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    "Elenchus, Epode", and Magic: Socrates as SilenusAuthor(s): Elizabeth BelfioreSource: Phoenix, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Summer, 1980), pp. 128-137Published by: Classical Association of CanadaStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1087871.

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    ELENCHUS, EPODE, AND MAGIC: SOCRATES AS SILENUSELIZABETH ELFIORE

    PLATO oftenuses the vocabularyofmagic (forexample,goes, goeteia,kelesis,nd their ognates), pells epodai), and drugs pharmaka)to con-demnan enemy.Thus, thesophist scalleda deceitfulmagician t Sophist234c, 235a, 241b, and in theRepublicthe imitator s called a magician(598d, 602d) who enchants (601b, 607c-d). Physical pleasure is con-demned as meremagic at Phaedo 81b, Philebus44c, and Republic584a.Yet Socrates himselfs comparedwitha magician Meno 80b) who en-chantspeople (Symposium 15c-d); themythat the end of the Phaedois said to be an epode 114d); knowledges called a pharmakon tRepublic595b and an epodeat Republic608a.1These applications of the termi-nologyofmagicto Socrates andphilosophy re more omprehensiblefwerealize that Plato is sometimesdeliberately opposing philosophytodeceitfulmagic,establishing sortof counter-magic. As JacquelinedeRomillyputs it: Whereas themagicofthesophists imedat producingillusion, ocrates'magicrestson the obstinatedestruction fall illusions.It is themagicof mplacabletruth..... It is thereforene magicagainstanother, he one takingthe former's lace, but withopposite aims andmeans. Philosophy pposes and disarmsdeceitfulmagic n a number fveryclearlydefined reas,and is in this ensea kindof counter-magic.A comparisonof the definition fdeceptivemagic in Republic II withPlato's statements bout the magic ofphilosophy an helpus to attaina betterunderstanding fhowdetailed and deliberatethisopposition s.Socratesdefinesmagic,goeteia, n the course ofdescribing ome tests

    1For further eferences nd discussion of these topics I have found the followingstudies most helpful:A. Dies, La Transposition Platonicienne, in Autour de Platon(Paris 1927); P. Boyanc6, Le Cultedes Muses chez es PhilosophesGrecs Paris 1936):hereafterBoyance; L. Edelstein, The Function of the Myth in Plato's Philosophy,fournal of theHistoryof Ideas 10 (1949) 463-481: hereafterEdelstein; E. R. Dodds,Plato, the Irrational Soul and the Inherited Conglomerate, in The Greeksand theIrrational (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1951): hereafterDodds; W. Burkert, Goes. ZumgriechischenSchamanismus', RhMus 105 (1962) 36-55; J. Derrida, La Pharmacie dePlaton, Tel Quel 32 (1968) 3-48, 33 (1968) 18-58: hereafterDerrida I and II; P. LainEntralgo, The Platonic RationalizationoftheCharm, in L. J.RatherandJ.M. Sharp,eds. and trans.,The Therapyofthe Word n Classical AntiquityNew Haven 1970), alsopublished separately in German: Hermes 86 (1958) 298-323, and in Spanish: ArchivoIberoamericanode Historia de la Medicina 10 (1958) 133-160: hereafter ain Entralgo;J. de Romilly,Magic andRhetoric n AncientGreece Cambridge,Mass. 1975): hereafterRomilly. See also D. Hitchcock, The Role of the Myth and Its Relation to RationalArgument n Plato's Dialogues, Diss. ClaremontGraduate School, 1973.2Romilly36-37. A similarpoint is made by Edelstein (475) and Derrida (11.21).

    128PHOENIx,Vol. 34 (1980) 2.

