DSIDEFENCE and SECURITY

of INDIA

AAyyeesshhaa SSiiddddiiqqaa

Ray of hope?TThhee ffrraaggiillee ddeetteennttee bbeettwweeeenn NNeeww DDeellhhii aannddIIssllaammaabbaadd mmuusstt ssuurrvviivvee tthhee MMuummbbaaii aattttaacckkss II 1144

SSaannjjooyy HHaazzaarriikkaa

Securing the NortheastIInnddiiaa’’ss nneegglliiggeennccee ooff tthhee NNoorrtthheeaasstt iiss bbootthhiinnaapppprroopprriiaattee aanndd ddaannggeerroouuss II 3322

VOLUME 1 ISSUE 3 Rs. 200DECEMBER 2008

CTSCANCTSCANIndia’s counter-terrorismapparatus suffered aspectacular body blowin the Mumbai attacks inNovember. The system desperately needsemergency intervention By Ajai Sahni II 0066

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LETTER FROM THE editor

EDITORDefence & Security of India

n the last issue of DSI, we analysed the recent Ahmedabad serial blasts, and concludedthat the woeful state of our counter-terrorist (CT) machinery and decision-making-processes foretold a continuation of terror strikes at vulnerable targets across the country.

We would rather have been proved wrong. Instead, the Mumbai fidayeen attackson November 26th once again highlighted the utter unpreparedness of our securityapparatus to deal with a chronic terrorist threat. Glaringly apparent in the 24X7 media

coverage of the attack was the government’s inadequate response. Instead of considered measures togear up our own CT responses, there was the usual circus of pinning blame on a malevolent externalscapegoat (Pakistan) and an ineffective internal scapegoat (Shivraj Patil), and announcing fruitlessmeasures like locating NSG units across the country.

And then attention moved on to the next round of elections. Nothing has changed. Surely itshould not take worse to bring about change.

In this issue of DSI, we focus again on what exactly needs to be done to counter the growingthreat of random terror. Our lead article argues that the march of terror cannot be halted by focusingon elite organisations. They play a role, but only as a back-stop to the first responders. And these willalways be the basic police forces: the beat policeman with his ear to the ground; the lightly armed police patrols who must respond within minutes or seconds to corner terrorists and localise damage.And the well-armed, quick reaction police teams who must be capable of neutralising any terroristscornered by the first responders.

It is time to stop aping irrelevant models of foreign security agencies. We must quickly refurbishand retrain our khakhi-clad policemen to confront the new threat.

The Mumbai attacks have damaged the fragile détente between India and Pakistan. This issueexplores whether there is still reason to hope for a new direction in Indo-Pak relations.

Even as terror morphs into a new urban form, we cannot take our eye off India’s long-playingthreats. We look at India’s forgotten front, the Northeast, and also examine the implications of elections in insurgency-affected Jammu & Kashmir.

And with a raft of high-value arms purchases in the offing, we focus on one of the most controver-sial aspects of Indian defence procurement. What wiggle room does the new Defence ProcurementPolicy allow for arms agents ? Are they necessary? How, then, must the government regulate them?

Finally, to help us shape DSI into a periodical that meets your expectations, we continue to solicityour feedback . Write in at dsieditor@gmail.com. And to subscribe, all you need to do is send an emailto dsisubscriptions@mtil.biz, and our marketing team will handle the rest.

I

DSIDECEMBER 2008

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DSIDEFENCE and SECURITY

of INDIAVikram S. MehtaIndiaa needss too thinkk beyondd oill suppliestoo ensuree itss energyy security I 42

P. SaravanamuttuAA victoryy overr thee LTTEE mayy endd thee warinn Srii Lanka,, butt won’tt bringg peace II 48

VOLUME 1 ISSUE 2 Rs. 200SEPTEMBER 2008

The internal security crisisSeriouss problemss bedevilIndia’ss counter-terrorismm apparatus II 26

DPP-2008Thee neww defencee buyingg proceduree takess aa smalll stepinn thee rightt directionn II 60

The Amarnath shrineland war fans theflames of discontent inJammu and KashmirBy Praveen Swami II 18

SUMMEROF HATESUMMEROF HATE

DSI DECEMBER 2008

2

CO

NTE

NTS

India’s counter-terrorism apparatus suffered a spectacularbody blow during the Mumbai attacks in November. The

system is sick, and desperately needs emergencyintervention if we are to stave off further assaults.

CTSCAN

COVER STORY

06

DSIDECEMBER 2008

3

NEIGHBOURWATCH 14

RAY OF HOPE?The fragile détente between NewDelhi and the fledgeling civiliangovernment in Islamabad took abeating with the terrorist attacks inMumbai. But there is reason to hopethat a new direction in Indo-Pakrelations is still possible.

POLITICS 24

BETTING ONDEMOCRACYConvulsed by religion-fuelledviolence over the summer, Jammuand Kashmir went to the polls amidst tight security. New Delhi isbetting that secessionist leaders badly misjudged the public mood.Will the gamble pay off?

PHOTO FEATURE 54

PIRATESON THE RUNThe Indian Navy takes on pirates in the Gulf of Aden.

INTERNAL SECURITY 32

SECURING THENORTHEASTNew Delhi’s negligence of theNortheast of India is not onlyinappropriate but also dangerous.The region needs a stake in the idea of India as much as it needs securityand law enforcement.

INDO-US RELATIONS 42

NUCLEARFALLOUT

The long-awaited civil nuclear deal, concluded after a three year

struggle, will affect India’s strategicand energy requirements. A look at what we have, what we'll get,

and what it means.

POLICY ISSUES 48

MEN IN THEMIDDLEThe new Defence ProcurementProcedure allows no official place forbrokers in defence deals. It’s time forthe government to take a morerealistic stand. Agents are necessary,and need to be regulated.

CONTRIBUTORSDSI DECEMBER 2008

Ajai Sahni is, among other things,Founding Member & Executive Direc-

tor of the Institute for Conflict Man-agement, Editor, South Asia Intelli-

gence Review, and Executive Director,South Asia Terrorism Portal. He has

researched and written extensively onconflict, politics and development inSouth Asia, and participated in advi-sory projects undertaken for various

National or State Governments.

Praveen Swami is Associate Editorfor The Hindu, and also writes for its

sister publication, Frontline magazine.He reports on issues of security and

low-intensity warfare, particularly theconflict in Jammu and Kashmir and

the operations of Islamist terrorgroups in India. His most recent book

on Kashmir was published in January,2007. He has won several major

awards for his work.

AJAISAHNI

PRAVEEN SWAMI

DECEMBER 2008 VOLUME 1, NUMBER 3

EDITORSonia Shukla

ASSOCIATE EDITORMitali Saran

ASST. ART DIRECTORSubrata Jana

BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT MANAGERRoop Arora

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Defence and Security of India is published and printedby Xavier Collaco on behalf of Media Transasia IndiaLimited. Published at K-35, Green Park Main, New Delhi110016 and printed at Paras Offset Pvt Ltd, C176,Naraina Industrial Area, Phase I, New Delhi. Entire con-tents Copyright © 2008. All rights reserved. Reproduc-tion and translation in any language in whole or in partwithout permission is prohibited. Requests for permission should be directed to MediaTransasia India Limited. Opinions carried in the magazine are those of the writers’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the editors or publishers.While the editors do their utmost to verify informationpublished they do not accept responsibility for its absolute accuracy.

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DEFENCE and SECURITYof INDIA

Ayesha Siddiqa is an independent po-litical and defense analyst currently

teaching at the University of Pennsyl-vania. She has a Ph.D. in War Studies

and is the author of Pakistan’s ArmsProcurement and Military Buildup,

1979-99: In Search of a Policy; and Military Inc, Inside Pakistan’s Military

Economy. She has served in Pak-istan’s civil service, and is a columnist

for Pakistani newspaper Daily Times.

AYESHASIDDIQA

Major General (Retd) Mrinal Sumanis considered the foremost expert on

various aspects of India’s defence procurement regime and offsets, and

was closely associated with the evolu-tion of the new defence procurementmechanism. He is often consulted bypolicy makers and the Parliamentary

Committee on Defence, and heads theDefence Technical Assessment and

Advisory Service of CII.

MRINAL SUMAN

Prof. R. Rajaraman is Emeritus Profes-sor of Physics at the Jawaharlal NehruUniversity, New Delhi. He got his PhD

in theoretical physics from Cornell andhas taught for 40 years at Cornell,

Princeton, Harvard, Stanford, MIT, IISc,and CERN. Since 1998 he has focused

on technical research on nuclear policyissues, including the Indo-US deal. He

is Co-Chair of the International Panel onFissile Materials.

Sanjoy Hazarika is Managing Trustee,C-NES; Visiting Professor at the

Centre for Policy Research; Editor;columnist and author of several books.

He is a specialist on migration and issues in the Northeast, a member of

several advisory bodies to the govern-ment, and one of the principal authors

of the North East Vision 2020 document, released by the Prime

Minister in July 2008.

PROFESSORR. RAJARAMAN

SANJOYHAZARIKA

DSI DECEMBER 2008

6

COVER STORY

Ajai Sahni examines India’s counter-terrorism response to the Mumbai

attacks this November.

CT SCAN

DSIDECEMBER 2008

7

THE Mumbai carnage of November2008 was by far the most dramaticterrorist attack ever to be staged onIndian soil. While it is not the

country’s deadliest terror strike—257 people died in the 1993 serial blasts inMumbai—this latest incident, which endured for over 60 hours of relentlessfighting, and left at least 183 dead andsome 300 injured, was remarkable for itssheer audacity, its unprecedented protraction, and the unwavering murder-ousness of its executors—all of this covered 24x7 in the most macabre reality

TV show since 9/11. Worse, the personalcourage and commitment of SecurityForce personnel notwithstanding, the attack exposed the utter inadequacy, inappropriateness and incompetence ofIndian security responses.

There has been a great deal of specula-tive commentary regarding the diversemotives that provoked this eventuallyspectacular attack. A rising consensus appears to be that elements within thePakistani establishment were eager to provoke a withdrawal of forces from theNWFP and FATA regions; heightened

Smoke andflames billowfrom the upperfloors anddome of the TajMahal hotel,one of theterrorist attacksites, wherefighting ragedfor sixty hours

DSI DECEMBER 2008

tensions with India would force such action. Others suggest that the attacks intended to undermine warming relationsbetween the new ‘democratic’ dispensa-tion at Islamabad and New Delhi, and tosabotage the peace process between Indiaand Pakistan. One American commentatornotes that the terrorists “almost certainlysought to provoke an Indo-Pakistani crisis,much like the 2001-02 military standoff thatnearly brought the two nuclear-armed nations to war”.

Much of this analysis is of the ‘blind menand the elephant’ variety, and follows apattern that is manifested after each majorattack in India. The argument that Pakistanis looking for an excuse to vacate theNWFP/FATA region—knowing full wellthat this could lead to an irreversible radicalconsolidation, and a possible and perma-nent loss of these territories—merely in order to spite the US or undermine the waron terror in Afghanistan, seems deeplyflawed. Further, in any ongoing war—andthe carnage in Mumbai is part of a protracted war of terror against India—there is little reason to ask why the enemy isattacking you after each new assault.

