 5, 2010 x x x, this Commission (First Division) has resolved to grant the Petition for Registration of LPGMAas a sectoral organization under the party-list system of representation. After a thorough evaluation of the Petition,the Commission (First Division) has concluded that LPGMA truly represents a marginalized and underrepresentedsector. With respect to the said conclusion, absent any circumstance subsequent to the promulgation of thementioned Resolution which would call for the cancellation of registration of LPGMA, the same can no longer bedisturbed by this Commission. To warrant a cancellation of LPGMAs registration, there should be a strong showingthat there has been a change in the relevant factual matters surrounding the Petition x x x.18

Ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the COMELEC, the petitioners now implore the Court to determine thecorrectness of the COMELEC resolutions dated August 5, 2010 and September 6, 2010.

The Arguments of the Parties

After directing the respondents to comment on the petitions,19the Court received on March 17, 2011 from the Officeof the Solicitor General (OSG), a Manifestation and Motion to Remand (In Lieu of Comment).20According to theOSG, since the COMELEC failed to resolve the factual issue on the qualifications of LPGMA as a registered party-listorganization, the case must be remanded to the electoral body for summary hearing and reception of evidence onthe matter.

For its part, LPGMA retorted that another hearing would be a superfluity because the COMELEC has already heardand verified LPGMAs qualifications during the proceedings for its petition for registration. LPGMA asserts that thepetitions should instead be dismissed as they involve factual questions that cannot be entertained in a petition forcertiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.21

On December 26, 2012, LPGMA manifested22to the Court that pursuant to COMELEC Resolution dated December13, 2012, LPGMA passed the recent automatic review conducted by the COMELEC on the qualifications of party-listgroups. LPGMA was found compliant with the guidelines set by law and jurisprudence and its accreditation wasretained for purposes of the 2013 party-list elections.

Ruling of the Court

There was no valid justification for the dismissal of the complaint for cancellation. However, in light of COMELECResolution dated December 13, 2012, the present petitions ought to be dismissed.

An opposition to a petition for registration is not a condition precedent to the filing of a complaint for cancellation.

Section 6, R.A. No. 7941 lays down the grounds and procedure for the cancellation of party-list accreditation, viz:

Sec. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt17

8/10/2019 Consti 102714

5/50

5 | J o h a n


1 0 - 2 7 - 2 0 1 4

The COMELEC may, motu propio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after duenotice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of thefollowing grounds:

(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious purposes;

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization,whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisanelection purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%)of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which ithas registered.

For the COMELEC to validly exercise its statutory power to cancel the registration of a party-list group, the lawimposes only two (2) conditions: (1) due notice and hearing is afforded to the party-list group concerned; and (2) anyof the enumerated grounds for disqualification in Section 6 exists.

Section 6 clearly does not require that an opposition to the petition for registration be previously interposed so that a

complaint for cancellation can be entertained. Since the law does not impose such a condition, the COMELEC,notwithstanding its delegated administrative authority to promulgate rules for the implementation of election laws,cannot read into the law that which it does not provide. The poll body is mandated to enforce and administer election-related laws. It has no power to contravene or amend them.23

Moreover, an opposition can be reasonably expected only during the petition for registration proceedings whichinvolve the COMELECs power to register a party-list group, as distinguished from the entirely separate powerinvoked by the complaint, which is the power to cancel.

The distinctiveness of the two powers is immediately apparent from their basic definitions. To refuse is to decline orto turn down,24while to cancel is to annul or remove.25Adopting such meanings within the context of Section 6,refusal of registration happens during the inceptive stage when an organization seeks admission into the roster of

COMELEC-registered party-list organizations through a petition for registration. Cancellation on the other hand, takesplace after the fact of registration when an inquiry is done by the COMELEC, motu propio or upon a verifiedcomplaint, on whether a registered party-list organization still holds the qualifications imposed by law. Refusal ishanded down to a petition for registration while cancellation is decreed on the registration itself after the petition hasbeen approved.

A resort to the rules of statutory construction yields a similar conclusion.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt23http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt23http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt23http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt24http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt24http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt24http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt25http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt25http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt25http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt25http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt24http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt23

8/10/2019 Consti 102714

6/50

6 | J o h a n


1 0 - 2 7 - 2 0 1 4

"refusal and/or cancellation" means "refusal and cancellation" or "refusal or cancellation". It has been held that theintention of the legislature in using the term "and/or" is that the word "and" and the word "or" are to be used

interchangeably.The legal meaning of the term "and/or" between "refusal" and "cancellation" should be taken in itsordinary significance26

