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The Madhyamaka and Modern Western PhilosophyAuthor(s): Peter Della Santina

Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Jan., 1986), pp. 41-54Published by: University of Hawai'i PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1398507

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Peter Della Santina The Madhyamaka and modern Western philosophy

INTRODUCTION

The task of comparative philosophy presupposes a more or less intimate ac-

quaintance with the philosophies or philosophical traditions to be compared.While the writer of this article may perhaps pretend to a reasonable familiaritywith the

Madhyamaka philosophy,he cannot

pretendto a similar

familiaritywith the Western philosophical tradition. This is said not as an excuse, but as a

justification for the approach that is proposed for adoption in this article.

Moreover, in the case in hand, it is proposed not simply to compare one

philosophy with another philosophy, but rather a philosophy with a philosophi-cal tradition which is by no means homogeneous. Since it is in any case not

practicable to attempt to consider modern Western philosophy in its entirety,certain significantmovements within the tradition will be dealt with instead, and

reference will be made to specific systems only insofar as they serve to illustrate

these movements or philosophical attitudes. In this context, it must be said thatthe task of selection has been made easier by the fact that in this century, there

have been a number of attempts to identify Western counterparts of the Mad-

hyamaka philosophy. This is of particularinterest when the question of critiqueis to be approached, because it will be of greater value if the Madhyamaka is

evaluated in relation to philosophies which at least on the surface have some

claim to share the same universeof discourse. The examination of what might be

the Madhyamaka critique of the thought of Kant and Wittgenstein is more

promising, because these philosophies do bear some resemblance to the Mad-

hyamaka, and have been recognized as such by modern scholars. Nonetheless, if

comparison and critique are to be something more than merely an arid in-

tellectualexercise, it will be necessaryto look not only at the tenets of the systemsto be so treated, but also at their antecedents and their purpose. Finally, in

concluding this preamble, let it be said that philosophical comparisons have all

too often in the past been undertaken with the idea of securing enhanced

philosophical respectabilityfor one of the two systemsinvolved. That this hardlydoes justice to the intrinsic value, such as it is, of the system whose status is

sought to be enhanced need scarcelybe said. Alternatively, comparisons may beundertakenwith a view to facilitating the understandingof a given philosophy in

an alien universe of discourse. While this objective is undoubtedly worthy, onemust guard against facile and superficialequations which may do more to foster

misunderstanding than to promote comprehension. It is therefore imperativethat genuine differences not be glossed over in the excitement of discoveringapparent parallels.

Peter Della Santinareceivedhis Ph.D. in BuddhistStudies rom the University of Delhi, and is a part-time Lecturer at the National Universityof Singapore.PhilosophyEast and West36, no. 1 (January, 1986). © by The University of Hawaii Press. All rights reserved.



42 Della Santina

PHILOSOPHY: EAST AND WEST

Beforeproceeding any further, t may be useful for me to restatesomethingwhich

may seem obvious to those who areused to these investigations,but which is yetso important that it may profitablybe reiteratedif only becauseit informs much

of what will be said later:namely, that the nature and historyof the philosophicalenterprise n theEast, specifically n India,has beenverydifferent rom thatin the

West. It may be said without fearof arousingmuch controversythat philosophyin India has always partakenof what has come to be called in the West religion,

and, conversely, that religion in India has always partakenof what has come to

be called in the West philosophy. To put it anotherway, the distinction between

philosophy and religion,whichhas until ratherrecentlybeen so sharplydrawnin

the West, does not by and large apply to the Indiantradition.Indianphilosophy,

therefore,has always contained and often been characterizedby a soteriological

preoccupation. This is not, however, to say that it thereby ceases to be philo-

sophy. On the contrary, it may be argued that it is philosophy par excellence,

philosophy with an existential relevance which philosophy in the West has not

until very recently and even now not fully secured. Moreover, this existential

relevance of Indian philosophy has not been purchased, as some would like to

think, at the cost of intellectual clarity or even scientificrigor.

In the West, the story of philosophy has been something quite different.

Although the philosophical enterprisewitnessed a promising start in Greece, it

soon fell into disrepute largelyas the result of the growthof Christianorthodoxy.Philosophy did not accord well either with Semitic monotheism or with the

Christianemphasison faith. Despite occasional and furtiveflirtationswith Neo-

Platonism, as for instance in Augustine, Christian orthodoxy remained stead-

fastly waryof reason and gnosis. Small wonder in a traditionwhich had inherited

the Judaic conviction of the absolute otherness and inaccessibility of God and

which was anxious to preservethe uniquenessof Christ and of faith in Christas

the sole means of bridging the gulf between the absolute and man. Although

Neo-Platonism did to some extent subvert Christianorthodoxy in the shape of

mystical experience, the accommodation between the Judeo-Christiantradition

and a gnostic soteriology was always an uneasy one. Mysticism, thanks perhaps

to its esotericquality,managedto survivein the hostile climate of orthodoxy, but

philosophy fell by the wayside.