Crucially, the planners of the Mumbaicarnage simply could not have imaginedthe sheer scale and success it would

eventually achieve. The impact of the at-tack, executed by just ten terrorists dispersed across three principal locations,armed only with assault rifles and grenades(and RDX packs which they inexplicablyfailed to use, despite ample opportunitiesover nearly 60 hours), was magnified by thesheer incoherence of response—an incoherence that persisted until the veryend of the operation.

Indeed, perhaps the most effective andeconomical response came from theshamefully ill-equipped, under-trainedand unprepared personnel of the MumbaiPolice in the early stages of the attack, whenthey successfully neutralised two terroristsin the first minutes of the operation (onekilled, one taken alive and now the principal source of much of the evidence inthis case). Perhaps the most remarkable index of the state of this police force,thought of as one of India’s best, is that theweapon used by many of those who confronted the well-armed terrorists wasthe ‘very old faithful’ .303 Lee Enfield riflewhich dates back to 1895, and which wasfirst used in the Second Boer War (1899-1902)—a weapon more suited for displayin a museum than for issue to an active police force in the 21st Century.

The counter-terrorism response went all

8

COVER STORY

Clockwise: NSG commandos take position around Colaba market; a commando abseils ontothe roof of Nariman House; and a policeman prepares to take position as gunshots are fired

DSIDECEMBER 2008

the way downhill after this. Once the surviving terrorists had made their wayinto their target structures—the Taj MahalHotel, Nariman House and the Oberoi-Trident Hotels—someone decided that thiscould not be handled by anyone but ‘crackcommandos’. The result of this decisionwas that these locations were cordoned offby the police, reinforced hours later by localArmy units. The terrorists were trapped,but given complete freedom to commitmayhem within each target. No determined effort was made to engagewith the holed-up terrorists until theNavy’s Marine Commandos (MARCOS)arrived, more than five hours into the attack. And not a single terrorist was neutralised until the National SecurityGuard (NSG) replaced the MARCOS team.

Delays in decision-making, and inherent structural fractures—includingthe fact that the NSG is based at Manesar in

Haryana, 50 kilometres outside Delhi, andwas not provided with immediate access toaircraft to transport it to Mumbai—ensuredthat it was eventually deployed only tenhours after the attack commenced. Whatfollowed, however, must certainly be ablemish on the NSG’s record as an effectivecounter-terrorism (CT) force: another fiftyhours of often aimless shooting and explosions, before the last of the eight terrorists could be neutralised. It is impossible to understand what precise mission objective was provided to the NSGcommandos. It could not have been simplyto go in and ‘try to kill the terrorists in whatever time it takes’. Containment, theimmediate isolation of the terrorists in assmall a part of the structures as possible,and the protection and evacuation of civilians, should have been the first imperatives. And yet, these did not appearto be the priorities, as the commandos

9

The most effective andeconomical response

came from the shamefullyill-equipped, under-

trained and unpreparedpersonnel of the MumbaiPolice in the early stages

of the attack, when theysuccessfully neutralisedtwo terrorists in the firstminutes of the operation

”

DSI DECEMBER 2008

seemed to be chasing the tail of the terroristsfor those many long and agonising hours.Clearly, just two hundred NSG commandos could not be expected to effectively carry out the tasks of contain-ment and evacuation, but there were thousands of other Force personnel whocould have backed these actions, instead of standing paralysed in a cordonoutside the target structures.

An objective operational assessment ofthe commando action cannot, of course, becarried out on the basis of open source information at this juncture, but there is little possibility of declaring this operation asuccess on the grounds that the terroristswere finally killed. Indeed, the planners behind this attack must certainly perceivethe incident as an extraordinary success,considering the few resources put into it. Tothat extent, this must stand out as a signalfailure of India’s security agencies.

The antecedent failures, in terms of lackor loss of actionable intelligence, the failureto act on such intelligence, and the failureto maintain a posture of high alert withinthe security systems at previously identified target locations, have also beencolossal, and their magnitude is still beingdiscovered. Once again, a thorough assessment can only be carried out by agencies with full access to the facts. However, the minutiae, both of these priorfailings and of operational errors, while

significant, are dwarfed by the systemic infirmities that have, once again, been exposed in the wake of the Mumbai attacks.It must be evident to any objective observerthat, if another comparable attack werelaunched anywhere in the country—oreven in Mumbai again—in the proximatefuture, the outcome may not be startlinglydifferent.

Worse, most of the ‘corrective’ measuresand policies currently being examined inofficial circles and in the media discourseappear to be uninformed, potentially counterproductive or wasteful, and, inmany cases, plain stupid. If national resources are not to be poured into the bottomless pit of bad ideas, it is essential toexamine the logic and viability of some ofthe most visible proposals currently beingarticulated.

The first category among these includesthe imitative institutions that are being recommended, such as a Federal Investiga-tive Agency modelled on the AmericanFederal Bureau of Investigation, or the pro-posal to set up a derivative Department ofHomeland Security.

These proposals arise out of an obsession, in India, with form to the exclusion of content. For one thing, solutions have to be prescribed withinavailable resources parameters. Simply arguing that America has prevented attacksafter 9/11, so we must do what America did,

is quite ludicrous. America does not havePakistan, the epicentre of global terrorism,as its immediate neighbour. America haslaunched two major wars, purportedlywith the objective of containing the‘sources of terrorism’ abroad. And, with aGDP of USD 14.14 trillion and a populationof just over 300 million, its resources are virtually limitless in comparison to India,the GDP of which barely touches USD Onetrillion. More specifically, it is useful to note that the total Union Government’s budgetary outlay in India is USD 150 billion, while the US spends as much asUSD 650 billion on defence alone. The annual budget of the Department ofHomeland Security is USD 44 billion; thatof India’s Home Ministry is just USD 160million. The FBI’s budget is USD 7.1 billion; the Government of India’s totalexpenditure on policing amounts to

10

COVER STORY

A railway worker mops the floor at

Chhatrapati ShivajiTerminus (CST),

where over fifty werekilled in the attacks.

(R) A protest rally heldin the wake of the

attacks to honour thedead and demand

better security

DSIDECEMBER 2008

just USD 3 billion.Crucially, the Union Government

already presides over a multiplicity of dysfunctional agencies. These include several that have been set up in the recentpast to mimic foreign (usually American)institutions: the National Security Council,backed by an elaborate secretariat and theNational Security Advisory Board; the Defence Intelligence Agency; the Depart-ment of Net Assessment; and the NationalDisaster Management Authority (imitatingthe Federal Emergency ManagementAgency in the US). Most of these institu-tions remain under-manned and under-resourced across all parameters, and operateunder ambiguous mandates, with little effective or statutory authority, and everyone of them has failed to secure the objec-tives of its creation. The Centre is toyingwith the idea of setting up a Federal

Investigative Agency to handle all cases ofterrorism, organised crime, narcotics offences and money laundering, where inter-state or international linkages are involved, ignoring the fact that this wouldamount to tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of cases every year. This wouldobviously require entire armies of highlyqualified investigators and experts to handle. But the Centre has failed to providethe requisite manpower and resourceseven for a relatively tiny Central Bureau ofInvestigation to fulfil its relatively insignifi-cant mandate. The CBI, for instance, hassuffered chronic manpower shortages,which are particularly acute at the level ofsenior officers and investigators. How,then, does the Centre imagine that the FIAwill arise, fully formed, functional and efficient, from the womb of the earth, whenits own record of institution-building has

Most of the ‘corrective’measures and policies

currently being examinedin official circles and in themedia discourse appear tobe uninformed, potentially

counterproductive orwasteful, and, in many

cases, plain stupid

”11

DSI DECEMBER 2008 COVER STORY

12

been utterly disastrous?Another proposal, based on what can

accurately be described as the Rambomodel, is for the location of NSG units atseveral strategic and urban centres acrossthe country. The idea is that small contingents of this ‘elite’ force wouldquickly be able to smash up any terroristgroup that had the audacity to attack. TheNSG’s present record though does not support such an assessment. Furthermore,the terrorists are unlikely to do us the courtesy of attacking where we are pre-pared for them. Consequently, there willstill be significant delays in actually deploying the NSG, though they may notbe as interminable as in the case of Mumbai in November.

It is essential to recognise, here, that thepotential of any terrorist operation can only be contained or neutralised in the firstfew minutes. This means that the “first responders”—invariably the local police—have to be equipped, trained and capableof at least containing terrorists if not neutralising them. If the first batches of police personnel had arrived in sufficientstrength at each of the locations of terroristattack in Mumbai, with appropriate transport, weaponry and communications,and had immediately engaged with the terrorists, they would probably have been able to isolate them in small cornersof the target structures and minimise theloss of life, material damage, and operational time.

The reality is that while Special Forcessuch as the NSG—or, even better, Quick Re-sponse Teams within the police—may playa significant tactical role in counter-terrorism, the strategic success of India’scounter-terrorism responses will dependoverwhelmingly on the capacities, mandate and effectiveness of its generalforces. It is, however, in these that the great-est and most intolerable deficits currentlyexist. A quick look at these distressing figures is illuinating.

The first and greatest infirmity exists atthe level of general policing. India has a police-population ratio of just 125 per100,000 in 2007, and it is useful to note that,despite so much hysteria and posturingover the ‘terrorist threat’, this ratio actuallyfell marginally from 126 per 100,000 in 2006.Most Western countries have ratios ranging between 225 per 100,000 to over500 per 100,000. Western police forces,moreover are, infinitely better equipped,trained and resourced, even though theytend to confront far less acute challengesATS chief Hemant Karkare’s funeral; (R) new Home Minister P Chidambaram at CST

DSIDECEMBER 2008

13

than those faced by their Indian counterparts.

A great deal of noise has recently beenmade regarding the ‘failure’ of the CoastGuard to interdict the Mumbai terroristsdespite ‘specific intelligence’ regarding thethreat and, possibly, their initial movement.Once again, it is necessary to realistically assess response capacity. The Indian coastline is as much as 7,516 kilometreslong. Reports suggest that as many as50,000 trawlers are registered in just Maharashtra and Gujarat. To patrol thisvast coastline, the Coast Guard has a sanction of 106 patrol boats, of which just92 are currently operational; and 52 aircraft,of which only 45 are presently in flyingcondition. Even if there were specific intelligence that terrorists had hijacked anunidentified fishing vessel, it is not clearhow the fraction of the Coast Guard available on the Western Coast would havebeen able to locate and interdict the offending vessel, among the tens of thousands of fishing boats that are at sea inthe area at any one time.

Finally, some of the greatest infirmitiesexist in intelligence, which is by far the mostpowerful CT instrument in the State’s arse-nal. Apart from the entire issue of intelli-gence coordination and dissemination, it isuseful to look at the basic capacities for intelligence gathering. The Intelligence Bureau, for instance, has a total strength ofsome 13,500 officers and personnel

involved in intelligence operations, ofwhich under 3,500 are actually involved inthe task of field intelligence gathering. Thisis for all issues that come under the IB’smandate, not just CT. The dedicated resource for CT intelligence is in the regionof about 300 (these figures are fairly reliablebut not authoritative). As for the capacitiesof the State Police intelligence apparatus,these hardly bear mention in a current CTcontext.