The term "and/or" means that effect shall be given to both the conjunctive "and" and the disjunctive "or" or that one

word or the other may be taken accordingly as one or the other will best effectuate the purpose intended by thelegislature as gathered from the whole statute. The term is used to avoid a construction which by the use of thedisjunctive "or" alone will exclude the combination of several of the alternatives or by the use of the conjunctive "and"will exclude the efficacy of any one of the alternatives standing alone.27

Hence, effect shall be given to both "refusal and cancellation" and "refusal or cancellation" according to how Section6 intended them to be employed. The word "and" is a conjunction used to denote a joinder or union; it is pertinentlydefined as meaning "together with", "joined with", "along or together with."28The use of "and" in Section 6 wasnecessitated by the fact that refusal and cancellation of party-list registration share similar grounds, manner ofinitiation and procedural due process requirements of notice and hearing. With respect to the said matters, "refusal"and "cancellation" must be taken together. The word "or", on the other hand, is a disjunctive term signifyingdisassociation and independence of one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in

the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word.29As such, "refusal or cancellation", consistent with theirdisjunctive meanings, must be taken individually to mean that they are separate instances when the COMELEC canexercise its power to screen the qualifications of party-list organizations for purposes of participation in the party-listsystem of representation.

That this is the clear intent of the law is bolstered by the use simply of the word "or" in the first sentence of Section 6that "the COMELEC may, motu propio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after duenotice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition."

Consequently, the COMELECs conclusion that the complaint for cancellation, filed four(4) months after the petitionwas approved, is actually a belated opposition, obliterates the distinction between the power to register/refuse andthe power to cancel. Since an opposition may only be sensibly interposed against a petition for registration, theproceedings for which involve the COMELECs power to register, it is wrong to impose it as a condition for theexercise of the COMELECs entirely separate power to cancel. As such, the absence of an opposition to a petition forregistration cannot serve to bar any interested party from questioning, through a complaint for cancellation, thequalifications of a party-list group.

II. The accreditation of a party-list group can never attain perpetual and irrefutable conclusiveness against thegranting authority.

There is no arguing that the COMELEC Resolution dated January 5, 2010 granting LPGMAs registration has sincebecome final. Such finality, however, pertains only to the Resolution itself and not to the accreditation of LPGMA as aparty-list organization.

The said Resolution, as in any other resolution granting the registration of any other organization desirous of party-listaccreditation, did nothing more but to vest with LPGMA the right to participate in the party- list elections, i.e. file amanifestation of its intent to participate and have the same given due course by the COMELEC, the right to field itsnominees, the right to exercise all that is bestowed by our election laws to election candidates (hold campaigns,question the canvass of election returns, etc.), and the right to assume office should it obtain the required number of
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt26http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt26http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt26http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt27http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt27http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt27http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt28http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt28http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt28http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt29http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt29http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt29http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt29http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt28http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt27http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt26

8/10/2019 Consti 102714

7/50

7 | J o h a n


1 0 - 2 7 - 2 0 1 4

votes. With respect to such matters, the COMELEC resolution was already final. LPGMAs right to run, as it did sorun, during the 2010 party-list elections is already beyond challenge.

However, the Resolution did not create in LPGMAs favor a perpetual and indefeasible right to its accreditation as aparty-list organization. Neither did it grant finality and indefeasibility to the factual findings of the COMELEC on thequalifications of the group. Both the accreditation and the facts substantiating the same, can be reviewed and

revoked at any time by the COMELEC, motu propio, or upon the instance of any interested party thru a complaint forcancellation, as set forth in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941.

Each accreditation handed by the COMELEC to party-list organizations can be likened to the franchise granted byCongress, thru the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), to corporations or associations created under theCorporation Code.

Franchise is a right or privilege conferred by law. It emanates from a sovereign power and the grant is inherently alegislative power. It may, however, be derived indirectly from the state through an agency to which the power hasbeen clearly and validly delegated. In such cases, Congress prescribes the conditions on which the grant of afranchise may be made.30

The power to pass upon, refuse or deny the application for registration of any corporation or partnership is vestedwith the SEC by virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 902-A. R.A. No 7941, on the other hand, is the legislative actthat delegates to the COMELEC the power to grant franchises in the form of accreditation to peoples organizationdesirous of participating in the party-list system of representation.

Corporations formed under the Corporation Code become juridical entities only when they are granted registration bythe SEC in the same way that peoples organizations obtain legal existence as a party-list group only upon theiraccreditation with the COMELEC. A party-list organization, like a corporation, owes its legal existence to theconcession of its franchise from the State, thru the COMELEC.

Being a mere concession, it may be revoked by the granting authority upon the existence of certain conditions. The

power to revoke and grounds for revocation are aptly provided in Section 6(1) of P.D. No. 902-A,31

for corporationsand Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 for party-list organizations.