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    ELENCHUS, EPODE, AND MAGIC 129to determinewhichof theyoung people of the ideal cityare least likelyto cast out and forget heopinionthatone should do what s bestfor hecity (412e). He explains that we cast opinionout of our mindseitherwillinglyhekousios),whenwe learn betterand get rid of falseopinion,orunwillinglyakousios),when we lose trueopinion.This is because wearedeprived fevilswillinglyndofgood things nwillingly. ut tohavea false opinion is evil and to have a true opinion is good (413a). Weshould note that akousiosis used here in the peculiarlyPlatonic sense,according owhichwe aredeprivedofgood things nwillinglyvenifwewant to be deprivedof them,not knowing hemto be good.3After hisexplanation,Socratesdescribesthreeways in whichpeople are deprivedunwillinglyfthetruth 413b-c): robberyklope),force bia), andmagic(goeteia).Those robbedare thosewhomtimemakes forget r argument(logos) persuades, and those forcedare those made to change theiropinionsby pain (b6'vY, XyqrGcv).inally, Socrates says that thosebewitched, s I think,you also would say are those who change theiropinion ither ecausethey reenchantedby pleasureor because theyareterrifiedysome fear (413c1-3): TobsAv yo/TEvOEvras,sycAat, K&vaUicaLrsEtvatlt v ecaoawaotv 'iit' ?OV^SfKrtkrtOE'rEbr 460ovrtl5all7-es.4This passage givesus a definitionfmagic: (1) The aim ofmagic s tochangeouropinions,driving ut trueopinion nd givingus falseopinion.(2) Magic affects s by means of the emotions fpleasure (hedone)andfear phobos). (3) Because magic drives out trueopinionit compelsitsvictims, hatis,makes themact unwillinglyakousios).The passage also tellsus that the man who is best able to resistmagic(dysgoeteutos)smost harmonious nd the bestguardofhimself,nd thathe is mostusefulto himself nd to the city 413e). Sincewe later learnthat this guardian is a philosopher,we see that Plato is deliberatelysetting ut toopposetheaimsand meansofphilosophy othose ofmagic.Plato does notsay in thispassage whatkindofmagiche has in mind.However, it is reasonable to suppose that he is not directing uch aseriousattack against the cruderforms f magic, such as placingwaxfiguresn crossroads,6 ut againstthemagicofthesophistsand poetshecondemns aterin theRepublic.ThroughouttheRepublic,Plato attacksas the opponentsof philosophythose who persuade the multitudebyappealingto theemotions nd appetitesrather han to reasonand truth.In RepublicVI he attacks the educators and sophists (492d6), among

    *See Adam on Republic412e and 382a, and below, 136 and note 22.'Adam, on Republic413c, gives some examples in the Laws of tests forresistance toforce nd magic.However, thedistinction nRepublic III betweenforce s causingpain,and magicas causingfear is probablymore rhetoricalthan philosophical.At least, it isclear in RepublicX that pain fallswithinthe provinceof the magic of poetry below,130), and manypassages, e.g., Laws 633c9-dl, linkpain with fear.5Mentionedat Laws 933b.

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    130 PHOENIXwhom he includes politicians, painters,musicians, and poets (493d),whoknownothing bout the truthbut instead have learned thepassionsand desires of the multitude and how to please or anger it (493a-c).These sophistswho want to please the crowdnecessarilyblame philo-sophy 494a). In RepublicVIII tragedy s blamed forpraising hetyrantand fordrawingregimestowardsdemocraciesand tyrannies 568a-d),and inRepublic X thetyrants associatedwith hedesires nd appetites.The terriblemagicians magoi) and tyrantmakers producea tyrant yimplanting ros nhim 572e-573a). The tyrant s ruledby eros,physicalpleasures,thus enjoying only a phantasmaof true pleasure, a sort ofmagic (584a) whichPlato compareswithshadow-painting586b-c).

    The attack on the opponentofphilosophy ulminates n RepublicX,where Plato condemnsthepoet as a magician (598d, 602d) who makespleasureand pain rulein thecity nsteadoflaw and the best argument(607a-b) and tries to please themultitude 604e-605a).6 Plato explainsthat poetry imitates those who display excessive grief (605c-606c),excessive aughter 606c), or lust, anger,and all thedesires and painsand pleasures in the soul (606d) and that it produces and increasestheseemotional xcesses nus (605b, 606d). It is significanthatthe oveofpoetry scalled eros t 607e5. Plato explicitly ontrasts heseemotionalexcesses withthe restrainedgrief r pleasureof the reasonable manwho feelsemotionsbut nevertheless ses reason to control hem 603e-604d). In himrule reason and law, whichbid us resistpain, insteadofthat drawing (helkon, word oftenused ofmagical spells) us towardspain (604a10-bl).7 The pleasureand pain by means ofwhichthepoet-magicianaffects s are excessiveemotionswhich are not merelynon-rational, s are all emotions, ut anti-rational, avingthepowertomakereason let down its guard (606a8). The poet-magician fRepublicX,like themagicianofRepublic II, drivesout trueopinion,makingus takethe illusion forthe reality (598c, 602b, 602c, 603b, and passim). InRepublicX Plato also contrasts the magician's emotionalmeans withsimpleargument.He comparesmeter,rhythm, nd harmonywith thecolors of painting (chromata), nd says that without these the merewordsofpoetry annotenchantus (601a-b).8