Unless this crisis of capacities is addressed, it must be accepted that terrorists will continue to strike targetsacross India with virtual impunity. Terror-ism is, in essence, a ‘small commander’swar’. It is first responders—the units immediately located in the field, usuallythe local police—who must be empoweredto respond effectively. Creating top-heavyinstitutions at the Centre is not going to altercapacities on the ground. The necessary capacities have to be created at the most decentralised level, albeit within the context of a coherent and centralised CT response strategy; and this, in the Indiancontext, must be at the level of the thana,the chowki and the mobile police units.These may be backed by special force QRTs,but unless the quality of general policing isnot enormously improved, our capacity torespond to and contain terrorism will remain ineffectual.

We are constantly casting about for irrelevant ‘models of response’ across the

world, but India has persistently and carelessly neglected its own experience ofsuccessful CT, particularly the com-prehensive victory in the Punjab and the dramatic reversal of insurgencies inTripura and Andhra Pradesh. The principal response in each of these three theatres was precisely the creation of decentralised capacities within a coherent CT strategy.This alone has real potential for success inIndia.

Ajai Sahni is Founding Member & Executive Director of the Institute for Conflict Management. He is also Editor,South Asia Intelligence Review; Executive Director, South Asia TerrorismPortal; Executive Editor, Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolution. He isMember, State Police Commission, Uttarakhand; and Member, Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific-India. He has researched and written extensively on issues relating to conflict, politics and development in South Asia, andhas participated in advisory projects undertaken for various National or StateGovernments. Jointly edited (with K.P.S.Gill) Terror & Containment: Perspectiveson India’s Internal Security; and TheGlobal Threat of Terror: Ideological, Material and Political Linkages. He received a Ph.D. from Delhi University with his thesis on Democracy, Dissent &the Right to Information.

We are constantly castingabout for irrelevant

‘models of response’, butIndia has persistently and

carelessly neglected itsown experience of

successful CT in Punjaband the dramatic reversalof insurgencies in Tripura

and Andhra Pradesh

”

DSI DECEMBER 2008

14

Pakistani Army tanks during a military operationagainst Islamic militants in September. The militarylaunched a major offensive in August 2008 againstIslamic extremist fighters in tribal areas, and havewon the support of local tribal militias

RAY OFHOPE?

DSIDECEMBER 2008

THE new Pakistan People’s Party-ledgovernment which came to powerin Islamabad a few months ago facesaccusations that it continues to fol-

low the policies of the Musharraf regime,and does not represent change. While mostof the criticism at home focuses on Presi-dent Zardari’s inaction on the issue ofrestoring deposed judges, internationallyattention has shifted to his willingness tosolve the crisis vis-à-vis India.

The Mumbai attacks have once againforegrounded Pakistan’s relations with In-dia. Ordinary people, unconcerned aboutstate-level solutions a couple of months ago,are suddenly talking about what will hap-pen next; India-Pakistan relations are todayas much a part of drawing room and dhabadiscussion as they were a few years ago.

Zardari’s ability to solve the issue depends not on his will but on his capacity tocarry the larger establishment with him.Any move that the right wing, security establishment and media could interpret asthe government caving in to external pressure, would be added to the list of blun-ders that the new government in Islamabadhas already committed. The recent terroristattacks will determine the future of bilateralrelations. With both countries’ security establishments gaining greater say, the at-tacks and their aftermath will determinewhether the peace process can be revived.

Whether Zardari can resolve the Mum-bai mystery and improve relations with In-

NEIGHBOURWATCH

15

Ayesha Siddiqa examinesa delicate new moment in

India-Pakistan relationsthat could yield rich

dividends if it isn’tderailed in the aftermath

of the Mumbai attacks.

DSI DECEMBER 2008

dia is a critical question. But the answer alsodepends on how he survives at home andbuilds his government’s credibility to fightterrorism inside Pakistan and in the region.The Mumbai attacks have temporarilypushed Kashmir into the background; noone expects him to solve that issue until thecurrent crisis is over. However, it remains acore issue crucial to bilateral relations.

Before talking of the direction of India-Pakistan relations in general and the Kash-mir issue in particular, one must define thecontours of the new policy. Does PresidentZardari have a plan for how far he is will-ing to reverse Pakistan’s traditional stanceon Kashmir? At this juncture, it would befar-fetched to claim that the new regimehas any policy beyond a general desire toimprove relations with India. Zardari’sgenerous interview to the Wall Street Jour-nal, in which he went out of his way to de-nounce militancy in Indian-Held Kashmiras terrorism, and his earlier statement thatthe people of Pakistan will soon hear goodnews on Kashmir, is as much as we know.

This is not to suggest that Pakistan’spresident cannot deliver. However, lastingchange in Indo-Pak relations will depend a

great deal on four factors: a well-definedpolicy formulation; the Pakistani regime’sstrength and steadiness; Islamabad’s ability to prove that peace will yield greaterdividends; and Delhi’s capacity to over-come the problems of coalition politics andpresent itself as a generous power.

From the perspective of Pakistan-Indiarelations, the fact that the Pakistani leaderhas few traumatic memories of 1947 is posi-tive. Zardari’s Sindh, always a Muslim-majority area, did not suffer during Parti-tion the way Punjab did. Sindh is the onlyprovince in post-Partition Pakistan whoseHindu minority did not choose to leave forIndia in 1947. Arguably, therefore, Zardaridoes not have anti-India bias of the earliergeneration of Pakistani leaders like GeneralsZia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf.

Zardari is also part of a generation ofpoliticians who have learnt that Pakistan’spolitical system will never strengthen whilethe military enjoys untrammelled power.In this he differs from Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto,his father-in-law and original Chairman ofthe Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), whopromised to launch a thousand years ofwar on India; and from his own wife Be-

16

NEIGHBOURWATCH

Zardari is part of ageneration of politicians

who have learnt thatPakistan’s political

system will neverstrengthen while the

military enjoysuntrammelled power. His

instincts are to improverelations with India

”

DSI DECEMBER 2008

18

NEIGHBOURWATCHnazir Bhutto, who stuck to her father’s tac-tics of keeping the military placated and en-gaged through sweeteners.

Zardari’s instincts are to improve rela-tions with India, and he realises he mustnot only curtail the military’s power, butalso challenge the military’s very raisond’etre, which is opposition to India. In thisrespect his motivations for improving tieswith New Delhi are different even fromMusharraf ’s, who tacked towards peaceonly after the 1999 Kargil misadventure.

Zardari is therefore keen to solve theKashmir issue, which has traditionally beenthe cornerstone of the military’s signifi-cance in the state system and in society atlarge. With this issue off the table, therewould be little to justify the military’spower. The new regime’s willingness totalk to some of the warriors of terror is basi-cally designed to prevent the army frombuilding an internal security role and usingthe war on terror as a replacement for theKashmir issue, should that eventually beresolved. From this perspective, juxtapos-ing Zardari’s comment on the warriors inKashmir against his willingness to negoti-

ate with domestic warriors represents nota contradiction, but sensitivity to the domestic political dynamics of Pakistan.

But intent is different from will and capacity. In fact, the capacity to make policy changes determines will. Zardari’sinterview to an Indian channel or The NewYork Times shows a genuine intent to improve relations with India and help solvethe Mumbai attacks problem. However, hisstatements will ring hollow unless he cancontrol the military establishment, and hecannot contain the military without effect-ing institutional changes. In the face of India’s anxiety about the Mumbai attacksand the media hype, Pakistan’s right-wingestablishment—relatively strengthened inthe last three or four months—will increasepressure on Zardari, who will be caught between his will to survive and his commit-ment to deliver peace.

At this juncture, however, Pakistan lacks a concrete plan.The PPP government’s decision-making process is part of theproblem. The party’s policymak-ing revolves around one man—a

centralisation that will make it extremelydifficult for the government to build con-sensus in Pakistan for a fundamentalchange in relations. At the moment, Zardariis leaning on external help, especially fromthe US. That comprises a catch-22 for thegovernment: assistance is necessary to keepthe GHQ at bay, but excessive dependenceon the US, given the unpopularity of thewar on terror, might undermine the PPP’scredibility which is so essential for Zardari toforge better relations with India. His state-ment categorising Kashmiri freedom fight-ers as terrorists will make him unpopular incertain circles, but will not greatly hamperpolicy change, if the Presidency and Parlia-ment can sell a new policy using their credi-bility as a popularly elected government.

The present time is also critical. Witheconomic pressure building, the PPP gov-

ernment must create multiplechannels for revenue generation,and here relations with neigh-bouring India are significant.Building the capacity to tradewith India is couched within thelarger parameter of improving

Camp at SiachenGlacier (18,000ft) in 1913.Previous page:President Zardariat the UN

DSI DECEMBER 2008

relations with Delhi. As of now, Pakistanisociety is prepared for better relations; barring a general mistrust that is natural after 61 years of hostility, people are less ob-sessed with India as an enemy. In fact, the2008 elections were notable for not makingIndia a point of electoral discussion.

The critical question is, can Asif Zardarideliver at all? His ability to resolve theKashmir issue on the pattern accepted byPrevez Musharraf—resolution withoutmajor territorial adjustment—depends notonly on Islamabad’s capacity to build do-mestic confidence, but also on New Delhi’sability to encourage the civilian regime. Itis vital that the Indian government and po-litical leadership realise that PresidentZardari has the capacity to alter views andpolicies within Pakistan regarding Delhi, aslong as the strategic community and gov-ernment across the border understand hisintent and the sensitivity of his position.

It is relevant to add that India’s strategiccommunity seems to take Pakistani politi-cians less seriously than Pakistani generals,despite the fact that the politicians, espe-cially after the 1990s, have been keener toimprove relations with Delhi. The new gen-eration of politicians is also less interestedin holding politics hostage to the Kashmirissue or the larger animosity with India.

India must learn to appreciate the sensi-tivity of Pakistan’s leadership, particularlythe latest government, to help solve en-demic Pakistan-India hostility. A practicalway to help Zardari is for Delhi to proac-tively address the more resolvable issues.For example, a resolution to the SiachenGlacier and Sir Creek issues wouldstrengthen the Pakistani president’s credi-bility in his country, and thus strengthen hisposition vis-à-vis the military establish-ment. Even Pervez Musharraf, seen bymany in Delhi as a harbinger of change inbilateral relations, was keen to solve theseissues, especially the Siachin Glacier issue,to convince his army of India’s willingness tomend relations with Islamabad.

Unfortunately, India’s strategic commu-nity insists on linking Siachen to the largerKashmir issue. Despite the fact that the twosides have often come close to resolving thisissue, Delhi’s reluctance—explained as se-curity concerns—have checkmated anypositive development. The latest effort toresolve this minor issue was thwarted bythe Indian Army’s refusal to take any responsibility if the Manmohan Singh government agreed to withdraw troops.