It was not until the advent of modern scienceand the Europeanenlightenment

thatWesternphilosophy againdaredto raise its head,and whenit did so, it found

itself in the unenviable position of being neither here nor there, in a sort of

halfway house betweenreligionand science. It could not aspireto the soteriolog-

ical content and existential relevanceof

religion,but neither could it

pretend,despite sometimes ferventefforts, to the intellectualrigor of science. As a result,

philosophy in the West remained until very recently an academic diversion, a



43

parlorgame for the educated few who neitherwerecalled to the churchnor chose

to follow the utilitarian way of science. The effects of the limitation of the wider

and, one might well argue, legitimate role of philosophy are still very much

evident in the thought of Kant and in that of his contemporaries and immediate

successors. Indeed, it was not until this century that philosophy in the West

began to show signs of recovery from the crippling experienceof orthodoxy andan inclination to resume its classical role as a whole science (of becoming) with a

soteriological concern and an existential relevance.

RATIONALISM AND EMPIRICISM

The historyof modern Westernphilosophy began with the conflict betweenratio-

nalism and empiricism. It is an accepted fact that even the philosophy of Kant

(which will be dealt with at some length presently)was an attempt to resolve this

early and apparently insoluble problem of Western philosophy. Briefly, the

conflict revolves around the question of whether certain generalpropositions-that A is A and not non-A, and that every event must have a cause, and so

forth-are a priori facts about reality or merely a posteriori conventions. In the

first alternative, such propositions are assumed to be innate, the result of direct

rational insight and so universally necessary. In the second alternative, they are

derived from experience and therefore merely contingent.lThe Madhyamaka, and indeed Buddhistsin general,have no difficultydealing

with the problem of generalpropositions which appearto be innate or a priori-

that is, not the products of immediateexperience.They are able to do so becauseof the conception of rebirth. In the Buddhist view, this life is the effect of a

countless series of earlier lives. The totality of experienceaccumulated through-out these existences results in what are termed mental formations or predispo-sitions (samskdra).For Buddhists, such predispositions contain not only a static

element but also a dynamic one, for which reason the term is sometimes trans-

lated as volitions. In otherwords, the totality of accumulatedexperiencenot only

supplies the patternof experience,but also inclines one to act in a particularway

according to habitual tendencies. However, here it is the static more than the

volitional aspect of mental formations that is of interest, and Buddhists have a

specific word for this static aspect of intentionality. It is vdsana, mental im-

pression or propensities. Mental impressions are the habitual patternscreated inthe mind by repeated experience.Nagarjuna is quite specificabout ascribingthe

appearanceof the world to mental impressions.2So what of a prioripropositions?For Buddhists, they are a priori in the sense that they are not derived from the

experienceof this life alone; in other words, they arewith one at birth.Nonethe-

less, they arenot a priori in the sense that they arenot the result of what has beencalled rational

insight, but are rather ultimately the outcome of accumulatedexperience over innumerable existences. Nor are they necessary. This last doesnot concern Buddhists because they have never been exercised over how things



44 Della Santina

must be in all possible worlds, but on the contrary, their concern is with how

things are here and now.

IDEALISM AND REALISM

If the history of Westernphilosophy has been colored from the beginningby the

conflict between rationalismand empiricism,there is also anotherconflict which

has been perhaps of even greater importance. That is the conflict between

idealism and realism. Like the conflict between rationalism and empiricism,the

conflict between idealism and realism may be traced to an ambivalence in the

attitude of Descartes, but unlike the first-mentionedconflict, that between ideal-

ism and realism did have a similar history in the Buddhist philosophical tra-

dition. Descartes was able to hold that rational insight supplies necessarytruth

about reality (despite the devil, who induced him to doubt the very existence of

the externalworld)only because of his confidencein thegoodness of God.3 While

the latter may have constituted a satisfactory solution for Descartes, the doubtwhich he so unambiguously articulated was to dog philosophy for a very long

time in the West.

Naive realism is content to accept things for what they appear to be; it is the

attitude of the man in the street. But philosophers are often not content to leave

things alone. If they were, they would not be philosophers, but tradesmen or

agriculturists.In addition, certain obvious examplesof illusion, suchas the moon

appearing largerat the horizon that at the zenith, may have contributed to the

growing preoccupation with the question of the reality of the external world.

This led to the emergence of representativeor critical realism, a notoriously

unstable philosophical position. Briefly, it affirmedthat although the external

world exists, perception does not provide direct access to it. All that perception

provides is acquaintancewith the representationsor effectsof the externalworld.

