London knife attacks: a failure of deradicalisation and...

Osservatorio sociale

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anno IX, n. 3, 2019 data di pubblicazione: 24 aprile 2020

Democrazia e Sicurezza – Democracy and Security Review ISSN: 2239-804X

London knife attacks: a failure of deradicalisation and rehabilitation programs? * di Maria Luisa Maniscalco **

SUMMARY: 1. Introduction. – 2. The UK counter‐terrorism legal system. – 3. The UK strategy for countering

terrorism. – 4. Conclusion.

1. Introduction

Two years after the 2017 massacre, which saw eight people die at the

hands of Islamic extremists, London Bridge was again the scene of a ter‐

rorist attack. Two people were killed and eight injured. The November

29, 2019 knifing attack was performed by Usman Khan, born in the

United Kingdom to immigrant parents from the Pakistan controlled Kash‐

mir province. Khan who wore a fake kamikaze belt was first blocked by

bystanders and then killed by the police.

* Essay issued on the basis of the project funded by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 re‐

search and innovation programme ‐ Grant agreement No 740934.

** Direttrice di ricerca presso il Jean Monnet – Centro di Eccellenza «Altiero Spinelli». Contri‐

buto sottoposto a doppio referaggio anonimo (double blind peer review).


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In 2012 Khan – a follower of the Islamist extremist Anjem Choudary,

who co‐founded the now banned Al‐Muhajiroun group – was sentenced

to eight years in prison for plotting to blow up the London Stock Ex‐

change, the Houses of Parliament, the US embassy, the home of then

London Mayor Boris Johnson and the London Eye. In April 2013, a Court

of Appeal gave him a sentence of 16 years. He was granted an early re‐

lease in December 2018 on the agreement that he would wear an elec‐

tronic monitoring tag.

The London Bridge terror attack unfolded during a conference organ‐

ised by the Institute of Criminology of the University of Cambridge pro‐

gram called “Learning Together”. According to the University of Cam‐

bridge, the aim of this program is to break down prejudices and create

new possibilities for all of those who took part. This program is consistent

with a consideration of civil society as a key player in a whole‐of‐society

approach to preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalisa‐

tion that lead to terrorism (Khosrokhavar 2014). Furthermore the civil so‐

ciety participation is a fundamental part of building community resilience

and contributing to the success of the United Kingdom’s strategy in re‐

habilitating and disengaging former terrorists and offenders.

The fifth anniversary of “Learning Together” had been hosted at Fish‐

monger’s Hall, near London Bridge, to celebrate how reintegration pro‐

grams work. Khan had been present as a model of the recovery program.

He had even written a poem and a note of thanks to the organisers. Para‐

doxically, the two people killed worked for the program “Learning To‐

gether”: Jack Merrit as a course co‐ordinator and Saskia Jones a volunteer.


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They both dreamed of working to deradicalise and rehabilitate jihadists1.

So an event that should have celebrated the success of the initiative to

deradicalise the jihadists marked its failure in a dramatic and exemplary

way.

A further confirmation of the failure of the deradicalisation measures

in the United Kingdom, is that one of five of Khan’s accomplices in the

2010 plot, Mohibur Rahman, released early after he similarly applied to

a deradicalisation program, was jailed again in August 2017 for plotting

a mass casualty attack on a police or military target.

A new terrorist assault in London came more than three months after

the London Bridge attack. The latter took place on February 2, 2020

around 2 pm in Streatham in the south of London where Sudesh Mamoor

Faraz Amman stabbed two pedestrians. Amman who had been released

from prison less than a fortnight ago and was under active surveillance

when the bloodshed happened was shot dead by British police.

London and Great Britain have already been the scene of numerous ji‐

hadist attacks over time. London remains one of the places, in recent history,

most involved and most relevant in the evolution of these new forms of Eu‐

ropean jihadist terrorism. Despite its long history and experience in the fight

against terrorism and in the prevention of radicalisation, the UK has again

tested its fragility and permeability in the face of potential sudden attacks.

1 The use of the term “jihadist” may generate controversy because the word jihad has

various religious significances in Islam. Indeed, simplistically reducing the concept to the

use of violence is incorrect and maybe offensive to many Muslims. At the same time, the

term is widely used in the Arab and Muslim world by both supporters and critics to

indicate groups that use religiously legitimated violence to achieve their political goals.

In this essay the term is used to indicate the ideology inspiring the Islamic State, al Qaeda

and other like‐minded groups.


