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R E P U B L I C A N I S M
aurizio Viroli
Translated from theItalian by Antony Shugaar
Hill and Wans
A division ofFarrar, Straus and Giroux
New York
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R E P U B L I C A N I S M
topreserveitsliberty, must keepitfirmlyin itshands," republi-
canism became
a
federalist theory
of
political liberty C attan eo
believed,
in
fact, tha t
a
people could preserve
its
liberty only
by
meansofself-government, and heidentified a republic with
liberty. "Liberty,"hewrote,"isrepublic"butheadded,and it
is
an
important addition, "Republic
is
plurality, w hich
is to
say,
federation."
He
meant
by
this,
as
Norberto
Bobbio
observed,
that "theunified state,by itsvery natur e, cann ot h elp being
authoritarian andthus in the end imperious anddespotic,
because unity tends
in and of
itself
to
suffocate autonomy,
free initiative,in aword, liberty;and it isonlyapluralityof
political centers,orperhapsweshould say, onlyapluralistic,
non-undifferentiated unity,aunity with varietyasopposedto a
unity without distinctions, that offers
any
real ass uranc e
ol
liberty; thisis theonly environmentinwhich society can pros-
per andmake civic progress."
23
Moreover, Cattaneo rightly
believed that Italian history
itself, in its
most vital aspects,
tended toward
the
federal rep ublic: "But this
is
proper
to our
nation, thattherepublican soulisfound in allorders. . . and
indeed it seems that outsideof this form ofgovernmentour
nation
does
not
know how
to
achieve great things."
2
3
4
T
W O
The New Utopia
of Liberty
R
EPUBLICANISM NOTONLY is a noble traditionof
the past butalsoismeant as anew,or rediscovered,
Utopia
of
political liberty. Theorists
of
republicanism
today claim that true political liberty consistsnotonlyof the
absenceofinterference(in theactions that individuals wishto
perform and are capable
of
performing) from other individuals
or institutions,
as
liberals claim,
but
also
of the
absence
of
domination (ordepend ence), understood as theconditionof
the individual
who
does
not
have
to
depend
on the
arbitrary
will
of
other individuals
or
institution s that m ight oppress
him
or her with impunity
if
they
so
desired. '
Afewexamplescanhelptoclarifythedifference betwee n
being subject
to
interference,
or
hindered,
and
being depen-
dent,
or
subject
to
domination.
Let us
consider
the
following
cases: citizens who canbeoppressed byatyrantoran oligarchy
that has nofear of incurring legally prescribed sanctions;a
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R E P U B L I C A N I S M
wife
who can be
abused
by her
husband without being able
to resistor to demand restitution; workerswho can be sub-
jected
to
minor
or
major abuses from their employer
or
super-
visor;
a
retiree
who
must depe nd
on the
whim
of a
functionary
to obtain
the
pension
to
which
he has a
legitimate right;
an
invalid
who
must depend
on the
goodwill
of a
physician
in
orderto getwell; young scholarswhoknow that their caree rs
dependnot on the quality of their workbut on the whims
of
a
senior professor;
a
citizen
who can be
thrown into prison
atthearbitrary wordofam agistrate.In all these cases there
is
no
interference:
I
spoke
not of a
tyrant
or
oligarchy that
oppresses
but of one
thatcanoppress
if it
chooses;
I
said
not
that the husband abuseshiswifebut thathecanabuseher
without fear
of
sanction,
and the
same goes
for the
employer,
the functionary,
the
physician,
the
professor,
and the
judge.
Noneof them keeps others from pursuingtheends they w ish
to pursue; none
of
them interferes
in the
lives
of
others.
The
subjectsthe wife, the workers, the retiree, the invalid,the
young scholars are thus perfectly freeif byfreedomwemean
freedom from interference
or
freedom and this amountsto
the same thingfrom hindranceor restriction. Theyare sub-
ject, however, to
the
arbitrary will
of
other individuals
and
therefore
live
in acondition
of
dependence, like
the
slaves
of
whom Plautus writes
in his
comedies,
who are
often perfectly
free
to do
what they want, either because their master
is far
away
or
because
he is
kind
or
foolish,
but who are
also subject
tohisarbitrary
will,
sincehe can punish them harshlyif he
chooses.
While interference
is an
action
or an
obstacle
to
action,
dependence is acond itioningof the will thathas fear as its
3
6
The New Utopia of Liberty
distinguishing feature.
