Caprio College Prezentacija

8/8/2019 Caprio College Prezentacija

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Bank Regulation Is Changing:Bank Regulation Is Changing:

But for Better or Worse?But for Better or Worse?

Gerard CaprioGerard Caprio

Williams CollegeWilliams College


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If men were angels, no government would be

necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither

external nor internal controls would be necessary.

In framing a government which is to beadministered by men over men, the great difficulty

lies in this: you must first enable the government

to control the governed; and in the next place

oblige it to control itself.

James Madison, Federalist Papers, Number 51


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Institutional EnvironmentDemocratic, Political Structure/System

Technology, Information

Infrastructure

Judicial ,

Legal

,

Reg

ulatoryEn

viron

ment

Market

Structu

re

Med

ia

The Market:Depositors,creditors,rating agencies

Politicians

Regulators andsupervisors

Borrowers,counterparties

Corruption

corruption Banks

The Public

corruption

A Framework for Bank Regulation


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2. Debate about governments role2. Debate about governments role

Public interest viewPublic interest view

Govt maximizes social welfareGovt maximizes social welfare

Govt has incentives / ability toGovt has incentives / ability toameliorate market failuresameliorate market failures

If we identify best practices,If we identify best practices,countries will change.countries will change.

Private interest viewPrivate interest view

Govt maximizes Govt welfare; so doGovt maximizes Govt welfare; so doregulateesregulatees

Govt does not necessarily haveGovt does not necessarily have

incentives / ability to fix failuresincentives / ability to fix failures

Need more than best practices:Need more than best practices:

Combination of incentives forCombination of incentives for

regulators and regulatees will notregulators and regulatees will not

maximize social welfaremaximize social welfare

Laissez-Faire : Market failures minorno need for government


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3 Surveys3 Surveys 11stst: 1998-99-2000: 1998-99-2000

107 countries107 countries 175 questions175 questions

22ndnd: 2003: 2003 152 countries152 countries 275 questions275 questions

3rd: 20063rd: 2006 142 countries142 countries 300+ questions300+ questions

3. Collecting the data...3. Collecting the data...


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14%

64%

361%

Ratio of Bank Assets to GDPRatio of Bank Assets to GDP


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Not AvailableLess Than 10 Percent

Greater Than 60 Percent

Greater Than 10 Percent, Less Than 30 PercentGreater Than 30 Percent, Less Than 60 Percent

Government-Owned BanksGovernment-Owned Banks


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Government Ownership of Banks DiffersGovernment Ownership of Banks Differs

WidelyWidely

Share of Total Assets in Government-Owned Banks

as of Year-End 2005

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

Brazil 45%

China 68%Germany 40%

Russia 39%

India 74%

United State 0%

Median = 5%


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Government-Owned Banks Share ofGovernment-Owned Banks Share of

Total Bank AssetsTotal Bank Assets

78 Percent 68 Percent
http://www-vrl.umich.edu/sel_prj/ibm/wall/GreatWall.gif


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Foreign Ownership of Banks Differ WidelyForeign Ownership of Banks Differ Widely

Share of Total Assets in Foreign-Owned Banks

as of Year-End 2005

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

Brazil 20%

China 2%

Germany 6.5%

Russia 8.3%India 6.8%

United Kindom 54%

United States 8.5%

Japan 6.1%

Median = 39%


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11 Percent 98 Percent

Foreign-Owned Banks ShareForeign-Owned Banks Share

of Total Bank Assetsof Total Bank Assets


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Grouping and Aggregating Data to AssessGrouping and Aggregating Data to Assess

What Works BestWhat Works Best

Structure, scope,Structure, scope,independence ofindependence ofregulation andregulation and

supervisionsupervision

Bank activitiesBank activities Entry requirementsEntry requirements CapitalCapital

requirementsrequirements Deposit InsuranceDeposit Insurance

Supervisory powersSupervisory powers

Private monitoringPrivate monitoring

ExternalExternalgovernancegovernance

OwnershipOwnership

characteristicscharacteristicsAll the data is online in the hopes oflowering the entry barriers to

conducting better research.


