Maurizio Maggi, Stefano Piperno

TURIN: THE VAIN SEARCH FOR GARGANTUA

W.P. 124/1999

Working paper n. 124, giugno 1999

ISTITUTO DI RICERCHE ECONOMICO-SOCIALI DEL PIEMONTE

IRESPIEMONTE

CORE Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk

Provided by Byterfly

L’IRES PIEMONTE è un istituto di ricerca che svolge la sua attività d’indagine in camposocioeconomico e territoriale, fornendo un supporto all’azione di programmazione dellaRegione Piemonte e delle altre istituzioni ed enti locali piemontesi.Costituito nel 1958 su iniziativa della Provincia e del Comune di Torino con la partecipa-zione di altri enti pubblici e privati, l’IRES ha visto successivamente l’adesione di tutte leProvince piemontesi; dal 1991 l’Istituto è un ente strumentale della Regione Piemonte.Giuridicamente l’IRES è configurato come ente pubblico regionale dotato di autonomia fun-zionale disciplinato dalla legge regionale n. 43 del 3 settembre 1991.

Costituiscono oggetto dell’attività dell’Istituto:– la relazione annuale sull’andamento socioeconomico e territoriale della regione;– l’osservazione, la documentazione e l’analisi delle principali grandezze socioeconomiche

e territoriali del Piemonte;– rassegne congiunturali sull’economia regionale;– ricerche e analisi per il piano regionale di sviluppo;– ricerche di settore per conto della Regione e di altri enti.

© 1999 IRES – Istituto di Ricerche Economico-Sociali del Piemonte via Nizza 1810125 TorinoTel. 011.66.66.411, fax 011.66.96.012

Si autorizza la riproduzione, la diffusione e l’utilizzazione del contenuto del volume con lacitazione della fonte.

Contents

TURIN: THE VAIN SEARCH FOR GARGANTUA

Introduction 5

1. Institutions and economic development in the Turin metropolitan area 7

1.1 Socio-economic trends 7

1.2 Institutional trends 15

2. The development of the main networked metropolitan services 22

2.1 The aqueduct service: municipal concerns, private firms, communal management 22

2.2 Effluent water softening services 23

2.3 Other services 24

2.4 Privatisations in progress 25

3. In search of political leadership 27

Conclusions 31

References 35

W o r k i n g p a p e r n . 1 2 4 , 1 9 9 9

3

Questo lavoro costituisce il primo contributo dell'IRES Piemonte per un program-ma di ricerca comparata sulle dinamiche istituzionali nelle regioni urbane inEuropa, iniziato nel 1996 e svolto attraverso una rete di istituzioni di ricerca inFrancia, Inghilterra, Germania e Olanda. Sono state analizzate, oltre a quella diTorino, le regioni urbane di Bologna, Lione, Bordeaux, Rotterdam, Stoccarda,Manchester, e del bacino lemanico. Il Laboratoire de recherches Interdisciplinai-res Ville, Espace et Societé de l'Ecole Nationale des Travaux Publics de l'Etat diLione è stato il capofila del programma di ricerca finanziato dalla Agence Rhône-Alpes pur les Sciences Sociales et Humaines. La versione definitiva di questo lavo-ro è contenuta nel rapporto finale della ricerca recentemente pubblicato in Fran-cia (B. Jouve, C. Lefèvre, a cura di, Villes, Métropoles. Les nouveaux territoiresdu politique. Paris: Economica, 1999).

Turin: the vain search for Gargantua

Maurizio Maggi*

Stefano Piperno*

W o r k i n g p a p e r n . 1 2 4 , 1 9 9 9

Introduction

The decision to use the case of Tu-rin in a comparative study of me-tropolitan governments in Europemight appear an anomalous one.More than anywhere else in Italy,the problem of governing the Tu-rin urban area has, de facto, been

erased from the political agendaof the principal local institutions.Vice versa, it may be useful to at-tempt a parallel reconstruction ofthe theoretical and institutionaldebate on the prospects of metro-politan governance and the initia-tives of the principal wide areaservice policies to answer some of

* Istittuto di Ricerche Economico-Sociali del Piemonte - Turin.E-mail: maggi@ires.csi.it

piperno@ires.csi.it

the questions posed by the overallresearch project.

The first of these questionsconcerns the emergence of a mo-del of governance to replace tra-ditional government. The factthat the term ‘governance’ is sohard to translate into Italian givessome idea of the difficulty whichthis new paradigm is meeting he-re in Italy, although awareness ofthis need is now precisely felt inthe Turin area. The concept ofmetropolitan governance impliesgoverning a metropolitan areawithout a formal local govern-ment organisation. It is thus pos-sible to verify whether a model ofthis type, albeit partial and em-bryonic, has emerged in the Tu-rin area.

The second question concernsthe development of the system ofintergovernmental relations inPiedmont. Relations between thevarious levels of government havea specific regional dimension:they vary, that is, from one part ofthe country to another accordingto existing socio-economic andpolitico-institutional conditions.The fact that metropolitan gover-nance has developed one way inTurin and another in Bolognaconfirms this hypothesis1.

The third question is about in-stitutional innovation. It asks: isinnovation possible without a for-

mal general metropolitan govern-ment structure?

This report is split into fourparts. The first sketches an extre-mely schematic outline of the pa-rallel institutional and socio-eco-nomic development of the areaover the last thirty years. The factis that Turin as a city is a symbolof the post-war Italian economicmiracle and national urbanisa-tion, just as it has since become atypical case of deindustrialisation,in which new models of urban de-velopment have begun to emergeand the need for institutionalchange is sharply felt.

The second part describes howthe principal networked services– the ones, that is, which ideallyrequire a wide area institutionalorganisation – are run, verifyingthe advantages and disadvantagesof the functional models curren-tly being adopted.

The framework which emergesis still unclear. The fact is that lo-cal elites’ awareness of the pro-blems of urban governancewithin the new context of inter-national competition and theircapacity to come up with strate-gic new projects are still conspi-cuous by their absence. In thethird part of the report, we seekto understand why.

The fourth and final part ad-dresses the basic question of

W o r k i n g p a p e r n . 1 2 4 , 1 9 9 9

6

1 It is interesting to note that this is the second time that the two cities have been com-pared in an international comparative research project (cf. Euricur, 1996).

whether Turin needs a new modelof urban government or not. Or,alternatively, are minor correc-tions to the policies in progress allthat is needed?

1. Institutions and economic development in the Turin metropolitan area

1.1 Socio-economic trendsWhat exactly is the Turin me-

tropolitan area? It would take awhole report on its own to answer

this one simple question. Geo-graphers, sociologists, economistsand urban planners have arguedover what criteria to use to delimitthe plausible boundaries of thearea without ever coming to anyunanimous conclusion. For ourpurposes, we follow the only exi-sting administrative delimitation(fig. 1), which dates from 19722,and which comprises 52 of Turin’sneighbouring ‘comuni’, or com-munes, in two concentric circles.

The demographic and econo-

W o r k i n g p a p e r n . 1 2 4 , 1 9 9 9

7

2 An area comprising the commune of Turin and another 52 communes on the basis ofDPGR No. 719 of 1972 issued by the Piedmontese Regional Authority.

CASELLE T.SE

VENARIA

COLLEGNOTORINORIVOLI

GRUGLIASCO

PIOSSASCO

CARMAGNOLA

CHIERI

CHIVASSO

Figure 1 Administrative borders of the Turin metropolitan area

Communes comprised inthe delimitation of 1972

Communes comprised inthe delimitation of 1991

mic evolution of Turin over thelast thirty years reflects some ofthe typical phases in urban deve-lopment: urbanisation, suburba-nisation, deurbanisation andreurbanisation.

“In the urbanisation phase, po-pulation and economic activityconcentrates in urban centres.In the suburbanisation phasethe growth of the suburbs out-strips that of the city centre and,eventually, there is a shift of po-pulation and jobs to the su-burbs. In the deurbanisationphase the wider conurbation asa whole loses population, smal-ler urban areas grow and a mo-re decentralised urban systemdevelops. In the reurbanisationphase, cities which have beenlosing population begin to growagain” (Commission of the Eu-ropean Communities, 1992).

In the seventies (in some caseseven earlier), the population of thecentral city of the metropolitanarea began to decline, while thegrowth of that of the inner urbanrings also began to dwindle. At thesame time, the population of theexternal rings and often also of theperiurban agricultural belts has in-creased, with a consequent diffu-sion of residential settlement andproduction activities. Since this isnot the place to address the causesof the phenomenon – which stemfrom transformations in urban

W o r k i n g p a p e r n . 1 2 4 , 1 9 9 9

8

Tabl

e 1

Pop

ulat

ion

patte

rns

in th

e Tu

rin m

etro

polit

an a

rea

(197

1-19

95)

No.