The water crisis is another issue thatcould make or mar the future of any sub-

20

NEIGHBOURWATCH

DSI DECEMBER 2008

22

NEIGHBOURWATCH

stantive improvement in bilateralrelations. Delhi’s attitude towardsPakistan and other neighbours ismarked by a confidence that othergovernments view as arrogance. Contraryto the view within India that the countrymust not change for others, it is necessaryfor Delhi to show some largesse towards itsneighbours. This is not just a matter of in-dulging perceived insecurity, but about encouraging regional countries’ confidencein a larger neighbour. For instance, Delhi’sdeliberate silence during Pakistan’s politi-cal crisis helped to make India relatively lessrelevant in Pakistan’s domestic politics. Similarly, steps to manage water or createshared energy resources would bolster confidence. And refraining from exploitingthe situation in Baluchistan will encouragethe liberal viewpoint in Pakistan, a lobbyupon which Zardari will ultimately depend

to solve the Kashmir issue or improve relations in general.

The window of opportunityon both sides remains narrow.

India’s relatively strengthened right wingis enhancing communal tension; the wors-ening condition of her religious minorities,including Christians and Muslims, feedsthe insecurity of the Pakistani establish-ment, and strengthens the hands of thosewho argue that Pakistan’s relations with In-dia can never improve due to ideologicalreasons. This viewpoint sees Kashmir as acatalyst of bilateral tension rather than as amain source of conflict.

It would help if the Indian leadershipshowed the same sensitivity to Pakistan’spoliticians as it does to India’s coalition pol-itics. The peace process in Kashmir, and thelarger bilateral peace process must not fallvictim to political inertia on both sides. Both

Islamabad and Delhi should keep adding totactical measures such as cross-LoC trade.

Like Pervez Musharraf, Asif Ali Zardarihas the will to improve bilateral relations,including resolving the Kashmir issue.While Musharraf learned the worth of regional peace the hard way, for Zardaripeace is critical to his political interests. Itwould suit Delhi’s interests to remain engaged with the new government, especially through a show of credible ges-tures mentioned above, to help the PPPgovernment sell a long-term peace with India inside the country. It is up to both India and Pakistan to capture the moment.

Ayesha Siddiqa is an independent politicaland defense analyst teaching at the Universityof Pennsylvania. She did her Ph.D. in WarStudies from King's College, London and is theauthor of Pakistan's Arms Procurement andMilitary Buildup, 1979-99: In Search of aPolicy; and Military Inc. She was the inaugural Pakistan Fellow at the WoodrowWilson International Center for Scholars and aFord Fellow at the Bonn International Center for Conversion. She is a columnist forPakistani newspaper Daily Times and hascontributed to international academic journals. She taught at the Department of International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad and Lahore Universityof Management Sciences. Prior to her academiccareer she served in Pakistan's civil service including a stint as Director of Naval Researchwith the Pakistan Navy. She has also workedfor Jane's Defense Weekly.

While Musharraf learnedthe worth of regional

peace the hard way, forZardari peace is critical to

his political interests. Itwould suit Delhi’s

interests to remainengaged with the new

government

”Manmohan SinghPrevious page:Musharraf retires

FROM his massive wooden throne inSrinagar’s historic Jamia Masjid, thecleric Mirwaiz Umar Farooq lastmonth flagged off the secessionist

campaign against elections to Jammu andKashmir’s legislative assembly.

“I want to ask the Prime Minister of India,” the cleric and secessionist politiciansaid in his October 10 sermon, “whether itserves any purpose to hold discussionswith leaders who do not dare move amongthe masses unless they are protected by acordon of guards.” Farooq then lashed outat the coming elections, demanding thatNew Delhi instead hold direct dialoguewith the All Parties Hurriyat Conference(APHC), the secessionist coalition he headsin alliance with Kashmir ’s Islamist patriarch, Syed Ali Shah Geelani.

Mirwaiz Farooq’s fighting words wouldhave had greater moral force had it notbeen for one uncomfortable fact: he isamong the ranks of politicians he railedagainst. Like his secessionist colleagues Sajjad Gani Lone, Bilal Gani Lone, Abdul

Gani Butt and Aga Syed Hassan, he is protected by Jammu and Kashmir Policepersonnel. In addition the Mirwaiz, whosefather was assassinated by jihadists for initiating a covert dialogue with the Government of India, has invested in a bullet-proof car—a sign of just how fraughtpeacemaking can be in Jammu and Kashmir.

On October 20, the Election Commis-sion of India announced a seven-phaseelection schedule in Jammu and Kashmir—a startling development for those observerswho believed that democracy would beplaced in cold storage until next summer.

As in 1996 or 2002, when jihadist groupsmurdered more than a hundred politicalworkers, the coming elections will be held indifficult circumstances. New Delhi will beshipping in 452 companies of central govern-ment police to help protect voters, in addi-tion to the military and police forces alreadyin Jammu and Kashmir—but their principalmandate will be suppressing Islamist-ledstreet violence, not fighting terrorism.

For much of this year, Jammu and

DSI DECEMBER 2008

24

POLITICS

BETTING ON D

PRAVEEN SWAMI

As the summer’sIslamist-led mobilisation

in Kashmir fizzles out,New Delhi holds

elections to the state’slegislature.

DSIDECEMBER 2008

Kashmir was set ablaze by competing reli-gion-fuelled mobilisations that pittedJammu against Kashmir. In Kashmir, Islamists spearheaded a violent campaignagainst land use rights granted to a state-run trust that manages the annual pilgrim-age to a Hindu cave-temple. When the stategovernment revoked the land use grant,entropy followed: the alliance between theCongress and the People’s DemocraticParty fell apart because of internal strains; amassive Hindu-chauvinist counter-protesttook hold of the Jammu region; and dozensdied in violent clashes with police.

Few believed that Governor NN Vohra’scentrally appointed interim administrationwould be able to contain the damage—butthe Election Commission of India’s decisionto go ahead with elections reflects the con-siderable progress that was made. Vohra’sadministration used force to beat back themassive mobilisation seen this summer, butalso leveraged measures like the openingof the Line of Control for cross-border tradeto break the secessionist constituency.

The results are evident:where tens of thousands—sometimes hundreds of thousands—of protestors were on Kash-mir ’s streets this summer, Farooq’s All Parties Hurriyat Conference and Geelani’sTehreek-i-Hurriyat have failed to organise asingle rally of consequence for their anti-election programme. Few expect spec-tacular voter turnout—not least because ofthe short notice for campaigning and thedisruption of normal political life duringthe summer—but the restoration of mainstream political activity is no smallachievement in itself.

How has this come about? And whatoutcomes could New Delhi’s decision tobet on democracy have?

Why the ‘revolution’ fizzled“REVOLUTION 2008” one commentatorsaid of the mass mobilisation seen this sum-mer. If Kashmir did in fact see a revolutionthis summer, it has ended in a whimper.

Not three months ago, Sri-nagar-based newspaperswere suffused with commen-

tary proclaiming that Kashmir was poisedon the edge of revolution, the kind of masspeople-power that has swept away unpop-ular regimes in Yugoslavia, Georgia,Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. But reality turnedout to be somewhat less colourful thanKashmiri secessionists had hoped.

The secessionists made four serious errorsof judgment in their management of eventsin the build-up to the election campaign.

First, the secessionist leadership came tobelieve that the mass mobilisation seen thissummer meant that the anti-India movement had acquired both political legitimacy and momentum. Outside ofparts of Srinagar and other urban centres, however, this mobilisation centred not onthe secessionist political platform, but onreligious-chauvinist anxieties—in particu-lar, worries that outsiders were preparingto seize Kashmiri land, or annihilate thepopulation through an economic blockade.

25

DEMOCRACY

Troubled valley: A view ofSrinagar

DSI DECEMBER 2008

Just as importantly, the protests often involved ground-level leaders of pro-Indiaparties like the National Conference andthe People’s Democratic Party, who werecashing in on the charged political climate.As the violence stilled, and elections became a possibility, these leaders ceasedto support the agitation. As a consequence,the secessionists’ anti-election movementhas found itself confined to the anti-Indiamovement's urban heartland, just as it hasbeen this past decade and more. WhenNew Delhi began cracking down on the secessionists’ cutting-edge political leader-ship, arresting figures like Shabbir Shah,Massrat Alam, Naim Khan and GhulamNabi Hubbi, the APHC found itself unableto build mass protests.

Second, the APHC alienated importantsections of Kashmiri society by pushing aneconomically crippling programme ofstrikes and shutdowns that hit the urbanand rural middle class hard. In October, district level offices set up by the APHCwere shut down after the arrest of theirleading financier, Shah—a sign that the or-ganisation simply did not have the supportof the local elite who might have continuedto fund the operation. Parents became increasingly concerned about frequentschool closures; others tired of witnessingthe deaths and injuries of young people inapparently endless—and evidently pointless—clashes with police.

Third, Kashmiri secessionists paid fortheir failure to reach out to the state’sHindu and Buddhist religious minoritiesand their political leadership. By castingtheir movement in opposition to JammuHindus in particular, the secessionists madeit nearly impossible for New Delhi to makeconcessions or engage them in dialogue.

As the pro-Islamist cultural historianIqbal Ahmad pointed out in a recent commentary, the summer violence demon-strated the growing influence of the globalIslamist movement within Kashmir. Notingthat clerics and their mosque-based networks had played a key leadership role inthe movement, he argued that that summerhad in fact seen something that needed to“be classified as an Islamic revolution”.

Yet, this Islamist resurgence inevitably fuelled concerns across the state—and else-where in India. In a recent essay, the scholarYoginder Sikand noted that the situation inJammu and Kashmir bore interesting similarities to that in India before Partition.Just as many Muslims in pre-IndependenceIndia refused to accept the Congress’ promises of secularism, he noted, “the non-

Muslim minorities in Jammuand Kashmir refuse to buy thearguments of the Kashmiri na-tionalists, which they rightlysee as a thinly-veiled guise tojustify Kashmiri hegemony.”

Islamists in Kashmir,Sikand noted, assert that “if Jammu andKashmir gets freedom and becomes a trulyIslamic state, the non-Muslim minorities

will have full freedom andequality. The late SadullahTantrey, once head of theJammu branch of the Jamaat-e Islami, even wenton to insist, in all seriousness,that ‘Indeed so happy will

the non-Muslims of Jammu and Kashmirbe in this independent Islamic state thateven Hindus from India would line up to

26

POLITICS

Mirwaiz Farooq,Chairman of the APHC,speaks to survivors of the2005 earthquake at Uriduring prayers markingthe first day of Eid

DSIDECEMBER 2008

settle in the state.’” Sikand concluded: “Isquirmed in my seat as he went on,stunned at his evident ignorance orhypocrisy or, as seemed more likely, both.”

Fourth, the secessionists misread theglobal strategic situation at their cost. Earlythis year, a wide spectrum of secessionistleaders had persuaded themselves that theUnited States would push India to makeconcessions on Jammu and Kashmir, in an

effort to contain the rising influence of Islamists in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

It is unclear just what led South Asian Islamists to read events in this manner. Partof this reason may lie in a string of commentary from think tanks in Washing-ton, D.C.; more importantly, Islamists mayhave drawn their own conclusion from theUnited States’ support of independence forKosovo.

In February, Geelani had hailed the independence of Kosovo, declaring that“the day is not far away when the peopleof Kashmir will announce their Indepen-dence from imperial India.” Malik, for hispart, announced that Kosovo’s independ-ence “immortalises the fact that sacrifices ofmartyrs for freedom of their motherlandnever go in vain.” Last month, when Russia recognised the independence ofSouth Ossetia and Abkhazia, Malik onceagain proclaimed the decision “a psycho-logical inspiration for the suppressed peopleof Kashmir.”