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How Many Bank Supervisory AuthoritiesHow Many Bank Supervisory Authorities

Do Countries Have?Do Countries Have?

6

9

44

82

92

51

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Is there a single financial

supervisory agency for all

of the main financial

institutions (insurancecompanies, contractual

savings institutions,

savings banks)?

Is there a single financial

supervisory agency for all

of the activities in which

commercial banks areallowed to do business?

N ot Availab le Yes N o


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Is the Central BankIs the Central Bank

a Supervisory Authority?a Supervisory Authority?

Yes

54%

No

42%

Not

Available

4%


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Who Funds SupervisionWho Funds Supervision

in Countries?in Countries?

Banks

23%

Government

31%

Not

Available

36%

Both10%


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What Is a Bank?What Is a Bank?

Regulatory Restrictions on ActivitiesRegulatory Restrictions on Activities

36

13 11

31

40

4220

34

33

18

21

26

46

32

31

41

7

974

0

20

40

60

80

100

Securities InsuranceReal estate Bankownership

of

nonfinancial firms

Nonfinancial firm

ownership

of banks

PercentUnrestricted Permitted Restricted Prohibited


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CapitalCapital

Summary measure of initial and generalSummary measure of initial and general

capital stringencycapital stringency Basel C/ABasel C/A

Capital varies with market riskCapital varies with market risk

loan securities, FX losses deducted from capitalloan securities, FX losses deducted from capital

initial capital only with cash and government securitiesinitial capital only with cash and government securities

borrowed funds for initial capitalborrowed funds for initial capital

verify capital sourcesverify capital sources


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Are Countries Planning on Adopting BaselAre Countries Planning on Adopting Basel

II?II?

Yes

76%

No13%

Not

Available

11%


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Which Approach DoWhich Approach Do

Countries Plan to Adopt?Countries Plan to Adopt?

Yes

82%

No

2%

Not

Available

16%

Yes45%

No38%

NotAvailable

17%

Standardized Approach

Foundation IRB Approach

Yes

40%

No43%

NotAvailable

17%

Advanced IRB Approach


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Deposit Insurance GenerosityDeposit Insurance Generosity

ExplicitExplicit

Level of coverageLevel of coverage

CoinsuranceCoinsurance Coverage (e.g., FX, interbank deposits)Coverage (e.g., FX, interbank deposits)

Funding (source; flat or risk based)Funding (source; flat or risk based)

ManagementManagement MembershipMembership


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Do Countries Have ExplicitDo Countries Have Explicit

Deposit Insurance Schemes?Deposit Insurance Schemes?

Yes

49%No

51%Yes54%

No44%

Not Available

2%

Survey III143 CountriesSurvey II

152 Countries

Countries recently adopting depositinsurance: Armenia, Hong Kong,

Malaysia, Moldova, Russia, Singapore,Tajikistan, Uruguay, and Zimbabwe


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Percent of the Commercial Banking SystemsPercent of the Commercial Banking Systems

Assets Funded by DepositsAssets Funded by Deposits

0 20 40 60 80

ColombiaMauritius

PhilippinesGreece

United StatesBulgariaMexicoCanadaIrelandCroatia

KoreaJamaicaBurundi

GhanaCzech Republic

IndonesiaPortugalJordan

RomaniaEl Salvador

ArgentinaCyprus

ChileSlovakiaArmenia

Kyrgyz RepublicTrinidad and Tobago

ItalyTajikistan

LatviaUnited Kingdom

SloveniaHungary

PolandGermanyMozambique

ZimbabweMalta

EstoniaSpain

NorwayBelarus

BrazilNetherlands

AustraliaSingapore

DenmarkRussia

BelgiumLuxembourg

LesothoFinland

SwedenIceland

FranceBotswana

Algeria

SurinameGuyana

SeychellesMacau, China

FijiDominica

Dominican RepublicBhutan

BangladeshTanzania

Cook IslandsMorocco

Papua New GuineaSouth Africa

ChinaPakistan

KenyaLebanon

LithuaniaIndia

BahrainNew Zealand

BelizeLiechtenstein

NicaraguaThailandMoldova

GuatemalaMalawiJersey

VenezuelaUruguayMaldives

Bosnia andSaudi Arabia

BoliviaMalaysia

Costa RicaSri Lanka

OmanJapan

PeruSwitzerland

HondurasUganda

MacedoniaPanama

Angola


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Assets Funded with Insured DepositsAssets Funded with Insured Deposits