The problem is that if one is never directly acquainted with the externalworld,

but only with its representationsor effects,how is one to know for certain that it

exists at all. The inescapability of this question once again brought philosophy

face to face with Descartes' devil. The only obvious solution was idealism of

either the dogmatic or the pragmaticvariety. The inevitability of this process isclearly illustratedin the West by Locke and Berkeley.

The history of the evolution of Buddhist schools in India is also not without

examples of the movement from naive realism to representative realism to

idealism. The first is nicely illustratedby the Vaibhasikaschool, perhapsthe first

systematic formulation of the philosophy of the Buddha. The Vaibhasika inter-

pretation could not, however, remain unchallenged for long in the critical

environment of the Buddhist tradition, and soon it was supplanted by the

Sautrantika school, a species of representativeor critical realism which had a

much greaterrole to play in the evolution of Buddhistthought in India. Nonethe-

less, the inherent instability of the Sautrantikaposition was not long to endure

unnoticed. The Yogacara or Vijiinnavadaresponded to the Sautrantikaview of



45

representativerealism by jettisoning the external world. This was easy for the

Yogacarins, because they, deeply influenced as they were by the model of

meditative experience, had no particularlove or use for extra-mental reality.The foregoing discussion presents a tidy picture of a scholastic philosophical

evolution which fits very nicely into the pattern of naive realism, representative

realism,and idealism mentioned

earlier,but is this all that Buddhist

philosophyoffers in reply to the West?What of the Buddha's own attitude and what of the

Madhyamaka, which, it will be argued, representsthe systematic expression of

the former?

The Buddha was preeminently concerned with experience. His rejection of

metaphysical speculation is well-documented and has been acknowledged byscholars.4 So was the Buddha an empiricist?Not so far as the term has been

accepted within the Western philosophical tradition. Why? Because he recog-nized all experienceto be essentially and finally mental. The sense organs do not

see, hear, and so forth, divorced from consciousness. So the Buddha was not anempiricist in the Western sense of the term, although it may be argued that his

attitude is more genuinely empiricalthan that of the Westernempiricist,because

the assumption of an extra-mental referent is hardly justified by experience;rather it is more of the nature of dogmatism. But what of the nature of reality?

Quite simply, the Buddha was not interested in questions about the ultimate

nature of reality. He was not interested in describing it. He rejected even the

categories of existence and nonexistence as ultimately predicable of reality.5So what is one to make of a philosophy which does not concern itself with

describing the ultimate nature of reality?A number of answers to this questionhave been proposed. One common, although now somewhat outdated, answer is

that the Buddha was not a philosopher at all. According to this view, he was

interested in ethics. Another more modern view holds that the Buddha did not

teach philosophy, but psychology. Although more satisfying than the former,this answer,like the first,begs the question. The realpoint at issue is the definition

of terms. How is one to deal with an intellectual tradition which does not fit

comfortably into the category of eitherphilosophy or religion as they have been

understood in the West? Like the problem of the conflict between rationalismand empiricism,and like so many other problems that stem from that attempt to

apply alien conceptual models to a tradition which is not constrained by them,the conflict between philosophy and psychology does not occur for Buddhists. If

all experienceis essentially and finallymental, then a system of soteriology which

provides for the realization of an existentially desirablemode of experiencemust

also resolve the problem of reality. The pragmatismof the Buddha did not allowhim to concern himself with the question of the nature of a reality which in fact

was not experienced, being extra-mental. This is the point of the rejection of

metaphysical speculation as not conducive to edification, as exemplified in the

parable of the wounded man.6 The important fact to remember is that, as the

Yogacarins realized, this attitude does not for practical purposes alter one's



46 Della Santina

picture of the everyday world. One can very well go on acting as if there were

externalobjects, because that is the way it all appearsto one, without assumingtheir extra-mental reality.

The Madhyamaka, it is argued, embodies that pragmatic and antimetaphys-ical attitude which was the real heart of the Buddha's teaching. As such, it

acknowledgesthe fact that all

experienceis mental and that

metaphysical specu-lation is soteriologically counterproductive. This is evident in the works of

Nagarjuna. He has said, "This world of illusion, a delusion of consciousness,

comes not from anywhere,goes not nor really stays."7 "Thewheel of becoming

is produced through the propensity (vasana) for erroneous conceptualisation

(vikalpa)."8 "Sinceregardingthat very same object one is desirous, and regard-

ing that very same object one is malevolent, and regardingthat very same objectone is deluded; therefore they (desire, malevolence, and delusion) are produced

through conceptualization. Conceptualization also is, in reality, not existent."9

"The afflictions (klesa) and action (karman)arise from conceptualization andthis from conceptual constructions (prapanca)."10 "As the painter painting a

terrible monster is himself frightened thereby, so is the fool frightened with

transmigration."11 "All phenomena are interdependentlyoriginated as shown

through the examples of magical spells, drugs, and illusion. Therefore, they

are ultimately proved to be perfectly beyond existence and non-existence."12

"Ultimately, this world is beyond truth and falsehood, therefore, the Buddha

does not assert that it reallyexists or does not.... How could the omniscient one

sayit has limits or no limits or has both or neither?"13"Those who thinkin terms

of existence and non-existencedo not graspthe truthof the Buddha's teaching."