However, the fact is that no majorpower—not the United States, nor Chinaor Russia, all of which have their own concerns about Islamists—have any desireto see an independent or quasi-independ-ent state emerging at the heart of one Asia’smost troubled regions. Pakistan PresidentAsif Ali Zardari, for his part, was also bluntin attacking jihadist groups operating inJammu and Kashmir. In a landmark interview to the Wall Street Journal, Zardarimade clear he did not see India as an enemy but as a partner—bad news forKashmiri secessionists whose political plat-form Islamabad has financed for decades.

New opportunitiesFOR New Delhi, each of these four factorsmarks a historic opportunity—if the government that takes power after thecoming general elections has the vision andwill to break with the unhappy scriptwhich has shaped the course of politics in

27

On October 20, the ECannounced a seven-phase

election schedule inJammu and Kashmir—a

startling development forthose observers who

believed that democracywould be placed in cold

storage until next summer

”

DSI DECEMBER 2008

Jammu and Kashmir.Ever since Independence, New Delhi

has sought to secure Jammu and Kashmir’srelationship with India through a series ofbackroom deals. Politicians were cajoled—and sometimes coerced—into signingagreements in 1952, 1966, 1971, and 1975.Not one of these was debated and ratifiedby an elected body.

It takes little to see what drove this unhappy story. Prime Ministers from Jawaharlal Nehru to PV Narasimha Raowere driven by the need to defend Indiaagainst Pakistan’s covert war in Jammu andKashmir. In their view, the proper role ofelected governments in Jammu and Kashmir was to dispense patronage, andthus undermine dissent—not deal with theissues that drove the conflict.

This paradigm continued to shape NewDelhi’s policies when democratic governance was restored in Jammu andKashmir in 1996. Soon after he took office,Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee setabout seeking a deal with the secessionists,who were cast as the sole representatives ofKashmir’s authentic, secessionist sentiment.

Prime Minister Vajpayee’s peace efforts,although they were helped along by generous covert funding of the APHC leadership, achieved little. Hemmed in byhawks in his cabinet, Mr Vajpayee was inno position to make significant politicalconcessions. APHC leaders, for their part,faced massive coercive pressures from jihadist groups like the Hizb ul-Mujahi-deen and Lashkar-e-Taiba. In essence, theAPHC and the Government of Indiaplayed for time. Both hoped that negotiations with Pakistan would lead toan agreement that would end the conflictby gifting the secessionists power withinan autonomy-based framework. Appre-hensive of just that outcome, the National Conference began adopting increasinglyintransigent postures, hoping to cut theground out from under a New Delhi-Islamabad-APHC deal. Even as New Delhitalked to the APHC, though, it rejected theNational Conference’s calls for a dialogueon autonomy—souring relations with themost important player in state politics.

During his first years in office, PrimeMinister Singh’s policies closely mirroredthose of his predecessor. He once again initiated negotiations with the APHC, andauthorised a covert programme to reach outto hardline secessionists outside its fold. Asbefore, though, the APHC refused to bring aroadmap for dialogue to the table. And mirroring the actions of the National

Conference earlier, the People’sDemocratic Party turned to Islamist ideas and practices inan effort to stave off the politicalconsequences of a New Delhi-APHC deal.

In 2006, the Prime Minister finally departed from the tried and tested path, realising it led only to certain failure. In-stead of seeking a deal with the APHC

alone, he now reached out to thefull spectrum of political opinion inJammu and Kashmir. Following all-party conferences in New Delhiand Srinagar, the Prime Minister setup five Working Groups on the

conflict. Four of those Working Groups—on social confidence-building measures,the cross-Line of Control relationship, eco-nomic development, and governance—

28

POLITICS

Soldiers watchover polling boothsas Kashmirisexercise theirfranchise

DSIDECEMBER 2008

submitted their reports last year.But the critical fifth Working Group,

which discussed Jammu and Kashmir ’sconstitutional relationship with New Delhi,has not met in over a year, let alone submitted a report.

Part of the reason for this is that majorpolitical parties in Jammu and Kashmirhave failed to arrive at a shared vision ofthe future. National Conference leaders

reiterated their controversial 1999 proposalsfor wide-ranging autonomy within theUnion of India, but offered no blueprint foraddressing the anxieties of those Jammuand Kashmir residents who oppose thisagenda. The People’s Democratic Partycalled for “self-rule” within the existingstructure of Indian sovereignty—a formulation it has now fleshed out in a pre-election manifesto. Bharatiya Janata

Party representatives called for the abroga-tion of Article 370, while the Congress saidnothing at all.

New Delhi’s failure to push the fifthWorking Group also stemmed from itshope that the APHC could still be made tosign on to an emerging India-Pakistandeal. In secret meetings that began in 2005,Prime Minister Singh’s envoy, SK Lambah,and his Pakistani counterpart Tariq Aziz,

29

New Delhi has sought tosecure J&K’s relationship

with India through a seriesof backroom deals.

Politicians were cajoled —and sometimes coerced—

into signing agreements.Not one of these was

debated and ratified by anelected body

”

Jammu and Kashmir PoliceGovernor NN Vohra salutesduring official celebrations

for Independence Day atBakshi Stadium in Srinagar

DSI DECEMBER 2008 POLITICS

30

arrived at five points of convergence. First,the two men agreed, there would be no re-drawing of the Line of Control. Second,they accepted that there would have to begreater political autonomy in both sides ofJammu and Kashmir. Lambah and Azizalso agreed that India would begin troopscuts in response to de-escalation of jihadistviolence, cooperatively share resourceslike watersheds, forests and glaciers; and, finally, open the LoC for travel and trade.

From the outset, the APHC rejected participation in the Prime Minister ’sround-table dialogue, refusing to acceptthat it was just one of several politicalvoices in Jammu and Kashmir. Speakingafter a February 20, 2006 meeting wherethe APHC rejected an invitation to partici-pate in the Delhi round-table conference, Mirwaiz Farooq said that while “the Hurriyat is not averse to New Delhi’s consultation process with others”, it “believes that for permanent resolution ofthe Kashmir crisis, the governments of India and Pakistan shall have to essentiallydeal with those people who have beentreating Jammu and Kashmir as a disputedterritory from day one.” Before the subse-quent Srinagar conference, Prime MinisterSingh’s advisors have long claimed, Mirwaiz Farooq tempered that stand, andagreed to join in the discussions. However,the APHC backed out at the last moment.

As things stand, it appears that theAPHC and other secessionists want a dealwhich hands them power, not a real

dialogue. Instead of empowering secessionists by starting a renewed engagement with the APHC after the elections, New Delhi would do well toturn, instead, to the politicians whom thepeople of Jammu and Kashmir choose torepresent them.

Praveen Swami is Associate Editor forThe Hindu and also writes for its sister

Instead of empoweringsecessionists by starting arenewed engagement with

the APHC after theelections, New Delhiwould do well to turn,

instead, to the politicianswhom the people of

Jammu and Kashmirchoose to represent them

”

DSIDECEMBER 2008

31

publication, Frontline. He reports on issues of security andlow-intensity warfare, particu-larly the conflict in Jammu andKashmir and the operationsof Islamist terror groups in India.Mr. Swami has won several awards for hiswork, including the Indian Express-Ram-nath Goenka Print Journalistof the Yearprize, 2006, for his reportage on a series of

terrorist attacks across India; thePrem Bhatia Award for PoliticalJournalism, 2003, for an exposeon how an Indian Army forma-tion in Jammu and Kashmir hadfalsified data to exaggerate its

successes; and the Sanskriti Samman, 1999,for investigative work on the Kargil war.His most recent book India, Pakistan andthe Secret Jihad: the Covert War in

Jammu and Kashmir, 1947-2002(Routledge, 2007) was written while he wasa Jennings Randolph senior fellow at theUnited States Institute of Peace in Wash-ington, D.C.. His scholarly work includesThe Kargil War; chapters in several editedvolumes; and papers in journals includingThe India Review and Faultlines. Born in1969, Mr. Swami read history at King’sCollege, Cambridge University.

Farooq and OmarAbdullah at ameeting in Delhi.(L) The Amarnathpilgrimage

DSI DECEMBER 2008

32

INTERNAL SECURITY

SECURING THE NORTHEAST

A view of Guwahati. The capitalof Assam, once known asPragjyotishapura (city of easternlight) has a 2000-year history

DSIDECEMBER 2008

33

The multiple troubles of a much-neglected regionmust be addressed with dialogue, development and amore comprehensive security strategy.

REGARDING the Northeast of India as a mere appendage to the mainland ismisleading and inappropriate. Such an attitude, at the policy level in NewDelhi and in the mainstream public and media views in other parts of the coun-try, has led to flawed policies and flawed perceptions.

The Northeast is part of a greater region; 96 percent of its international borders arewith other countries, and a mere four percent with the rest of India. As the crow flies,Hanoi is closer than New Delhi. In this context, former Prime Minister of India Inder Gujral’swords to an ASEAN conference resonate: “The food we eat, the clothes we wear, the languages we speak” demonstrate that connectivity, past and present.

Today Assam, the largest state, maintains its historic economic and political dominationof the Northeast, even though it is a third of the size it was in 1972 before the reorganisa-

SANJOYHAZARIKA

DSI DECEMBER 2008

tion of the region. But the Northeast is alsohome to over 220 ethnic groups, eightstates, about 40 million people and a burgeoning list of armed groups seeking arange of demands—from outright independence (although that flavour hasabated substantially and few take it seriously any longer), to greater autonomyor new internal political boundaries. Manyethnic groups have kin on the other side ofthe international border in Bangladeshand Myanmar, Tibet (China) and Bhutanand even Nepal, a short distance from thethin Chicken’s Neck that remains the region’s only physical connection to mainland India.

The idea of India was first tested hereover fifty years ago, and continues to bechallenged. Small communities and groupshave, through the decades, mobilised public support for movements against it.They have battled the might of the IndianState (army, air force and paramilitary aswell as local police) in impossible terrain for decades—sometimes with Chinese, Pakistani and Bangladeshi support—andfretfully and fitfully engaged in peace negotiations, some successful, others not.

In addition, India and its Northeast cannot but be concerned about China’sloud new claims to Arunachal Pradesh.The Chinese have built an amazing network of roads and railways in Tibet almost to India’s doorstep; Lt. Gen. JNMukherjee, former GOC Eastern Com-mand and soldier-writer, remarks thatthese are not merely economic highways,but have strategic relevance. There is virtually nothing on the Indian side, although the Centre has now announcedplans to build a trans-Arunachal highway.As usual, India is playing catch up.

Udayon Misra says that the Northeastrepeatedly questions the centralised powerof the Indian State and its management ofthe problems of dissent and political iden-tity, especially the question of “one nation”,with a stress on homogeneity.

The first political challenge to the ideaof India was represented by the revolt inthe Naga Hills in the 1950s, which followedyears of demands for independence by theNagas trying to hold the British to a promisethey never quite made. Military operations,mixed with occasional political parleys,failed to crush the armed uprising. In recent years, however, Delhi has adoptedan approach that recognises that politicalidentity lies at the core of the demands ofthe Nagas, Mizos, Manipuris, Assamese,Bodos and others, and is trying to

negotiate processes for change within theIndian Union.