ColombiaCzech Republic

IndonesiaBulgaria

BangladeshLithuania

GuatemalaLatvia

PortugalPoland

HungaryMexico

DenmarkNetherlandsMacedoniaArgentinaZimbabwe

United StatesCyprus

KoreaSlovakiaRomania

NicaraguaPeru

SloveniaJamaicaNorwayCroatia

SpainEl Salvador

MalaysiaLuxembourg

IcelandFinland

LiechtensteinTanzania

FranceArmeniaMoldovaLebanon

SwedenBrazil

62 countries with no assets62 countries with no assets

funded with insured depositsfunded with insured deposits

Angola, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda,Angola, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda,

Australia, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia,Australia, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia,

Botswana, British Virgin Islands, BurkinaBotswana, British Virgin Islands, Burkina

Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cayman Islands,Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cayman Islands,Central African Republic, Chad, China,Central African Republic, Chad, China,

Congo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, CoteCongo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cote

d'Ivorie, Dominica, Dominican Republic,d'Ivorie, Dominica, Dominican Republic,

Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon,Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon,

Ghana, Grenada, Guernsey, GuineaGhana, Grenada, Guernsey, Guinea

Bissau, Guyana, Jersey, Kosovo, Kuwait,Bissau, Guyana, Jersey, Kosovo, Kuwait,

Kyrgyz Republic, Lesotho, Macau, China,Kyrgyz Republic, Lesotho, Macau, China,Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritius,Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritius,

Montserrat, Mozambique, New Zealand,Montserrat, Mozambique, New Zealand,

Niger, Pakistan, Panama, Papua NewNiger, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New

Guinea, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa,Guinea, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa,

Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St.Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St.

Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname,Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname,

Syria, Thailand, Togo, VanuatuSyria, Thailand, Togo, Vanuatu


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Official SupervisionOfficial Supervision

Supervisory powerSupervisory power Power to take legal action against auditors, director, officersPower to take legal action against auditors, director, officers Force bank to provision, change organizational structureForce bank to provision, change organizational structure Power to suspend dividends, bonuses, management feesPower to suspend dividends, bonuses, management fees Legal power to declare insolvencyLegal power to declare insolvency

Power to supercede shareholder rights, remove/replacePower to supercede shareholder rights, remove/replacemanagers, directorsmanagers, directors

Forbearance discretionForbearance discretion

Loan classification and provisioning stringencyLoan classification and provisioning stringency

Diversification: domestically and abroadDiversification: domestically and abroad

Supervisory resourcesSupervisory resources


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What Powers Do Supervisors Possess?What Powers Do Supervisors Possess?

8

12

9

28

66

11 7

10 6

64

16

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Can individual supervisory staff be held personally

liable for dam age s to a bank caused by their actions

or omissions committed in the good faith exercise of

their duties?

Can the supervisory agency be held l iable for

damages to a bank caused by its actions?

Are ba nk directors lega lly liable if informa tion

disclosed is erroneous or misleading?

Not Available Yes No


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Are Courts Supervisory Authorities Too?Are Courts Supervisory Authorities Too?

9

9

9

6

69

115

127

64

18

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Is court approval required for supervisory actions, such

as superceding shareholder rights, removing and

replacing management, removing and replacing director,

or license revocation?

Is court order re quired to appoint a receiver/liquidator in

the e vent of liquidation?

Can the bank shareholders appeal to the court against a

decision of the bank supervisor?