"The Buddha repudiatedboth the thought that something exists and that some-

thingdoes not." 14 "Know that the ambrosiaof the Buddha's teachingis the pro-

found and uncommon doctrinegoing farbeyond existenceand non-existence."15

Here attention should be drawn to threekey terms:propensities,conceptuali-

zation, and conceptual constructions. The first of these has already been

encountered.The second, conceptualization (vikalpa),has sometimesbeen trans-

lated as imagination or (as Sprung'6 does) "hypostatizingthought." Even in the

Sautrantikaview, it was responsiblefor the notions of the self, the whole, and soon, but in the Madhyamaka, it is responsible for the totality of the objects of

experience. Finally, conceptual constructions (prapanca) has been a source of

difficultyfor translatorsand interpretersof the Madhyamakaphilosophy. This is

perhapsin partbecausein the Brahmanicaltradition, it has an ontological flavor.

Even Sprung translates it as "the manifold of named things," which is at best

ambiguous becauseone is not surewhetherthe emphasis should be on named or

on things. The Tibetan exegetical tradition holds that the term ought to be

understood in the sense of expressingthe objectivelyexperiencedcounterpartof

conceptualization (vikalpa)-in other words, the crystalized and objectified

aspect of conceptualization. It is interesting to note that Cheng, basing himself

on an earlyChineseMadhyamakatradition,agreeswith this interpretations.17 t



47

would be remarkable f this interpretationof the term were not correct, given the

fact that two recognized, independent, and venerable Buddhist traditions agree

upon it. Significantly, this interpretation avoids going beyond the exclusively

mental natureof experienceand does not ontologize the object. At the same time,

however, it can deal with the object as if it were real for practical purposes.

So is the Madhyamaka philosophy reducibleto

idealism;and what then is the

distinction between the Madhyamaka and the Yogacara, the recognized school

of Buddhist idealism?Indeed, it is arguedon the basis of the passagesjust quoted

that the fundamental attitude of the Yogacara was already implicit in the

Madhyamaka and even more in the Buddha's own utterances. This much is

supported by the interpretationof Santaraksita, founder of the synthetic school

of the Yogacara-Madhyamaka, who, it is contended, only made explicit and

systematic the tendencies alreadyevident in the works of Madhyamaka authors.

Nonetheless, the Madhyamakais not idealismin the metaphysicalor ontological

sense. This is in fact the point upon which the Madhyamaka and the Yogacara

split. The Yogacara, according to the Madhyamaka view, err insofar as they

make consciousness into a real, an existing, thing, an ontological or metaphys-ical entity. They stray, too, from the Buddha's way in that rather than avoidingthe alternatives of existence and nonexistence, they assert both the existence of

consciousness and the nonexistence of the object. The Madhyamaka, while

acknowledging the fact that all experience is mental, can yet avoid the pitfalls of

metaphysicaldogmatism, because this fact leads it not to metaphysical assertion

andnegation,

but rather tosoteriological

freedom. TheMadhyamaka indeed,

as

Candrakirtipoints out, has no difficulty in employing the attitudes of realism,

idealism, and so forth, because all these formulations are just pedagogical

devices, soteriological tools, not ontological assertions.18

TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM AND EMPIRICAL REALISM

In the West, Immanuel Kant attempted to resolve the conflict between rational-

ism and empiricism, and the more fundamental one between realism and ideal-

ism, by means of his critique of pure reason. It has been suggested that his

solution raises more problems than it solves, and it has sometimes been regardedas skepticism.19 It is ironic that the Madhyamaka has been compared to this

system. It may be ventured that a certain affinityin philosophical attitude and a

strikingcoincidence with regardto a set of philosophical problems prompted this

comparison. Like the Madhyamaka, Kant's characteristicphilosophical method

is critical and dialectic, and, like the Madhyamaka, his philosophy is ostensively

opposed to metaphysical speculation. The antinomies of Kant correspond exact-

ly to the sets of metaphysical problems rejectedas not tending to edification bythe Buddha.20 Notwithstanding these similarities, it will be argued that the

analogy between the views of Madhyamaka and Kant is more apparent than

real. Kant arrived at his characteristic philosophical standpoint through an

examination of the mind or reason. For this, he has been credited by T. R. V.