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These attacks show the attempts to rehabilitate prisoners are failing and the

need of new ideas on deradicalisation.

What happened on November 19, 2019 and on February 2, 2020 made

UK citizens fear a renewed major wave of jihadist terrorism. A heated de‐

bate has opened: the push for tougher laws and the government’s possible

response to recent terror attacks (for example the introduction of emer‐

gency legislation making retrospective provision in relation to those sen‐

tenced before the law was changed) are a cause of increasing concern for

civil liberties.

2. The UK counter‐terrorism legal system

The UK has had a long history of counter‐terrorism policy and legisla‐

tion (Maniscalco 2019), at first relating to the separatist conflict in North‐

ern Ireland in the last century. The recent terrorist conflict in Northern

Ireland – which began in the late 1960s and is usually deemed to have

ended with the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 – lasted for three decades,

during which a special legislation was developed.

The policy adopted to deal with this kind of terrorism was as far as

possible based on a criminal justice – although somewhat modified – pro‐

cess in order to make it better respond to challenges posed by the nature

of terrorist secret groups and their ability to intimidate the community,

witnesses and jurors.

In the UK, long‐standing laws and measures similar to an emergency

regime, albeit adopted outside of a formally declared state of emergency,

are operational. In this legislation terrorism is just one form of emergency


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where special powers may be invoked in order to provide the government

with “enhanced” emergency powers. Counter terrorism is a reserved

matter2, but many of the local implementation mechanisms, such as po‐

licing and justice in Scotland and Northern Ireland, and health, education

and local government in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are de‐

volved. It should also be noted that Scotland and Northern Ireland are

separate legal jurisdictions from England and Wales, and Scotland oper‐

ates a different system of law.

Just before the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on Sep‐

tember 11th, the awareness of having to deal with a changed landscape of

terrorism and particularly with the rise of Islamist terrorism led to the

adoption of the Terrorism Act 2000 (TA) that, unlike the previous laws on

the fight against terrorism, appears as permanent legislation and is appli‐

cable throughout the territory of the United Kingdom and not only a part

of it3.The Terrorism Act 2000 completely reforms the law concerning the

prevention of terrorism in the United Kingdom, albeit with some excep‐

tions; furthermore, it applies to any terrorist activity in the United King‐

dom and abroad.

Following a succession of disrupted or actual terror attacks in Britain

and other locations across Europe, the UK government began drafting ad‐

ditional legislative action to meet the threat. Between 2001 and 2010,

many additional pieces of “counter‐terrorism” legislation were adopted

2 In the United Kingdom reserved matters and excepted matters are the areas of public

policy where the UK Parliament has retained the exclusive power (jurisdiction) to make

laws (legislate) in the devolved nations (Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland). 3 https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/contents.


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with tight control measures expanding the Terrorism Act 2000 definition

of terrorism through the so‐called “terrorism‐related” activities.

After the 7/7 bombing in London, British authorities passed more se‐

curity legislation while simultaneously coming to the realisation that se‐

curitisation was not enough. Indeed the attack marked a decisive change

on the personal characteristics of the perpetrators, which anticipated one

of the most significant innovations of the third generation of jihadism and

its protagonists in Europe. This change occurred in the same period when

Abu Musab Al‐Zarqawiʹs bloody action in Iraq – both ideologically and

practically through the beginning of the use of the web and social net‐

works to advertise terrorist actions and executions – also had a strong im‐

pact on the evolution of jihadism and determined the basic conditions that

then made the advent of Isis possible.

The Terrorism Act 2006 created new offences related to terrorism and

amended existing ones4; some of its terms have proven to be highly con‐

troversial. The following are some of the new criminal offences: a) encour‐

agement of terrorism (prohibits the publishing of “a statement that is

likely to be understood … as a direct or indirect encouragement or other

inducement … to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of ter‐

rorism”)5; b) disseminating terrorist publications (prohibits the dissemi‐

nation of a publication which is likely to be understood as either directly

4 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/11/pdfs/ukpga_20060011_en.pdf.

5 Indirect encouragement statements include every statement which glorifies the com‐

mission or preparation (whether in the past, in the future or generally) of such acts or

offences; and is a statement from which those members of the public could reasonably be

expected to infer that what is being glorified is being glorified as conduct that should be

emulated by them in existing circumstances.