A
fine
description
ol
dependence
as a
denialofliberty,and the learit engenders,hasbeen givenby
Francesco MarioPagano:
If
the law
supplies
the
means, eitherto aprivate citizen
orto an entire classandbranch of thestateorto the
magistrate
himself,
for oppressing others
with
the
forces
of
public order, which
are
required
to
defend
everyone equally, through
an act not
merely
of
omission
but indeed of commission, civil liberty is suffocated.
Not just
the
deed
but the
mereability
to do it,
even
if no
violence
is
entailed,
is an
offense against liberty. Free-
dom is sovery fragile tha t every shadow darken sit, the
slightest breath fogs
it
over.
The
mere belief that
one
mightbeoppressed with impunity strips
us of the
free
faculty
to
avail ourselves
of our
rights. Fear attacks
lib-
ertyat its very source. It is a poison steeped in the
spring whence flows the riverthere, where external
force hinders only
the
exercise
of
liberty.
2
An equally clear description
of
political liberty
as the
absence
of
fear
can be
found
inThe
Spirit
of
Laws:
"The
politi-
cal liberty
of the
subject
is a
tranquility
of
mind, arising from
the opinion each personhas of hissafety.Inordertohave this
liberty,
it is
requisite
the
government
be so
constituted
as one
man need
not be
afraid
of
another."'
5
Having clarified the difference betw een interferen ceand
dependence,ordomination,weneedadd that there is inter-
ference without domination when
we are
subjected
to the
restraints
and
restrictions
of
law.
A law
that req uires thai
I and
3
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R E P U B L I C A N I S M
all other citizens paytaxesinproportionto ourincome,or a
law that condem nsme andanyone elseto alife s ente nceif we
commit murder,
to
name
two
obvious exam ples, certainly
con-
stitutes
a
restraint, restriction,
or
interference,
but it
does
not
make
me in any way
dependent
on the
arbitrary will
of
other
people, because thesearerestrictions givennot to me in par-
ticularbut to one and all andtheydo notexpressthewillof
one
or
more persons imposing their personal interest.
As
Rousseau
put it, "One is
always free when
one is
subject
to the
laws,
but notwhen one must obey anotherman;becausein
the latter caseImust obeythewillofanother."
4
Does this interpretation of political libertyas the absence
of dependence, which neo-rcpublican theorists propose, intro-
duce
a
significant
new
feature into
our
political language?
Two canonical texts
of the
liberal doc trine
of
political liberty
Benjamin Constant's "Discourse on the Liberty of the
Ancients Compared with Thatof the Moderns"and Isaiah
Berlin's"TwoConceptsof Liberty"donotmention theidea
oi liberty
as the
absence
ol
personal dependence. Constant
distinguishes between liberty
in
antiquitywhich consisted
"in exercising collectively but directly many functions of the
entire sovereignty, deliberating on war andpeacein thepublic-
square, concluding treatiesof alliance with foreigners, voting
on laws, handing down judgments, managing magistrates,
hav-
ing them appear before
the
entire populace, placing them
under accusation, condemning them, or absolving them"-
and libertyinmodernity, which consistsof
the right
to be
subjected only
to the
laws,
and to be
neither arrested, detained, put todeath orm altreated
i 8
The New Utopia of Liberty
in
any way by the
arbitrary
willol one or
more individ-
uals.It is the
right
ol
everyone
In
express (heir opin-
ion, choose
a
profession
.nul
practise
it. lo
dispose
ol
property,andeventoabuse it;toconicandgowithout
permission,
and
without having
to
account
For
their
motives
or
undertakings.
It is
everyone's right toasso-
ciate with other individuals, either
to
discuss
their
interests, or
to
profess
the
religion which they
and
their associates prefer, oreven simplyto occupy their
days or hours in a way which is most compatible
with their inclinations
or
whims. Finally
it is
every-
one's right
to
exercise some influence
on the
adminis-
tration
of the
government, either
by
electing
all or
particular officials,
or
through representations, peti-
tions, demands to which theauthorities are moreor
less compelled
to pay
heed.
Berlin takes Constant's idea
and
makes
a
distinction
between negativeandpositive liberty.Thefirst,hewrites,can
be described thu s:
Iam normally saidto be free to the degree to which
noman orbodyof meninterferes withmyactivity. Polit-
ical libertyinthis senseissimplythearea within which
a
man can act
unobstructed
by
others
. . .