48 Della Santina

Murti with what has been termed the Copernicanrevolution in philosophy.21In

otherwords, he focused the attention of philosophy upon the subjectratherthan

the object. But Kant was unable to dispense with the assumption of an extra-

mental reality. Indeed, he sought to explain knowledge as the result of the

combination of the data given in experiencewith the forms of intuition and of

understanding:space, time, substance,and causality. This being the case, all thatis known, all that can ever be known, is phenomenal-that is, what is presented

to theknowing subjectthroughthe structuresof the mind. Theabsolute, thingsin

themselves,the noumenal, can never be known butcan be assumed becausesense

data, accordingto Kant, must have a cause which is not the subject.The effectsof

the unknown things-in-themselves which influence sensibility are representa-

tions. The purpose of Kant's critique was to limit the domain of knowledge to

the empirical.In this way, he hoped to expose the pretensionsof metaphysicians

who vainly seek to say something about the unknowable noumenal. Therebyhe

intended to make room for faith through disallowing reason in the sphereof the

absolute, essentially the same concern that had animated the doctors of the

Churchat Nicaea more than a millennium earlier.

From the Madhyamaka point of view, Kantian philosophy is riddled with

difficulties.Despite being dialectical, it is dualistic and ontological, even meta-

physical, as Cheng points out.22 Synthesis is not a solution, as is clear from the

Madhyamaka critique of the Jaina philosophy. In ascribing knowledge to a

combination of objective sense data and the subjectiveforms of the mind, Kant

betraysan

ontologicalcommitment to both the

objectand the

subject.In

addition, the assumption of an extramentalrealityrequiresthat the gap between

subject and object be bridged by a representative theory of perception, the

instability of which has alreadybeen pointed out. Moreover, the radicalpolarity

between the ontological character of Kant's notion of the noumenal and the

phenomenal are foreign to the Madhyamaka. Finally and significantly,the end

of Kant's critique is trivial from the Madhyamaka point of view.

Kant's system, as it has been said, grew out of the attempt to resolve the

conflict between rationalism and empiricism-a conflict which did not exist for

the Madhyamaka nor indeed for any system of Indian thought, for the reasonsexplained earlier.Again, Kant sought to resolve the controversy between ideal-

ism and realismby ascribing particularfunctions to the subjectiveand objective

components in the formation of knowledge. In the process, Kant had to resortto

a representativetheory of perception.Although the history of Buddhistthought

in India did include a phase of criticalrealismin thecourseof which a representa-

tive theory of perception was entertained, the Madhyamaka never had to face

this predicament, because it never assumed an extra-mental referent of expe-

rience.Theseconsiderations,however,though tellingenough in themselves,have

never, to the author's knowledge, been considered by those who like to find

parallels between the Madhyamaka and Kantian philosophy. Here, too, they

shall not be treated at length, because it is when the real heart of Kant's



49

philosophy, the doctrine of the noumenal and the phenomenal, is reached that

thereis a greatertemptation to see apparentcoincidences and yet an even greater

danger that a facile identification of actually diverse philosophies will engender

misunderstandingrather than appreciation.The Kantian noumenal and phenomenal have been termed the absolute and

therelative,

and these terms have beenimposed

as it wereupon

theMadhyamaka

conceptions of ultimate truth (paramdrtha-satya)and conventional or appa-ritional truth (vyavahdraor samvrti-satya).The Madhyamaka's advocacy of the

ultimate truth has led T. R. V. Murti to call it absolutism. Although in all fairness

it must be said that he does so in order to save the Madhyamaka from the chargeof nihilism, does he do it justice in clothing it with another threadbaregarmentfrom the wardrobe of philosophical labels which is, to say the least, ill-fitting?

Surely Murti knows that the translation of paramdrtha (literally, highest end,

purpose, or meaning) as "absolute" can scarcely be justified etymologically.

Similarly, the translation of the terms "vyavahdraor samvrti"(literally,conven-tion, usage, language or obscured, covered, veiled) by "relative" stands on no

firmerground. What, then, other than a fascination with a conceptual analogy,could induce a competent scholar to adopt these terms for the Madhyamaka

conceptions of the ultimate and conventional truths;and yet, a whole generationof translators, nfluencedby this samefascination with a conceptual analogy, have

adopted these terms and have characterized the Madhyamaka as absolutism.