N ot Available Yes N o


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3. Private monitoring3. Private monitoring

Certified audit requiredCertified audit required

Percent of 10 biggest banks rated byPercent of 10 biggest banks rated byinternational rating agenciesinternational rating agencies

Accounting disclosure and liabilityAccounting disclosure and liability accrued but unpaid interestaccrued but unpaid interest consolidated statementsconsolidated statements

liability of directorsliability of directors No deposit insuranceNo deposit insurance

Private monitoring

Laissez-Faire

Private monitoring

involves supervision


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Do Countries Require a SimpleDo Countries Require a Simple

Leverage Ratio?Leverage Ratio?

Yes

17%

No

70%

Not

Availabl

13%


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4. What Works Best?4. What Works Best?

What worksWhat works Bank developmentBank development

EfficiencyEfficiency IntegrityIntegrity StabilityStability Bank governance?Bank governance?


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4. Bank development4. Bank development

s = Supervisory/regulatory indicatorss = Supervisory/regulatory indicators

X = Exogenous determinants of Bank Development, identifiedX = Exogenous determinants of Bank Development, identifiedby existing research (legal origin, ethnic diversity, settlerby existing research (legal origin, ethnic diversity, settlermortality, etc.)mortality, etc.)

Z = Instrumental variables for the bank supervision andZ = Instrumental variables for the bank supervision andregulation variables (religious orientation, endowments,regulation variables (religious orientation, endowments,latitude)latitude)

u andu and are error termsare error terms ,, ,, , and, and are the estimated parametersare the estimated parameters

Bank Development =Bank Development = ++ s +s + X + uX + u

s =s = Z +Z +


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Private monitoring boosts bank developmentPrivate monitoring boosts bank development


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Official supervisory power lowers bankOfficial supervisory power lowers bank

developmentdevelopment


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Changes in Restrictions on BanksChanges in Restrictions on BanksChanges - Overall Restrictions - Survey III - I

Belarus

MauritiusBelgiumBhutan

PolandRomania

BrazilGhana

GreeceIcelandIreland

Morocco

Guatemala

JordanKuwaitLatviaLebanonMaltaNetherlands

BahrainBoliviaBotswanaCanadaCroatiaDenmarkIndia

Saudi ArabiaSloveniaSweden

AustraliaAustriaFinlandGermanyHondurasHungary

Italy

Lithuania

South AfricaSpain

ChileCyprusFrance

PortugalSwitzerland

MoldovaPeru

Thailand

GuyanaTajikistan

Japan

United Kingdom

PhilippinesUnited States

Malaysia

Russia

Korea

Argentina

Singapore

Panama

CzechRepublic

Oman

Lesotho

Indonesia

Trinidad and Tobago

BurundiEstonia

Mexico

Luxembourg

NewZealand

Kenya

-6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8


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Impact of Changes in RestrictionsImpact of Changes in RestrictionsDifference in BankDevelopment - Overall Restrictions - Survey III - I

GuyanaTajikistan

CzechRepublicKenya

MoldovaPeru

ThailandChile

CyprusFrance

LuxembourgPanama

Portugal

Trinidad and TobagoAustralia

AustriaFinland

GermanyHondurasHungary

Italy

Lithuania

South Africa

BahrainBolivia

BotswanaCanadaCroatia

DenmarkIndia

Lesotho

SloveniaSweden

BurundiEstonia

Guatemala

JordanKuwaitLatviaLebanonMaltaNetherlands

BrazilGhanaGreece

OmanPolandRomania

Belarus

Indonesia

Japan

PhilippinesUnited States

United Kingdom

Mexico

Korea

Singapore

NewZealand

Saudi Arabia

Morocco

Bhutan

Mauritius

Belgium

IrelandIceland

Russia

Malaysia

Spain

Switzerland

Argentina

-0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3


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Changes in Entry RequirementsChanges in Entry Requirements

Changes - Entry Requirements - Survey III - I

Cyprus Peru

SwedenAustralia

GreeceKenya

RomaniaSpain

TajikistanVenezuela

AustriaBahrainBelarusBelgiumBoliviaBotswanaBrazilCanadaCroatiaCzechRepublicDenmarkEstonia