    'Gerald Else, The Structureand Date of Book 10 of Plato's Republic, AbhHeidel-berg1972, argues convincingly hat we should connectthe poet and painterofRepublicX withthepainterand sophistoftheSophist, ll ofwhom are called magicians. In bothdialogues, Plato is attackingthe same enemy: the deceitfulmagic ofrhetoric.71 wish to thank the anonymousreferee f Phoenix forcalling my attention to thispassage. See also Phdr. 238al fora similaruse ofhelko.8Thispassage should be comparedwithGorgias 465b-c, where cosmetology is saidto give a veneer ofalien beauty,partlybymeans ofcolor.Though Plato does notuse thewordpharmakonn thesepassages, it is commonlyused ofthecolorsused bypainters forexample in Cratylus 24e and 434b,Republic 420c). See P. M. Schuhl,Platon etL'Art deson temps Paris 1952) 22 and Derrida 11.34-35.

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    ELENCHUS, EPODE, AND MAGIC 131A comparisonof Plato's description f magic in Republic II and Xwith Gorgias' descriptionof the magic of rhetoricand poetryin the

    EncomiumofHelen' also gives muchsupportto the view that Plato isattackingthesophistsand poets in our passage inRepublic II. Gorgiascalls speech, ogos, form fmagicwhichcompelspeople to changetheiropinionsbymeans ofpleasureand pain. Divine spells epodai) charm ndpersuadeby means ofmagic,goeteia 10), and speech can drugand be-witchthe soul (14). The personwho persuades,says Gorgias,exercizescompulsion,while thepersonpersuaded s compelled 12). Speechcomestogetherwiththeopinionand changes t bymeansofmagic (10). It cantake away pain and bringpleasure (10) but it can also cause fearfulshuddering nd much-weeping ity (9)10 orpain and fear 14). Gorgiasgives an account ofpleasureand pain verymuch ike Plato's. Poetry,aform f speech, producespleasurewhichhelps to change the opinions,producing rrors nd deceptionsofthe soul (10), and pleasureis associ-atedwitheros 18-19). Gorgiascomparesthepain and fear aused bythelogoswith fearful ightswhichcause men to flee n panic before here sactual danger, nd so to neglectthatwhich s udged to be nobleby thelaw and thegoodwhichcomes from ictory 16). Fear is anti-rational,for t extinguishes nd drivesout law (17). Gorgias' account of themagicofthe ogos s thussubstantially he same as Plato's accountoftheaims and meansofmagicin theRepublic.Plato's enemy hemagician, hen, s a serious nddangerous dversary.The philosopher ttacks him nthevery hree reascoveredbythedefini-tion nRepublic II. Philosophy 1) drivesout falseopinion, ttacking heaim ofmagic,and (2) it enables us to resistthe powerofpleasure andfear,preventing hemeans ofmagic frombeingeffective.n thisway,(3) it does not compel,but on the contrary nables us to act withoutcompulsion.Philosophydrives utfalseopinionveryoften ymeansoftheelenchus,whichdoes notteachany positivedoctrines r mpart nyactual informa-tion,but instead purifies he soul of the worstkind of ignorance, hebelief hatone knowswhat one doesn't know.These pointsarediscussedin theSophist 229b ff.)wheretheelenchuss defined s a kindof educa-