The fact that a franchise/accreditation may be revoked means that it can never be final and conclusive. A fortiori, thefactual findings leading to the grant of the franchise/accreditation can never attain finality as well. Both theaccreditation and the facts substantiating it can never attain perpetual and irrefutable conclusiveness as against thepower that grants it. The circumstances of the grantee are subject to constant review and the franchise/accreditationfrom which it derives its existence may be suspended or revoked at the will of the granting authority.

The separate instances when the COMELEC can check the qualifications of party-list groups entail distinct statutorypowersthe power to register which includes the power to refuse registration, and the power to cancel theregistration so granted. Necessarily then, proceedings involving the exercise of one power is independent of the

other such that factual findings in the proceedings for a petition for registration are not conclusive with respect to thefactual issues that may be raised in a complaint for cancellation.

Further, it must be noted that refusal and cancellation share similar grounds. The registration of a putative party-listgroup can only be granted if none of the disqualifications in Section 6 exists. Conversely, a complaint for cancellationwill prosper if any of the same grounds in Section 6 is present. Inevitably then, a negative finding of disqualification ina petition for registration is the very same fact that will be questioned in a complaint for cancellation. Hence, to say
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt30http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt30http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt30http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt31http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt31http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt31http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt31http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt30

8/10/2019 Consti 102714

8/50

8 | J o h a n


1 0 - 2 7 - 2 0 1 4

that the findings leading to the grant of registration are final and conclusive with respect to the qualification of theparty-list group will effectively put in vain any complaint for cancellation that may be filed. It leads to the perilousconclusion that the registration of a party-list group, once granted, is unassailable and perpetual which, in turn, willrender nugatory the equally existing power of the COMELEC to cancel the same. R.A. No. 7941 could not havecontemplated such an absurdity.

The Court has recognized the COMELECs cancellation power in several occasions.

In Bello v. COMELEC,32the Court confirmed that a complaint for the cancellation of party-list registration, aside froma petition for the disqualification of the party-list nominee, provides a "plain, speedy and adequate remedy", against aparty-list organization alleged to have failed to comply with Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 880733whichrequires a party-list group and its nominees to submit documentary evidence to prove that they belong to amarginalized and underrepresented sector.

In the recent ABC (Alliance for Barangay Concerns) Party-List v. COMELEC,34the Court reiterated that Section 6 ofR.A. No. 7941 validates the authority of the COMELEC, not only to register political parties, organizations orcoalitions, but also to cancel their registration based on the same legal grounds. Such authority emanates from noless than Section 2(5), Article IX-C of the Constitution, which states:

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

x x x x

(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to otherrequirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens arms ofthe Commissionon Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goalsthrough violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported byany foreign government shall likewise be refused registration.

Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties, organizations, coalitions, orcandidates related to elections constitute interference in national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additionalground for the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in addition to other penalties that may beprescribed by law. (Underscoring ours)

It is the role of the COMELEC to ensure the realization of the intent of the Constitution to give genuine power to thosewho have less in life by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves, by seeing to it that only thoseFilipinos who are marginalized and underrepresented become members of Congress under the party-listsystem.35To effectively discharge this role, R.A. No. 7941 grants the COMELEC the power not only to register party-list groups but also to review and cancel their registration.

In ruling that the finality of its Resolution dated January 5, 2010 stretched to the accreditation of LPGMA, the

COMELEC practically enfeebled and denied its own power to cancel what it is exclusively empowered to grant.

Under paragraph 5 of Section 6, a party-list organization may be disqualified on the ground that its officers andmembers do not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector.

The allegation in the complaint for cancellation, that the incorporators, officers and members of LPGMA do notbelong to the marginalized or underrepresented sector, is within the ambit of paragraph 5 of Section 6.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt32http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt32http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt32http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt33http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt33http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt33http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt34http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt34http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt34http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt35http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt35http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt35http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt35http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt34http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt33http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt32

8/10/2019 Consti 102714

9/50

8/10/2019 Consti 102714

10/50

10 | J o h a n


1 0 - 2 7 - 2 0 1 4

EXISTING PARTY-LIST RETAINED (With dissent)

PARTY-LIST ACRONYM

x x x x

35 LPG Marketers Association, Inc. LPGMA

x x x x42

Evidently, the COMELEC has already determined and declared that the present factual circumstances of LPGMAmeet the qualifications imposed by law on party-list groups. It will be a needless roundabout to still remand thecomplaint to the COMELEC for it to determine anew the present state of LPGMA's qualifications. No useful purposewill be served thereby and it will just be a tedious process of hearing the factual and evidentiary matters of LPGMA'squalifications again. The COMELEC in its Resolution dated December 13, 2012 has passed upon the issue and allother relevant questions raised in the complaint.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the consolidated petitions are hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Atong Paglaum vs. COMELEC G.R. No.203766, April 2, 2013

This case partially abandoned the rulings inAng Bagong Bayani vs COMELECandBANAT vs COMELEC.

Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in the May 2013 party-list

elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for marginalized or

underrepresented sectors.

Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on thepart of COMELEC in disqualifying them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-lists.

HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases ofAng Bagong Bayaniand BANAT.

However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for

new guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are

as follows:

I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2)regional

parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral linesand do not need to represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not

field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in

legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt42http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt42http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt42http://www.uberdigests.info/2014/05/banat-vs-comelec-april-2009/http://www.uberdigests.info/2014/05/banat-vs-comelec-april-2009/http://www.uberdigests.info/2014/05/banat-vs-comelec-april-2009/http://www.uberdigests.info/2014/05/banat-vs-comelec-april-2009/http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/gr_193643_2013.html#fnt42

8/10/2019 Consti 102714

11/50

11 | J o h a n


1 0 - 2 7 - 2 0 1 4

register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a

political party through a coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in well -defined

political constituencies. It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their

sector. The sectors that are marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,

indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack well -defined

political constituencies include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and

underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a

majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack well-defined political constituencies must

belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the

marginalized and underrepresented, or that represent those who lack well-defined political constituencies, either

must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The

nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or

organizations.6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are

disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

II.In the BANATcase, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice, from participating in

the party-list elections. But, since theres really no constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political

parties can now participate in the party-list system provided that they do so through their bona fide sectoral

wing(see parameter 3 above).

Allowingmajor political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will encourage them to

work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the marginalized and underrepresented and to those who

lack well-defined political constituencies.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission when they were

drafting the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention

to include all parties into the party-list elections in order to develop a political system which is pluralistic and

multiparty. (In the BANATcase, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the intent of the

framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that the party-list system should be

reserved for the marginalized sectors.)

III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the marginalized and

underrepresented or for parties who lack well-defined political constituencies. It is also for national or regional

parties. It is also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack well-defined political constituencies.

The common denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery unlike major politicalparties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can acquire the needed votes in a national

election system like the party-list system of elections.

If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly excludes other

cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house.

8/10/2019 Consti 102714

12/50

12 | J o h a n


1 0 - 2 7 - 2 0 1 4

As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to include only labor,

peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and

other sectors that by their nature are economicallyat the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of

Republic Act 7941 includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral representation groups of professionals, which

are not per se economically marginalized but are still qualified as marginalized, underrepresented, and do not

have well-defined political constituencies as they areideologically marginalized.

BANAT v COMELEC G.R. No. 179271 April 21, 2009

07/16/2010

0 Comments

Facts: On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Providedby the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because "theChairman and the Members of the COMELEC have recently been quoted in the national papers that the COMELECis duty bound to and shall implement the Veteransruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocatingparty-list seats."

BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT didnot file a motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.

On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider itsdecision to use the Veteransformula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula isviolative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied

reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.

Issue: Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these cases, we defined thefollowing issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008:

1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitutionmandatory or merely a ceiling?

2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat constitutional?4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can

the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?

Held: WHEREFORE we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. Wedeclare unconstitutionalthe two percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats.

Ratio: Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-
http://nonamalum.weebly.com/1/post/2010/07/banat-v-comelec-gr-no-179271-april-21-2009.htmlhttp://nonamalum.weebly.com/1/post/2010/07/banat-v-comelec-gr-no-179271-april-21-2009.html#commentshttp://nonamalum.weebly.com/1/post/2010/07/banat-v-comelec-gr-no-179271-april-21-2009.html#commentshttp://nonamalum.weebly.com/1/post/2010/07/banat-v-comelec-gr-no-179271-april-21-2009.html

8/10/2019 Consti 102714

13/50

13 | J o h a n


1 0 - 2 7 - 2 0 1 4

list representatives found in the Constitution. However, we cannot allow the continued existence of a provision inthe law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated20% party-list representatives from beingfilled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy,remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections.

We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold

for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible toachieve the maximum number of available party list seatswhen the number of available party list seats exceeds50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates theattainment of the permissive ceiling.

In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional seats to thetwo-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number ofvotes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are twosteps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38,which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteedseats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats

corresponds to a partys share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of theparties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats inthe second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats eachqualified party-list candidate is entitled.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system.On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participatein party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down,19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoralgroups. In defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A.No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding themajor political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional

Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate theexclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.