GhanaGuatemalaHondurasIndiaIrelandItalyJordanLebanonLesothoLithuaniaLuxembourgMaltaMauritius

MoldovaMoroccoOmanPanamaPortugal

Saudi ArabiaSlovenia

South AfricaSwitzerlandThailand

BhutanChileEl SalvadorFranceGuyanaHungaryIceland

PolandSingapore

BurundiGermanyLatviaTrinidad and Tobago

KuwaitFinland

Philippines

Malaysia

KoreaNetherlands

Russia

United Kingdom

Indonesia

NewZealand

Sri Lanka

Japan

Mexico

Argentina

United States

-6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

I t f E t ChI t f E t Ch


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Impact of Entry ChangesImpact of Entry Changes

Difference in BankDevelopment - Entry Restrictions - Survey III - I

CyprusPeru

SwedenAustralia

GreeceKenya

NetherlandsRomania

TajikistanVenezuela

AustriaBahrainBelarusBelgiumBoliviaBotswanaBrazilCanadaCroatiaCzechRepublicDenmark

EstoniaGhanaGuatemalaHondurasIndiaIrelandItaly

JordanLebanonLesothoLithuaniaLuxembourgMaltaMauritius

MoldovaMoroccoOmanPanamaPortugalSaudi Arabia

SloveniaSouth AfricaSwitzerland

BhutanChileEl SalvadorFranceGuyanaHungaryIceland

PolandSingapore

BurundiGermanyLatvia

Trinidad and TobagoKuwait

Finland

Korea

Philippines

United Kingdom

Malaysia

United States

Sri Lanka

NewZealand

Japan

Thailand

Russia

Mexico

Spain

Indonesia

Argentina

-0.15 -0.1 -0.05 0 0.05 0.1 0.15

I t f I d S i iI t f I d S i i


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Impact of Improved SupervisionImpact of Improved Supervision

Difference in BankDevelopment - Official Supervisory Power - Survey III - I

Singapore

South AfricaMauritius

LithuaniaTrinidad and Tobago

LatviaGuatemala

IrelandMoldova

GhanaIcelandMalta

BelarusGuyana

SpainAustralia

Bolivia

BurundiDenmarkEstonia

FranceIndia

ThailandItaly

CanadaChile

Finland

MoroccoPortugal

Switzerland

BelgiumLesotho

BrazilGreeceHondurasHungary

KenyaLebanonPeru

VenezuelaEl SalvadorGermanyOmanPanamaSloveniaSaudi Arabia

CroatiaCyprusPoland

BahrainNewZealand

AustriaLuxembourgCzechRepublic

BotswanaBhutan

United Kingdom

United States

Japan

ArgentinaRussia

Malaysia

Mexico

Korea

-0.15 -0.1 -0.05 0 0.05 0.1


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Impact of Private MonitoringImpact of Private Monitoring

Difference in BankDevelopment - Private Monitoring - Survey III - I

BurundiFinland

OmanAustralia

Jordan

MaltaPeru

Portugal

Switzerland

BotswanaBrazilChileCroatiaEstoniaGuyanaHonduras

LuxembourgMoldovaPanamaSingapore

Trinidad and Tobago

BahrainBelgiumBoliviaIcelandIreland

MauritiusNewZealand

Slovenia

South AfricaSpainSweden

CyprusCzechRepublicEl SalvadorFranceGermanyGreeceGuatemalaHungaryItalyLatviaMoroccoNetherlands

ThailandBelarusMexico

Indonesia

Russia

LithuaniaJapan

ArgentinaUnited States

United Kingdom

Korea

Malaysia

-0.2 -0.15 -0.1 -0.05 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3

I t f Di ifi tiI t f Di ifi ti


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Impact of DiversificationImpact of Diversification

Difference in Probability (Banking Crises) - Diversification Index - Survey III - I