These processes remain ad hoc and non-substantive for the most part, given the nature of the State, its inherent reluctance toengage with such groups for a long-termsolution, and the suspicion and short-termpolitical party interests that dominate suchdiscussions. There are also acute divisionswithin the insurgencies along ethnic lines.

But the issues go beyond assuring con-ventional security—they are about meet-ing basic needs, ensuring participatory development, and giving people a stake intheir future. This article looks at these issuesthrough the prism of non-conventionalthreats to security, which are not as well understood as the conventional. It is divided into four sections and focuses on

34

INTERNAL SECURITY

MIZORAM

TRIPURA

MANIPUR

NAGALAND

SIKKIM

MEGHALAYA

ASSAM

ARUNACHALPRADESH

WEST BENGAL

ORISSA

Aizwal

Agartala

Shillong

GangtokGuwahati

Kohima

Imphal

Itanagar

Kolkata

Dhaka

Mayanmar

Bhutan

Bangladesh

C H I N A

B A Y O F B E N G A L

DSIDECEMBER 2008

Assam and Nagaland in the main (to discussthe problems of other states that have facedthe impact of violent conflict, like Manipurand Mizoram, would require greater space).

The migration conundrumTHE Northeast is intertwined and inter-dependent, and so too are its security con-cerns. Some non-conventional challengesare those that do not respect borders—likecross-border cyber-, small arms- and narco-terrorism—and among the most critical isillegal migration from Bangladesh.

In April of 2005, an extraordinary SMSfound its way into my mobile while I wastravelling in Assam, showing how swiftlymedia and technology can span barriersand spread disinformation. Issued by a local

youth group hitherto (and since) unheardof in the tea and oil-rich belt of Upper Assam, the message proclaimed: “Save Assam, Save Identity” and added that thestate’s people should take an oath to denywork, food and shelter to Bangladeshis aspart of their patriotic duty.

The Assamese and English languagemedia at the time were hysterical with reports of “Bangladeshis”—popularly believed to be Muslim—being rounded upin Dibrugarh city, raids by vigilante groups,and “foreigners” leaving for fear of beingcaught.

“Thousands” were said to have left thearea, including from other towns in UpperAssam—one estimate placed the figure atover 10,000. These were mostly seasonallabourers, including brick-kiln workers.

The migrants went off in buses to Guwa-hati, the principal city of the state, denyingthat they were Bangladeshis and assertingthat they were from the border districts ofAssam close to the Bangladesh border, andhad voting rights and residences there.They were tracked to the railway station atGuwahati and soon after that seeminglydisappeared, from the media and publicmemory as well as from official records.

A senior official in Dibrugarh said that atthe peak of the agitation, no more thanabout 4,000 had left, of which less than halfwere Bangladeshi, a figure he said wasbased on reasonably reliable police reports.The others, he asserted, were Indian Muslims as well as Hindu migrant labourersfrom other states, especially Bihar, whichhas long sent workers to the Northeast to

35

The Northeast isintertwined and

interdependent, and so tooare its security concerns.

Some non-conventionalchallenges are those that

do not respect borders,and among the most

critical is illegal migrationfrom Bangladesh

”PM Manmohan Singh at theinauguration of Indira Gandhi Park inItanagar, during an official visit toArunachal Pradesh in January 2008

DSI DECEMBER 2008

flee the poverty and unemployment intheir home areas.

Despite local hostility and sharpeningethnic confrontations, and despite the ex-istence of a border fence, migrants stillcome for economic purposes, to work andearn a living.

Some of the movement is temporary—people going back and forth for work, especially as unskilled labour—and someof it is permanent, with people leaving theirhomes with the intention of setting up anew residence. Some move to Assam andthen travel to other parts of the Northeast

and of India. An elaborate industry of traveltouts and organisers facilitates this travel,which was, at one point, largely voluntary.This sort of movement comprises a real andpresent threat, which cannot be underesti-mated, of radicals and other elements infiltrating and potentially destabilising the

36

INTERNAL SECURITY

DSIDECEMBER 2008

region. But to label all migrants as securityrisks, and all settlers as Bangladeshis, isboth illogical and inappropriate.

There are various demographic pres-sures, security threats and perceptions. Butthe infiltrators who pose one of the greatest security threats are the anti-India

insurgent groups who slip in and out ofBangladesh. They receive support fromgroups in Bangladesh, including politicalparties, members of parliament, humanrights groups as well as some media and, ofcourse, the ubiquitous Directorate Generalof Field Intelligence.

There are an estimated 1.5-2 million (15-20 lakh) illegal migrants in Assam, andno law or government is strong enough ordetermined enough to “throw them out”,as agitators demand. The concentration ofmigrants, the range of ethnic communities,and the danger of clashes leading to majorlaw and order situations has prevented anygovernment in Delhi or Assam from doinganything substantial about the issue for thepast thirty years, despite the rhetoric. Afterall, the first task of a government is to maintain law and order so as not to createfresh problems for itself.

There is also a threat from within. Likethe migration issue, it is not militaristic inorigin, but springs from neglect and lack ofdevelopment. Field research in the “migrant-dominated regions” in Assam—essentially western and central Assam—shows that large populations live withoutaccess to basic infrastructure. This fact, if itremains unaddressed, could lead to the development of a truly radicalised groupborn out of the frustration of being shut outof the system despite being part of it. Assamhas the second highest Maternal MortalityRate in India after Bihar, and 61 percent liter-acy places it at number 20 among the statesin India. Poor HDI and bad infrastructureare sure incentives to further alienation.

How are these issues to be resolved?Certainly not by vigilantism or aggressivepublic posturing. There needs to be a rational approach with a focus on bordermanagement, because people are leavingBangladesh for economic and environmen-tal reasons.

My suggestion on migration has been inthe public domain for some years: ID cardsfor all residents in the region, based on theNational Register of Citizens of 1951 andthe 1971 state electoral rolls; and work permits (WPs) for all who came after 1971and those who wish to come for brief oneor two-year periods. A work permit wouldnot be an acceptance of permanent settlement, nor would it confer the right tovote; it would confirm the temporary status of a migrant and ensure that he orshe is not eligible to the rights of a citizens(to acquire immovable property, move elsewhere in the country, marry locally, orvote). It is possible, in a country with thebest software engineers in the world, to develop bio-metric ID cards or, in the in-terim, issue WPs with photographs, fingerprinting and pupil detection.

This may not solve the problem, but it iscrucial to look at fresh ways of managingIndia’s borders in a region where 96

37

Field research in“migrant-dominated”

regions of Assam showsthat large populations live

without access to basicinfrastructure. This fact, if

it remains unaddressed,could lead to the

development of a trulyradicalised group

”

Buddhist monks celebrateBuddha Mahotsav inTawang, Arunachal Pradesh

DSI DECEMBER 2008 INTERNAL SECURITY

38

percent of these borders are international.At the moment, many illegal migrants arede facto Indian citizens without even goingthrough the minimal process that thoseborn in India are required to; yet, many arestill without ID cards or the vote.

The Naga imbroglio ALTHOUGH the Nagas’ resistance to alarger nation goes back to their resistanceto the British in the latter part of the 19thcentury (when the area was lightly controlled), the first political organisationto evolve in the then Naga Hills of Assam,the Naga Club, was formed in 1918. OnJanuary 10, 1929 it submitted a memoran-dum to the Simon Commission, demand-ing that the Nagas be under British control and excluded from proposed constitutional changes. The desire to belocated outside India and not withinseemed clear even at that nascent stage ofnationalism. It was prompted also by thedetermination to protect what was perceived as a traditional way of life basedon customary laws that were not codified.

If the Nagas’ first brush with the worldwas with the British in the 19th century, itwas followed by the Second World War,when the Japanese military tide wasstopped and turned back at Kohima.

Naga political organisation grew withthe formation of the Lotha and Ao Coun-cils as well as with the emergence of theNaga Hills District Tribal Council, whichgave way to the Naga National Council in1946. The birth of the NNC flagged thefoundation of Naga consciousness.

A series of events followed, includingthe ill-fated agreement between the NagaCouncil and the then Governor of Assam,Sir Akbar Hydari, whose ninth clause con-tinues to be interpreted in different wayssince it said that the Nagas could, at theend of ten years, decide on their future.

“The Governor of Assam, as represen-tative of the Government of the IndianUnion, shall have a special responsibilityfor a period of ten years to observe the dueobservance of the Agreement. At the endof the period, the Naga National Councilshall be asked if they require the aboveAgreement to be extended for a further period or a new agreement regarding thefuture of the Naga people to be arrived at.”

The Nagas felt this meant they couldopt out of India, but that was not to be.The agreement fell by the wayside as violence erupted in the 1950s, and the Indian State hurled land and air power

against the rebels led by AZ Phizo.Seeking support, the Nagas trekked to

Yunnan Province in China under theleadership of Th. Muivah in 1966, and established political links that enabledarms training and weapons supply. Con-nections with the Pakistani establishment,especially the army, were also established,as was Muivah’s legendary status asfighter, diplomat and astute politician.

Half a century down the line, withthousands of lives lost on both sides, threeceasefires and one accord, the Nagas arestill negotiating for political space. Despite

the fragility of the ceasefire, clashes between the security forces and the NSCNare at an all-time low. Yet, the fratricidalkillings continue and represent the failureof peace and reconciliation efforts by thegovernment, the factions and civil societygroups, without which there cannot be alasting peace. Reconciliation may not precede a settlement, but no agreementcan be sustained without it. Personal egosand tribal bitterness going back twentyyears run dark, deep and bloody betweenthe Khaplang and Muivah groups.

The NSCN has given New Delhi a list

DSIDECEMBER 2008

39

of 35 demands, including demands for afederal relationship based on a differentconstitution, control over internationaltrade and foreign affairs as applicable toNagaland, and even its own army. Thiswill not get beyond the first cut; nor willthe demand for greater territory slicedoff from Assam, Arunachal and Manipur,none of whom want to give an inch. Bothsides cite history. No agreement can last ifit generates ill will. Despite Article 3 ofthe Constitution, which empowers theCentre to redraw a state’s boundaries,New Delhi knows that this is too

sensitive an issue to press.Today, discussions between the Nagas

and the State have resulted in the problembecoming an internal problem of India,rather than a bilateral issue negotiated bytwo independent groups. What Muivahwants is de jure; what he has, as I remarkedto him once, is de facto. “Exactly,” he said.It’s a question of how negotiators breakthat down into nuts and bolts.

There is hope in Nagaland these daysafter the two factions have begun meetingunder the banner of the Naga Reconcilia-tion Forum; a recent football match in

Kohima brought foes together on the field,developing a new space and opportunityfor dialogue and better understanding.

Ulfa's rise and fallMANY have followed with sadness the descent of the United Liberation Front ofAsom (Ulfa) from an organisation thatchampioned the well-being of Assam(however misplaced that vision) to one thatpreys on the people it claims to fight for.The genuine concerns Ulfa initially raisedhave gotten lost in the storm of killings,counter-killings, violence, anger and suspicion that has been unleashed by thegroup and the State in retaliation. Overthirty years, it has morphed into an armedgroup that remains capable of occasionalstrikes but especially of harming the vulnerable and poor who have no security.