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or indirectly encouraging terrorism, or includes information which is

likely to be understood as being useful in the commission or preparation

of an act of terrorism); c) preparation of terrorist acts (prohibits anyone

from engaging in any conduct in preparation for an intended act of ter‐

rorism); d) training for terrorism (prohibits anyone from training others

in terrorist activities, or from receiving training); e) attendance at a place

used for terrorist training (prohibits anyone from being at a place where

training is going on whether in the United Kingdom or abroad, provided

the person knew or reasonably believed that it was happening).

The government considered this Act a necessary response to an un‐

precedented terrorist threat; it met with opposition from those who be‐

lieved it was an undue imposition on civil liberties.

On December 14, 2011, the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation

Measures Act 2011 (TPIM)6 came into force. The law provides the statu‐

tory framework for administrative restrictions on people suspected of

posing a threat to national security and replaces the “control orders”

with the “terrorism prevention and investigation measures” that have

characteristics very similar to the previous measures. On the basis of

these new measures, the Home Secretary may assign such a person to a

particular residence, restrict with whom they may live, impose geo‐

graphic and curfew restrictions, and limit association and communica‐

tion with others.

The “terrorism prevention and investigation measures” can be ap‐

plied to UK nationals and foreigners, are limited to two years and allow,

among other things: a) assigned overnight residence; b) a ban on travel

6 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2011/23/contents/enacted.


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outside the country or outside a specified area within the UK; c) exclu‐

sion orders prohibiting a person from entering an area or specific types

of places (such as internet cafes); d) restrictions on access to financial

services and the use of mobile phones; e) restrictions on association with

other people.

In November 2016, Parliament passed the Investigatory Powers Act

20167 (nicknamed the Snoopers’ Charter), the most significant update of

British surveillance laws in 15 years. The Act comprehensively sets out

and, in limited respects, expands the electronic surveillance powers of the

UK Intelligence Community and law enforcement agencies, mandating

broad powers for bulk interception, bulk acquisition and access to bulk

personal datasets. It also aims to improve the safeguards on the exercise

of those powers. The Act also creates a new criminal offence for unlaw‐

fully accessing internet data.

The Snoopers’ Charter allows intelligence services to hack phones and

computers and even use a suspect’s camera or microphone in their

smartphones to eavesdrop remotely on conversations. These warranted

powers allow the security services and the law enforcement agencies to

monitor the content of emails, texts, phone calls and real‐time conversa‐

tions. It also contains wide‐ranging powers to require web and phone

companies to retain records of everyone’s web browsing histories and

communications data records for phone calls and texts for two years for

access by the intelligence and law enforcement services.



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On 12 February 2019, the Counter‐Terrorism and Border Security Act

20198 became law after passing UK parliament with less debate than many

had hoped while Brexit dominated the political agenda. It received royal

assent on 12 February 2019 and came into force on 12 April 2019. The law

updates existing counter‐terrorism legislation to reflect the digital age, in‐

cluding the way in which people view content online. It also reflects the

speed at which terrorism plots develop.

The law also intends to address hostile activities that threaten the na‐

tional security committed by individuals or that may be carried out for,

or on behalf of, a state other than the UK, or otherwise in the interests of

a state other than the UK.

In addition, the Counter‐Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019: a)

amends certain terrorism offences for the digital age; b) reflects contem‐

porary patterns of radicalisation, ensuring laws reflect modern use of the

internet; c) intends to help meet the operational needs of intelligence ser‐

vices and police forces, strengthening their powers to prevent and inves‐

tigate terrorist offences; d) increases the maximum penalty for certain of‐

fences, ensuring the punishment better reflects the crime and better pre‐

vents reoffending; e) manages offenders following their release from cus‐

tody; f) intends to prevent and investigate terrorist offences; and g) creates

extensive new border security powers, which include accessing infor‐

mation on electronic devices.

The new law has been criticised in several respects, including how it

limits freedom of expression and access to information online and creates



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extensive new border security powers, which include access to infor‐

mation on electronic devices.

Lastly the United Kingdom has over the years strengthened legislative

tools to target and disrupt terrorist finance.

3. The UK strategy for countering terrorism

In addition to the powerful legal measures, the United Kingdom has

developed a set of strategies and interventions to counter terrorism and

radicalisation.

CONTEST is the name of the United Kingdom’s counter‐terrorism

strategy. It was first developed by the Home Office in early 20039. The aim

of the strategy is “to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas

from terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with

confidence”. This strategy is based on the conviction that terrorism poli‐

cies need to address not only the immediate threat of attacks but the

longer term factors that enable terrorist groups to grow and flourish.