Popu

latio

nPo

pula

tion

Popu

latio

nPo

pula

tion

Gro

wth

Gro

wth

Gro

wth

com

mun

es19

95%

1991

%19

81%

1971

%’7

1-’8

1’8

1-’9

1’9

1-’9

5

Turi

n1

923,

106

5096

2,50

752

1,11

7,15

457

1,16

7,96

861

-4.4

-15.

9-4

.1

Firs

t rin

g23

523,

445

2852

6,31

028

494,

922

2544

6,88

523

10.7

6.4

-0.5

Seco

nd r

ing

2925

8,96

714

242,

222

1323

1,91

712

187,

870

1023

.44.

56.

9

Thir

d ri

ng56

139,

694

813

4,19

47

124,

587

611

0,47

36

12.8

11.4

4.1

Tota

l 10

91,

845,

212

100

1,86

5,23

310

01,

968,

580

100

1,91

3,19

610

02.

9-5

.2-1

.1

Tota

l are

a ‘7

253

1,70

5,51

892

1,73

1,03

993

1,84

3,99

394

1,80

2,72

394

2.3

-6.1

-1.5

Sour

ce: I

stat

, Pop

ulat

ion

Cen

sus

Dat

a. (F

or 1

995

data

see

: Con

fort

i - D

avic

o -

Mel

a, 1

997)

.

economic bases, production tech-nologies and real estate markets –we refer the reader to the vast lite-rature which already exists on thesubject. For our purposes, it is suf-ficient to stress that Turin is notdevoid of this tendency, althoughit does display peculiarities withrespect to other Italian and Euro-pean metropolitan areas.

In 1951, Turin had a popula-tion of over 700,000 inhabitants,in 1961 of more than a million,and the number continued to in-crease continuously until 1974,when it reached a peak of1,205,000 inhabitants (urbanisa-tion). The trend was subsequentlyreversed and Turin’s populationbegan to decrease; since 1990 ithas dropped below one million.

In the same years, the popula-tion of the suburbs grew (subur-banisation) to such an extent that

it set off the drop in the numberof inhabitants of the central com-mune, but this only happened un-til the eighties. Subsequently, thegrowth of suburban areas ceasedto compensate for the decrease inTurin so that, in 1991, the popu-lation of the metropolitan areafell by more than 100,000 inhabi-tants – a clear symptom of deur-banisation – although between1981 and 1991 the growth rate ofthe population in the first ring ex-ceeded 6.4% and that of the se-cond ring 4.5%. Yet it would bepremature to interpret this trendas a sign of reurbanisation.

The most recent migratorytrends (1991-’95) show (see table2) that the drop in population inTurin stems from the exchangewith other Piedmontese commu-nes and between the latter andthe extended metropolitan area3.

W o r k i n g p a p e r n . 1 2 4 , 1 9 9 9

9

Table 2 Migration from and to Turin

Immigrants Emigrants Balanceto Turin % from Turin %

Rest of metrop. area 33,661 35.7 65,118 49.9 -31,457

Rest of Piedmont 15,186 16.1 26,365 20.2 -11,179

Rest of Italy 33,632 35.7 34,906 26.8 -1,.274

Abroad 10,435 11.1 3,472 2.7 6,963

Not determined 1,247 1.3 517 0.4 730

Total 94,161 100.0 130,378 100.0 -36,217

Source: Conforti - Davico - Mela, 1997.

3 Composed in this case of the 52 communes of the original delimitation plus another 56bordering communes (cf. Conforti - Davico - Mela, 1997).

Against an influx of 94,000 newresidents, the city registered anoutflow of 130,000 people.Breaking down the total figure byareas of origin/destination, itemerges clearly that the drop islargely due to the population ex-change with communes in themetropolitan area (31,467 inhabi-tants). As a consequence, a dyna-mic trend in population was re-corded only in the second andthird rings (table 1), and this, inturn, suggests that the deurbani-sation phase is persisting.

Within this framework of demo-graphic decline, one importantnew development is the growth inthe inflow of immigrants fromcountries outside the EU. In Sep-

tember 1996 17,000 non-EU citi-zens – 33% of whom from Mo-rocco – were registered in Turin.The figure considerably underesti-mates the effective presence of fo-reigners, failing to take into ac-count the number of illegal immi-grants (at least 10,000). Althoughit corresponds to a relatively lowpercentage of the total populationof Turin, and is hence by no meanscomparable with other Europeanmetropolises, it has been largeenough to trigger a good deal ofsocial tension. The 1997 electioncampaign in Turin, for example,was dominated by the question ofurban safety, relegating seriousproblems such as that of economicdevelopment to a secondary role.

W o r k i n g p a p e r n . 1 2 4 , 1 9 9 9

10

Table 3 Level of education in some metropolitan areas in Italy(percentage of over six by degree of education) 1991

Graduates High Lower Elementary Without school middle qualifications

Central cities

Turin 6.0 21.9 34.0 29.0 8.8

Milan 9.3 27.7 32.8 23.6 6.4

Bologna 9.6 24.2 27.5 30.6 8.1

Rome 8.5 28.3 30.2 24.3 8.7

Provinces

Turin 4.0 19.7 34.3 32.2 9.0

Milan 5.2 23.4 33.8 29.4 8.0

Bologna 6.0 21.4 28.7 33.0 10.9

Rome 7.0 26.2 31.1 25.8 9.9

Source: Istat. Central cities: data refer only to the biggest municipality in the area;provinces: data refer to the provincial administrative area.

This process is transformingthe urban area of Turin from a‘monocentric’ structure to an in-creasingly ‘polycentric’ one inwhich the emerging ‘subpoles’are displaying growing autonomywith respect to the central pole.This has undoubtedly hamperedthe building of a metropolitanidentity, aggravating the fears ofsurrounding communes vis-à-visthe risk of exploitation by Turin,as we see below.

The way the economic structurehas developed also reveals a gra-dual transformation from an eco-

nomic system based on industrialactivities to one dominated by ter-tiary services, even though the Tu-rin area continues to be much mo-re industrialised than other me-tropolitan areas in Italy. This tran-slates (table 3) into a lower level ofeducation in the Turin metropoli-tan area due to the increased im-portance of relatively skilled occu-pation in industry.

A brief glance at tables 4-5shows how the importance of oc-cupation in the various economicactivities, in industry especially,has gradually increased in the pe-

W o r k i n g p a p e r n . 1 2 4 , 1 9 9 9

11

Table 4 Occupation in firms and other activities in Turin and its rings

1981Industry % Others % Total %

Turin 212,490 49.8 262,735 71.5 475,275 59.8

First ring 136,269 32.0 64,798 17.6 201,099 25.3

Second ring 59,446 13.9 29,420 8.0 88,880 11.2

Third ring 18,203 4.3 10,733 2.9 28,940 3.6

Total 426,408 100.0 367,686 100.0 794,194 100.0

Total area ‘72 408,205 356,953 765,254

1991Industry % Others % Total %

Turin 147,455 43.8 277,719 67.4 425,218 56.8

First ring 119,018 35.3 84,117 20.4 203,170 27.1

Second ring 52,478 15.6 36,329 8.8 88,823 11.9

Third ring 18,020 5.3 13,974 3.4 31,999 4.3

Total 336,971 100.0 412,139 100.0 749,210 100.0

Total area ‘72 318,951 398,165 717,211

Source: Istat, Industrial Census Data (agricultural occupation not considered).

ripheral rings. Hence in 1991 (ta-ble 5) the two rings outstrippedTurin in terms of their share of in-dustrial occupation (53.8%). Fol-lowing a perfectly symmetricaltrend (table 6), Turin became alargely service-based city as earlyas 1981 (55% of employment),whereas the metropolitan area of53 municipalities (TMA) registe-red the primacy of service occu-pation in 1991 (55%). Between1981 and 1991 the metropolitanarea lost about 90,000 jobs in in-dustry, most of them located inthe central city.

This series of transformationshas been widely interpreted as asymptom of the decline of thearea following the decline of thetraditional production base, cen-tred round the mechanical engi-neering industry and means oftransport. In the early nineties,the high rate of unemployment,which has risen from an averageof 8% in the late eighties to10,5%, the constant drop in thenumber of industrial workers andfirms and Turin’s descent in clas-sifications of Italian provinces interms of income per capita (figu-

W o r k i n g p a p e r n . 1 2 4 , 1 9 9 9

12

Table 6 Share of occupation in industry and services in 1981 and 1991

% Industry % Others1981 1991 1981 1991

Turin 44.7 34.7 55.3 65.3

52 TMA* 67.5 58.7 32.5 41.3

Total 53.3 44.5 46.6 55.5

* TMA: Turin metropolitan area.