GuyanaHonduras

BurundiLesotho

GuatemalaGhana

Lithuania

DenmarkPanama

India

Tajikistan

AustraliaAustriaBoliviaBotswanaBrazilCanadaChileCroatiaCyprusEstoniaFinlandFranceGermanyIcelandItalyJapanLuxembourgMalaysiaMauritiusMoroccoNetherlandsNewZealandPeru

PolandPortugalRomania

SloveniaSwedenSwitzerlandThailandTrinidad and Tobago

Saudi ArabiaMoldovaMaltaBahrainJordan

SpainHungaryCzechRepublicRwandaSouth AfricaOman

VenezuelaGreece

LebanonBelarus

Korea

Mexico

Indonesia

Argentina

Philippines

Russia

United KingdomUnited States

-1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4


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6. Qualified Conclusions6. Qualified Conclusions Until angels govern, the data suggest Until angels govern, the data suggest

Avoid relying on official oversight, restrictions, & ownershipAvoid relying on official oversight, restrictions, & ownership Emphasize private monitoring / incentives (deposit insurance)Emphasize private monitoring / incentives (deposit insurance) Stress Basel IIs 3Stress Basel IIs 3rdrd pillar (not capital and official oversight)pillar (not capital and official oversight)

Supervisors have crucial roleSupervisors have crucial role

Support market discipline, not supplant itSupport market discipline, not supplant it Foster / force information disclosureFoster / force information disclosure

Do not fax best practices to countries!Do not fax best practices to countries!

Empiricists / Researchers deserveEmpiricists / Researchers deserve aa seat atseat at

the regulatory reform tablethe regulatory reform table

Wh d ?Wh t t d ?


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What to do?What to do? Data say that capital and supervision do notData say that capital and supervision do not

workwork Implications:Implications:

Emerging markets need to emphasize infrastructureEmerging markets need to emphasize infrastructurefirst, with better information, incentives to use itfirst, with better information, incentives to use it

Look to why supervision has not been workingLook to why supervision has not been working(politics).(politics).

Focus on private sector incentives and diversifyFocus on private sector incentives and diversify State guarantees (deposit insurance) and/or stateState guarantees (deposit insurance) and/or state

ownership reduces monitoringownership reduces monitoring Limits on activities are badLimits on activities are bad Diversification (activities, portfolios) is essentialDiversification (activities, portfolios) is essential Foreign entry matters, esp. for small countriesForeign entry matters, esp. for small countries

Go slow on Basel II (wait for version II.x,Go slow on Basel II (wait for version II.x,or later)or later) Emphasize pillar 3Emphasize pillar 3Till Angels GovernTill Angels Govern..


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Our LimitationsOur Limitations

MeasurementMeasurement Errors, omissions,Errors, omissions, time-seriestime-series in measuring supervision / regulation?in measuring supervision / regulation? Impact of supervision on the ground (only have proxies)Impact of supervision on the ground (only have proxies) Better aggregate indexes of approaches to supervision / regulation?Better aggregate indexes of approaches to supervision / regulation? Solution: get better dataSolution: get better data

Gauging Government RoleGauging Government Role Policies may work differently in different political / institutional regimesPolicies may work differently in different political / institutional regimes Do we capture these nuances?Do we capture these nuances? Solution: add case studiesSolution: add case studies

Regulatory choicesRegulatory choices Does X-C evidence add much?Does X-C evidence add much? Solution: add time series dataSolution: add time series data


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Our LimitationsOur Limitations

MeasurementMeasurement Errors, omissions,Errors, omissions, time-seriestime-series in measuring supervision / regulation?in measuring supervision / regulation? Impact of supervision on the ground (only have proxies)Impact of supervision on the ground (only have proxies) Better aggregate indexes of approaches to supervision / regulation?Better aggregate indexes of approaches to supervision / regulation? Solution: get better dataSolution: get better data

Gauging Government RoleGauging Government Role Policies may work differently in different political / institutional regimesPolicies may work differently in different political / institutional regimes Do we capture these nuances?Do we capture these nuances? Solution: add case studiesSolution: add case studies

Regulatory choicesRegulatory choices Does X-C evidence add much?Does X-C evidence add much?