In security parlance, it remains a ‘low-grade’ insurgency/conflict, when com-pared to that in Jammu and Kashmir, although more lives have been taken in theAssam arena these past years because morecivilians have been targeted.

A significant number of cadres havebeen killed and a larger number have beencaptured or have surrendered. While thishas reduced the active armed strength ofthe organisation in Upper Assam, recruit-ment continues because it is offered as asource of employment for the desperate.

In addition, the pendulum of publicopinion, anchored by a noisy and breath-less media, has swung from the side of mil-itants on the run to the government, andthen back again, depending on the condi-tions and the incidents which take place.

During a conversation with Ulfa’s representatives in 2006, the Prime Ministershared a remarkably honest view: that hewas “a servant of the Constitution, respon-sible to parliament and the collective wisdom of the Cabinet”, and that he woulddo everything within those powers to resolve the issues. But talks have meandered to a stalemate and neither sideshows interest in moving them forward, forthere cannot be talks with preconditions.

Yet, there must be some ground rules:keep the doors open; use interlocutors whoare acceptable to both sides; don’t trumpetthe talks from the rooftops; and have directnegotiations. Ulfa’s reluctance towards dialogue reveals its political timidity interms of a negotiated settlement; it prefersthe status quo which will keep Assam andthe Northeast dependent on India, the verycolonial relationship they claim to oppose.

Many have followed withsadness the descent of

Ulfa from an organisationthat championed the

well-being of Assam,however misplaced thatvision, to one that preys

on the people it claims to fight for

”Security personnelinspect a bike destroyedby an Ulfa bomb blast inGuwahati, January 2007,which killed two

DSI DECEMBER 2008

But keeping the doors open has led to twostrike companies of Ulfa participating in thenegotiations even though the top leadersstay away.

Rights, laws and justice FINALLY, we need to review the role ofsweeping legal powers in difficult securitysituations, especially if these create

conditions of enduring enmity, suspicionand tragedy as well as extensive humanrights abuse.

The Armed Forces Special Powers Actwas passed by Parliament in 1958 and isone of the baldest, barest laws aimed atcrushing an armed threat to the state. Thegovernment said at the time that such powers were a temporary measure, butmore than fifty years after its promulgation,

the AFSPA continues in the Northeast. Ithas also been used in Jammu and Kashmirand in Punjab where the State defends itsuse, citing the need to fight local strugglesfor self-determination and/or outright independence which could harm “nationalintegrity”.

One of the most controversial clauses ofthe Act, which authorises the state or Central government to use the army when

40

We need to review the role of sweeping legal

powers in difficult securitysituations, especially

if these create conditionsof enduring enmity,

suspicion and tragedy aswell as extensive human

rights abuse

”

INTERNAL SECURITY

NSCN leaders Isak Chisi Swu(R) and Thuingaleng Muivah (L)

with then Home MinisterShivraj Patil in New Delhi,

December 2004, leading up topeace talks in Bangkok

DSIDECEMBER 2008

“civil disturbance” spins out of the control ofthe local administration, enables juniormembers of the security forces to shoot tokill without the risk of criminal prosecution.Such a law has no place in a democracy.Any discussion on a national security lawcannot but provide safeguards for protect-ing basic rights that are guaranteed by theConstitution. The army has to be pulled outof the policing work that it often does in the

Northeast. The police have been doing lessand less, hiding behind the army.

No state can fulfil its legal and constitu-tional mandate if it does not stop such dependency. The role of the security forceshas been besmirched by overuse in whatshould be essential civilian operations. Thiswas reflected in the killing of the suspectedmilitant Ms Manorama Devi while she wasin the custody of the Assam Rifles; the

subsequent upsurge against the AFSPAprompted the Centre to review it.

The Justice Jeevan Reddy Committee,which reviewed the Act, said that “forwhatever reason, (the act) has become asymbol of oppression, an object of hateand an instrument of discrimination andhigh-handedness … should be repealedwithout losing sight of the overwhelmingdesire of a majority of the region that thearmy should remain although the actshould go.”

The Committee, of which I was a member, provided a legal mechanism forthis. The tragedy is that over two years after our report, the Government of Indiahas neither tabled it in Parliament, nor developed a debate on the report itself orthe issues it raises, indicating its lack of interest in reducing arbitrary and overwhelming powers, and its reluctanceto rein in the army and give local police achance to perform. (However, the reportcan be read in full on The Hindu news-paper ’s website).

The AFSPA review provided a rare moment when a national security law wascritiqued by a committee that drew onpeople outside government as well. That isthe test of a democracy; but the real test ofa mature democracy is accepting thechanges needed. In that, the governmenthas been found wanting.

Sanjoy Hazarika is Managing Trustee,Centre for North East Studies and PolicyResearch (C-NES); Visiting Professor at theCentre for Policy Research; Editor; authorand columnist. He is a specialist on migra-tion and issues in the Northeast and hisbooks include Writing On The Wall: Re-flections on the North East; Strangers ofthe Mist: Tales of War and Peace fromIndia’s North East; and Rites of Passage.He is an award wining former correspon-dent of The New York Times, and was amember of the National Security AdvisoryBoard, the Armed Forces Special PowersAct (AFSPA) Review Committee, and anadvisory panel for the NE in the NationalCommission to Review the Working of theConstitution. He is a former member of IC-SSR and is appointed to the National Disas-ter Management Advisory Board and theTask Force to look into the problems of HillStates and Hill Areas. He is also a member ofvarious committees in the Planning Com-mission for the Eleventh Five Year Plan. Hewas one of the principal authors of the NorthEast Vision 2020 document, released by thePrime Minister in July 2008.

41

DSI DECEMBER 2008

42

INDO-US TIES

NATIONAL SECURITYTHE deal could impact our strategic programme in two possible ways: the qual-ity of weapons, and their quantity.

The right to testTHE deal could impinge on the quality ofour weapons because of its impact on ourfreedom to conduct further nuclear tests. Improving or modifyingIndia’s weapons, eitherby making them smallerand more easily trans-portable in long rangeAgni missiles, or by making more powerfulfusion weapons, maycall for further testing.Opinions differ on howlikely all this is. It is notclear whether any contingencies wouldarise requiring India tomodify its weapon design. If they did, theymight or might not require further underground testing; computer simulations might suffice.

Nevertheless, it would be a serious mat-ter if, as part of the deal, we lost the option toconduct a test should such a remote contingency arise. But that is simply not thecase. Concerns that the deal will rob India ofits “sovereign right to test” are totally misplaced, and based on confusion if notobfuscation. The only agreements India hassigned in this deal are the safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and the 123agreement with the US. There is no mention in either document of India agree-ing not to test. Other documents are notbinding on us—neither the Hyde Act, norany internal correspondence between theUS government and its Congressmen.

What is endangered is not our right totest, which we can always exercise, but thedeal itself, should we choose to exercise thatright. All serious observers have knownfrom the beginning that the deal may bejeopardised if we conduct another nucleartest (and especially if we are the first to doso). Even so, the response of different nations to any future test we may conductcould vary. The NSG’s clearance frees us to

deal not just with the US, but with all nations, particularly Russia and France. Notall of them will necessarily discontinuewhat could be plum commercial contractsfor them.

Even if we were to end up conducting atest (say, ten or twenty years from now),and even if the deal were to totally break

down as a result, we would be no worse offthen than we would have been had therebeen no deal at all. For decades we havebeen under siege because of technologicalsanctions. The deal will at least permit us,for as long as it lasts, to enjoy the benefits ofinternational nuclear commerce and techni-cal interaction. Needless to say, we shouldtake precautions, when contracting to buyindividual reactors from other countries,

against being left holding a large bunch ofunusable reactors starved of fuel or spareparts. In any event the option of whetherto conduct a test or not will be entirely ours,taking into account all the consequences, ofwhich losing nuclear commerce may not bethe most serious.

Impact on fissile material productionTHE effect of the deal on quantity, i.e. thesize of India’s nuclear arsenal, needs to bediscussed in quantitative detail, since criticsof the deal had prophesied dire conse-quences on this front. This concern is

related to the deal’s im-pact on the productionof plutonium (Pu), onwhich India’s weaponsprogramme is based.Unlike uranium, Pu isnot available under-ground to be mined; ithas to be artificially pro-duced in nuclear reac-tors, where some of theparent uranium fuel isconverted to plutoniumunder the impact of neutrons in the reactorenvironment. Thus thespent fuel rods of our reactors contain somePu, which can later be

chemically separated in reprocessing plants. We must distinguish between two

categories of plutonium. Weapons-gradeplutonium (WgPu), which has over 90 per-cent of the isotope Pu (239), is best suitedfor weapons. Almost all Pu-based bombs inthe world use this grade. To produce it onehas to run reactors in a special way (“at lowburn-up”) as India’s Cirus and Dhruva reactors have done to produce Pu forweapons. But the bulk of our CANDU reactors, run at normal burn-up, producean impure form called Reactor-grade Plu-tonium (RgPu). It must be borne in mind,however, that RgPu, although not ideallysuited for that purpose can, in a pinch, stillbe used to make nuclear weapons.

Existing plutonium stocksWWeeaappoonnss--ggrraaddee pplluuttoonniiuumm:: One of thefeatures of the nuclear deal is that all existingstocks of Pu can be used for military purposes. The Indian government does notput out official data on its stocks of fissilematerials, but, given the characteristics of areactor, it is possible to estimate how muchPu it will deposit in its fuel rods. My colleagues and I at the International Panel

THE Indo-US nuclear deal has finally been successfully concluded, after athree-year-long struggle during which it was given up for dead severaltimes. It is now time to take stock of its implications and impact in two impor-tant areas: national security and energy requirements.

NUCLEARFALLOUT

The impact of the Indo-US nuclear deal

on India’s strategic andenergy programmes

R. RAJARAMAN

DSI DECEMBER 2008

44

on Fissile Materials have made these andother such calculations, which form the basis of the discussion in this section. Thedetails are available in research reports atwww.fissilematerials.org, but, in summary,the Cirus and Dhruva reactors should haveproduced about 750 kg of WgPu so far. Ofthis, about 120 kg will have been used upin past nuclear tests and research work etc,leaving over 600 kg of WgPu. At roughly

5 kg per warhead, we have a WgPu stockequivalent to about 120 weapons. We expect most of this to have been separatedby reprocessing, although we don’t knowexactly how much has been weaponised.

RReeaaccttoorr--ggrraaddee pplluuttoonniiuumm:: Four out of 17power reactors, built with foreign collabora-tion, are already under safeguards. Theiroutput cannot be used for weapon

purposes. Based on the actual electricpower generated by each of the remaining13 reactors, we estimate that by mid-2007over 12 tonnes of RgPu will have been deposited in their fuel rods.

If India chooses to use this RgPu to makeweapons, which in principle is possibleeven though the weapons may not be reliable in their yield, these 12 tonnes areenough to make anywhere between 1200

US President George Bushgreets PM Manmohan Singh at the G20 Summit inWashington in November

INDO-US TIES

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and 1700 weapons. That is larger than thecurrent arsenals of the UK, France andChina put together.