Source:Istat, Industrial Census Data.

Table 5 Percentage of occupation in industrial firms in Turin andits rings

1951 1981 1991

Turin 82.1 52.0 46.2

First ring 12.4 33.4 37.3

Second ring 5.5 14.6 16.5

Total 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Istat, Industrial Census Data.

re 2) were signs of a situation ofstress against which no new formof metropolitan polarisation th-rough the development of tech-nological/managerial managed toemerge. Another sign of the pro-blems of transition of the Turineconomy was the fact that, in1994, the city and its provincewere earmarked as one of the re-gions covered by objective 2 ofthe European Union’s structuralpolicies.

Whether the economic revolu-tion was doomed to progressivedecline or whether instead it con-cealed positive factors for ele-ments of reorganisation and pro-ductive conversion is still a

subject of analysis and discussion.In the period from 1992 to 1995the prevailing feeling in Turin wasundoubtedly one of pessimism,but in recent years a significantshift has taken place, bolstered bysome of the strong points of thesystem.

The area’s industry still looksabroad a lot. Between 1988 ex-ports from the province of Turinaccounted for 9% of the Italiantotal; in 1993, the figure had fal-len to 6.9%, although it has sub-sequently risen again, thanks ini-tially to the devaluation of the li-ra, returning to 8% in 1995 and7.9% in 1996, thus offering proofof the competitive capacity offirms in the area.

W o r k i n g p a p e r n . 1 2 4 , 1 9 9 9

13

Figure 2 Added value per capita per inhabitant in four provinces (index with respect to the Italian average = 100)

140

135

130

125

120

115

110

105

1001980 1985 1990 1992 1993

Torino MilanoBologna Roma

Furthermore, on the basis of re-cent projections, from now until2000 exports from the provinceof Turin will show an annualgrowth rate in excess of 8%. Themost recent estimates of provin-cial revenue for the same periodshow growth rates significantlyhigher than in other areas of thecountry (i.e., the North-east andthe Centre).

A recent survey by the TurinEmployers’ Association revealedthat industrial firms in the areaare extremely internationalised,not only in terms of the export-production ratio. One firm out ofevery five interviewed has decen-tralised production phasesabroad, 17% receive funding out-side Italy, 23% use foreign tech-nicians and 37% buy in technolo-gies from abroad.

Last but not least, 67% of so-called ‘innovative firms’ registe-red in Piedmont in all size classesare concentrated in the provinceof Turin4.

Turin is thus by right one of theEuropean areas most heavily af-fected by economic globalisationprocesses and the competitivestress which they generate. Com-pared with those of other regions

affected by deindustrialisationprocesses, the local economyshoulders the burden of over-spe-cialisation in some mature pro-duction sectors, as well as Turin’simage as a ‘one company town’. Itis a well known fact that other oldindustrial regions with more dif-ferentiated economic structureshave suffered the reorganisation-redevelopment-image relaunchprocess much less (Chinitz,1961). Fiat’s economic weight inthe Turin area has neverthelessdecreased considerably. Accor-ding to IRES estimates, between1986 and 1996 employment gene-rated by the Fiat group decreasedfrom 92,000 to 47,000 units, fal-ling from 25% to 15% of total in-dustrial occupation (craft-basedenterprises excluded).

Generally speaking, the occu-pational importance of small andmedium enterprises increased.Between 1981 and 1991, the per-centage of people employed infirms with fewer than 100 em-ployees increased from 55% to64%. In the metropolitan area,made up of 53 communes, the in-cidence of occupation in innova-tive segments of the service sector(financial, business and professio-

W o r k i n g p a p e r n . 1 2 4 , 1 9 9 9

14

4 Cf. IRES, 1997, and CCIAA, 1996. Analysis of the information pool produced by the Ob-servatory of the diffusion of innovation, set up by the Chambers of Commerce of Pied-mont and built on the basis of a set of selection criteria, highlights how, of the 2,600 firmsrecorded, about two thirds make use of leading-edge technologies and acquire techno-logical knowhow through an autonomous research centre. To give an idea of their rela-tive incidence, suffice it to think that in the 1991 census about 13,000 manufacturingfirms were present in Piedmont, about 7,000 of them in the province of Turin.

nal services) increased from 24%to 30%.

As a consequence, processes ofreorganisation of the socialmorphology of the city and itsmetropolitan area due to post-in-dustrial transition are also lessevident than in other urban areas.More specifically, analyses of1991 figures highlight the factthat Turin displays none of theconspicuous phenomena of ur-ban dualism5 which have charac-terised the largest European me-tropolitan areas (Ires, 1995b).

In conclusion, all the classic in-dicators highlight that the Turinmetropolitan area is passing through a phase of demographicand occupational stagnation, ac-companied by processes of redi-stribution of population and localeconomic business activities. Thissocio-economic and spatial reor-ganisation involves a redefinitionboth of the reciprocal roles of Tu-rin and its external rings to re-launch both the economic attrac-tiveness of Turin in terms of highquality service activities and itsresidential attractiveness for thepopulation working in these sec-tors. In this respect, it is worthpointing out how Turin’s transi-tion into a post-Fordian metro-polis has been littered with hold-ups and difficulties. Over the last

few years, this diagnosis of Turinhas been relatively widely sharedand has influenced the debate onmetropolitan institutions: the hal-ting of the economic decline ofTurin and its metropolitan areaand its relaunching on new eco-nomic bases was one of the keymessages of the 1993 electoralcampaign (the first to envisagethe direct election of the mayor),which saw the victory of anunorthodox centre-left coalitionled by a university professor, Va-lentino Castellani, from outsidethe world of politics.

1.2 Institutional trendsThe framework of intergovern-

mental relations in Italy is a com-plex one. The debate on a possi-ble federalist-oriented reform ofthe Italian state has now broughtthe entire three-tier Region-Pro-vince-Commune system underreview. For our purposes, two ba-sic aspects deserve mention. Thefirst is the growth of the politicalclout of medium-large citiesthanks both to electoral reformand renewed commitment to lo-cal development policies. The dy-namism of such cities has beenevident in the initiatives of theirmayors, of the National Associa-tion of Italian Communes (ANCI)and of the Union of Italian Pro-

W o r k i n g p a p e r n . 1 2 4 , 1 9 9 9

15

5 By ‘urban dualism’ we mean the concentration in the central city of population of highsocial class and groups with low, irregular income, with an accentuation of the processof suburbanisation of the middle classes and blue-collar workers in the Fordian sector.

vinces (UPI). The latter two orga-nisations are powerful nationallobbies which have fostered thesetting up of a new intergovern-mental decision-making and ad-visory body, the State-City-Auto-nomies Conference, alongsidethe pre-existing State-RegionsConference. Basically speaking,local authorities are unwilling toaccept any form of subordinationto the Regions, a sine qua non forfederal reform.

The second aspect is bound upin the phenomenon of the growthof functional administrations(health, hydrogeological and en-vironmental protection, water cy-cle management and so on), as wesee below vis-à-vis networked ser-vices in the Turin metropolitanarea. Combined with privatisa-tion processes, this tends to striplocal government of technical andmanagerial-type activities, withthe risk, on the one hand, of ca-mouflaging forms of creeping re-centralisation and, on the other,of eroding citizens’ control overactivities of public interest. Bothaspects have weighed negativelyon metropolitan reform in Italy.

In Turin, the process of urbandevelopment described in theprevious paragraph has had noto-rious institutional consequences.The lack of cohesion between ad-ministrative units and the urbansystem within which all the func-tional interdependencies of a gi-ven community happen demandsa reorganisation of local govern-ment according to alternative mo-dels which can be either structu-ral or functional6. Our researchhypothesis was to verify the ex-tent to which, whereas the Turi-nese political-institutional debateover the last thirty years has,theoretically, been dominated bythe need to arrive at a structuralsolution of metropolitan gover-nance, we have, de facto, witnes-sed the gradual emergence of a ty-pe of metropolitan governancethat we might define as implicitlyfunctional.

Albeit approximately and ex-tremely synthetically, it is worthidentifying some of the phases ofthe institutional debate that areconnected with the phases of theeconomic and urban develop-ment that we saw above.

W o r k i n g p a p e r n . 1 2 4 , 1 9 9 9

16

6 Given the aims of this seminar, the differences between the structural and functionalmodels of metropolitan governance are taken as understood. The structural solution isbased on the creation of a new level of government to carry out a plurality of functionsat metropolitan level; the functional solution, instead, identifies the different proceduraland administrative structures to address the main metropolitan problems; for example,general associations among local authorities, a transport authority, miscellaneous agree-ments among local authorities for specific policies, programme agreements, etc. Thesemodels stem also from the intercommunal and supracommunal models presented inLefèvre, 1996.