Updates on the strategy were published in 2006, 2009, 2011, and 201810.

The last one focuses on all types of terrorism and reflects the findings of a

fundamental review of all aspects of counter terrorism, updating and

9 The government introduced Prevent in 2003 but it wasn’t made public for some years.

In practice, it is delivered differently in the different devolved nations of the UK as many

of the organisations involved, for example, the police and councils, are under the control

of devolved governments. The Prevent strategy is not applied in Northern Ireland.

10 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/atta‐

chment_data/file/716907/140618_CCS207_CCS0218929798‐1_CONTEST_3.0_WEB.pdf.


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strengthening this approach within the tried‐and‐tested strategic frame‐

work of the four work strands: a) Prevent: safeguard people from becom‐

ing terrorists or supporting terrorism; b) Pursue: stop terrorist attacks

happening in the UK and overseas; c) Protect: strengthen protection

against a terrorist attack in the UK and overseas; d) Prepare: mitigate the

impact of terrorist incidents if they occur. The primary outcome is to re‐

duce: a) intent; b) capability; c) vulnerability; and d) impact.

The approach of 2018 strategy is similar to the previous one of 2011,

but it implements new changes that increase and optimise capabilities in

domestic investigations. It includes more prevention by disrupting terror‐

ist threats earlier and faster by allowing authorities to intervene in the

early stages (prosecution for terrorist offences, longer sentences and bet‐

ter supervision of individuals after prison). Information sharing is the key

of the new strategy: Better communication channels on the local and na‐

tional levels; integrated relationships with the private sector to ensure cer‐

tain venues, detect faster alerts and detect suspicious purchases.

The current Prevent strategy addresses all forms of terrorism and rad‐

icalisation as the “process by which a person comes to support terrorism

and forms of extremism leading to terrorism”.

Prevent has distinct objectives: a) Challenging the ideology that sup‐

ports terrorism and those who promote it. Prevent recognises that people

who are engaged in terrorist activities are often initially drawn into extrem‐

ist narratives and beliefs, and these narratives (violent and non‐violent)

should be challenged to stop people moving from extremism into terror‐

ism. So a fundamental part of Prevent lies in challenging ideologies that

lead to extremism and violence and disrupting the ability of terrorists to


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promote them. To avoid the dissemination of terrorist material, Prevent fo‐

cuses on building strong counter‐terrorist narratives and on online activity

in order to ensure there are no safe places for terrorists online. b) Protecting

and supporting vulnerable people. Radicalisation is usually a process, not

an event. During that process it is possible to intervene to prevent vulnera‐

ble people from being drawn into terrorist‐related activity.

A wide range of sectors work to prevent people becoming terrorists or

supporting terrorism; priority areas include education, faith, health, crim‐

inal justice and charities. More specifically, the Prevent program foresees

government cooperation with many civil society organisations located in

over forty priority areas spread across the country. The public sector or‐

ganisations are subject to a duty to prevent people from being drawn into

terrorism. The duty requires local authorities, schools, colleges, higher ed‐

ucation institutions, health institutions, prisons and probation, and the

police to consider the need to protect people from being attracted to ter‐

rorism. The duty is designed to help ensure that vulnerable people at risk

of radicalisation are as supported as they would be if subjected to other

processes protecting people from exploitation by a series of other dam‐

ages such as drugs, gangs, and physical and sexual exploitation. Prevent

and its Channel program were placed on a statutory footing by the Coun‐

ter‐Terrorism and Security Act 2015.

The new element of the 2018 Prevent strategy is the inclusion of De‐

sistance and Disengagement Program s (DDP) under its purview. DDP

has been running in pilot through 2017, focusing on people subject to

court‐approved conditions, including all terrorism and terrorism‐related

offenders on probation licence, as well as those on TPIMs and those who

have returned from conflict zones in Syria or Iraq (the so‐called foreign


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terrorist fighters) and are subject to Temporary Exclusion Orders (TEOs).

The DDP reflects increasing collaboration across different elements of the

counter‐terrorism system, notably Prevent and Pursue. The offered sup‐

port could include mentoring, psychological support, and theological and

ideological advice.