Freedom
in this sense
is not, at any
rate logically, conn ecte d with
democracy or self-government. Self-governmentmay,
on the whole, providea better guaranteeof thepres-
ervation of civil liberties than other regimes,and has
been defended
as
such
by
libertarians.
But
there
is
no
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R i ;
P U B L 1 C A N I S M
necessary connection between individual liberty and
democratic rule.
Positive liberty is different:
The "positive" sense of the word "liberty" derives from
the wish on the pa rt of the individual to be his own mas-
ter. I wish my life and decisions to depend onmyself,
not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the
instru me nt of my own, not of other m en's, acts of will. I
wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by rea-
sons,
by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by
causes w hich affect me, as it were, from outsid e.
5
As legitimate as this wish may be, claims Berlin, the positive
conception of liberty has historically been viewed as the affir-
mation of a true, or superior, or autonomous "ego" that should
be allowed to triumph over all, even if through coercion. For
this reason, liberals have though t of the positive idea of liberty
as a mask concealing tyranny.
It is easy to see that the republican conception of liberty is
neither the negative nor the positive liberty described by
Berlin and Constant. Republican liberty differs from its liberal
counterpart in that it identifies the absence of liberty not
merely in interference (being obstructed by others, as Berlin
puts it) but inth econstan t possibilityof interferenc e due to the
presence of arbitrary powers. No republican political writer
would call liberty a "liberty" enjoyed by subjects of a "liberal"
despot, as Berlin does, since the despot could, at any time and
at his own discretion, keep them from doing what they want to
4 0
The New Utopia of Liberty
do and might otherwise oppress them. They are subject to no
interference, but they are in a condition ol dependence: a lib-
eral can describe it as a condition ol liberty, bul a republican
canno t. Nor can a republican identify liberty as the affirmation
of a certain type of life orself; to speak of liberty it is sufficient
for there to be an absence of domination, whatever the way of
life the person chooses and whatever self she wishes to affirm.
Both Constant and Berlin identify modern, or negative,
liberty as the fundamental or more genuine form of liberty,
even if they admit that liberty understood as active participa-
tion in public life can have positive effects on the defense of
modern liberty. Neitherand this is the point I wish to
emphasizetreats an absence of personal dependence as im-
portant to political liberty. It is not necessary here to ask
why Constant and Berlin overlooked a conception of political
liberty that stretches back over centuries and that has been
analyzed and debated in many fundamental texts. But their
silence on this point is surprising: if they chose not to discuss
the republican idea of liberty because they considered it irrel-
evant or identical to negative or positive liberty, they might
have said so; if they overlooked it out of ignorance, it is further
confirmation that those who reason about political theory with
inadequate historical knowledge rarely develop theories of
great importance.
The republican conception of liberty differs from the dem-
ocratic idea that liberty consists of the "power to establish
norms for oneself and to obey no other norms than those
given to
oneself."
This is liberty in the sense of autonomy.
Democratic liberty, as Bobbio puts it, is opposed to constraint
A person who is free in the democratic sense ol the wore
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R E P U B L I C A N I S M
is thereforeapersonwho hasfree
will:
the"nonconformistwho
thinks
for
himself,
who
waits
for
approval from
no one, who
withstands pressure, flattery,
and
illusory career goals," who,
in
other words,has a free will in the sense that heenjoysself-
determination.
The democratic conception
of
liberty also differs from
the
liberal conception,inwhich,as
Bobbio
explains,"onespeaks
of liberty
as
something
in
contrast
to the law, to all
forms
of
law,sothatall laws (both prohibitiveand imperative) restrict
liberty."In the democratic conception,"onespeaksof liberty
as
a
field
of
action
in
compliance with
the law, and one dis-
tinguishesnot between an unregulated actionand an action
regulated
by the law, but
rather between
an
action regulated
by
an
autonomous
law (one
accepted voluntarily)
and an
action regulated by a heteronomous law (oneaccepted under
duress)."