During the industrialisationand urbanisation phase (which la-sted until the mid seventies), thedebate focused on institutionalhypotheses based on co-operativemodels – especially at the plan-ning level. An initial proposal foran intercommunal planning sche-me (envisaged by the town plan-ning law of 1942) can be tracedback to 1951. It was subsequentlyto develop through a series ofprojects up to the Turin munici-pality’s approval of the scheme in1964, although only a few com-munes in the metropolitan areawere to follow the city’s lead. Theexperience had no practical con-sequences7, one of the reasons forthis being that, throughout theperiod in question, single com-munes had pursued planning po-licies totally at loggerheads withthe aims of the scheme. Parallelcollaboration initiatives were de-veloped among the communes ofthe ring administered by left-wingmajorities, often in conflict withthe decisions taken in Turin whi-ch, until 1975, was governed bycentre-right and centre-left majo-rities. An important factor in thatperiod was the approaching birthof regional authorities. Althoughsome participants in the culturaldebate argued in favour of expe-riences of metropolitan governan-ce along the lines of European

and Canadian models or, at allevents, of the debate in the An-glo-Saxon world, the prevailinghypothesis was to assign the re-gional authority the role of mana-ging the planning of the metropo-litan area as part of the urbanplanning competences envisagedby art. 117 of the Constitution.

As the process of industrial de-velopment and urbanisation cameto an end, so an important newplayer – the regional authority –appeared on the stage. The periodbetween 1975 and 1980 (the se-cond regional legislature) was ar-guably the most florid for the va-rious regional authorities, in termsboth of their institutional planningcapacity and their ability to in-fluence central government andother local autonomies. The regio-nal authorities – and Piedmont’sfits perfectly into the model – be-gan by reorganising the system ofautonomies, introducing new in-termediate levels of government(‘comprensori’, or local districts,including that of Turin) to down-grade the role of provincial autho-rities, seen more as decentralisedoffshoots of central governmentthan as local government bodies.Clearly, a strong level of governan-ce of the metropolitan area, espe-cially its structural variant, wasseen by the regional authorities asa hindrance to the implementation

W o r k i n g p a p e r n . 1 2 4 , 1 9 9 9

17

7 For an effective reconstruction of the Turin intercommunal planning scheme episode,see Urbanistica, Nos. 50-51, October 1967.

W o r k i n g p a p e r n . 1 2 4 , 1 9 9 9

of its local policies. This contradic-tion arose in those years and, as weshall see, still continues to this day.

1980 marked an important poli-tical and economic turnaroundfor Turin. It was in that year, infact, that Fiat embarked upon amajor reorganisation process ba-sed on massive lay-offs. Afterblocking production for almost amonth, the unions were forced toaccept a compromise. Industrialoccupation began to fall in themetropolitan area, and the pro-cess of industrialisation/expan-sion of the service industry typicalof many European cities andtowns speeded up.

From an institutional point ofview, 1980 also marked the begin-ning of the third regional legisla-ture (1980-’85). This was a periodin which regional authorities lostmuch of the planning vigour theyhad shown in the previous fiveyears and, at the same time, tradi-tional local autonomies – provin-cial authorities and, above all,communes – reasserted their in-fluence; directly aided and abet-ted by the political parties theywere able to leapfrog the regionalauthorities and deal directly withcentral administrations.

In Turin, the ‘Fiat shock’ trigge-red a debate, which was to deve-lop in the course of the eighties,against the paradigm of re-equili-brium which had dominated re-gional policies in the previous fi-ve-year period. It soon becameclear that the big risk for the me-tropolitan area lay not so much inphenomena of congestion and ex-ternal diseconomies caused by anexcessive concentration of pro-duction activities as in the gradualeconomic and social decline towhich it was prone (as had beenor was the case in other Europeanurban areas) due to the decline oftraditional industries – the car in-dustry, first and foremost.

As early as 1982, Turin wasswept by a series of scandals whichcaused a political crisis in the left-wing municipal administration,subsequently replaced by a cen-tre-left administration in 1985(and the same happened at regio-nal level). The following years we-re marked by instability and thecommunal government’s activism– alas, without any strategic plan-ning or agreement with othercommunes in the metropolitanarea – on major infrastructuraland real estate projects8.

18

8 One of the most important investments in Turin was made in the new municipal sta-dium, built for the 1990 World Cup. Turin’s leading soccer club, Juventus F. C., are cur-rently involved in a dispute with the franchisees over excessive rental costs, and are th-reatening to play their matches in other stadiums elsewhere in Italy unless they are gran-ted permission to build a new smaller stadium with additional commercial centre func-tions (on the Dutch and British model). This is one example of the consequences of theeuphoric climate of those years (cf. Ires, 1989, 1995a).

W o r k i n g p a p e r n . 1 2 4 , 1 9 9 9

19

The nineties, finally, have beencharacterised by two majorreforms of the system of local go-vernment in Italy – Law No.142/1990 and Law No. 81/1993on the direct election of mayors –which have changed the institu-tional reference frameworkprofoundly. More specifically, thefigure of the mayor has becomemuch more representative, capa-ble of promoting significant inno-vations in the local political sy-stem – but also many an illusionand unrealistic expectation – atleast until further reforms of thelocal administrative system9, un-der review by parliament in re-cent months, are passed. It is alsotrue, however, that the direct elec-tion of the mayor has returned thecommune ‘to the centre of the in-stitutional system’, further deple-ting the institutional clout andprestige of the regional authorityand, secondarily, of the provincialauthority. In the final analysis, theproblem of the metropolitan areawas shelved in the eighties due toinstitutional conflicts between thevarious levels of government. But,as we shall see, this did not meanthat no metropolitan policies we-re implemented with regard tonetworked services.

So how has the problem beenaddressed over the last 30-40years? It is worth stressing that, inthis period, the metropolitan pro-blem has been formulated in dif-ferent ways with contradictory in-stitutional effects.

For brevity’s sake, we built themodel shown in table 7 in whichwe outline the institutional deve-lopment of Turin in relation to itseconomic and urban develop-ment and some reference para-digms of possible conceptualisa-tions of administrative challenges.

Institutional innovations stemdirectly from the analytical refe-rence categories which can beused to define the metropolitanarea concept. Bruno Dente’s ef-fective classification (Dente,1989), widely used in the debateover the last few years, identifiesthree main innovations: ‘big villa-ge’, ‘functional region’ and ‘capi-tal city’. Below we provide a briefoutline of Dente’s theory, butanyone wishing further detailsshould see Dente’s essay and thenow very extensive literature onthe subject10.

The first identifies the metropo-lis as a ‘big city’, with an ‘outsizeurban settlement’, characterised

9 See the recent book by Luciano Vandelli, 1997, a brief and effective reconstruction ofthe effects of the electoral reform of 1993. 10 Cf. Dente, 1989. The literature on metropolitan areas is very rich indeed: see the bi-bliography contained in Dente’s article and Ires’ two previous studies: Ires, 1991a andIres, 1991b.

W o r k i n g p a p e r n . 1 2 4 , 1 9 9 9

by a high concentration of popu-lation, extra-agricultural activitiesand infrastructure around onemain urban pole. The principalproblem of metropolitan gover-nance is to produce public servi-ces efficiently, capturing econo-mies of urban scale and taking in-to account the effects of serviceoverspills.

The second identifies the urbanmetropolitan area as a complex,integrated set of several interde-pendent centres, each of which

characterised by a functional spe-cialisation vis-à-vis residential,productive and, in general, ‘envi-ronmental’ functions (to describethe phenomenon, we also speakof functional or urban regions).This set of interrelations demandsthe governance of interdependen-cies at a supramunicipal level byplanning an area vaster than theone linked to the urban agglome-rate itself.

The third, finally, identifies me-tropolises as places characterised

20

Table 7 Economic growth, urban growth and institutional changein Turin: a preliminary and tentative analytical framework

Economic Urban Years Institutional Administrativegrowth growth change challenge

(paradigm)

Industrialisation Urbanisation- 1955-1975 Weak ‘Big villagesuburbanisation intergovernmental problems’

(vertical and horizontal) co-operation

Deindustrialisation Suburbanisation 1975-1985 Regionalisation ‘Urbanagglomeration problems (functional region)’

Growth service Suburbanisation- 1985-1995 Stronger ‘Capital city industry deurbanisation intergovernmental problems’,

(horizontal- ‘big village functional-indirect) problems’co-operation

Post-Fordism Deurbanisation- 1995-… Strong regionalism ‘Capital city reurbanisation or functional problems’

flexible metropolitan governance

by the presence of advancedfunctions connected with strate-gic decision-making activities andinnovation-intensive technologi-cal processes demanding a speci-fic socio-cultural environmentand high quality urban infrastruc-ture. In this case, the metropolishas a radius of influence whichtranscends the regional and natio-nal dimensions and develops anetwork of relations with metro-polises of comparable rank.

