Viroli, Maurizio. Republicanism (Capítulos 2, 3, 4 e 5). 2002

7/23/2019 Viroli, Maurizio. Republicanism (Captulos 2, 3, 4 e 5). 2002

1/24

R E P U B L I C A N I S M

aurizio Viroli

Translated from theItalian by Antony Shugaar

Hill and Wans

A division ofFarrar, Straus and Giroux

New York


2/24


topreserveitsliberty, must keepitfirmlyin itshands," republi-

canism became

a

federalist theory

of

political liberty C attan eo

believed,

in

fact, tha t

a

people could preserve

its

liberty only

by

meansofself-government, and heidentified a republic with

liberty. "Liberty,"hewrote,"isrepublic"butheadded,and it

is

an

important addition, "Republic

is

plurality, w hich

is to

say,

federation."

He

meant

by

this,

as

Norberto

Bobbio

observed,

that "theunified state,by itsvery natur e, cann ot h elp being

authoritarian andthus in the end imperious anddespotic,

because unity tends

in and of

itself

to

suffocate autonomy,

free initiative,in aword, liberty;and it isonlyapluralityof

political centers,orperhapsweshould say, onlyapluralistic,

non-undifferentiated unity,aunity with varietyasopposedto a

unity without distinctions, that offers

any

real ass uranc e

ol

liberty; thisis theonly environmentinwhich society can pros-

per andmake civic progress."

23

Moreover, Cattaneo rightly

believed that Italian history

itself, in its

most vital aspects,

tended toward

the

federal rep ublic: "But this

is

proper

to our

nation, thattherepublican soulisfound in allorders. . . and

indeed it seems that outsideof this form ofgovernmentour

nation

does

not

know how

to

achieve great things."

2

3

4

T

W O

The New Utopia

of Liberty

R

EPUBLICANISM NOTONLY is a noble traditionof

the past butalsoismeant as anew,or rediscovered,

Utopia

of

political liberty. Theorists

of

republicanism

today claim that true political liberty consistsnotonlyof the

absenceofinterference(in theactions that individuals wishto

perform and are capable

of

performing) from other individuals

or institutions,

as

liberals claim,

but

also

of the

absence

of

domination (ordepend ence), understood as theconditionof

the individual

who

does

not

have

to

depend

on the

arbitrary

will

of

other individuals

or

institution s that m ight oppress

him

or her with impunity

if

they

so

desired. '

Afewexamplescanhelptoclarifythedifference betwee n

being subject

to

interference,

or

hindered,

and

being depen-

dent,

or

subject

to

domination.

Let us

consider

the

following

cases: citizens who canbeoppressed byatyrantoran oligarchy

that has nofear of incurring legally prescribed sanctions;a


3/24


wife

who can be

abused

by her

husband without being able

to resistor to demand restitution; workerswho can be sub-

jected

to

minor

or

major abuses from their employer

or

super-

visor;

a

retiree

who

must depe nd

on the

whim

of a

functionary

to obtain

the

pension

to

which

he has a

legitimate right;

an

invalid

who

must depend

on the

goodwill

of a

physician

in

orderto getwell; young scholarswhoknow that their caree rs

dependnot on the quality of their workbut on the whims

of

a

senior professor;

a

citizen

who can be

thrown into prison

atthearbitrary wordofam agistrate.In all these cases there

is

no

interference:

I

spoke

not of a

tyrant

or

oligarchy that

oppresses

but of one

thatcanoppress

if it

chooses;

I

said

not

that the husband abuseshiswifebut thathecanabuseher

without fear

of

sanction,

and the

same goes

for the

employer,

the functionary,

the

physician,

the

professor,

and the

judge.

Noneof them keeps others from pursuingtheends they w ish

to pursue; none

of

them interferes

in the

lives

of

others.

The

subjectsthe wife, the workers, the retiree, the invalid,the

young scholars are thus perfectly freeif byfreedomwemean

freedom from interference

or

freedom and this amountsto

the same thingfrom hindranceor restriction. Theyare sub-

ject, however, to

the

arbitrary will

of

other individuals

and

therefore

live

in acondition

of

dependence, like

the

slaves

of

whom Plautus writes

in his

comedies,

who are

often perfectly

free

to do

what they want, either because their master

is far

away

or

because

he is

kind

or

foolish,

but who are

also subject

tohisarbitrary

will,

sincehe can punish them harshlyif he

chooses.