In view of the inclusion of major political parties (according to Puno, J.)The Court today effectively reversed the ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC with regard to the

computation of seat allotments and the participation of major political parties in the party-list system. I vote for theformula propounded by the majority as it benefits the party-list system but I regret that my interpretation of Article VI,Section 5 of the Constitution with respect to the participation of the major political parties in the election of party-listrepresentatives is not in direct congruence with theirs, hence

There is no gainsaying the fact that the party-list parties are no match to our traditional political parties in the

political arena. This is borne out in the party-list elections held in 2001 where major political parties were initiallyallowed to campaign and be voted for. The results confirmed the fear expressed by some commissioners in theConstitutional Commission that major political parties would figure in the disproportionate distribution of votes: of the162 parties which participated, the seven major political parties made it to the top 50. These seven partiesgarnered an accumulated 9.54% of the total number of votes counted, yielding an average of 1.36% each, while theremaining 155 parties (including those whose qualifications were contested) only obtained 90.45% or an average of0.58% each. Of these seven, three parties or 42.8% of the total number of the major parties garnered more than 2%

8/10/2019 Consti 102714

14/50

14 | J o h a n


1 0 - 2 7 - 2 0 1 4

of the total number of votes each, a feat that would have entitled them to seat their members as party-listrepresentatives. In contrast, only about 4% of the total number of the remaining parties, or only 8 out of the 155parties garnered more than 2%.

In sum, the evils that faced our marginalized and underrepresented people at the time of the framing of the 1987Constitution still haunt them today. It is through the party-list system that the Constitution sought to address this

systemic dilemma. In ratifying the Constitution, our people recognized how the interests of our poor and powerlesssectoral groups can be frustrated by the traditional political parties who have the machinery and chicanery todominate our political institutions. If we allow major political parties to participate in the party-list system electoralprocess,we will surely suffocate the voice of the marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty and betray thedemocratic spirit of the Constitution. That opinion will serve as the graveyard of the party-list system.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, I dissenton the ruling allowing the entry of major political parties into the party-listsystem.

In view of 2% being unconstitutional (according to Nachura, J.)

However, I wish to add a few words to support the proposition that the inflexible 2% threshold vote required forentitlement by a party-list group to a seat in the House of Representatives in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941 isunconstitutional. This minimum vote requirement fixed at 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party listsystem presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5 (2), Article VI, of the PhilippineConstitution. As such, it effectively defeats the declared constitutional policy, as well as the legislative objectiveexpressed in the enabling law, to allow the peoples broadest representation in Congress,the raison detre for theadoption of the party-list system.

Today, a little over eight (8) years after this Courts decision in Veterans Federation Party, we see that in the 14thCongress, 55 seats are allocated to party-list representatives, using the Veterans formula. But that figure (of 55) cannever be realized, because the 2% threshold vote requirement makes it mathematically impossible to have more than50 seats. After all, the total number of votes cast for the party-list system can never exceed 100%.

Lest I be misunderstood, I do not advocate doing away completely with a threshold vote requirement. The need forsuch a minimum vote requirement was explained in careful and elaborate detail by Chief Justice Puno in his separateconcurring opinion in Veterans Federation Party. I fully agree with him that a minimum vote requirement is needed --

1. to avoid a situation where the candidate will just use the party-list system as a fallback position;

2. to discourage nuisance candidates or parties, who are not ready and whose chances are very low, fromparticipating in the elections;

3. to avoid the reserve seat system by opening up the system;

4. to encourage the marginalized sectors to organize, work hard, and earn their seats within the system;

5. to enable sectoral representatives to rise to the same majesty as that of the elected representatives in thelegislative body, rather than owing to some degree their seats in the legislative body either to an outrightconstitutional gift or to an appointment by the President of the Philippines;

6. if no threshold is imposed, this will actually proliferate political party groups and those who have not really been

8/10/2019 Consti 102714

15/50

15 | J o h a n


1 0 - 2 7 - 2 0 1 4

given by the people sufficient basis for them to represent their constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to theParliament through the backdoor under the name of the party-list system; and

7. to ensure that only those with a more or less substantial following can be represented.9

However, with the burgeoning of the population, the steady increase in the party-list seat allotment as it keeps

pace with the creation of additional legislative districts, and the foreseeable growth of party-list groups, the fixed 2%vote requirement is no longer viable. It does not adequately respond to the inevitable changes that come with time;and it is, in fact, inconsistent with the Constitution, because it prevents the fundamental law from ever being fullyoperative.

It is correct to say, and I completely agree with Veterans Federation Party, that Section 5 (2), Article VI of theConstitution, is not mandatory, that it merely provides a ceiling for the number of party-list seats inCongress. But when the enabling law, R.A. 7941, enacted by Congress for the precise purpose of implementing theconstitutional provision, contains a condition that places the constitutional ceiling completely beyond reach, totallyimpossible of realization, then we must strike down the offending condition as an affront to the fundamental law. Thisis not simply an inquiry into the wisdom of the legislative measure; rather it involves the duty of this Court to ensurethat constitutional provisions remain effective at all times. No rule of statutory construction can save a particular

legislative enactment that renders a constitutional provision inoperative and ineffectual.