Over the years these three ima-ges of metropolitan problems inTurin have succeeded oneanother, thus creating the needfor special institutional solutions.Only rarely, however, have theybeen addressed together.

Only the administrative chal-lenge of wide area services has al-lowed major steps forward to bemade, as we see in the sectionthat follows.

In Turin’s case, the questions ofthe functional region and capitalcity role were addressed as part ofthe debate on the implementationof Law No. 142/1990 during the1990-’95 regional legislature,although at the outset they ten-

ded to get mislaid in a disputeover the boundaries of the newauthority. In 1991 the regionaljunta presented a bill proposing arelatively small-sized metropoli-tan area of 33 communes by wayof application of the structuralmodel envisaged by Law No.142/1990.

During the ensuing debate a re-gional position developed in fa-vour11 of the setting up of an ex-perimental form of metropolitangovernance based on association,beginning as a consortium andsubsequently becoming a confe-rence of metropolitan communes;here we saw explicit acceptanceof a functional (intercommunal)model. In 1995, the new regionaljunta suspended all institutionalinitiatives in this direction, andsince then central commune hasadopted a wait-and-see stance,although it officially favours afunctional approach. The mayorValentino Castellani has explicitlyreferred to the experience of theAgreement for the MetropolitanCity in Bologna12.

The role of the province of Tu-rin has also been marginal,

W o r k i n g p a p e r n . 1 2 4 , 1 9 9 9

21

11 This position emerges with some force in a document published by the regional autho-rity (cf. Regione Piemonte, 1994) proposing the setting up of an association for the Turinmetropolitan area made up not only of the regional and provincial authorities and commu-nes in the area, but also the Chamber of Commerce, universities and research establish-ments, non-profit associations, banking foundations, interest groups and public and priva-te firms. This is the only explicit proposal to date for a model of ‘metropolitan governance’. 12 “Now, luckily, a new school of thought is prevailing: the one of a bottom-up functio-nal approach. In this way we can deal with a variable geometry geographical structure”(cf. Castellani, 1996, p. 111).

W o r k i n g p a p e r n . 1 2 4 , 1 9 9 9

although by virtue of its increasedfunctions it might be able to un-lock the situation of institutionalstalemate in the future.

This is why institutional chan-ges (table 7) since 1995 only showan increase in forms of technical-functional horizontal co-opera-tion, developed largely throughmunicipal concerns, and a que-stion mark looms over the scena-rio of intergovernmental relationsthat can be hypothesised in thenear future.

Ultimately, the case of Turin ef-fectively shows how the mono-poly of geographical representa-tion by existing institutions hasde facto blocked processes of in-stitutional innovation.

2. The development of the mainnetworked metropolitan services

Even without an institutionallystructured governmental autho-rity, since the second half of thenineties the principal networkedservices have been developing inimplicit accordance with a metro-politan reference scale. This typeof development was led by publicand private sector entities withdifferent forms of management(franchises, contracting, relianceon municipal concerns or consor-tia, tenders, production throughcommunal municipal concernsand so on). The services that aremost interesting to analyse froman economic point of view are

those of the so-called ‘water cy-cle’ (aqueduct and effluent watersoftening services).

2.1 The aqueduct service: municipal concerns, privatefirms, communal management

Drinking water supply servicesin the metropolitan area are ope-rated by a plurality of bodiesadopting different managementmodels. Services are currentlysupplied by:– a municipal concern in Turin

and another 11 communes,which represent 45% of the po-pulation of the rest of the area;

– private firms in 12 communesaccounting for 46% of the po-pulation outside Turin;

– direct production by the com-mune in 8 communes.

In addition, a mixed private-pu-blic company with a majoritycommunal stake operates for theaqueduct of Alpignano. The earlynineties saw increases in the num-ber of inhabitants served by themunicipal concern of Turin andSAP-Italgas, which replaced directmanagements and the drinkingwater company.

The water company considera-bly enlarged its area of activity in1982, first to small hillside com-munes and then, from the late ei-ghties, gradually to other commu-nes in the area. The process of ex-tension continued until recently(figure 2), especially outside themetropolitan area.

22

W o r k i n g p a p e r n . 1 2 4 , 1 9 9 9

The lack of a structured metro-politan area appears not to havegiven networked service the mu-ch feared ‘leopard-spot’ configu-ration.

If anything, the real problem isthat, despite the presence of twoconcerns which compete againsteach other (AAM and SAP-Italgas),communes appear not to havereaped the benefits of competi-tion. One explanation for this mi-ght be the administrative naivetéof communes, undemandingwhen they stipulate contracts.Another might be the lack oftransparency of the main bidders.

An oligopolistic concern, be itpublic or private, can achieveeconomies of scale even withoutstructured metropolitan gover-nance, but the problem of consu-mer guarantee and protection re-mains open.

2.2 Effluent water softening services

Technological and operationalunhomogeneities also exist forservices related with effluent wa-ter (the collection and softeningof water from civilian and produc-tive installations, the disposal ofsoftening muds and so on). The

23

Figure 2 Expansion of the municipal aqueduct concern in the eighties and nineties

8

7

7

65

8 2

6

64

93

3

2

2

2

3

3

4

8 8

7

Sap-Italgas

Aam 19872 = 19883 = 19894 = 19905 = 19916 = 19927 = 19938 = 19959 = 1996

W o r k i n g p a p e r n . 1 2 4 , 1 9 9 9

24

quality of communal sewagenetworks varies greatly; this partlydepends on their degree of wearand tear and the separationbetween water for civilian use andwater for industrial use. Thenetworks are almost always opera-ted by the communes themselveswith their own personnel and pe-riodical interventions by speciali-sed firms; only in a few cases is theservice completely delegated toprivate firms through special con-ventions. Water softening, in-stead, is almost entirely publiclyoperated, carried out largely bythe Azienda Po Sangone which,through a network of sewage col-lectors, receives the effluent waterof 18 communes in the area otherthan Turin, and covers 85% of thepopulation. Three consortia alsooperate on behalf of 6 communes(10% of the population of thearea). In the remaining 9 commu-nes, water is softened at smallcommunally-owned plants self-managed by private firms. In twocases, a single firm operates bothaqueduct and sewage networks, aswell as softening plants.

The water softening concernhas expanded considerably in re-cent years, especially outside themetropolitan area. A total of 31communes have joined the con-sortium and, in 1997, five com-munes in the area stipulated anagreement with the company forthe management of sewer net-works.

2.3 Other servicesThe area in which solid waste

cycle and transport activities ope-rate has also expanded.

The collection and transport ofurban solid waste apparently re-quires minimal ceilings of usersserved to enable the operatingfirm to use the capital allocationsneeded optimally. It is also felt,however, that it fails to give riseto sizeable economies of scaleabove this level (minimal ceilingsare, nonetheless, low, fewer than100,000 inhabitants). A largenumber of private and publicfirms in the area provide a servi-ce similar to that of the munici-pal concern of Turin, with com-parable cost burdens, calculatedin terms of spending by quintalcollected or inhabitant served,and chargeable to the communesinvolved.

Less homogeneous proceduresare adopted to dispose of waste.In certain cases, the service is in-tegrated into municipal concernsor consortia which already hand-le the collection of solid urbanwaste and dispose of it within thearea of the commune; in other ca-ses, disposal is totally delegatedto the solid urban waste collec-tion contractor.

The other services considered –street cleaning and washing anddifferentiated collection – areprovided virtually everywhere.

Albeit without expanding, thetransport service also has become

W o r k i n g p a p e r n . 1 2 4 , 1 9 9 9

more integrated, especially throu-gh tariff innovations.

This service boasts a multiplicityof operators in the area, and thetransport supply is largely radial,converging on Turin. It consists ofboth rail and road transport.

The rail service is made up of10 lines belonging to the Turin FS

State Railway division and the Tu-rin-Ceres and Canavesana linesoperated under franchise by Satti.Road transport is differentiatedinto an urban/suburban service(more frequent and continuouswith a basic fixed fare) and an in-tercommunal service (less conti-nuous with a fare system based onblock distances). The suburbanservice largely covers the first ringof Turin. Forty-seven companiesprovide the local transport servi-ce in the area. In view of the mo-bility and commuter-type travelround the node (Turin), not tomention the present complexionof the transport supply, the areaclearly has the right characteri-stics for the integrated control ofmobility. The metropolitan cityconfiguration which emerges isalmost circular in shape with a ra-dius of 15-20 km and is made upof 35 communes besides Turin.The single basic fare policy waslaunched in 1996 under the ‘For-mula’ project. The distinctionbetween urban, suburban, inter-communal and rail fares was eli-minated so that any user can tra-vel on any means of public tran-

sport, be it rail or road, simply bybuying one unified travel docu-ment (ticket or season ticket).