Prevent has been the subject of criticism, and the decision to impose a

statutory duty on public sector organisations has been particularly con‐

troversial. In August 2016, the Home Affairs Select Committee published

a report, “Radicalisation: The counter‐narrative and identifying the tip‐

ping point” following an inquiry into the government’s counter‐extrem‐

ism strategy11. The Committee sought views on the effectiveness of Pre‐

vent and the key problems with it. The report concluded that failure to

address concerns about Prevent among the communities most affected by

it would mean that it would continue to be viewed with suspicion. The

new version of Prevent also sparked the same reactions from various sec‐

tions of British society. More recently (2019) the Commission for Counte‐

ring Extremism12 published a new report highlighting some of Prevent’s

weaknesses (Fenwick 2019).

Another CONTEST work strand is Pursue; its purpose is to stop ter‐

rorist attacks happening in the country and against UK interests overseas.

11 https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmhaff/135/135.pdf.

12 The Commission for Countering Extremism is a British government independent

agency created under Prime Minister Theresa May in response to the 2017 Manchester

Arena bombing. The Commission for Countering Extremism supports society to fight all

forms of extremism. It advises the government on new policies to deal with extremism,

including the need for any new powers: https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/com-mission-for-countering-extremism


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To disrupt terrorist activity in addition to the capabilities of counter‐ter‐

rorism policing and the security and intelligence agencies, including cov‐

ert human intelligence sources, surveillance assets and the lawful inter‐

cept of communications, Pursue uses a wide range of tools; for example,

working to proscribe organisations, freeze and seize their financial assets,

and break up networks and associations in prison. Conviction in court

and imprisonment are considered the most effective way to stop and de‐

ter terrorists and deliver justice to their victims. Its objectives are to: a)

detect and understand terrorist activity; b) investigate terrorist activity;

and c) disrupt terrorist activity, including through prosecutions.

Another one is Protect; its purpose is to strengthen protection against

a terrorist attack in the UK or against its interests overseas and so reduce

its vulnerability. The work focuses on border security, transport systems,

national infrastructure, and crowded places. Protective security is princi‐

pally achieved by identifying risks, assessing vulnerabilities and encour‐

aging infrastructure owners and operators to implement proportionate

mitigation measures.

The last work strand is Prepare that aims to mitigate the impact of a

terrorist incident when it cannot be stopped. The UK approach to prepar‐

ing for civil emergencies (including terrorist attacks) is to build and main‐

tain generic capabilities applicable for use in any eventuality. For a terror‐

ist attack, additional specialist capabilities are envisaged. The Home Of‐

fice works with intelligence agencies and emergency services to stop a

terrorist attack and recover from its consequences. The emergency ser‐

vices have trained specialists to deal with terrorist incidents – including

armed officers supported by specialist fire and ambulance teams. They

also have skills and equipment to deal with an attack using a chemical,


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biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) device. The objectives of Pre‐

pare are to: a) deliver a coordinated multi‐agency response to all types of

terrorist attacks; b) ensure that the UK has a full range of capabilities to

respond to current and future threats; c) minimise the impact of terrorist

attacks on people, services and communities.

4. Conclusion

The UK policy for combating terrorism and countering violent radical‐

isation has become over the years a complex and articulated set of levels,

regulations and measures that permeate and involve the whole society,

its actors and stakeholders, in different roles and environs.

Despite such considerable commitment, the problems of integration of

the Muslim population remain13, together with the threat from home‐

13 The UK has the third‐largest Muslim population in the European Union, after France

and Germany, and, according to new figures, is home to more than 3 million Muslims for

the first time ever, with more than half born outside the UK. The number has doubled in

just over a decade as a result of soaring immigration and high birth rates. The United

Kingdom has a tradition of receiving people from different ethnic or religious groups and

taking a multicultural approach, allowing people to live in the UK whilst continuing to

practice their own traditions rather than expecting them to adapt to the so‐called “British

way”. However, despite its long history of relationships and mutual influence with

Muslim populations linked to its colonial past the segregation into ethnic enclaves, some

integration problems of the Muslim population and the threat from home‐grown terro‐

rism have thrown the multicultural policies into crisis. In 2016, on behalf of the British

government, Dame Louise Casey produced a report on integration in the UK, in which

she concluded that Muslims were the hardest ethnic and religious community to integrate.

See Casey (2016) and Maniscalco (2017).


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grown terrorism and the proliferation of “low‐tech” attacks14. Moreover

approximately 850 British citizens have travelled to Iraq and Syria to join

the Islamic State and other jihadist groups since the beginning of the con‐

flict15. Therefore, possible negative consequences and challenges posed by

returnee foreign terrorist fighters from the Middle East are.