NOTE: This case is consolidated withBAYAN Muna vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 179295).

In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a partial proclamationof

the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.

In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the following rules:

1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall come from

party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);

2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of the total

votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;

3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seatsthis is pursuant to the 2-4-6 ruleor the Panganiban Formulafrom the case of Veterans Federation Party vs

COMELEC.

4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the votes cast for the

party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).

The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned

the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA

7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the

votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical

impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.

BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2%

qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in

the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall be discussed in the HELD portion of this

digest).
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179271_2009.html#fnt9nhttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179271_2009.html#fnt9n

8/10/2019 Consti 102714

16/50

16 | J o h a n


1 0 - 2 7 - 2 0 1 4

On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a

of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list

elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.

ISSUES:

I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?

II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.

III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.

IV. How are party-list seats allocated?

V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.

VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.

HELD:

I.The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts, there shall be

one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not more

than250 members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would

be from party-list representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number of themembership of the lower house as in fact, it can create additional legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As

can be seen in the May 2007 elections, there were 220 district representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the

5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted for party-list representatives.

How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:

(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available to Party-List

Representatives

Hence,

(220 0.80) x (0.20) = 55

II.The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling meaning, the number of party-list

representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower house. However, it is not

mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.

III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists which

garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified.

Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme

Court explained:

To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants

in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat.

Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the

availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even ifwe increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus,

even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the

number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.

8/10/2019 Consti 102714

17/50

17 | J o h a n


1 0 - 2 7 - 2 0 1 4

It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of

Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest possible representation of

party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.

IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is guaranteeda seat,

and not qualified. This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get a seat.

But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of

votes they garnered during the elections.

2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list

system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.

3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional

seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.

4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been

allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as additionalseats are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are

disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.

In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-lists which

garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one seat each. The total number of

seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17

party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38

remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation).

The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly, in determining, first,

the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at

least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.

How is this done?

Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining number of seats. The

product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number of seats allotted for the party list but the 3

seat limit rule shall still be observed.

Example:

In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total votes cast

for the party-list elections (15,950,900).

Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of additional seat

Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter which means it

has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20%

of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.

8/10/2019 Consti 102714

18/50

18 | J o h a n


1 0 - 2 7 - 2 0 1 4

Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there are still unoccupied

seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in the voting shall be

prioritized until all the seats are occupied.

V.No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the likes of UNIDO, LABAN,

etc) from participating in the party-list elections.

Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the Constitution or from

RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in the party-list elections as the word party was not

qualified and that even the framers of the Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties

to participate in the party-list elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which represents the marginalized

(indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will of

the people defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the people who ultimately ratified

the Constitutionand the will of the people is that only the marginalized sections of the country shall participate in

the party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

VI.Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall dominate the party-list system.

G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Facts:

Comelec refused to recognize Ang Ladlad LGBT Party, an organization composed of men and women who identify

themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs),as a party list based on moral

grounds. In the elevation of the case to the Supreme Court, Comelec alleged that petitioner made misrepresentationin their application.

Issue:

Whether or not Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualifies for registration as party-list.

Ruling:

Ang Ladlad LGBT Partysapplication for registration should be granted.

Comelecscitation of the Bible and the Koran in denying petitionersapplication was a violation of the non-

establishment clause laid down in Article 3 section 5 of the Constitution. The proscription by law relative to acts

8/10/2019 Consti 102714

19/50

19 | J o h a n


1 0 - 2 7 - 2 0 1 4

against morality must be for a secular purpose (that is, the conduct prohibited or sought to be repressed is

detrimental or dangerous to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human

society"), rather than out of religious conformity. The Comelec failed to substantiate their allegation that allowing

registration to Ladlad would be detrimental to society.

The LGBT community is not exempted from the exercise of its constitutionally vested rights on the basis of their

sexual orientation. Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to

participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.

Discrimination based on sexual orientation is not tolerated ---not by our own laws nor by any international laws to

which we adhere.

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. COMELECG.R. No. 190582April 8, 2010

FACTS:

Petitioner is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays,

bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with

the COMELEC in 2006 as a party-list organization under Republic Act 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List

System Act. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial

membership base. In 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a petition for registration with the COMELEC upon which it was

dismissed on moral grounds.

Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration but the COMELEC upheld its First Resolution, stating that the party-list

system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests are also the nations.

Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is

beneficial to the nation, its application for accreditation under the party- list system will remain just that. That the

Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some moral precepts

espoused by said religions have sipped into society and these are not publicly accepted moral norms. COMELEC

reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national poltical agenda to benefit the nation and that

the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not

among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941. Thus Ladlad filed this petition for Certiorari under

Rule 65.