    9Diels-Kranz, orsokr.711.1oFor discussionfpity ndfearphobosndeleos) nGorgias, lato,andAristotleseeH. Flashar, Die MedizinischenrundlagenerLehrevonderWirkungerDich-tung nderGriechischenoetik, Hermes 4 (1956) 12-48;W. Schadewaldt,Furchtund Mitleid?, Hermes 3 (1955) 129-171; M. Pohlenz, Furchtund Mitleid?EinNachwort, ermes 4 (1956)49-74.For a goodaccount fGorgias' sychologicalheoriesee C. P. Segal, Gorgias ndthePsychologyftheLogos, HSCP 66 1962)99-155.OnGorgias'deasaboutrhetoricas magic eeRomilly -22andalso her rticleGorgias t e pouvoir e a po6sie, HS93 (1973) 155-162.

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    132 PHOENIXtion.Those whopracticethe elenchus uestionpeople about things heyclaim to know until they contradictthemselves.This instruction, rpurification,makes those who undergo it angrywith themselvesandgentle owardsothers.The Eleatic Stranger omparesthosewhopracticeit withdoctors: Doctors ofthebodybelieve that thebodycannotbenefitfrom henourishment rought o it untilone casts out the obstructionswithin t. These othersbelieve the same thing bout thesoul,that twillnever profitfromthe learning broughtto it until by cross-examining(elenchon)one shames the person cross-examined, hus removingtheopinionswhich are obstructions o learningand renderinghim pure,thinkinghat he knowsonlythosethingshe does knowand notmore. '2The elenchus, hen, affectsthe reason, though it does not impartinformation r offer ounter-arguments.t is instructionn thenegativesense of removal of false belief.Nevertheless, t has the very positiveeffect f preparingthe soul to receive learning.The comparisonwithmedicine s interesting. rue medicine,Plato again tellsus at Republic426a-b, consists n the removaloftheobstaclesto health, uch as over-indulgencesof all sorts,while drugs and spells are useless until theseobstacles are removed. Health is not something ut into the body by adrugalien to it. This is exactlyhowPlato describes hehealthy onditionof the rationalpart of the soul (phronesis) n RepublicVII. The othervirtues re not n the souluntiltheyareput thereby practiceand habit,but the power of exercizingphronesis s always in the soul. The trueteacherdoes not put knowledge nto the soul like sight nto blindeyes,but instead removes heobstaclesto theproperfunctioningfphronesis,turningtaround tothe ight.'3 imilarly,ntheSophist assagequotedabove, theelenchus estores hereasonto its natural,healthyconditionrather hangiving t a drug forwisdom.But the elenchus oes not affect hereason alone. Our Sophistpassagesays that it makespeople ashamed and angrywiththemselves. t thusarouses certainemotions whichare the allies of reason.'4Accordingto

    12Sophist 30c-d, Cf. Theaetetus 10c. The Sophist passage is usually taken to be adescription fthemethodofSocratesand hisfollowers. ee, for xample,F. M. Cornford,Plato's Theory fKnowledge London 1935) 177-183; V. Goldschmidt,Les Dialogues dePlaton (Paris 1963) 29-31; G. M. A. Grube, Plato's Thought London 1935) 241-242.For other views see A. E. Taylor, Plato, the Man and His Work' (New York 1952)380-381; J.Burnet,GreekPhilosophy,Thales to Plato (London 1914) 224; G. B. Kerferd,Plato's Noble Art of Sophistry, C9 N.s. 4 (1954). I agreewith F. Oscanyan that thepassage is a perfectdescriptionof Socratic dialectics: On Six Definitionsof theSophist: Sophist221c-231e, PhilosophicalForum4 (1972-1973) 254.'Republic518b-519a. Cf. Timaeus 89a-d and Derrida 11.32 ff. n artificial emedies(pharmaka) as opposed to naturalmethodsofcuring.14P. W. Gooch, 'Vice is Ignorance': The Interpretationof Sophist 226a-231b,Phoenix25 (1971) 130,makes thepointthatcross-examination eals with the irrationalaspects of the soul at least indirectly,by bringingthe irrationalparts into a rightrelationshipby pointingout inconsistencies o the rational part.