The UK is not the only country in Europe with a failing judicial and

monitoring apparatus regarding terrorists. The last London Bridge Terror

Attack is the second in recent memory where the jihadist was wearing an

electronic tag. The first one took place in Saint‐Étienne‐du‐Rouvray near

Rouen (France) in July 2016 when Jacques Hamel an elderly Catholic

priest was brutally murdered by two jihadists. One of the attackers, iden‐

tified as Adel Kermiche, had tried several times to travel to Syria using

the passports of family members. He was put under official investigation

in May 2015, but released on 18 March 2016 on certain conditions includ‐

ing being fitted with an electronic tag allowing authorities to monitor his

movements, to live at his parents’ home and to only go out between

8.30am and 12.30pm.

Equally serious, the case of Larossi Abballa, sentenced in 2013 to three

years in jail for recruiting jihadists, that carried out in 2016 the atrocious

murder, in the name of the Islamic State, in Magnanville of a couple, that

14 In 2017 the UK witnessed four jihadist attacks: the Westminster Bridge attack on 22

March (6 people, including the perpetrator, were killed in the incident, and 49 people were

injured), the Manchester Arena bombing on 22 May (22 people killed and 250 injured), the

London Bridge attack on 3 June (8 people were killed and 48 injured), and the London

tube train attack on 15 September (30 people were injured). On August 14, 2018, Salih

Khater, the 29‐year‐old British citizen, originally from Sudan, injured 3 people by hitting

cyclists and pedestrians with a car.

15 https://www.bbc.com/news/uk‐32026985.


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were both police officers. Other terror attacks in the last few years have

been conducted by jihadists who were already flagged in France’s special

counter‐terrorism database as the attack at Christmas market in Strasburg

(December 2018). Recently (October 2019), a jihadist attack took place in‐

side Paris police headquarters. The terrorist, Mickaël Harpon, an IT spe‐

cialist who worked in the intelligence unit of the police headquarters for

the last 16 years and held a military clearance stabbed six colleagues. It

was later revealed that Harpon had caused alarm among his colleagues

as far back as 2015, when he defended the attack on the newspaper Charlie

Hebdo and that he adhered to a radical vision of Islam.

Belgium also has suffered through the failure of the monitoring me‐

chanism: on 29 May 2018, Benjamin Herman, a prisoner on temporary

leave from prison, stabbed two female police officers, took their guns,

shot and killed them and a civilian in Liège. Local media report that he

may have been radicalised while in jail. It was the 14th time since his de‐

tention that he was granted temporary leave despite being on the national

terror watch list.

These failures are also attributable to the real complexity of the phe‐

nomenon and to the very nature of this type of terrorism. The terrorists,

over the past few years, have almost always been people born or lived for

a large part of their lives in the same countries where they carried out the

attacks (Vidino et al. 2017). They are difficult to identify because they are

apparently integrated into the social contexts in which they live; they are

often young, with different stories of personal and family successes or

failures, that, at some point and for reasons difficult to predict, have


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turned into jihadist terrorists. Pathways into radicalisation are highly dis‐

similar, situational and not explicable through a single model (Maniscalco

2016; Antonelli 2019).

From the reconstruction of western jihadist biographies often emerges

the rapidity of the transition to terrorist violence. After more or less

lengthy periods of latency in which objective conditions and subjective

situations predispose to the search for a new “sense” and a new way of

life, they “find” almost suddenly their way and embrace without hesita‐

tion a doctrine that practices hatred, exalts cruelty and “martyrdom”

(Benslama 2016).

Some of them, coming from the roots of common crime, already have

a life of violence and are convinced that they have no future; so they seek

through a glorious end a personal and collective ransom16. They share

with others radicalized people, without a criminal past, the rejection of

social injustices, the repulsion of Western costumes judged immoral and

corrupt, the fear of contamination, the identification with all Muslims

considered to be victims of the West and the desire of revenge17. Dealing

with imprisoned terrorists and reopening communication channels after

16 In Europe there is an evident link between petty crime and terrorism, where indi‐

viduals on the margins of society and the formal economy or in prison are most vulne‐

rable to radicalisation. In other areas of the world, the relationship between organised

crime and terrorism has transformed to one of symbiosis and convergence.