While interference

is an

action

or an

obstacle

to

action,

dependence is acond itioningof the will thathas fear as its

3

6

The New Utopia of Liberty

distinguishing feature.

A

fine

description

ol

dependence

as a

denialofliberty,and the learit engenders,hasbeen givenby

Francesco MarioPagano:

If

the law

supplies

the

means, eitherto aprivate citizen

orto an entire classandbranch of thestateorto the

magistrate

himself,

for oppressing others

with

the

forces

of

public order, which

are

required

to

defend

everyone equally, through

an act not

merely

of

omission

but indeed of commission, civil liberty is suffocated.

Not just

the

deed

but the

mereability

to do it,

even

if no

violence

is

entailed,

is an

offense against liberty. Free-

dom is sovery fragile tha t every shadow darken sit, the

slightest breath fogs

it

over.

The

mere belief that

one

mightbeoppressed with impunity strips

us of the

free

faculty

to

avail ourselves

of our

rights. Fear attacks

lib-

ertyat its very source. It is a poison steeped in the

spring whence flows the riverthere, where external

force hinders only

the

exercise

of

liberty.

2

An equally clear description

of

political liberty

as the

absence

of

fear

can be

found

inThe

Spirit

of

Laws:

"The

politi-

cal liberty

of the

subject

is a

tranquility

of

mind, arising from

the opinion each personhas of hissafety.Inordertohave this

liberty,

it is

requisite

the

government

be so

constituted

as one

man need

not be

afraid

of

another."'

5

Having clarified the difference betw een interferen ceand

dependence,ordomination,weneedadd that there is inter-

ference without domination when

we are

subjected

to the

restraints

and

restrictions

of

law.

A law

that req uires thai

I and

3

7


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all other citizens paytaxesinproportionto ourincome,or a

law that condem nsme andanyone elseto alife s ente nceif we

commit murder,

to

name

two

obvious exam ples, certainly

con-

stitutes

a

restraint, restriction,

or

interference,

but it

does

not

make

me in any way

dependent

on the

arbitrary will

of

other

people, because thesearerestrictions givennot to me in par-

ticularbut to one and all andtheydo notexpressthewillof

one

or

more persons imposing their personal interest.

As

Rousseau

put it, "One is

always free when

one is

subject

to the

laws,

but notwhen one must obey anotherman;becausein

the latter caseImust obeythewillofanother."

4

Does this interpretation of political libertyas the absence

of dependence, which neo-rcpublican theorists propose, intro-

duce

a

significant

new

feature into

our

political language?

Two canonical texts

of the

liberal doc trine

of

political liberty

Benjamin Constant's "Discourse on the Liberty of the

Ancients Compared with Thatof the Moderns"and Isaiah

Berlin's"TwoConceptsof Liberty"donotmention theidea

oi liberty

as the

absence

ol

personal dependence. Constant

distinguishes between liberty

in

antiquitywhich consisted

"in exercising collectively but directly many functions of the

entire sovereignty, deliberating on war andpeacein thepublic-

square, concluding treatiesof alliance with foreigners, voting

on laws, handing down judgments, managing magistrates,

hav-

ing them appear before

the

entire populace, placing them

under accusation, condemning them, or absolving them"-

and libertyinmodernity, which consistsof

the right

to be

subjected only

to the

laws,

and to be

neither arrested, detained, put todeath orm altreated

i 8


in

any way by the

arbitrary

willol one or

more individ-

uals.It is the

right

ol

everyone

In

express (heir opin-

ion, choose

a

profession

.nul

practise

it. lo

dispose

ol

property,andeventoabuse it;toconicandgowithout

permission,

and

without having

to

account

For

their

motives

or

undertakings.

It is

everyone's right toasso-

ciate with other individuals, either

to

discuss

their

interests, or

to

profess

the

religion which they

and

their associates prefer, oreven simplyto occupy their

days or hours in a way which is most compatible

with their inclinations

or

whims. Finally

it is

every-

one's right

to

exercise some influence

on the

adminis-

tration

of the

government, either

by

electing

all or

particular officials,

or

through representations, peti-

tions, demands to which theauthorities are moreor

less compelled

to pay

heed.