8/10/2019 Consti 102714

20/50

20 | J o h a n


1 0 - 2 7 - 2 0 1 4

ISSUE:

Whether or not Petitioner should be accredited as a party-list organization under RA 7941.

HELD:

The Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the resolutions of the COMELEC. It also directed the

COMELEC to grant petitioners application for party-list accreditation.

The enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not

whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of

the Constitution and RA 7941. Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements

for accreditation. Nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to

register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of

religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is

government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent

with this policy of neutrality.

Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs and they deserve to participate in theparty-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.

The principle of non-discrimination requires the laws of general application relating to elections be applied to

all persons, regardless of sexual orientation.

==============================================================

ARTICLE VITHE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 8.Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and the Members of the House ofRepresentatives shall be held on the second Monday of May.

Section 9.In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may be called tofill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thuselected shall serve only for the unexpired term.

8/10/2019 Consti 102714

21/50

21 | J o h a n


1 0 - 2 7 - 2 0 1 4

Section 10.The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall be determined by law. Noincrease in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of theSenate and the House of Representatives approving such increase.

Section 11.A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more thansix years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned

nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.

Section 12.All Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall, upon assumption of office, make afull disclosure of their financial and business interests. They shall notify the House concerned of a potential conflict ofinterest that may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of which they are authors.

Section 13.No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in theGovernment, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlledcorporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to anyoffice which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.

Section 14.No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before anycourt of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he,directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted bythe Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned orcontrolled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before anyoffice of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.

Section 20.The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be preserved and be open to the public inaccordance with law, and such books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit which shall publish annually anitemized list of amounts paid to and expenses for each Member.

============================================================

TOLENTINO & MOJICA vs. COMELEC, RECTO & HONASAN

G.R. No. 148334

January 21, 2004

This is a petition for prohibition to set aside Resolution No. NBC 01-005 dated 5 June 2001 (Resolution No. 01-005)

and Resolution No. NBC 01-006 dated 20 July 2001 (Resolution No. 01-006) of respondent Commission on

Elections (COMELEC). Resolution No. 01-005 proclaimed the 13 candidates elected as Senators in the 14 May

2001 elections while Resolution No. 01-006 declared official and final the ranking of the 13 Senators proclaimed in

Resolution No. 01-005.

Facts:

Following the appointment of Senator Teofisto Guingona as Vice-President of the Philippines, the Senate on

8/10/2019 Consti 102714

22/50

22 | J o h a n


1 0 - 2 7 - 2 0 1 4

February 8, 2001 passed Resolution No. 84, calling on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be

held simultaneously with the regular elections on May 14, 2001. Twelve senators, with 6-year term each, were due to

be elected in that election. The resolution further provides that the Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest

number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. which ends on June

30, 2004.

On June 5, 2001, after canvassing the election results, the COMELEC proclaimed 13 candidates as the elected

Senators, with the first 12 Senators to serve the unexpired term of 6 years and the 13th Senator to serve the full term

of 3 years of Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. Gregorio Honasan ranked 13th.

Petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica, as voters and taxpayers, filed the instant petition for prohibition,

praying for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005. They contend that COMELEC issued Resolution 01-005 without

jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in the special election as required

under Section 2 of RA 6645; (2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy

whether they seek election under the special or regular elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of BP 881;

and, consequently, (3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking election under the

special or regular senatorial elections as purportedly required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of RA 6646. Tolentino

and Mojica add that because of these omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial

candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections without distinction such that there were no two separate Senate elections

held simultaneously but just a single election for thirteen seats, irrespective of term. Tolentino and Mojica sought the

issuance of a temporary restraining order during the pendency of their petition. Without issuing any restraining order,

the Supreme Court required COMELEC to Comment on the petition. Honasan questioned Tolentinos and Mojica's

standing to bring the instant petition as taxpayers and voters because they do not claim that COMELEC illegally

disbursed public funds; nor claim that they sustained personal injury because of the issuance of Resolutions 01-005

and 01-006.

Issue:

WON the Special Election held on May 14, 2001 should be nullified:

(1) for failure to give notice by the body empowered to and

(2) for not following the procedure of filling up the vacancy pursuant to R.A. 6645.

Decision:

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.

Ratio Decidendi:

(1) Where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special election but empowers some authority to fix

the time and place after the happening of a condition precedent, the statutory provision on the giving of notice is

considered mandatory, and failure to do so will render the election a nullity.

The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give notice of the special election is

whether want of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient number of voters as would change the result of special

election. If the lack of official notice misled a substantial number of voters who wrongly believed that there was no

8/10/2019 Consti 102714

23/50

23 | J o h a n


1 0 - 2 7 - 2 0 1 4

special election to fill vacancy, a choice by small percentage of voters would be void.