On the evidence of the Madhyamaka's own texts, too, the ultimate truth has

nothingto do with Kant's

things-in-themselves.Indeed,the division between the

ultimate and conventional truths, for the Madhyamaka, is nothing more than a

pedagogical device.23 Emptiness (sunyatd)is said to be the ultimate truth, but

emptiness is not an ontological category, but a soteriological therapy.24 Empti-

ness, the relativity of all things, is itself relative. The ultimate truth, like the

conventional, is devoid of independentbeing. This much has been indicated also

by Cheng.25 What then of the things-in-themselves, Kant's absolute, his nou-

menal?They could perhaps be likened to the unique particularsof the Sautrant-

ikas, the conception so elaborately explained by Th. Stcherbatsky,26but hardly

to the Madhyamaka conception of emptiness or the ultimate truth.Now what of Kant's notion of the phenomenal, the absolutely unknowable

things-in-themselves known through the forms of time, space, substance, and

causality? Kant believed these forms to be necessary and unalterable, and so

from the Madhyamaka point of view inescapably ontological.27 For Kant,

empirical knowledge was true, unlike metaphysics, because here, reason waslimited to its proper sphere. This was natural enough for one who wished to

guarantee the philosophical foundations of science, but for the Madhyamaka,the conventional or apparitionaltruthis neithernecessaryand unalterable,nor is

empiricalknowledge true. The first of these considerations has important rami-

fications for the results of the Kantian and the Madhyamaka philosophical

exercises, respectively,and the second, applied to the more recent attempt to see



50 Della Santina

similarities between the Madhyamaka and the school of language analysis,

disallows another popular misconception of the Madhyamaka philosophy.Kant's philosophy yields few existential benefits,because in consonance with

the Westernphilosophical tradition it is concerned with descriptionrather than

with change. As Hume was pleased to go back to playing backgammon after

having indulgedhimself in

philosophical diversions,so Kant was

resignedto

continuing to live in a world of illusion, finally and unalterablycondemned to

ignoranceof theabsolute, thehighertruth,except perhaps throughfaith. Thus he

damned man through philosophy in order to save him through religion, but no

such maneuvers are necessaryfor the Madhyamaka. The only positive result of

Kant's critiqueof metaphysicswhich does not depend upon revelation, is that it

ostensively curbs the pretensions of metaphysiciansand limits knowledge to the

empirical. As a consequence, philosophers are warned to avoid the forbidden

ground of rationalpsychology, speculative cosmology, and naturaltheology and

are encouraged to concentrate their descriptivetalents, such as they may be, onthe sphere of the empirical.

For the Madhyamaka, the forms of experience-space, time, substance, and

causality-are neither necessaryand unalterable,nor are they intrinsicallytrue

even on the level of conventional truth. By the same token, the ultimate truth,or

emptiness, is not in principleunknowable. The forms of the mind, space, and so

on are for the Madhyamaka the result of conceptualization conditioned by

mental impressionsand correspondingto conceptual constructions;they are, in

other words,objectifiedconcepts.

The habitual tendencies that give rise to these

forms of experiencecan be self-consciously altered, and this indeed is the aim of

the Madhyamaka philosophy. The ultimate truth, unlike Kant's things-in-

themselves, is knowable not only by nondual perceptionvouchsafed by medita-

tion, but also by inference,for "Bythe reasonthat sundersconceptualisation,the

ultimate is known mediately."28 The result of this knowledge of the ultimate

mediately and immediately is the progressivetransformationof experiencefrom

the undesirableto the desirable.This is possible, for the Madhyamaka, because

neither the conventional nor the ultimate is set up as an ontological entity

existing as it were objectively and in its own right. Both are rather modes ofexperience, the latter preferable because psychologically and soteriologically

desirable. In other words, that which makes one free is the truth.

It is of course not suggested that Murti is oblivious to all or any of these

considerations. What is suggested is that, persuaded by the fascination of a

conceptual analogy, his treatmentof the Madhyamakaphilosophy in relationto

Kantian concepts and his liberaluse of Kantian terminology inexorably lead to

the emergenceof a somewhat distorted pictureof the Madhyamaka.This is not

to deny the illuminating characterof much of what Murti has to say about the

Madhyamaka. It is to warn of the danger of accepting the applicabilityof alien

concepts and terminology to a system of thought so patently different in its

orientation and fundamental concern.



51

LANGUAGE ANALYSIS

The Madhyamaka, as it has been suggested, is a system of soteriology. The

system works by the application of progressive negations of (perhaps better)correctives. Thus the ultimate truth negates or corrects the conventional, while

the ultimate truth isitself negated or correctedby enforcingthe recognition of its

therapeutic function to the exclusion of any ontological claim on its behalf. It is

suggested that the Kantian interpretation, by making the Madhyamaka into a

kind of transcendentalabsolutism, emphasizes the negation of the conventional,

while the interpretation along the lines suggested by modern language analysis,

by making the Madhyamaka into a kind of positivism, emphasizes the negationof the negation of the conventional truth, that is, the negation of the ultimate

truth. However, the negation of a negation for the Madhyamaka does not mean

the reinstatement of the original hypothesis. When it is said that the therapyis no

longer needed once the disorder has been cured, this is not to accept the disorderas it was before the therapy was applied.