17 The dynamic of so called “chosen trauma” inspires heroic aspirations in order to

revenge Muslims killed or oppressed somewhere in the world. According to the psycho‐

analyst Vamik Volkan, the “chosen trauma” is the process put in place by a group that

evokes the memory of a persecutory event and attributes to it an excessive emotional and

historical significance (Volkan 2008).


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terrorist violence is an epochal challenge of European countries. We must

not allow terrorists to normalise their hatred in our countries.

Now, after the Isis defeat and the loss of its territorial strongholds in

Syria and Iraq, Europe is dealing with the return of Isis’s foreign fighters.

New problems emerged: How dealing with foreign fighters returnees and

imprisoned terrorists? There is a possibility that, upon release, an impri‐

soned terrorist may carry out terrorist actions. Additionally, even when

returnees personally do not carry out attacks back home, they make great

tools for recruitment and for guiding public opinion. Terrorist organiza‐

tions usually recruit new members from their established connections –

often close friends or family18.

The returnees are not monolithic, however. Three types of returnees

will give different challenges: The first are the persistent true believers;

the second are the defectors who left Isis for different reasons but who

remained true believers of the jihadist ideology. The third are the defec‐

tors, who are in the process of dropping their former ideologies. While

the first category comprises the most dangerous terrorists, the latter two

might be dangerous as well.

The foreign fighters form a small group, but have a big impact on society

in terms of anxiety, discomfort and polarisation. In Europe the subject

18 For example, the brothers Khalid and Ibrahim el‐Bakraoui (attack in Brussels, March

2016), Fabien and Jean‐Michel Clain (the first claimed from Syria the attacks in Paris in

November 2015 the latter voiced a nachid accompaniment song), Brahim and Salah Abde‐

slan (attack in Paris, November 2015), Said and Chérif Kouachi (attack in Paris, January

2015), Džochar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev (attack in Boston April 2013), Mohamed Merah

(Toulouse and Montauban massacre, 2012) and Abdelkadar Merah (now in prison) and

their sister Souad (in Syria with her children), Abdelhamid Abaaoud (mind of the attacks

in Paris in November 2015) and his younger brother Younes, brought to Syria.


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of repatriation and prosecution of foreign terrorist fighters proved to be

an extremely divisive issue. Complex legal and moral questions arise. Is

the state responsible for its own war criminals? Does the state have the

duty of care in these cases? Do foreign fighters still have a right to citizen‐

ship?

If for many years the policies of the European countries have mainly ad‐

dressed prevention as an indispensable tool to try to block radicalisation

phenomena in the bud, more recently growing interest in rehabilitating and

disengaging former terrorists arose. Several European countries – Den‐

mark, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom … –

have organized deradicalisation programs; nevertheless, the matter is more

complex than they had initially expected. In addition, all over in Europe,

none of the deradicalisation programs seem to be had any proven effective.

Differentiating from criminal prisoners, radicalised individuals need

other forms of rehabilitation programs which take into account their ra‐

dical conviction. According to the majority of the experts, the jihadist

ideology is the driver that motivates young women and men, born or li‐

ving in the West, to engage in global jihad and fight against Western ene‐

mies, more precisely the enemies in their countries of residence.

This ideology provides a common system of beliefs and values, and

suggests how to translate that narrative to action. Its basic precepts ask

for the implementation of sharia law and the replacement of the system

of nation states with a worldwide Caliphate as its ultimate political aims.

Due to the complexity that characterizes them, deradicalisation pro‐

grams and other efforts to rehabilitate terrorists beyond incarceration pre‐

suppose a commitment that must involve not only the competent author‐

ities, but also civil society and institutions in all their organizations.


63



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Abstract

London Knife Attacks: a Failure of Deradicalisation and Rehabilitation

programs?

In the next few years in Europe the problem of violent radicalisation

could become more urgent and without adequate attention and long‐term

policies the risk of a polarisation of our societies increases with conse‐

quent responses dictated by contingencies.

This article starts from the case study of the UK that, despite its long

history and experience in the fight against terrorism and in the prevention

of radicalisation, has lately tested its fragility and permeability in the face

of potential sudden attacks. The UK however is not the only country in

Europe with a failing security and monitoring apparatus regarding ter‐

rorists.

The main aim is to pave the way to a growing interest in new policies

and measures of rehabilitating and disengaging former terrorists.

Keywords: Terrorist attacks; deradicalisation; rehabilitation programs.

London knife attacks: a failure of deradicalisation and...

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