2.4 Privatisations in progressLaw No. 142/1990 has laid the

bases for a large number of com-munal activities to be performedthrough autonomous forms of or-ganisation, thus creating a newmodel of communal managementwhich has been dubbed in somequarters as ‘the Commune cumholding company’. It is arguedthat the Commune ought tobehave like a parent companywhich performs no direct pro-duction and trade activity, butconfines itself to directing subsi-diaries. From the point of view ofthe economy of local government,these innovations are of broad in-terest for at least two reasons. Inthe first place, a sizeable part ofthe activity carried out by Com-munes could be privatised: theeconomic criteria used to choosebetween public and private sectorfor the supply and production ofa given service are thus of consi-derable operating importance.Secondly, the legislation in que-stion stems from the gradual cut-ting of costs of the so-called natu-ral monopolies as a result of a se-ries of technological innovations,which now tend to make forms ofcompetition possible even in sec-tors (water, electricity, etc.) tradi-tionally entrusted to communalmonopolies. As in Bologna, the

25

W o r k i n g p a p e r n . 1 2 4 , 1 9 9 9

26

municipal concerns of Turin werealso swept by a wave of ‘neo-libe-ralism’ – validated by the PartitoDemocratico della Sinistra – whi-ch led to the setting up of a speci-fic communal department as earlyas 1993. Now, four years on, thegradual introduction of munici-pal concerns onto the market(quotation on the stock exchangecannot be ruled out in the future,but for the moment the Commu-ne is holding onto a majoritystake) is, de facto, only just begin-ning. The Commune has nowconverted the water and electri-city concerns (AAM and AEM) in-to limited companies, while theurban transport and urban hygie-ne concerns (ATM and AMIAT) ha-ve stayed under communal con-trol with ‘special company’ status.Only in the case of the electricalconcern has a minority share ofthe capital been put on sale to theprivate sector. Delays have beencaused both by political forces inthe city council and by the tradeunions and managers at the con-cerns themselves, who are favou-rable towards leaner forms of or-ganisation but also determined tomaintain the balance of power ofthe monopolistic management ofservices. Concerns have seen thereform as an opportunity to im-plement their strategies more ef-fectively in a supracommunal per-spective, further developing theimplicitly functional model refer-red to above. The ‘società per

azioni’ (limited company) modeloffers them three types of advan-tage. First, it facilitates the re-course to indebtedness (throughforms of project financing, forexample) or, in any event, capita-lisation to make the investmentnecessary to develop networksand service areas. Secondly, limi-ted companies are no longersubject to legal constraints fromthe geographical point of view;more precisely, unlike municipalconcerns they can provide theirservices anywhere. Thirdly, thechoice of limited company legalstatus ensures greater transpa-rency in patrimonial and financialdealings with the Commune,although it reduces competitionfor the service, which may be en-trusted directly without a call fortenders.

The social connotation of thepublic services to be entrusted tolimited companies demands aneffective control system to assurethe public interest and ensure ser-vice quality. Whereas in the caseof disposals (entrustment to thirdparties), these guarantees are con-tained in the deed of concession,in the setting up of limited com-panies the control is envisaged inthe convention which accompa-nies the entrustment of the servi-ce and is also guaranteed by thepowers attributed by law to thecommunal assembly.

Two final considerations maybe pertinent to the analysis of our

W o r k i n g p a p e r n . 1 2 4 , 1 9 9 9

27

research project. First, the con-cept of the metropolitan area as atool for solving the problems ofbig cities through the direct pro-duction of public services exploi-ting economies of scale and scopeloses further ground. In contrast,greater recourse to the market th-rough privatisation stresses theneed for an authority monitoringefficiency, guaranteeing competi-tion, controlling quality and pro-tecting consumers over an areathat is probably larger than thatstrictly needed to achieve econo-mies of scale. Secondly, the diffi-culties encountered in the pro-cess of privatisation reveal the on-going mutual diffidence and im-permeability of public and priva-te actors. Hence the problems in-volved in building coalitions ofinterests at an urban level. It is nocoincidence that certain under-the-surface signs of interest forthe municipal electrical concernfrom Fiat group companies werenot received with overt enthusia-sm in the city’s political debate.

3. In search of political leadership

Why doesn’t the metropolitanquestion figure in Turin’s politicalagenda?

The answer lies in the insuffi-cient initiative of local public andprivate élites in building what, inother parts of this study, has beendefined as a ‘public policy com-

munity’. Big industry plays amajor role among private localélites in Turin. The saying ‘If Fiatis well, Turin is well too’ showshow the city was long identifiedwith the large-scale enterpriseround which its economic and, inpart, political systems rotated. Inrecent years Fiat, which, it wouldbe wrong to forget, is Italy’s lar-gest private industrial group, hasfully integrated in globalisationprocesses, successfully installingnew production locations in Asia(India) and South America (Bra-zil, Argentina). Turin, of course,is more than just Fiat and, as wehave seen, the area boasts a tech-nologically rich industrial fabric.In the services sector, it boasts therecently privatised Istituto Banca-rio San Paolo which, in terms ofassets, is Italy’s largest bankinggroup. Private players have failed,however, to perform an active ro-le in building a system of metro-politan governance. The most at-tentive observers of the Turinarea as a local society (Bagnasco,1996, 1990; Gallino, 1990) havelong been agreed that difficultiesof policy-making are due to thepolitical subsystem’s weaknesswith respect to the economic sy-stem. “Turin emerged from For-dism with an urgent need to re-build politics” (Bagnasco, 1990,p. 17). From this point of view,the absence of an explicit metro-politan government is simply theother face of the absence of what

W o r k i n g p a p e r n . 1 2 4 , 1 9 9 9

28

has been defined as ‘orgware’13:namely, organising capacity or“the ability to enlist all actors in-volved, and with their help to ge-nerate new ideas and develop andimplement a policy designed torespond to fundamental develop-ments and create conditions forsustainable development” (Vanden Berg - Braun - Van der Meer,1997, p. 256), a concept whichcan easily be traced to that of go-vernance14. It is also true, howe-ver, that it is not easy to weld theeconomic strategies of the leadinglocal private sector and politicalactors (Mazza, 1990). The firstare part of a network of interna-tional economic relations whichinevitably pushes them away fromtheir local roots, given the lack ofa lucid political-institutional stra-tegy capable of fostering the co-

operation of private interests,especially through real estate andinfrastructure policies (i.e., tran-sparent governance of the urbanrevenue). For example, the Fiat’sold Lingotto car productionplant, built in the twenties and asplendid example of industrial ar-chaeology, was converted into aservice centre without a clear ur-ban development strategy on thepart of the city of Turin and stillshows unsatisfactory economicreturns (Bobbio, 1991; Van denBerg - Braun - Van der Meer,1997).

Will the new municipal politicalclass in the Turin area be capableof recovering these delays? InItaly detailed analyses have yet tobe made of the effects of commu-nal electoral reform on the localpolitical class15. In Turin and some

13 The reference is to a study carried out by Euricur on behalf of the Eurocities Associa-tion based on eight European cities, among which Turin, Bologna and Rotterdam. Thestudy sets out from the model of Porter (1990), who identifies three types of factors un-derlying competitiveness in the different areas: tangible, ‘hardware’ factors such as la-bour, capital and infrastructure; intangible ‘software’ factors such as those connectedwith the quality of life; and, finally, ‘orgware’, the ability to handle urban hardware andsoftware effectively. Leadership, vision and strategy, strategic networks, political supportand societal support emerge as the critical factors for a successful organising capacity inan urban area.14 Attempts have been made to overcome this delay. The first was based on a cycle of se-minars, ‘Discussions on Turin’ promoted by economic actors (including Fiat, GFT, Ban-ca CRT, Istituto Bancario San Paolo) in 1988 and 1989, which sought to encourage scho-lars, administrators and firms to open a debate on the future of the city (cf. Bagnasco,1991). In 1992, through the Torino Incontra Association, the Turin Chamber of Com-merce presented a dossier of proposals to relaunch Turin (Torino Incontra, 1992), invol-ving all the strategic local economic and political actors. A similar initiative was launchedin July 1997 (Torino Incontra, 1997). The aim of these initiatives was precisely to iden-tify a shared vision of the future of the area, but they appear to have had no political fal-lout to date.15 The most recent was that of Bettin - Magnier, 1995.