(2) There is no basis in the petitioners claim that the manner by which the COMELEC conducted the special

Senatorial election on May 14, 2001 is a nullity because the COMELEC failed to document separately the candidates

and to canvass separately the votes cast for the special election. No such requirement exists in our election laws.

What is mandatory under Section 2 of R.A. 6645 is that the COMELEC fix the date of election, if necessary, and

state among others, the office/s to be voted for.

Significantly, the method adopted by the COMELEC in conducting the special election on May 14, 2001 merely

implemented the procedure specified by the Senate in Resolution No. 84. Initially, the original draft of said resolution

as introduced by Senator Francisco Tatad made no mention of the manner by which the seat vacated by former

Senator Guingona would be filled. However, upon the suggestion of Senator Raul Roco, the Senate agreed to amend

the resolution by providing as it now appears, that the senatorial cabdidate garnering the 13th highest number of

votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Giongona, Jr.

Philippine Constitution Association, Inc.(PHILCONSA) vs. Mathay (G.R. No. L-25554)Posted: July 25, 2011 inCase Digests

Facts:Petitioner has filed a suit against the former Acting Auditor General of the Philippines and the Auditor of the

Congress of the Philippines seeking to permanently enjoin them from authorizing or passing in audit the payment of

the increased salaries authorized by RA 4134 to the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives before

December 30, 1969.

The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and members of the House of

Representatives set by RA 4134, approved just the preceding year 1964. Petitioner contends that suchimplementation is violative of Article VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution. The reason given being that the

term of the 8 senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the approval of RA 4134, would have expired only on

December 30, 1969; while the term of the members of the House who participated in the approval of said Act expired

on December 30, 1965.

Issue:Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require that not only the term of all the members of the House

but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase must have fully expired before the increase becomes

effective?

Held: In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased compensation for legislators

becomes fully effective, the Constitutional provision refers to all members of the Senate and the House of
http://lawskooliscool.wordpress.com/category/case-digests/http://lawskooliscool.wordpress.com/category/case-digests/http://lawskooliscool.wordpress.com/category/case-digests/http://lawskooliscool.wordpress.com/category/case-digests/

8/10/2019 Consti 102714

24/50

24 | J o h a n


1 0 - 2 7 - 2 0 1 4

Representatives in the same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or separation between them. This unitary

treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the expiration of the full term of the Senators and

Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular form and not the plural, thereby rendering more

evident the intent to consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature. The

use of the word term in the singular, when combined with the following phrase all the members of the Senate and

the House, underscores that in the application of Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10), the fundamental consideration is that

the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that enacted the measure must have expired before the increase

in compensation can become operative.

The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation provided by RA 4134 is not operative until

December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it will have expired.

Ligot vs. Mathay, 56 SCRA 823

Benjamin Ligot served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines for three

consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969. During his

second term in office (1961-1965), Republic Act No. 4134 fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and certain

other officials of the national government was enacted into law and took effect on July 1, 1964. The salaries of

members of Congress (senators and congressmen) were increased under said Act from P7,200.00 toP32,000.00per

annum, but the Act expressly provided that said increases shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the

Constitution.

Ligots term expired on December 30, 1969, so he filed a claim for retirement under Commonwealth Act No. 186,

section 12 (c) as amended by Republic Act No. 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity of any official or

employee, appointive or elective, with a total of at least twenty years of service, the last three years of which are

continuous on the basis therein provided in case of employees based on the highest rate received and in case of

elected officials on the rates of pay as provided by law. The House of Representatives granted his petition however,

Jose Velasco, the then Congress Auditor refused to so issue certification. The Auditor General then, Ismael Mathay,

also disallowed the same.

The thrust of Ligots appeal is that his claim for retirement gratuity computed on the basis of the increased salary of

P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress (which was not applied to him during his incumbency which endedDecember 30, 1969, while the Court held in Philconsa vs. Mathaythat such increases would become operative only

for members of Congress elected to serve therein commencing December 30, 1969) should not have been

disallowed, because at the time of his retirement, the increased salary for members of Congress as provided by law

(under Republic Act 4134) was already P32,000.00 per annum.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement benefit.

8/10/2019 Consti 102714

25/50

25 | J o h a n


1 0 - 2 7 - 2 0 1 4

HELD: No. To allow Ligot a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of P32,000.00 per annum would be a subtle

way of increasing his compensation during his term of office and of achieving indirectly what he could not obtain

directly. Ligots claim cannot be sustained as far as he and other members of Congresssimilarly situated whose term

of office ended on December 30, 1969 are concerned for the simple reason that

Consti 102714

Documents

Transcript of Consti 102714