Streng and Gudmunsen like to emphasize the fact that, like Wittgenstein, the

Madhyamaka rejects the notion of an extralinguistic referent of words. This is

indeed to say very little that is new or revealing about the Madhyamaka. The

theory that words must refer to objects was chiefly advocated by the Naiyayikasin ancient India, and, like the whole of their philosophy of naive realism, it

was a favorite object of refutation for the Madhyamaka. However, does the

Madhyamaka's rejectionof the notion of an

extralinguisticreferent of words

mean that it endorses the everyday use of language as somehow valuable in its

own right?Does it mean, as Gudmunsen suggests, that the result of the Mad-

hyamaka critique is to leave everything more or less as it is?29 The latter in fact

refers to the Zen story which runs, "Beforeyou have studiedZen, mountains are

mountains and rivers are rivers; while you are studying it, mountains are no

longer mountains and rivers are no longer rivers;but once you have had Enlight-

enment, mountains are once again mountains and rivers are rivers."30 Waldo

goes so far as to claim that ordinarylanguage statements are paradigmsof what

we call true and coherent,31so is it then the end of the Madhyamaka philosophysimplyto let everyone go back to playing backgammon or the ordinarylanguagegame with the assurance that here lies truth?

Wittgenstein, like Kant, was interested in securinglegitimacy through delimi-

tation. Kant wanted to rescuephilosophy from disreputethroughlimitingreasonto the empirical. This enabled him to disallow metaphysics and so open the wayfor religion.Wittgensteinwanted to rescuephilosophy from conflict and perplex-

ity through limiting the philosophical enterprise to the description of languageand language itself to its everyday rather than its metaphysical use. In this way,he believed he could dissolve philosophical problems. While both these philoso-

phers are concerned with saving something of the descriptive function of philo-

sophy, the Madhyamaka has nothing to save, neither the metaphysical nor the



52 Della Santina

ordinary use of concepts and language. The Madhyamaka is not interested

in description, but in freedom, which interest is after all a reflection of their

respectivetraditions.

If Wittgensteindiffers from Kant in his attitudetowardsthe role of philosophyin personallife, it is in thathe no longerfeelstotally bound to leavereligionalone,

to divorce it as it were from philosophy. This perhaps reflects the progressiveliberalizationin the Westernphilosophical traditionwhich occurred betweenthe

eighteenth and the twentieth centuries. Nonetheless, the discerniblesoteriolog-ical flavor of some of Wittgenstein'sutterances can hardly justify the completeredefinition of philosophy within the Western tradition. It may be true, as

Gudmunsen suggests, that Wittgenstein with his religious concern fits rather

uncomfortably into a philosophical tradition notable for its lack of existential

relevance,32but Nagarjuna's position as a so-called philosophical writer in a

religious tradition is by no means similar. Wittgenstein is something of an

anomaly in the Westerntradition,but Nagarjuna'sphilosophy occupies a central

place in what can easily be termed the predominant Buddhist religious tradi-

tion. Moreover, Wittgenstein's tilt toward soteriology, refreshingas it is in the

context of the Westernphilosophical tradition, suppliesonly a shallow and timid

suggestion of freedom compared with the dramaticand radical transformation

of experienceofferedby the Madhyamaka.

So what of the Wittgensteinianclaimmade on behalf of the Madhyamakathat

the end of the philosophical exercise is to leave everything as it is? Nagarjuna

never denied the relevance of the wholegamut

of ethical andpsychological

practices offered by the Buddhist tradition as effective means of altering the

undesirablecharacter of experienceconditioned by negative and dualistic pro-

pensities and so of realizing the transformed mode of experience known as

enlightenment. If the end of the process is the discardingof the apparatusas in-

dicated in works like the Mulamadhyamakakdrikd,t is analogous to the discard-

ing of the raft once the river has been crossed.33It is not tantamountto remaining

on the near side of the riveror, worse, returningto it. Is it thereforecrediblethat,

for the Madhyamaka, the end of soteriology should be a return to the mode of

experienceof the man in the street,an acceptanceof the ordinaryuse of languageas a paradigm of truth?If there is a return for the Madhyamaka, it is a return

dictatedby the requirementsof altruisticsoteriology, not by a positive evaluation

of the ordinaryuse of language and the ordinarymode of experience.

For the Madhyamaka, language and ordinaryexperienceare neithertrue nor

false.34If the Madhyamaka resorts to ordinarymodes of expressionin orderto

suggest the transformedmode of experiencewhich is the goal of the soteriolog-

ical process, it is merely a concession to a conventional usage sustained by a

prevalent illusion. The Madhyamakas are very explicit about their condem-

nation of ordinary linguistic convention. All these conventions are determined

by a fundamentalerror,the nature of which is likened to a mirage, a dream,and

a magical illusion.35



53

CONCLUSION

The Madhyamaka teaches the middle way, a philosophical attitude enshrinedin

the very name of the system. The middle way is soteriologically desirable because

it prevents entanglement in extremes-that is, in limited positions which impedefreedom. No doubt the Madhyamaka makes use of positions and even of

propositions in the working out of its soteriology. The literature of the system is

replete with such formulations: realism, idealism, self, not-self, and so on.