W o r k i n g p a p e r n . 1 2 4 , 1 9 9 9

29

communes of the metropolitanarea, two elections have alreadybeen held under the new rules. Itis thus possible to ask to what ex-tent this has affected the prospectsfor a new metropolitan govern-ment. Various Italian studies haveshown how, in the first 25 years inthe life of the Republic, the mayorsof large cities displayed all thecharacteristics of local notables,but were actually selected throughintermediation by the parties16. Inthe sixties, a new type of mayoremerged, more closely tied to thephenomenon of the professionali-sation of politics as a consequenceof the growing role of politicalparties in Italian society. The 1993reform, combined with the inten-se process of delegitimatisation oftraditional political parties increa-sed the clout of mayors and cityspokesmen arriving directly fromcivil society, although empiricalevidence shows that the channelsof recruitment are still very often,directly or indirectly, linked to thepolitical parties. What would ap-pear to be becoming more conso-lidated is a managerial-entrepre-neurial vision of the mayor’s role,an experience to be exploited sub-sequently not so much in high-le-vel political posts as in managerial

activities in civil society, especiallyin the world of economics. Politicsis no longer defined as ‘the capa-city to deal with men but to dealwith the rules and financial re-sources offered by the communalmachine with a view to achievingshort-term concrete objectives’(Bettin - Magnier, 1995, p. 116).

In reality, the failure to solve theproblems of a large urban area su-ch as Turin confirms how the1993 reform has mainly influen-ced forms of communal govern-ment, stabilising executives andhelping bipolar electoral modelsto emerge, but also that this is anecessary but not a sufficient con-dition to perform a role of gover-nance. In other words, it has in-fluenced the capacity to solve col-lective problems such as the pro-motion of an adequate process ofdevelopment of a metropolitanarea17. As analysis of other studycases shows, local institutions mu-st be capable of governing a com-plex network of interactionsamong the principal public andprivate players inside a metropoli-tan area. Indeed, in Turin the par-tial ‘de-professionalisation’ of po-litics is, in all likelihood, in para-doxical contrast with the need fora ‘metropolitan political entrepre-

16 See Bettin - Magnier, 1995 and Spreafico, 1963. For differences between French andItalian mayors, see the now classic study by Tarrow (1979); on the effects of the 1993electoral legislation, see Vandelli, 1997. 17 For an analysis of the problems connected with the decision-making processes of Ita-lian communes, see Bobbio, 1997.

W o r k i n g p a p e r n . 1 2 4 , 1 9 9 9

30

neur’ capable of building a newsupracommunal political spaceand creating a specific coalition ofinterests – a sort of Turinese ur-ban growth machine – specificallyfor the purpose. The lack of astrategic metropolitan planningscheme as a symbolic foundationfor the new political space isfurther proof of the fact. The ab-sence of a clear metropolitan poli-tical leadership – a feature clearlyevident in the other case studies,with the exception of the Geneva-Lausanne metropolis – is proba-bly the main cause of Turin’s insti-tutional stagnation.

All of which is bound up withthe problems, outlined above, ofintergovernmental relations inItaly, where existing institutionsare an objective obstacle to me-tropolitan reform – and not onlyin Turin, as the history of Bolognashows.

The picture we have outlinedhere would be incompletewithout a brief reference to theconduct of the mayors of thecommunes in the metropolitanarea. In a recent Ires survey onthe 42 mayors of communes inTurin’s two concentric suburbanrings18, the absence of a metropo-litan political space – i.e., a con-text of preferential co-operativerelations – clearly emerges. Rela-tions between satellite communes

and the central commune itselfare regarded by mayors as diffi-cult and conflictual and the imageof the commune of Turin whichemerges is one of a subject withhegemonic intentions, keen todump the negative effects of itsown policies on bordering com-munes. The meagre technical-po-litical interactions which take pla-ce are concentrated exclusively inthe communes of the first ring.Vice versa, networks of relationsbased on mutual confidence havedeveloped among the variousgroups of communes of the me-tropolitan area, which often cor-respond to the administrativespaces previously occupied by lo-cal health units. Likewise, it isworth noting that these co-opera-tive formulas are often designedto promote economic develop-ment initiatives. If friction some-times arises among communes, itusually stems from differences insize (i.e., small communes versuslarge communes).

Answers to a specific requestfor an assessment of the metropo-litan model reveal the existence ofthree categories of mayors: thosein favour of structural solutions,supporters of a functional-typesolution and mild opponents,those with strong doubts but, no-netheless, open to a functional so-lution, which thus gains majority

18 Cf. Ires, 1998.

W o r k i n g p a p e r n . 1 2 4 , 1 9 9 9

31

approval (figure 3). All, however,betrayed a certain unwillingnessto side with one solution ratherthan another out of fear of largerentities such as the Commune ofTurin and the Provincial and Re-gional Authorities. This diffiden-ce also derives from the fact thatmayors have very vague knowled-ge – if any at all – of metropolitangovernment reform proposals orof the experiments in progress (inBologna, Rome and Florence).

Conclusions

The Turin area has long expe-rience of the problems caused bythe two main types of institutio-nal fragmentation: namely, func-

tional and political. The problemof metropolitan governance hasinvariably been addressed interms of the second. The specialauthorities set up to solve secto-rial/functional problems have, vi-ce versa, low political visibility.There is more talk about the in-clusion of Poirino (a communeon the outskirts of Turin) in themetropolitan area than the exten-sion of the aqueduct service the-reto by the city of Turin’s munici-pal water company. In this sense,the technical bureaucracies ofspecial companies have played amajor role, fostering the emer-gence of what we have defined asan implicit functional model th-rough a variable geometry geo-

Figure 3 Opinions of mayors in the metropolitan area about modelsof metropolitan government

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

7

14

9

structural functional uncertain

W o r k i n g p a p e r n . 1 2 4 , 1 9 9 9

32

graphical structure. This modellooks bound to be consolidatedvis-à-vis an emerging phenome-non mentioned above – that ofthe privatisation of some net-worked services – which makesthe problem of co-ordinating lo-cal public services among the va-rious communes of the con-urbation less important, irrespec-tive of certain aspects of strategicpolicies in the area (for example,choices for water sourcing or thelocation of refuse disposal sites).

The consequence of politicalfragmentation has been poor co-operation between the centralcommune and the communes inthe area, which have always felt‘exploited’ by Turin (in the fieldof public building policies, forexample). This has hindered thedevelopment of a ‘metropolitancommunity’; as a result, today themetropolitan problem is one ofgovernance and, as such, cannotbe easily solved using the originalproposals envisaged by Law No.142/1990.

The sad fact is that Turin hasfailed to respond equally well –returning to Dente’s effective ter-minology – to the problems of the‘big village’, the ‘functional re-gion’ and the ‘capital city’.

Our initial research leads us tofeel that the ‘big village’ challengehas been partly addressed andwon. The management of large-scale networked services in theTurin metropolitan area would

appear to rely more on privatisa-tion and market decentralisationthan on the building of new pu-blic co-ordination structures atthe metropolitan level.

There can be no doubt, though,that responses to the ‘functionalregion’ and ‘capital city’ challen-ges have fallen short of the mark.The need for co-ordination ofland planning policies (the func-tions communes are most jealousof!) has yet to mature, with theconsequence that there is no sha-red vision of the future of the area– a necessary premise for any at-tempt at strategic planning (it isimportant to note that this stateof affairs exists despite the factthat, politically, the local govern-ment majority is relatively homo-geneous). There are contradic-tory signals that the need is nowbeginning to be felt. For example,an agency (Agenzia per gli inve-stimenti a Torino e in Piemonte)has been set up to promote inve-stment in Turin and Piedmont,through a partnership among theRegion, the Province, the munici-pality of Turin, the Chamber ofCommerce and some industrialassociations; a convention hasbeen stipulated between theCommune of Turin and 17 com-munes in the surrounding area toco-ordinate cultural policies, butthe new urban policy planningand co-ordination mission recen-tly established for the CIT (theTurin Intercommunal Consor-

W o r k i n g p a p e r n . 1 2 4 , 1 9 9 9

33

tium, an association of 17 com-munes in the metropolitan area)so far has been unsuccessful. It is,nonetheless, significant that inthe election programmes of thecandidates of the two major poli-tical groupings (Polo per le Li-bertà [Pole for Liberties] andL’Ulivo Alleanza per il Governo[Olive Tree Government Allian-ce]) in the recent mayoral elec-tions in Turin, the metropolitanissue was entirely marginal. Theprogramme of the outgoingmayor Castellani (re-elected onMay 11, 1997) only speaks of thehypothesis of building a ‘forumfor development’ to promote Tu-rin’s development on new econo-mic bases, open to entrepreneurs,social forces, cultural institutionsand universities, without anymention of the other communesin the metropolitan area19.