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    ELENCHUS, EPODE, AND MAGIC 133the accountgiven in theRepublic,angerwith oneself s situated in thethumos,whichsometimesmakes war against the desireswhenthese tryto force omeonecontrary o reason,but whichnever becomes the allyof the desiresagainst the reason (440b). We finda similardistinctionbetween emotionallied with reason and emotion that works againstreasonat Laws 646e ff. here are, says theAthenian,twokindsof fear.One is the fear fevilwhenweexpect t to befallus; theother s fearofadeservedevil reputation, .e., shame, aischune.This latterkind of fearactuallyopposesourotherpains and fears nd ourgreatestpleasures. tcontributes o fearlessness ftheenemyand to a fearofdisgracebeforefriends.15he shameand angerwithoneself hat theelenchustirsup arethus theoppositeofthe fearproducedby thedeceitfulmagician,whichopposes and overcomes hereason.The elenchuss theoppositeofmagic nstillanotherway.The deceitfulmagicianworksby affectingnlyhis victims,while Socrates' magicaffectshimself s well. Thus, after Meno compares Socrates with theelectric ayofthesea, Socratesrepliesthat he is a ray that stings tselfas wellas others Meno 80c). And in theEuthyphroocratessays thathemakesbothhisownandothers' rgumentsmovearound,but that he hasthis skill against his own will (aiKWVdMl oTO46S,id). While the magiciandeliberatelyuses his skill to make his victims act against theirwill,Socrates uses his skillagainsthis own will and makeshis victims ableto act willingly.We can nowbetterunderstand heserious ntention ehind theironyin those passages in which the people who experiencethe Socraticelenchus ompare t withmagic.Plato is at once attackinghisenemy ndshowinghow philosophy s a kind of counter-magic. Meno says toSocrates, You are bewitching nd drugging nd simplyspellbindingme (yo'qreES EKalt apALa77lEL a ~7aTExvcoaT7arorts, 80a). This is becausehe is now unable to speak: I have oftenmade many speeches aboutvirtuebeforemanypeople,and I spokeverywell,as itseemed tome.Butnow amnot at all able to say evenwhat t is. Anywhere ut inAthens,he concludes,Socratesmightbe arrestedas a magician (80b). Meno iscomparingthe elenchuswith a definitekind of magic, spellbinding(katadesis), nwhich victim gainsthiswill s rendered nable to speak,oftenbecause he knows a truththat will harmthe spellbinder. n thiscase, however,Meno is able but unwilling o speak because he realizesthathe doesn't knowthe truth. '

    15Cf.Republic465a-b and Euthyphro 2b-c fora similardistinction etween Rosfearofsome evil such as bodily harm,and albt's, shame ofwrongdoing.eCf.Gorgias482e, where Callicles accuses Socrates of binding and gagging Polus;Laches 194b,whereLaches says he is not able to say what he knows; Republic350d and358b-c, whereThrasymachus blushes and is said to have been charmed like a snake.W. K. C. Guthrie,TheGreeks nd TheirGods London 1950) 270-274, gives some exam-

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    134 PHOENIXIn anotherwell-knownpassage, Alcibiades compares Socrates withthe satyr Marsyas, whose flutetunes enchantedpeople. We who hear