Berlin takes Constant's idea

and

makes

a

distinction

between negativeandpositive liberty.Thefirst,hewrites,can

be described thu s:

Iam normally saidto be free to the degree to which

noman orbodyof meninterferes withmyactivity. Polit-

ical libertyinthis senseissimplythearea within which

a

man can act

unobstructed

by

others

. . .

Freedom

in this sense

is not, at any

rate logically, conn ecte d with

democracy or self-government. Self-governmentmay,

on the whole, providea better guaranteeof thepres-

ervation of civil liberties than other regimes,and has

been defended

as

such

by

libertarians.

But

there

is

no

39


5/24

R i ;

P U B L 1 C A N I S M

necessary connection between individual liberty and

democratic rule.

Positive liberty is different:

The "positive" sense of the word "liberty" derives from

the wish on the pa rt of the individual to be his own mas-

ter. I wish my life and decisions to depend onmyself,

not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the

instru me nt of my own, not of other m en's, acts of will. I

wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by rea-

sons,

by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by

causes w hich affect me, as it were, from outsid e.

5

As legitimate as this wish may be, claims Berlin, the positive

conception of liberty has historically been viewed as the affir-

mation of a true, or superior, or autonomous "ego" that should

be allowed to triumph over all, even if through coercion. For

this reason, liberals have though t of the positive idea of liberty

as a mask concealing tyranny.

It is easy to see that the republican conception of liberty is

neither the negative nor the positive liberty described by

Berlin and Constant. Republican liberty differs from its liberal

counterpart in that it identifies the absence of liberty not

merely in interference (being obstructed by others, as Berlin

puts it) but inth econstan t possibilityof interferenc e due to the

presence of arbitrary powers. No republican political writer

would call liberty a "liberty" enjoyed by subjects of a "liberal"

despot, as Berlin does, since the despot could, at any time and

at his own discretion, keep them from doing what they want to

4 0


do and might otherwise oppress them. They are subject to no

interference, but they are in a condition ol dependence: a lib-

eral can describe it as a condition ol liberty, bul a republican

canno t. Nor can a republican identify liberty as the affirmation

of a certain type of life orself; to speak of liberty it is sufficient

for there to be an absence of domination, whatever the way of

life the person chooses and whatever self she wishes to affirm.

Both Constant and Berlin identify modern, or negative,

liberty as the fundamental or more genuine form of liberty,

even if they admit that liberty understood as active participa-

tion in public life can have positive effects on the defense of

modern liberty. Neitherand this is the point I wish to

emphasizetreats an absence of personal dependence as im-

portant to political liberty. It is not necessary here to ask

why Constant and Berlin overlooked a conception of political

liberty that stretches back over centuries and that has been

analyzed and debated in many fundamental texts. But their

silence on this point is surprising: if they chose not to discuss

the republican idea of liberty because they considered it irrel-

evant or identical to negative or positive liberty, they might

have said so; if they overlooked it out of ignorance, it is further

confirmation that those who reason about political theory with

inadequate historical knowledge rarely develop theories of

great importance.

The republican conception of liberty differs from the dem-

ocratic idea that liberty consists of the "power to establish

norms for oneself and to obey no other norms than those

given to

oneself."

This is liberty in the sense of autonomy.

Democratic liberty, as Bobbio puts it, is opposed to constraint

A person who is free in the democratic sense ol the wore

4 1


6/24


is thereforeapersonwho hasfree

will:

the"nonconformistwho

thinks

for

himself,

who

waits

for

approval from

no one, who

withstands pressure, flattery,

and

illusory career goals," who,

in

other words,has a free will in the sense that heenjoysself-

determination.

The democratic conception

of

liberty also differs from

the

liberal conception,inwhich,as

Bobbio

explains,"onespeaks

of liberty

as

something

in

contrast

to the law, to all

forms

of

law,sothatall laws (both prohibitiveand imperative) restrict

liberty."In the democratic conception,"onespeaksof liberty

as

a

field

of

action

in

compliance with

the law, and one dis-

tinguishesnot between an unregulated actionand an action

regulated

by the law, but

rather between

an

action regulated

by

an

autonomous

law (one

accepted voluntarily)

and an

action regulated by a heteronomous law (oneaccepted under

duress)."