A variety of different explana-tions can be put forward for allthese hold-ups. First and foremo-st, comes the conflict between re-gional authority and local authori-ties. For the regional authority,the birth of a powerful metropoli-tan local government would se-riously jeopardise its role. If Italywere to embark on the roadtowards a strong regional model,we would most likely be faced

with weak metropolitan govern-ments (along the lines of Ger-many and Spain). If, vice versa,the regional experience were toprogressively decline, we mightfind ourselves with a network oflarge cities allied with their re-spective provincial authorities,which would negotiate directlywith the central government overthe most important urban poli-cies. Likewise, there continues tobe reciprocal diffidence betweenTurin and the communes of its va-rious rings, which are afraid ofbeing dominated by the centralcommune, seen as a sort of ‘bigbrother’. The interviews with themayors show that the climate ofdiffidence is caused not only byobjectively bad past experiences,but also by a lack of mutual con-tact and information; the fact isthat no federal model can be in-troduced if there is no entity topromote a network of trust(although it is not clear what thatentity should be) similar to theone that has underpinned the Bo-logna experiment. After all, thefailure of the project to set up anew province in Rotterdam20

shows just how hard it is to builda model of consensus round thegovernment of a large urban area,even when external conditions are

19 The proposal is contained in a paragraph in the programme entitled precisely ‘A capi-tal city’.20 Cf. Te Velde, 1996; Vergès, 1997; Van der Veer, 1998.

W o r k i n g p a p e r n . 1 2 4 , 1 9 9 9

34

exceedingly favourable, as well asthe importance of effective publiccommunication when under-taking courageous institutional in-novation; last but not least, thelack of visible political leadership.

In conclusion, to use the evereffective metaphor of Ostrom,Tiebout and Warren21, no one inTurin is waiting for Gargantua tosolve all its metropolitan pro-blems, but the emergence of ametropolitan governance modelis still a long way behind schedu-le. Nonetheless, over the last twoor three years there has been aclear tendency – at least in thecultural debate – to question thestructural model envisaged by

Law No. 142/1990 and replace itwith contractual/federative-typehypotheses22 consistent with theproposals of national laws, iden-tifying what we have called the‘capital city challenge’ as the cruxof the metropolitan problem. Anew proposal is under the scru-tiny of parliament and, if appro-ved, could open a new way forthe building of a functional flexi-ble model.

It is hard to say, however, if andwhen the issue will be addressed.Only when the future develop-ment of regionalism in Italy beco-mes clearer shall we able to un-derstand the direction that policywill move in.

21 Cf. Ostrom - Tiebout - Warren, 1961.22 For a reconstruction of the problem of the government of metropolitan areas in Italy,see Ferlaino - Piperno, 1996.

W o r k i n g p a p e r n . 1 2 4 , 1 9 9 9

35

References

BETTIN, G. - MAGNIER, A.,1995 I nuovi Sindaci: come cambia una carriera politica, in “Rivista

Italiana di Scienza Politica”, No. 1, XXV, pp. 91-118

BAGNASCO, A.,1986 Torino. Un profilo sociologico. Torino: Einaudi.

BAGNASCO, A. ( ed.),1990 La città dopo Ford. Il caso di Torino. Torino: Einaudi.

BOBBIO, L.,1991 Gli attori delle grandi trasformazioni urbane a Torino, in Atti e

rassegna tecnica della Società degli Ingegneri e degli Architetti,Nos. 9-10, XLV, pp. 466-470.

BOBBIO, L.,1997 I processi decisionali nei comuni italiani, in “Stato e mercato”,

No. 49, April, pp. 39-66.

CASTELLANI, V.,1996 Il mestiere di Sindaco. Milano: Baldini e Castoldi.

CCIAA,1996 Osservatorio sulla diffusione dell’innovazione. Torino: Camera

di Commercio Industria, Artigianato e Agricoltura.

CHINITZ, B.,1961 Contrasts in Agglomeration: New York and Pittsburgh, in “Ame-

rican Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings”, pp. 279-289.

W o r k i n g p a p e r n . 1 2 4 , 1 9 9 9

36

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,1992 Urbanisation and the Functions of Cities in the European Com-

munities, Directorate-General for Regional Policies, RegionalDevelopment Studies, Bruxelles.

CONFORTI, L. - DAVICO, L. - MELA, A.,1997 Mobilità residenziale e ristrutturazione dello spazio metropolita-

no: il caso torinese, in Atti della XVIII Conferenza italiana diScienze Regionali, Siracusa, 8-11 October.

DENTE, B.,1989 Del governare la metropoli: obiettivi sostanziali e strumenti isti-

tuzionali, in “Stato e mercato”, No. 26, August, pp. 279-303.

FERLAINO, F. - PIPERNO S.,1996 La Reforme du gouvernment local en Italie: l’institution des ai-

res métropolitaines. Torino: Ires, Documenti Ires, No. 7.

GALLINO, L.,1990 Policy making in condizioni avverse, in Bagnasco, 1990, quot.

IRES,1989 Progettare la città e il territorio. Una rassegna critica di 100 pro-

getti per Torino e il Piemonte. Torino: Rosenberg & Sellier.

IRES,1991a Studio preliminare per la delimitazione dell’area metropolitana

di Torino. Torino: Ires, Working Paper No. 98.

IRES,1991b Le aree metropolitane tra specificità e complementarità. Torino:

Ires, Dibattiti Ires, No. 2.

IRES,1994 Uscire dal labirinto. Studi per l’attuazione della riforma delle

autonomie in Piemonte. Torino: Rosenberg & Sellier.

IRES,1995 L’attuazione dei principali progetti di trasformazione urbana e

territoriale in Piemonte 1995. Torino: Rosenberg & Sellier.

W o r k i n g p a p e r n . 1 2 4 , 1 9 9 9

37

IRES,1995b Relazione sulla situazione economica, sociale e territoriale del

Piemonte 1994. Torino: Rosenberg & Sellier.

IRES,1997 Relazione sulla situazione economica, sociale e territoriale del

Piemonte 1996. Torino: Rosenberg & Sellier.

IRES,1998 Aspetti istituzionali dell’area metropolitana di Torino, in “Mi-

meo”.

LEFÈVRE, C.,1996 Gouvernments metropolitains et gouvernance dans les pays occi-

dentaux, in Dynamiques institutionelles des Regions Urbaines enEurope: analyse comparée. Actes de seminaire de 8 et 9 No-vembre 1996, Lyon.

MAZZA, L.,1990 Società locale e strategie economiche: è possibile una convergen-

za nella politica urbana, in Bagnasco, 1990, quot.

OSTROM, V. - TIEBOUT, C. M. - WARREN, R.,1961 The Organisation of Government in Metropolitan Areas: a Theo-

retical Inquiry, in ‘The American Political Science Review’, No.55, December, pp. 831-842.

PORTER, M.,1990 The Competitive Advantage of Nations, in ‘The Free Press’,

New York.

REGIONE PIEMONTE,1994 Area metropolitana torinese: rapporto sulle politiche in corso. To-

rino.

SPREAFICO, A.,1963 L’Amministrazione e il cittadino. Milano: Edizioni di Comunità.

TE VELDE, R.,1996 The Administrative Challenge. Rotterdam: Mimeo.

W o r k i n g p a p e r n . 1 2 4 , 1 9 9 9

38

TORINO INCONTRA,1992 Una alternativa al declino - 18 idee per lo sviluppo di Torino ne-

gli anni novanta. Torino.

TORINO INCONTRA,1997 Crescere in rete- 18 idee per Torino e il Piemonte. Torino.

VAN DEN BERG, L. - BRAUN, E. – VAN DER MEER, J.,1996 Organising Capacity of Metropolitan Cities. Rotterdam: Euricur.

VAN DEN BERG, L. - BRAUN E. - VAN DER MEER, J.,1997 The Organising Capacity of Metropolitan Regions, in “Govern-

ment & Policy”, vol. 15, No. 3, August, pp. 253-272.

VAN DER VEER, J.,1998 Metropolitan Government in Amsterdam and Eindhoven: a Tale

of Two Cities, in “Government & Policy”, vol. 16, No. 1, Ja-nuary, pp. 26-50.

VERGÈS, V.,1997 L’Experience du Grand Rotterdam comme institution metropoli-

taine en devenir, in CNRS, Dynamiques institutionelles des ré-gions urbaines en Europe: analyse comparée, intermediate re-port, Octobre.

VANDELLI, L.,1997 Sindaci e miti. Bologna: Il Mulino.