Nonetheless, to interpret the system by choosing to emphasize any of these

formulations-the negation of the ordinarymode, the negation of the negation

of the ordinarymode-to interpretit as absolutism, nihilism, or positivism, is to

miss the realpoint of the system and to ignore the difference between philosophyand soteriology. It is for this reason that the interpretationof the Madhyamakain terms of Kantian or Wittgensteinian thought is hardly satisfactory.

There is no doubt that philosophy in the West is beginning to show signs oftranscending the constraints which the history of its origins and early develop-ment imposed upon it. A number of indications which may be gleaned from the

approaches adopted by language analysis, existentialism, phenomenology, and

post-structuralism are all evidence of the dawn of a new attitude in Western

philosophy. Despite all this, in the opinion of the author, Western philosophyhas yet to produce a system of thought that successfully unites the rigor of

philosophy with the relevance of religion in an integrated system of soteriology

capable of providing access to freedom in its fullest and most complete sense.

Such a system is available in the Madhyamaka.36

NOTES

1. John Hospers, An Introduction o Philosophical Analysis(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul

Limited, 1956), pp. 183ff.

2. L. Jamspal and P. Della Santina, "The Heart of InterdependentOrigination," The Journalofthe Departmentof BuddhistStudies(University of Delhi, 1974), verse 4 and commentary.

3. Ibid.,p.

496.

4. Majjhima Nikdya I, pp. 426-432 (Sutta 63); pp. 483-484 (Sutta 72); SamryuttaNikdya III,

pp. 257ff; SarhyuttaNikaya IV, pp. 374-403 (Vacchagotta Samyuttam and Avyakata Samyuttan).5. SarhyuttaNikaya II, p. 17.

6. MajjhimaNikdya I, 426ff (Cila Malufikya Sutta).7. Nagarjuna, RatndvalTI, verse 113.

8. "The Heart of Interdependent Origination,"verse 5 and commentary.9. Nagarjuna, Sunyatdsaptati,verse 50 (author's translation).

10. Nagarjuna, Malamadhyamakakdrikd, hap. 18, verse 5.

11. Nagarjuna, Mahdydna Viizaka, trans. by Susumu Yamaguchi, in The Eastern Buddhist4,no. 2 (Kyoto, 1927), verse 10.

12. Quoted from the VyavahdraSiddhi of Nagarjuna in the Madhyamakalahkarapanjikdof

KamalaSila (author's translation).13. Ratndval II, verses 104-106.

14. MulamadhyamakakdrikdXV, verses 6 and 7.

15. Ibid., I, verse 62.



54 Della Santina

16. M. Sprung, LucidExpositionof the Middle Way(Boulder, Colorado, Great Eastern, 1980).17. Cheng, Hsueh-Li, "Nagarjuna, Kant and Wittgenstein:The San-Lun Madhyamika Expo-

sition of Emptiness,"Journalof ReligiousStudies 17 (1981): 79.

18. Candrakirti,Prasannapadd,commentaryto Mulamadhyamakakdrikd VIII, verses 5 and 8.

19. Hospers, Introductionp. 185.

20. MajjhimaNikdya I, pp. 426ff (Cula Malunkya Sutta).21. Murti, T. R. V., The CentralPhilosophy of Buddhism(London: George Allen and Unwin,

1955),pp. 123-124.

22. Cheng, "Nagarjuna,Kant and Wittgenstein," p. 75.

23. Mulamadhyamakakdrikd,XXIV, verse 10.

24. Ibid., XIII, verses 7 and 8; XXII, verse 11.

25. Cheng, "Nagarjuna,Kant and Wittgenstein,"p. 68.

26. Th. Stcherbatsky,BuddhistLogic, vol. 1 (New York: Dover Publications, 1962).27. Mulamadhyamakakdrikd,XV, verse 8.

28. Madhyamakdlankdrakdrikd,erse 75 (author's translation).29. C. Gudmunsen, WittgensteinandBuddhism London: Macmillan, 1977),p. 44.

30. Ibid., p. 69.

31. I. Waldo, "Nagarjuna and Analytic Philosophy," PhilosophyEast and West28, no. 3 (July

1978).32. Gudmunsen, WittgensteinandBuddhism,pp. 68-80.

33. MajjhimaNikdya, I., p. 135 (Alaguddupama Sutta).

34. RatndvalT, I, verses 104-106.

35. Muilamadhyamakakdrikd, II, verse 34 (Sunyatdsaptativerse).

36. Prasannapadd,XCIII, verse 5; and XXII, verse 16 (author's translation).

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