6

The republican conception

of

political liberty approaches

the democratic idea

of

liberty

as

autonomy

of the

will

in

that

it,

too,

sees constraintas aviolationofliberty;yet it is notidenti-

cal, becauseitholds thatthewillisautonomousnotwhenthe

laws

or

regulations that govern

my

actions correspond

to my

will,

but

when

I am

protected from

the

constant danger

of

being subjected to constraint. Republican political writers

have never claimed that liberty consists

of

actions regulated

by

law (that

is,

accepted voluntarily)

or of the

power

to

bestow

rulesor tofollow onlytheruleswegive ourselves; ins tead, they

have claimed that the power to make laws for ourselves

directly

or

through representativesis

the

efficacious mea ns

(along with others)

for

living free,

in the

sense

of not

being

subjectto thearbitrary w illof one or a few ormany individuals.

4


Action regulated by law is Free, in oilier words,not w h e n

th elaw is acc epte d voluntarily, or when il co r r e sponds to the

desi resof theci t izens,but

when

the law is notarbitrary, tha tis,

w h e n it respects universal norm s (when it appl ies to all indi-

viduals

or to all

m e m b e r s

of the

group

in

question), aspi res

to

the publ ic good,and for th is reason protects thewillol the cit-

izens from thecons tant dangerofconst raint

imposed

by indi-

viduals

and

therefore rende rs

the

will fully auto nom ous .

A law

accepted voluntar i ly by m e m b e r s of the most democratic

assemblyon ear th may very wellbe an arbitrary lawthatper-

mits some par t of the society to const rain the will of o the r

par ts ,

thus depr iving them

of

thei r autonomy.

The r epub l i can concep t i on of liberty, then, is more exact -

ing than ei ther

the

liberal

or the

democrat ic con cept ion:

it

accep t s

the

idea

of

liberty

as an

absence

of

im ped im en t ,

but it

addsthe requireme nt that l iber tybe an absenceof dominat ion

(of the constant possibi l i ty of in ter ference) ; it accep t s the

dem ocr a t i c r equ i r em en t of sel f -determinat ion as a m eans to

obtaining liberty,

but it

does

not

identify self-governm ent w ith

the political liberty consistent witha republ ic . Re publ icanism

sustains a complex theoryofpolitical liberty that inc orpo rates

both the liberaland the demo crat ic require men t ; conversely ,

we can say that liberalism and dem ocr acy are impover ished

versionsofr epub l i can i sm .On this last point, given its theoret -

icaland pol i t ical impor tance, itwould be wor thwhi le to spend

a litt le more time.

4

i


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T H R E E

The Value oj

Republican Liberty

N

E O - R E P U B L I C A N T H E O R I S T S D I SA G R

E E

O v e rthe

meaning

of

republica n liberty.

In his

first essays

on

the subject, Quentin Skinner said that republican

political writersand liberal theorists agreeon themean ing of

political liberty, which both identify as the absenc e

of

coercion

or interference, but differ on the political conditions that make

liberty secure. In a later essayon thesubject,

Liberty before

Liberalism,

he

maintains instead that

the

difference betw een

liberal

and

republican theorists

(or

between liberal theorists

and theneo-Roman political writersof theseventeenthand

eighteenth centuries,as hecalls them, because they werenot

all advocates

of

republican government)

is to be

found

nol in

their viewsofwhat secures political liberty butintheir differ-

ing interpretationsofwhat constitutesarestraintorconstraint.

Neo-Roman political authors,

he

thinks, acc ept unreservedly

the idea that thecitizens' degree ol liberty depends on (he

t5


8/24

I E P U B L I C A N I S M

measuretowhich theyarerestrainedin theactions they wish

to takein pursuing their aims. They repudiate,inother words,

"thekeyassumption o( classical liberalismto theeffect that

forceor thecoercive threatof itconstitute theonly formsof

constraint that interfere w ith individual liberty." They emp ha-

size, rather, that "tolive in a condition ofdependence is in

itself a source and a form of constraint."Anindividualwho

lives in a condition ofdependence issubject to a constraint

that preventshimfrom exercisinghiscivil rights .Theabsence

ol libertycan becaused, then,heconcludes,''by interference

orbydependence."

1

AccordingtoPhilip

Pettit,

theabsenceoflibertyis,rather,

the consequence of dependence (or dom ination). Interfer-

ence

and

constraints, including those imposed

by

nonarbitrary

laws, should be considered onlya "secondary offense against

freedom."