6
The republican conception
of
political liberty approaches
the democratic idea
of
liberty
as
autonomy
of the
will
in
that
it,
too,
sees constraintas aviolationofliberty;yet it is notidenti-
cal, becauseitholds thatthewillisautonomousnotwhenthe
laws
or
regulations that govern
my
actions correspond
to my
will,
but
when
I am
protected from
the
constant danger
of
being subjected to constraint. Republican political writers
have never claimed that liberty consists
of
actions regulated
by
law (that
is,
accepted voluntarily)
or of the
power
to
bestow
rulesor tofollow onlytheruleswegive ourselves; ins tead, they
have claimed that the power to make laws for ourselves
directly
or
through representativesis
the
efficacious mea ns
(along with others)
for
living free,
in the
sense
of not
being
subjectto thearbitrary w illof one or a few ormany individuals.
4
The New Utopia of Liberty
Action regulated by law is Free, in oilier words,not w h e n
th elaw is acc epte d voluntarily, or when il co r r e sponds to the
desi resof theci t izens,but
when
the law is notarbitrary, tha tis,
w h e n it respects universal norm s (when it appl ies to all indi-
viduals
or to all
m e m b e r s
of the
group
in
question), aspi res
to
the publ ic good,and for th is reason protects thewillol the cit-
izens from thecons tant dangerofconst raint
imposed
by indi-
viduals
and
therefore rende rs
the
will fully auto nom ous .
A law
accepted voluntar i ly by m e m b e r s of the most democratic
assemblyon ear th may very wellbe an arbitrary lawthatper-
mits some par t of the society to const rain the will of o the r
par ts ,
thus depr iving them
of
thei r autonomy.
The r epub l i can concep t i on of liberty, then, is more exact -
ing than ei ther
the
liberal
or the
democrat ic con cept ion:
it
accep t s
the
idea
of
liberty
as an
absence
of
im ped im en t ,
but it
addsthe requireme nt that l iber tybe an absenceof dominat ion
(of the constant possibi l i ty of in ter ference) ; it accep t s the
dem ocr a t i c r equ i r em en t of sel f -determinat ion as a m eans to
obtaining liberty,
but it
does
not
identify self-governm ent w ith
the political liberty consistent witha republ ic . Re publ icanism
sustains a complex theoryofpolitical liberty that inc orpo rates
both the liberaland the demo crat ic require men t ; conversely ,
we can say that liberalism and dem ocr acy are impover ished
versionsofr epub l i can i sm .On this last point, given its theoret -
icaland pol i t ical impor tance, itwould be wor thwhi le to spend
a litt le more time.
4
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T H R E E
The Value oj
Republican Liberty
N
E O - R E P U B L I C A N T H E O R I S T S D I SA G R
E E
O v e rthe
meaning
of
republica n liberty.
In his
first essays
on
the subject, Quentin Skinner said that republican
political writersand liberal theorists agreeon themean ing of
political liberty, which both identify as the absenc e
of
coercion
or interference, but differ on the political conditions that make
liberty secure. In a later essayon thesubject,
Liberty before
Liberalism,
he
maintains instead that
the
difference betw een
liberal
and
republican theorists
(or
between liberal theorists
and theneo-Roman political writersof theseventeenthand
eighteenth centuries,as hecalls them, because they werenot
all advocates
of
republican government)
is to be
found
nol in
their viewsofwhat secures political liberty butintheir differ-
ing interpretationsofwhat constitutesarestraintorconstraint.
Neo-Roman political authors,
he
thinks, acc ept unreservedly
the idea that thecitizens' degree ol liberty depends on (he
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I E P U B L I C A N I S M
measuretowhich theyarerestrainedin theactions they wish
to takein pursuing their aims. They repudiate,inother words,
"thekeyassumption o( classical liberalismto theeffect that
forceor thecoercive threatof itconstitute theonly formsof
constraint that interfere w ith individual liberty." They emp ha-
size, rather, that "tolive in a condition ofdependence is in
itself a source and a form of constraint."Anindividualwho
lives in a condition ofdependence issubject to a constraint
that preventshimfrom exercisinghiscivil rights .Theabsence
ol libertycan becaused, then,heconcludes,''by interference
orbydependence."
1
AccordingtoPhilip
Pettit,
theabsenceoflibertyis,rather,
the consequence of dependence (or dom ination). Interfer-
ence
and
constraints, including those imposed
by
nonarbitrary
laws, should be considered onlya "secondary offense against
freedom."