Solution: add time series dataSolution: add time series data

P t f th C i l B ki S t P t f th C i l B ki S t


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Assets Denominated in Foreign CurrencyAssets Denominated in Foreign Currency

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

Trinidad and TobagoCroatia

LesothoRussia

UgandaIcelandPolandGhanaFrance

Czech RepublicGuatemalaIndonesia

NorwayNetherlands

MexicoArgentina

BurundiSaudi Arabia

ChilePakistan

KenyaSlovakia

GuyanaBhutan

BotswanaZimbabwe

MozambiqueVenezuela

MalawiThailand

Papua New GuineaBrazil

GreeceDominica

Dominican RepublicKorea

South AfricaBelize

FijiSeychelles

ItalyMoroccoMalaysia

SpainColombiaPortugal

AustraliaNew Zealand

AlgeriaBangladeshEl Salvador

BahrainMalta

Macau, China

KazakhstanBolivia

SingaporeUruguay

LatviaLebanon

KyrgyzMaldives

PeruSwitzerland

LithuaniaNicaraguaBosnia and

MauritiusCyprus

MacedoniaCook Islands

United KingdomCosta Rica

BulgariaArmenia

LiechtensteinTajikistanSuriname

AngolaRomania

HungarySloveniaDenmarkJamaicaFinlandBelarus

MoldovaCanada

HondurasTanzania

OmanIsle of Man

JordanBelgium



49/50


Liabilities Denominated in Foreign CurrencyLiabilities Denominated in Foreign Currency

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35

MoldovaHungary

RussiaIsle of Man

JordanUganda

BelgiumNetherlands

SlovakiaFranceGhanaOman

DominicaDominican

New ZealandSaudi Arabia

GuatemalaIndonesia

ChileCzech Republic

PolandBelize

MexicoArgentina

KenyaPakistanBurundiGreeceMalawi

BotswanaZimbabwe

BrazilPapua New Guinea

ItalyKorea

MalaysiaGuyana

SpainFiji

ColombiaThailand

KazakhstanSouth Africa

AustraliaMorocco

SeychellesLesotho

VenezuelaBhutan

El Salvador

BoliviaBahrainUruguay

KyrgyzMacau, China

SingaporeNicaragua

LatviaJersey

LebanonArmenia

PeruTajikistan

SwitzerlandMauritius

LiechtensteinCyprus

Bosnia andMaldives

Cook IslandsCroatia

BulgariaUnited Kingdom

FinlandAngola

Costa RicaSurinameLithuania

MacedoniaMalta

MozambiqueDenmarkRomaniaSloveniaJamaica

HondurasIcelandNorwayCanadaBelarus

TanzaniaTrinidad and



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Assets in Government SecuritiesAssets in Government Securities

OmanBelarus

Macau, ChinaMauritius

BangladeshMalta

FijiTrinidad and Tobago

BulgariaSurinameLithuaniaHungary

KazakhstanThailand

DenmarkBhutan

ChileCanadaCroatiaCyprus

MoldovaSouth Africa

Kyrgyz RepublicBolivia

SingaporeRussia

ItalySpain

UruguayBelizeLatvia

MalaysiaIreland

SwedenNew Zealand

FrancePanama

RomaniaGermany

NorwayIsle of Man

Cook IslandsCayman Islands

FinlandSwitzerland

IcelandBurundi

United KingdomTajikistanJersey

SyriaKosovo

Bosnia and Herzegovina

JamaicaIndia

Papua NewMalawi

VenezuelaGuyana

ZimbabweIndonesia

UgandaKenya

TanzaniaGhana

LebanonColombia

AngolaPoland

LuxembourgSlovenia

NicaraguaBrazil

Saudi ArabiaCosta Rica

SlovakiaLesothoMoroccoPakistanJordan

PhilippinesMexico

HondurasBelgiumArmenia

CzechGreece

El SalvadorUnited States

JapanPeru

DominicanDominica

MacedoniaNetherlands

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