Inother

words, while Skinner believes that republi-

can liberty

includes the

absence bothof domination and ol

interference, Pettit agreesbutadds thattheabsenceofinter-

ference is

I

he less relevant violation.Heemphasizes that it is

difficult tofind inrepublican political writersasignificantcri-

tique

olthi

1

limitationon

freedom

of

choice that

the

rule

ol

law imposes on individuals. They acce pt the restrictionson

freedom

ol

choice

and

emphasize

the

difference b etween

the

conditionsol those living undertheruleof law andthoseliv-

ingorwantingto live in aconditionof limitless license.Re-

publican political writers have always shown complete scorn

lor license and have always emphasized that licenseand

civil libertyare twoquite different matters. They nevercon-

sidered that restrictionsonfreedom ofchoiee imposedby he

ruleof lawmightbeconstrued as "aserious infringementon

liberty."

2

4 .

The Value of Republican Liberty

Both Skinner and Pettit rejeel the idea

that

being free

means obeying laws thaiweourselves haveapproved,andthey

both emphasize thai(berepublicanoi neoRomanconception

of political freedom is not .1positive conception of liberty

consisting

in the

direct exercise

ol

political rights.

Bui

while

Skinner believes thattheabsenceofliberty"can be

produced

eitherbyinterferenceor bydependence,"

3

Pettit believes that

it consists solelyofdependence.

I thinkit isimportanttoemphasizeinthis debate that clas-

sical republican writers have never claimed that true political

liberty consists of the absence of interference, since they

believed that restraintorinterference whichthe lawimposes

on individual choiee was not a restraint on liberty but a

brake,

an

essential limitation intrinsic

to

republican liberty.

(In

contrast, Isaiah Berlin noted that "Bentham, almost alone,

doggedly went on repeating that the business of lawswas

not toliberate but to restrain: 'Every law is an infractionof

liberty'even if such 'infraction' leadsto an increase to the

sumofliberty."

4

) They consideredthe law apublicanduniver-

sal commandment that applied equally

to all

citizens

or to all

membersof thegroupinquestion. This meant thatif therule

oflaw wasscrupulously respected,noindividual could im pose

his arbitrary will

on

other individuals

by

performing with

impunity actions forbidden toothers under painofsanction.II

men govern insteadoflaws, some individualscanimpose their

willsonothers, oppressing themorkeeping them from

pursu-

ingtheends they wishtopursue,and thus depriving themol

liberty. (This canalso be true in a ease where the majority

rules,thatis, in ademocracy.)

This interpretation of political liberty is eloquentl\

de

scribed in three classical texts that are the

core

ol modern

47


9/24


republicanism.Thefirst isLivy's statem ent thatthelibertythe

Romans regained after theexpulsion of the kings consisted,

firstandforemost, inhavingthelawsbemore powerful than

men.Thesecond is thespeech, reportedbySallust,inwhich

Aemilius Lepidus proclaimed that

the

Roman people were

free because they obeyedno one buttheirownlaws.Thethird

isthe passage from Cicero'sProCluentio, quoted countless

times

by

political writers

in the

Renaissance

and

later:

"All of

us obeythe law to the endthatwe may befree."

1

A second aspectof therepublican conceptionofpolitical

libertyis theconviction that liberty entails restraintsorbrakes

(frenum)on individual actions. These twoaspectsofRoman

political wisdom were adoptedandreformulatedbyFlorentine

civic humanists. Liberty, wrote Coluccio Salutati,

is a

"gentle

brake"( dulcelibertatis frenum ) that the lawimposeson all

citizens. Leonardo Bruni reiterated the same principle: true

liberty( meraac veraLibertas ) consistsof theequality gua ran-

teedby

the

laws.And heattributes to Giano della Bellathe

idea

that

liberty

is

preserved( Libertas

servatur )so

long

as he

lawsaremore powerful thanthecitizens.In thelate fifteenth

century,it wasprimarily oppo nentsof theMediciwhoempha-

sized thatthefoundation ofcivil libertywas theruleoflaw:a

republic thai wishesto"liveinliberty," wrote Alaman no Rinuc-

cini,

musl not

allow

a

citizen

"to be

more powerful than

the

laws."