    Socrates,saysAlcibiades,are amazed and possessed. Alcibiades'heartleaps and tearsflowfromhis eyesmore than ifhe werea participant ntheCorybantic ites.His soul is troubled nd criesout as thoughhe werea slave, and, moreover, ocrates s theonlymanwhocan makehimfeelshame. He admits,ust as Meno did,thathedoes notknowtherightwayto live. He has to escape from ocratesholdinghis ears as thoughfromSiren,yetas soon as he is outofearshothe returns ohisformerpinions(Symposium 15a-216c). In thispassage, as I. M. Linforth as correctlyshown,Socrates is being comparednot with a deceitfulmagicianwhoproducesfearbutwithan officiatorn a catharticritewhouses spellstocast out the fearwhich s already present s a disease. The first tageofthis cureconsists n allowing he fearto be consciously erceived o thatthose whosuffer romt willrealizethat theyneed a cure.'7These cath-articrites rethus nmanywayssimilar otheSocraticelenchus. ocratesfirstmakessomeonewith falsebeliefsrealizehis condition.This realiza-tion is accompaniedby strongemotion: shame and angerwith oneself(or with Socrates if the processbackfires).The disease can then beexpelled.As we shall see next,Plato often howsSocrateshelpingpeopleto cast out fearas well as false belief.When the vocabularyof magic is used forthis second purpose, t isoftenassociated with the epode,whichdiffersn several ways from heelenchus.When theyare associatedwithmagic,theelenchus, catharsisof thereason, s usually seen as directedagainstmagic's aim ofdrivingout trueopinion,whilethephilosophical pode s mostoften.conceivedsblockingthemeans by whichmagicworks: the use of the emotions toovercomereason. In manypassages,whether hevocabularyofmagic sused or not, the epodediffers adicallyfrom he elenchus, or t has anemotional ppeal, as explicitly pposedto a rational ppeal. Forexample,at Laws 903a10-b2 a distinctions made between the arguments logoi)that attemptto convince the atheist and the epode he will need inaddition. n contrast o theelenchuswhich s dangerousforyoungpeople(Republic538d-539d), theepode s useful n thetraining fchildrenwhocannotyetreason. n thesecond bookofthe Laws the musicaltraining fyoungpeople is said to providean epodeforthesoul so that it will feelpleasure,pain, love, and hate in concordwith reason and law, before tis able to reason (653b, 659d-e). In theRepublic,musicaltraining f theples of katadesis that allow us to connect Meno's description of the effects of theelenchuswiththisparticularkind ofmagic. A typicalkatadesis ays, for xample, mayhis tongueand his soul become lead that he may not be able to speak or act, and piercethou his tongueand his soul (272).17TheCorybantic ites n Plato (Berkeley 1946) 140-144.

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    ELENCHUS, EPODE, AND MAGIC 135youngis described n much the same way: music seeps into the innerpart of the soul and makes it love and praise the good and hate evil,before heyoung person s able to reason (401d-402a). The myth t theendof thePhaedo s also said tobe an epode hatadultscanuse toinspirethemselveswiththe courage to despise bodily pleasure (114d-e). Hereagain, it is distinguished rom ationalargument, orSocratessays thatno reasonableman would affirmhat the myth s the literal truth.Atothertimes, rgumenttselfmaybe called an epode,butinthesepassagesthe emotionaleffect f argument s what is stressed.Thus, in a passagein the Phaedo that uses the vocabulary of magic, Socrates says thatthoughthe existenceof the soul afterdeath has already been proved,Cebes and Simmias are afraid ike childrenwho fearthat the windwillscatterthesoulwhen omeonedies. Cebes agrees: Perhaps there s inusalso a childwho fears uch things.Try to persuadehimnotto fear eathas though t werea bogey-man. Socratesreplies, You mustsay a spell(epaidein) over himevery day untilyou charmaway his fears. He sug-geststhat dialectic 8willprovidethis charm Phaedo 77d-78a). Here itwould seem that the emotionaleffect frepetitions the effectivengre-dientofthe charm.Again,at theendofthe Crito 54d), Socrates ays thatthewordsof theLaws ring n his ears, like the flutesCorybantesthinktheyhear,and actuallypreventhimfromistening o the otherside.'9 tis true that n theCharmides157a-c) noble words are called an epode,and no particular mphasis s placed on theemotional, s opposedto therational,effects. his is, however,unusual.20 Most often Plato has twodistinctweapons thatmay be used against the deceitfulmagician: onethat purifies he rationalelement,drivingout false belief the elenchusor a process imilar o it thatwill turnaround thereason to itsproperobjects, as Republic518e describes t) and anotherprocedurethat willactivelytrainand strengthen he emotions o that theywillbe in har-monywiththereason (the epode,themyth,musicaleducation).2'If philosophy ucceedsin driving ut falsebelief nd in enablingus toresist heanti-rationalmotions fpleasureand fear,tsucceeds nfreeing

    '8R. S. Bluck, Plato's Phaedo (London 1955) ad loc. gives this interpretation f thepassage.9Thispassage was called to myattentionby Charles Young.20Dodds (226, note20) says that n theCharmides he epode is a Socratic cross-exam-ination. The bes t account ofthisunusual passage is thatgiven byT. M. Robinson,Plato'sPsychologyToronto 1970 [Phoenix Supp. Vol. 3]) 4-10. Robinson says that the noblewords have both an intellectualand a moraleffect7), and that in theCharmides theself s ... thewholeman 156e7-8), ofwhichbodyis an integral nd inalienablepart (8).The psychological theoriesof the Charmidesthus differ adically fromthose of thePhaedo and Republic.21Forsome good discussions of the emotional effects f the epode and the mythinPlato see Boyanc6 155 ff.,Dodds 212 and note 20, Edelstein 473 ff.,Lain Entralgo118 ff.