Inother
words, while Skinner believes that republi-
can liberty
includes the
absence bothof domination and ol
interference, Pettit agreesbutadds thattheabsenceofinter-
ference is
I
he less relevant violation.Heemphasizes that it is
difficult tofind inrepublican political writersasignificantcri-
tique
olthi
1
limitationon
freedom
of
choice that
the
rule
ol
law imposes on individuals. They acce pt the restrictionson
freedom
ol
choice
and
emphasize
the
difference b etween
the
conditionsol those living undertheruleof law andthoseliv-
ingorwantingto live in aconditionof limitless license.Re-
publican political writers have always shown complete scorn
lor license and have always emphasized that licenseand
civil libertyare twoquite different matters. They nevercon-
sidered that restrictionsonfreedom ofchoiee imposedby he
ruleof lawmightbeconstrued as "aserious infringementon
liberty."
2
4 .
The Value of Republican Liberty
Both Skinner and Pettit rejeel the idea
that
being free
means obeying laws thaiweourselves haveapproved,andthey
both emphasize thai(berepublicanoi neoRomanconception
of political freedom is not .1positive conception of liberty
consisting
in the
direct exercise
ol
political rights.
Bui
while
Skinner believes thattheabsenceofliberty"can be
produced
eitherbyinterferenceor bydependence,"
3
Pettit believes that
it consists solelyofdependence.
I thinkit isimportanttoemphasizeinthis debate that clas-
sical republican writers have never claimed that true political
liberty consists of the absence of interference, since they
believed that restraintorinterference whichthe lawimposes
on individual choiee was not a restraint on liberty but a
brake,
an
essential limitation intrinsic
to
republican liberty.
(In
contrast, Isaiah Berlin noted that "Bentham, almost alone,
doggedly went on repeating that the business of lawswas
not toliberate but to restrain: 'Every law is an infractionof
liberty'even if such 'infraction' leadsto an increase to the
sumofliberty."
4
) They consideredthe law apublicanduniver-
sal commandment that applied equally
to all
citizens
or to all
membersof thegroupinquestion. This meant thatif therule
oflaw wasscrupulously respected,noindividual could im pose
his arbitrary will
on
other individuals
by
performing with
impunity actions forbidden toothers under painofsanction.II
men govern insteadoflaws, some individualscanimpose their
willsonothers, oppressing themorkeeping them from
pursu-
ingtheends they wishtopursue,and thus depriving themol
liberty. (This canalso be true in a ease where the majority
rules,thatis, in ademocracy.)
This interpretation of political liberty is eloquentl\
de
scribed in three classical texts that are the
core
ol modern
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R E P U B L I C A N I S M
republicanism.Thefirst isLivy's statem ent thatthelibertythe
Romans regained after theexpulsion of the kings consisted,
firstandforemost, inhavingthelawsbemore powerful than
men.Thesecond is thespeech, reportedbySallust,inwhich
Aemilius Lepidus proclaimed that
the
Roman people were
free because they obeyedno one buttheirownlaws.Thethird
isthe passage from Cicero'sProCluentio, quoted countless
times
by
political writers
in the
Renaissance
and
later:
"All of
us obeythe law to the endthatwe may befree."
1
A second aspectof therepublican conceptionofpolitical
libertyis theconviction that liberty entails restraintsorbrakes
(frenum)on individual actions. These twoaspectsofRoman
political wisdom were adoptedandreformulatedbyFlorentine
civic humanists. Liberty, wrote Coluccio Salutati,
is a
"gentle
brake"( dulcelibertatis frenum ) that the lawimposeson all
citizens. Leonardo Bruni reiterated the same principle: true
liberty( meraac veraLibertas ) consistsof theequality gua ran-
teedby
the
laws.And heattributes to Giano della Bellathe
idea
that
liberty
is
preserved( Libertas
servatur )so
long
as he
lawsaremore powerful thanthecitizens.In thelate fifteenth
century,it wasprimarily oppo nentsof theMediciwhoempha-
sized thatthefoundation ofcivil libertywas theruleoflaw:a
republic thai wishesto"liveinliberty," wrote Alaman no Rinuc-
cini,
musl not
allow
a
citizen
"to be
more powerful than
the
laws."