6

Machiavelli,

too,

identified thelibertyofcitizens withthe

restrictions the law imposes equallyon them all. If in acity

thereis onecitizen whomthemagistrates fear,who canthere-

fore break

the

bonds

of the

laws, then that city

is not

tree,

he

wrote in theD iscourses.In theFlorentine Historieshewrote

4

S


that acity"can be called Iree" only il ils lawsandconstitu-

tional provisions ellicaciousK

restrain

the badimpulsesof the

nobilityand thepopulace.And bycivil liberty he meantthe

absenceofdominationordepende nce: "Without doubt,if one

considerstheendsol

the

noblesand ol

the

ignobles,onewill

see great desire

to

dominate

in the

former,

and in the

latter

only desire not to be dominated; and, in consequence,a

greater willtolive fre e."'

In contrast,all theinstancesofviolation

of

liberty thai

the

classical republicans offer areviolationsof theruleof law: a

tyrantwhosets himself above civilandconstitutional lawsand

therefore rulesbywhim;a powerful citizenwho hasobtained

for himself a privilege denied to other citizensand who can

therefore

do

things that others can not (such

as use

public

resourcesforprivate gainorobtain public offices inviolation

of normal procedures);arulerwho has discretionary powers.

The restrictions that

law

imposes

on the

actions

ol

rulers

and

ordinary citizensareconsideredtheonly valid defense against

coercion byindividuals.To befree me ans living under equ i-

table laws.

Asfor therelationship between libertyandself-government,

the classical republicans considered thelattera conditionof

the former.

For

Roman political writers,

a

people

who

receives

its laws fromakingisenslaved,notfree;itlivesin astate

not

of libertybut ofservitude, similartothatof aslave with resp ect

tohismaster.

8

Absolute monarchyistherefore similartodomi-

nation, whiletherepublic is theformofgovernmentand way

of lifeof afree peo ple.

Republican government,asMachiavelli explained inapas

sageof enlightening lucidity,is best suited to

the

defense

ol


10/24


liberty because

it has the

power

to

prevent private interests

from dominating thecityand rendering some,ormany, citi-

zens unfree: "Andwithout doubt this common good is not

observedif not inrepublics, sinceallthatis forthat purposeis

executed,

and

although

it may

turn

out to

harm this

or

that

pri-

vate individual, thoseforwhomtheaforesaid does goodare so

many that theycan goahead withitagainstthedispositionof

th efew who arecrushedby it."

9

ButMachiavelli also explains

that therecan be laws that comply withthecitizens' w illand

desiresbutthat imposeaprivate interes tandtherefore destroy

political liberty.As an example,hementionstheagrarianlaw

that the Roman plebeians, "through ambition," called for,

which

"was the

cause

of the

destruction

of the

republic"

and

"altogether ruined Roman freedom."

10

The republican argument thattheruleof law is anecessary

condition lorcitizens to live free and to prevent them from

being subject

to the

arbitrary willof a fewindividuals (or a

single individual) is at theheartofJames Harrington's reply

to Hobbess claim in

Leviathan

that

the

citizens

of a

repub-

lic such as

Lucca

hadno more freedom than thesubjectsof

an absolute sovereign such as thesultan of Constantinople,

because

both

were subjecttolaws. What makesthecitizensof

Lucca freer than thesubjects of Constantinople, Harrington

argues,is

that in

,ucca

both rulersandcitizensaresubjectto

civilandconstitutional laws, whereas in Constantinoplethe

sultanisabovethe law and mayarbitrarily disposeof theprop-

ertyandlivesof hissubjects, obliging them tolivein acondi-

tion of complete dependence and therefore without liberty.

The citizensof Lucca, Harrington explains,arefree "by the

lawsof Lucca," because they are controlled onlyby the law

5


and because

the

laws

are

"Iramed

by

every private

man

unto

no

otherend . . .than toprotect theliberty"I every privateman,

whichbythat m eans comeslo be ihe libert)olthecommon-

wealth."

11

The idea that

the

rule

ol law

protects

.1

citiz en From

the

arbitrary willol others because it binds everyonein thesame

way passed from the booksof republican theorists to those

written by the founders of liberalism. The most significant

exampleisthatofJohn Locke:

Th eend ofLawis not toabolishorrestrain,butto pre-

serve

an d

enlarge

Freedom:For in all the

states

of

created

beings capableof Laws,where thereis noLaw, thereis

no Freedom.

For

Liberty

is to be

free from restraint

and

violence from others which cannot be,where thereis

noLaw: ButFreedom is not, as we aretold,ALiberty

for everyMan todo whathelists:(Forwho couldbefree,

when every other Man's Humour might domineer over

him?)But a

Liberty

todispose,andorder,as helists,his

Person, Actions, Possessions, and his whole Property,

withintheAllowanceofthose Laws under whichhe is;

and therein not to be subject to the arbitrary Willof

another,butfreely followhisown.