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    136 PHOENIXus from ompulsion,not,of course n theusual sense ofallowingus to dowhatseemsgoodtous,but n the Platonic sense ofallowing s todo whatis actually forour good.22The philosopherwho can do this has greaterskill than thedeceitfulmagicianwhomheovercomes.Andhemayappearto be a sortof counter-magician nthat he has thetechne alsely laimedbyGorgias:powerovertheopinions nd theemotions.23The contrastbetween the deceitfulmagicianand Socrates the coun-ter-magician s broughtout most clearly in a little parable in theSymposium.mmediatelyfollowing is description fthemagicaleffectsSocrates has on his hearers (215-216) Alcibiades tells how, under theinfluenceof Socrates' spells, the mania and Bacchic frenzyof thephilosopher 218b), he triedto seduce Socrates (216-222). Alcibiadesreportsthat Socrates told him okinglythat in trying o exchangehisown beauty forSocrates' he mightbe trying o exchangemereopinion(doxa) fortruth,bronzeforgold (218e). Justas the deceitfulmagicianuses ouremotions o getus to take the llusionfor hereality,Alcibiadesusespleasure, ros, o try o makeSocrates tradegoldfor ronze.But thissortofmagichas no effect n thephilosopher.Not onlydoes Alcibiadesfail to seduce Socrates,thoughhe spends thenight n his bed, Socratesseduces Alcibiades into love ofvirtue, o that he ends by admiring(agamenon)this man's natureand self-control nd courage (219d4-5).It is significanthatagamenos s theverywordused ofthephilosopher'slove of truth t Republic500c6.The story howsclearlyhowphilosophy pposes a rational ove ofthegood to the enslavingand anti-rational ros associated withmagic. Italso showshow Socratesultimately eads us beyond magicof any kind.Throughout hissectionoftheSymposium, lcibiadescompares ocrateswitha little statue of a Silenus witha flute n its hand, whichcan beopenedup to revealfigures f thegods inside 215a-b, 216c-217a,221d-222a). Socrates'words, s we have seen,enchantand possesspeople liketheflute unesofthesatyrMarsyas (215b-c). But the flute s only partof the outercasing; Socrates' wordsonly appear to be likemagic,sincethey are equally powerful nd appear to the ignorantto have similareffects.nside,ifone takes the troubleto look,are the divine imagesof

    22SeeGorgias468d-e.23An nteresting arallel to our contrast between the philosopherand the magicianis thatdrawnby Morton Smithbetween the divine man, whoworks miraclesby hisindwellingdivine power and therefore oes not need rituals or spells, and the magi-cian, who merelygives ordersto a spirit:7esus theMagician (San Francisco 1978) 74.See also thedistinction rawnbetweenthe hero, who worksbyhis ownpower,and thesaint, who is the vehicle of divine will, n M. Hadas and M. Smith,Heroes and Gods(New York 1965) 12. Hadas and Smithsee Plato's Socrates as the model for particularkind of benevolent hero (17-18, 49-56) but do not explicitlycontrast him with themagician.

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    ELENCHUS, EPODE, AND MAGIC 137virtue (216e-217a, 222a). If one sees these,one realizes,as Alcibiadesdoes, thatSocrates' outercasingofmagician-seducers onlya deception,thatSocratesonly appearsto be a magicianand seduceruntilweopenuphis arguments.Then we understandthat he is not the seducerbut thebeloved,whomthe loverofvirtuefollows fhis own freewill (222a-b).And herewe reach the limitsof a metaphor.24

    UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA24Iwishto thankthe anonymousreferees fPhoenix and ProfessorCharles Young fortheirvaluable criticisms f an earlierversionof thispaper.