6
Machiavelli,
too,
identified thelibertyofcitizens withthe
restrictions the law imposes equallyon them all. If in acity
thereis onecitizen whomthemagistrates fear,who canthere-
fore break
the
bonds
of the
laws, then that city
is not
tree,
he
wrote in theD iscourses.In theFlorentine Historieshewrote
4
S
The Value of Republican Liberty
that acity"can be called Iree" only il ils lawsandconstitu-
tional provisions ellicaciousK
restrain
the badimpulsesof the
nobilityand thepopulace.And bycivil liberty he meantthe
absenceofdominationordepende nce: "Without doubt,if one
considerstheendsol
the
noblesand ol
the
ignobles,onewill
see great desire
to
dominate
in the
former,
and in the
latter
only desire not to be dominated; and, in consequence,a
greater willtolive fre e."'
In contrast,all theinstancesofviolation
of
liberty thai
the
classical republicans offer areviolationsof theruleof law: a
tyrantwhosets himself above civilandconstitutional lawsand
therefore rulesbywhim;a powerful citizenwho hasobtained
for himself a privilege denied to other citizensand who can
therefore
do
things that others can not (such
as use
public
resourcesforprivate gainorobtain public offices inviolation
of normal procedures);arulerwho has discretionary powers.
The restrictions that
law
imposes
on the
actions
ol
rulers
and
ordinary citizensareconsideredtheonly valid defense against
coercion byindividuals.To befree me ans living under equ i-
table laws.
Asfor therelationship between libertyandself-government,
the classical republicans considered thelattera conditionof
the former.
For
Roman political writers,
a
people
who
receives
its laws fromakingisenslaved,notfree;itlivesin astate
not
of libertybut ofservitude, similartothatof aslave with resp ect
tohismaster.
8
Absolute monarchyistherefore similartodomi-
nation, whiletherepublic is theformofgovernmentand way
of lifeof afree peo ple.
Republican government,asMachiavelli explained inapas
sageof enlightening lucidity,is best suited to
the
defense
ol
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R E P U B L I C A N I S M
liberty because
it has the
power
to
prevent private interests
from dominating thecityand rendering some,ormany, citi-
zens unfree: "Andwithout doubt this common good is not
observedif not inrepublics, sinceallthatis forthat purposeis
executed,
and
although
it may
turn
out to
harm this
or
that
pri-
vate individual, thoseforwhomtheaforesaid does goodare so
many that theycan goahead withitagainstthedispositionof
th efew who arecrushedby it."
9
ButMachiavelli also explains
that therecan be laws that comply withthecitizens' w illand
desiresbutthat imposeaprivate interes tandtherefore destroy
political liberty.As an example,hementionstheagrarianlaw
that the Roman plebeians, "through ambition," called for,
which
"was the
cause
of the
destruction
of the
republic"
and
"altogether ruined Roman freedom."
10
The republican argument thattheruleof law is anecessary
condition lorcitizens to live free and to prevent them from
being subject
to the
arbitrary willof a fewindividuals (or a
single individual) is at theheartofJames Harrington's reply
to Hobbess claim in
Leviathan
that
the
citizens
of a
repub-
lic such as
Lucca
hadno more freedom than thesubjectsof
an absolute sovereign such as thesultan of Constantinople,
because
both
were subjecttolaws. What makesthecitizensof
Lucca freer than thesubjects of Constantinople, Harrington
argues,is
that in
,ucca
both rulersandcitizensaresubjectto
civilandconstitutional laws, whereas in Constantinoplethe
sultanisabovethe law and mayarbitrarily disposeof theprop-
ertyandlivesof hissubjects, obliging them tolivein acondi-
tion of complete dependence and therefore without liberty.
The citizensof Lucca, Harrington explains,arefree "by the
lawsof Lucca," because they are controlled onlyby the law
5
The Value of Republican Liberty
and because
the
laws
are
"Iramed
by
every private
man
unto
no
otherend . . .than toprotect theliberty"I every privateman,
whichbythat m eans comeslo be ihe libert)olthecommon-
wealth."
11
The idea that
the
rule
ol law
protects
.1
citiz en From
the
arbitrary willol others because it binds everyonein thesame
way passed from the booksof republican theorists to those
written by the founders of liberalism. The most significant
exampleisthatofJohn Locke:
Th eend ofLawis not toabolishorrestrain,butto pre-
serve
an d
enlarge
Freedom:For in all the
states
of
created
beings capableof Laws,where thereis noLaw, thereis
no Freedom.