12

The limitation thatlawimposeson thedecisionsofindividuals

differs from the limitation thatanindividual m ight arbitrarily

imposeonothers:in the first case,wehave obed ience, inthe

second case, servitude.

The passages quoted here make

it

clear that republican

political writers never identified aslimitations on libcrlx the

I


11/24

I I P U B L 1 C A N I S M

restraints imposedbynonarbitrary laws,butthey have always

denned

as

such

any

dependence

on the

arbitrary willofother

individuals. They believed thattheruleof lawmakes individu-

als free,notbecause itexpresses theirownwillnot, thatis.

because they have given their assent

to

itbut because

the

law

is a

universal

and

abstract command

and as

such

pro-

tects individuals from thearbitrary willofothers. Forthem,

the validity ol various institutional systems ismeasuredby

their efficacy

in

preventing

the

arbitrary

use ot

power. When

Machiavelli defended

the

virtues

ol

republican government,

he always referred tothat governmentinwhichthefunctions

of power were distributed accordingto themodel ofmixed

government, where

the

people exercised sovereign power within

the limits defined

by

constitutional

law.

While

it is

certainly legitimate

to

consider dependence

on

the arbitrary willof anindividual"asourceand aformof con-

straint,"

M

as Skinner does, I believe that making adistinc-

tion between dependenceonarbitrary willandsubjection to

restraint oilers

the

best insight

into

classical republicanisms

conception ol political liberty. It it is tohaveanysignificance

in contemporary discussions, neo-republicanism must show

that

it is

critical

ol

dependence

and

domination,

and it

must

sharply differentiate itsell from both

laissez-faire

intolerance

ol restraintsandauthoritarian insensitivity toward domination.

Classical republicanism

has

always opposed dependence

becauseitbelievesthatthis encourages servilityon the onehand

and arrogance on theother, twomentalities that areequally

repugnant

to the

ideal

of

civil life. This

is

particularly important

becausethepersistenceofarbitrary powersand ofpracticesof

domination, aswell aslicenseand theabsence ofmoraland

52


soc ia l responsibi l i ty , suf loca tes c ivi l cul ture

D e m o c r a t i c

soc i -

e t i e s ne e d

a

pol i t ica l

and

mora l langu age lh . i l

c m

iHiisirale

per-

sua s ive ly

the

significance

1

and

va lue

ol a

dignifi ed civil life.

In

t h i s r e ga r d , r e pub l i c a n i sm

lu\

a u lho i i i . i i i ve

credent ia ls ,pro-

v ide d

it

r e m a i n s

faithful

to the

avers ion iismas ters fell

For

both

tyrannyandlicense.

A further reasonfordistinguishing between beingsubject

to restraintsandbeing dependent isthat legislative measures

that Iree some citizens from dependence restrict others in

their freedom

to

act.Consider some

of

theexamples citedal

the beginningofChapter2: awifewhocannot offer resistance

to

or

demand restitution

for

abuse

by her

husband; workers

who

may be

subjected

to

abuse from their employer

or

super-

visor;

the

elderly,

the

sick,

and

those living alone

who

depend

on charity.Tofree women from dependence,onemust have

laws that ensure equality within

the

family, limiting

the

arbi-

trary power

of men; to

protect dependent workers,

one

must

have laws that safeguard their physicalandmoral dignityand

limit their employer's arbitrary power;toemancipatetheneedy

from charity,

one

must impose taxes that provide adequate

public assistance. In these cases, reducing thedomination

from which some citizens suffer entails increasingtherestric-

tion

of

others' (negative) liberty;

or,

rather,

it

requires imposing

restraints

on

individuals

who

once could

act of

their

own

tree

will.

It is notpossible

to

reduce dependence without imposing

legal restraints. Wemust choose between domination(and

dependence)

and the

restraint

of the law.

Those whohark

back

to

republican tradition must choose policies thai

attenu

ate domination rather than those that try toattenuate civi

Viroli, Maurizio. Republicanism (Capítulos 2, 3, 4 e 5). 2002

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Transcript of Viroli, Maurizio. Republicanism (Capítulos 2, 3, 4 e 5). 2002