For
Liberty
is to be
free from restraint
and
violence from others which cannot be,where thereis
noLaw: ButFreedom is not, as we aretold,ALiberty
for everyMan todo whathelists:(Forwho couldbefree,
when every other Man's Humour might domineer over
him?)But a
Liberty
todispose,andorder,as helists,his
Person, Actions, Possessions, and his whole Property,
withintheAllowanceofthose Laws under whichhe is;
and therein not to be subject to the arbitrary Willof
another,butfreely followhisown.
12
The limitation thatlawimposeson thedecisionsofindividuals
differs from the limitation thatanindividual m ight arbitrarily
imposeonothers:in the first case,wehave obed ience, inthe
second case, servitude.
The passages quoted here make
it
clear that republican
political writers never identified aslimitations on libcrlx the
I
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I I P U B L 1 C A N I S M
restraints imposedbynonarbitrary laws,butthey have always
denned
as
such
any
dependence
on the
arbitrary willofother
individuals. They believed thattheruleof lawmakes individu-
als free,notbecause itexpresses theirownwillnot, thatis.
because they have given their assent
to
itbut because
the
law
is a
universal
and
abstract command
and as
such
pro-
tects individuals from thearbitrary willofothers. Forthem,
the validity ol various institutional systems ismeasuredby
their efficacy
in
preventing
the
arbitrary
use ot
power. When
Machiavelli defended
the
virtues
ol
republican government,
he always referred tothat governmentinwhichthefunctions
of power were distributed accordingto themodel ofmixed
government, where
the
people exercised sovereign power within
the limits defined
by
constitutional
law.
While
it is
certainly legitimate
to
consider dependence
on
the arbitrary willof anindividual"asourceand aformof con-
straint,"
M
as Skinner does, I believe that making adistinc-
tion between dependenceonarbitrary willandsubjection to
restraint oilers
the
best insight
into
classical republicanisms
conception ol political liberty. It it is tohaveanysignificance
in contemporary discussions, neo-republicanism must show
that
it is
critical
ol
dependence
and
domination,
and it
must
sharply differentiate itsell from both
laissez-faire
intolerance
ol restraintsandauthoritarian insensitivity toward domination.
Classical republicanism
has
always opposed dependence
becauseitbelievesthatthis encourages servilityon the onehand
and arrogance on theother, twomentalities that areequally
repugnant
to the
ideal
of
civil life. This
is
particularly important
becausethepersistenceofarbitrary powersand ofpracticesof
domination, aswell aslicenseand theabsence ofmoraland
52
The Value of Republican Liberty
soc ia l responsibi l i ty , suf loca tes c ivi l cul ture
D e m o c r a t i c
soc i -
e t i e s ne e d
a
pol i t ica l
and
mora l langu age lh . i l
c m
iHiisirale
per-
sua s ive ly
the
significance
1
and
va lue
ol a
dignifi ed civil life.
In
t h i s r e ga r d , r e pub l i c a n i sm
lu\
a u lho i i i . i i i ve
credent ia ls ,pro-
v ide d
it
r e m a i n s
faithful
to the
avers ion iismas ters fell
For
both
tyrannyandlicense.
A further reasonfordistinguishing between beingsubject
to restraintsandbeing dependent isthat legislative measures
that Iree some citizens from dependence restrict others in
their freedom
to
act.Consider some
of
theexamples citedal
the beginningofChapter2: awifewhocannot offer resistance
to
or
demand restitution
for
abuse
by her
husband; workers
who
may be
subjected
to
abuse from their employer
or
super-
visor;
the
elderly,
the
sick,
and
those living alone
who
depend
on charity.Tofree women from dependence,onemust have
laws that ensure equality within
the
family, limiting
the
arbi-
trary power
of men; to
protect dependent workers,
one
must
have laws that safeguard their physicalandmoral dignityand
limit their employer's arbitrary power;toemancipatetheneedy
from charity,
one
must impose taxes that provide adequate
public assistance. In these cases, reducing thedomination
from which some citizens suffer entails increasingtherestric-
tion
of
others' (negative) liberty;
or,
rather,
it
requires imposing
restraints
on
individuals
who
once could
act of
their
own
tree
will.
It is notpossible
to
reduce dependence without imposing
legal restraints. Wemust choose between domination(and
dependence)
and the
restraint
of the law.
Those whohark
back
to
republican tradition must choose policies thai
attenu
ate domination rather than those that try toattenuate civi
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