Perhaps less than half of this has beenactually separated till now, since India’sthree reprocessing units at BARC,Kalpakkam and Tarapur have been work-ing at far less than full capacity. However,all of the 1200-1700 weapons worth ofRgPu, whether separated out or sitting inour spent fuel, lies outside safeguards and isavailable for weaponisation. This is in addition to the previously mentioned120weapons’ worth of WgPu.

Future plutonium productionTO ESTIMATE how the deal will affect future production of Pu for weapon purposes, recall that under the deal’s Separation Plan, eight out of our 22 thermalreactors, and the Fast Breeder reactor(PFBR), are deemed military. (Althoughthis Breeder will use up some RgPu as fuel, it will “breed” WgPu as its output. This was why India insisted that it be considered military.)

In the immediate future, while some mil-itary reactors are being completed and oth-ers are being placed under safeguards in aphased manner, the amount of weapon-usable Pu produced will vary. But by, say,2014, all safeguarding arrangements will becomplete, the Cirus will have closed downand the Breeder will have come into opera-tion. Thereafter, the Dhruva will continueto produce about 23kg, and the Breederabout 130 kg of WgPu—altogether over 30warheads’ worth, every year. This is a five-fold increase from the current rate ofWgPu production.

In addition, the eight military CANDUreactors will churn out about one tonne ofRgPu annually.

In short, not only do we already have asubstantial reserve of reactor- andweapons-grade Pu, but the nuclear dealwill permit continued production, especially thanks to considering theBreeder military. Finally, the deal does notprohibit India from building more reactorsinside the military sector.

Critics of the deal in the West and in Pakistan allege that it will strengthen India’s weapons programme by allowing itto divert all its domestic supply of uraniumtowards WgPu production, since uraniumfor its civilian programme can now be purchased from abroad. In theory this maybe true, but in practice I believe it is unlikely. What India could do, in principle,if it had surplus domestic uranium, is to run

one of those eight CANDUs at low burn (of1000MWd/tonne) and thus produce moreWgPu. But this would require about 190tonnes more uranium annually.

The current uranium mining rate of lessthan 300 tonnes per year can barely fuel theeight CANDUs at a normal burn of7000MWd/tonne. So there is no uraniumsurplus right now, even with the nucleardeal. True, new mines may yield another 200tonnes, and if India were desperate to speedup its weapons production, it could resort torunning one CANDU at low burn. That is adifficult process that requires refuellingseven times faster, for which the loading accessories are not currently set up. Besides,as we have noted, India will in any case en-hance its WgPu production rate by a factor offive once the Breeder is in full flow, withoutresorting to these complicated manoeuvres.

Enriched uraniumALTHOUGH our weapons have been Pu-based, we do have one centrifuge facility atRattehalli in Karnataka, which produceshighly enriched uranium (HEU). But it is

46

INDO-US TIES

The immediate major benefit will be

the freedom to importbadly needed uranium forour civilian energy sector.

India’s uranium oreresources are limited and not of the highest

quality

”

DSIDECEMBER 2008

believed that the enrichment in U-235 ismuch less than the 90 percent needed for auranium weapon, and is meant to fuel ourforthcoming nuclear submarine. That is stilla military use, and that plant too lies outside safeguards as per the deal. So itswork will continue as before.

CIVILIAN NUCLEAR ENERGYON THE energy front, the deal can quiteobviously only be beneficial to us unless weshoot ourselves in the foot. The only argu-ment is over the extent of these benefits.The immediate major benefit will be thefreedom to import badly needed uraniumfor our civilian energy sector. India’s uranium ore resources are limited and notof the highest quality. The resulting ura-nium shortage depends, of course, on howmuch nuclear power you plan to generate.

As mentioned there are currently 17 reactors functioning in India, with a gener-ation capacity of 4,070 MW of power, andfive more reactors under construction, expected to generate an additional 2,660MW. India’s uranium requirement for these

existing and under-construction reactors isabout 675 tonnes. The current uraniumproduction is only about 300 tonnes/yr(600,000 tonnes of ore of 0.05 percent U content). Some of our reactors are reportedto be currently running at 50 percent of capacity or less because of this shortage.

Efforts are on to open new mines thatmay yield 150-200 tonnes more. But togrow to, say, a 50,000 MW capacity in a couple of decades, as the governmentwould like to, you would need about 7000tonnes of uranium a year. Even if Indiacould mine uranium that fast, it would runout of all underground ore soon. According

to the authoritative“Redbook” on uraniumresources, the knownconventional in situ resources include 54,800tU under the ReasonablyAssured Resources(RAR) category and

29,800 tU under Inferred Resources (IR) cat-egories. There may in addition be about29,000 tonnes in the “undiscovered resources” category. This gives a range ofavailable uranium from an assured 54,800tonnes to an optimistic maximum of about114,000 tonnes. That can fuel 50,000 MWworth of reactors only for 8-16 years.

Therefore, India simply does not haveenough uranium ore for such large generating capacities for any significantlength of time. This shortage was a majormotive behind signing the deal, which enables us to import uranium and permitsus to build up a fuel reserve. This is stated inArticle 5, sec.6 (b) (iii) of the 123 Agreement,and was reiterated by President Bush in hissigning statement.

Apart from allowing fuel imports, thedeal also enables other countries, especiallythe US, France and Russia to construct reactors here, which will significantlyspeed up the growth of our nuclear powercapacity. Major companies in a position todo this are General Electric and Westing-house in the US, Rosatom in Russia andAreva in France. Detailed discussions withall of them have been proceeding infor-mally for some time, in anticipation of thedeal. The NSG waiver has legally allowedus to sign nuclear cooperation agreementswith all these countries. They have alreadybeen signed with France and the US, andan agreement with Russia is expected to follow soon. Sharing technology and ex-pertise with these nations will also help ourbreeder-based thorium program.

The deal will also enable technology

transfer in other potentially dual-use areas,like supercomputers, robotics, advancedmaterials, sophisticated electronic sensorsand so on, and benefit sectors like meteorol-ogy, space and defence hardware. We canalso consider selling our indigenouslyimproved CANDU reactors to other coun-tries, perhaps in partnership with Canada.

We end with a word of caution. It wouldbe wise not to take seriously some of thehype generated in the heat of the debate.The nuclear deal will not solve all our energy problems. It is unlikely to yield even10 percent of our total electricity require-ments by 2030, expected to be well over500,000 MW at an 8 percent growth rate ofthe GDP. Our current nuclear capacity, developed over fifty years, is a meagre 4100MW with some 3000 MW more under construction. To reach 10 percent of 500,000GW by 2030, another 43,000 MW wouldhave to be added within 22 years, at a cost ofabout Rs10 crore per MW.

This will be difficult because of numer-ous practical constraints. It will require mas-sive funding and acquisition of land for thenew reactors. Contracts for new reactors byforeign builders must be negotiated hardnot only for the cost, but also to ensure theavailability of sufficient fuel for their lifetime.

Therefore, after initially signing contractsfor, say, another 10 reactors of appropriatesize and type distributed between US,French and Russian builders, the govern-ment must keep reviewing its energy mix. Itmust monitor the cost and state of develop-ment of alternative technologies like wind,solar and tidal power, as well as of environ-mentally improved versions of coal. The costof reactor dismantlement and spent fuel disposal must also be realistically included.

That we have won a hard-earned nuclear deal and NSG waiver does notmean that we should feel compelled to invest more in nuclear energy that what wecan afford. The deal has opened large nuclear options for us, but those optionsshould not be construed as compulsions.

Professor R. Rajaraman is Emeritus Profes-sor of Physics at Jawaharlal Nehru University,New Delhi. He got his PhD in theoreticalphysics from Cornell University in 1963. Hehas taught and done research in physics forfour decades at, among other places, Cornell,Princeton, Harvard, Stanford, MIT, IISc, andCERN, Geneva. After the Indian nuclear testsin 1998, he has concentrated on technical re-search on nuclear policy issues, including theIndo-US nuclear deal. He is also Co-Chair ofthe International Panel on Fissile Materials.

47

India’s atomicchief AnilKakodkar (R) atthe IAEA’sheadquarters inVienna in 2007

MOST defence deals worldwideare closed to public scrutinybecause of security considera-tions. This lack of transparency

regularly provokes charges of lack of probity and rampant corruption, notwithout reason; according to Trans-parency International’s Global Bribe Payers Index, the defence trade is one ofthe top three most bribery-ridden andcorrupt sectors (oil and major infra-structure projects being the other two).The US Government estimates that the defence sector accounts for almost 50 percent of all global kickbacks, although thearms trade accounts for less than one percent of international trade.

No wonder, then, that most peoplethink of the middlemen who broker defence deals as unscrupulous soulswhose underhandedness vitiates the defence trade. They are convinced thateliminating agents would make defence

transactions more transparent and lesscorrupt. Knowledgeable observers, however, know that agents perform veryuseful deal-making functions.

The intense public debate on this matter presents a dilemma for the Indian government. Should it sanctionthe role of agents and be accused of

MEN IN THE MIDDLEDSI DECEMBER 2008

48

POLICY ISSUES

The existing DefenceProcurement

Procedure’s policy onarms agents leaves thegovernment between arock and a hard place,

says Major GeneralMMrriinnaall SSuummaann

MRINAL SUMAN

Indian soldiers load a Bofors artillerygun during ‘Operation Desert Strike’ atPokhran in 2005. The acquisition of thegun was marred by charges of corruption

DSIDECEMBER 2008

endorsing corruption, or proscribeagents and drive them underground?Prime Minister Manmohan Singh wascandid enough to acknowledge thatmiddlemen cannot be wished away, andsuggested that their functioning be regulated instead. Rao Inderjit Singh,Minister of State for Defence, blamedthe policy of not involving agents for the

sluggish modernisation in the armedforces. “Military hardware that shouldhave been inducted into the armedforces ten years ago has not been inducted,” he said in January 2008.

Many thought that these statementsindicated a likely policy change, permit-ting agents to broker defence deals. However, the Defence Minister, replying

to a question in Parliament, unambigu-ously stated that agents would not be allowed in defence procurements. Thenew procurement procedure promul-gated with effect from 1st September2008, also rules out any role for agents.

Irrespective of government policy,however, agents are present and thriving in the Indian defence acquisi-

tion sector. The government had to banSouth African arms major Denel after itlearned that the company had paid ahefty commission of 12.75 percent to secure a contract supplying anti-material rifles to India after the Kargilwar. The deal was allegedly clinched byobtaining classified information regard-ing commercial negotiations throughagents. Early last year, the nation wasshocked when Rite Approach Group Ltd(represented by the Austrian Trade

49

Most people think of thethe middlemen who

broker defence deals asunscrupulous. Should thegovernment sanction the

role of agents and beaccused of endorsing

corruption, or proscribeagents and drive them

underground?

”

DSI DECEMBER 2008

Commission in Delhi) claimed that it hadacted as an agent, helping Kazan Heli-copters of Russia to clinch a Rs 180 croredeal to supply sixteen MI-17 helicopters tothe Ministry of Defence (MoD), for apromised commission of Rs 29 crore.These cases go to show that despite thegovernment’s no-agents policy, businesscontinues as usual for them; in fact, agentshave hiked their commissions from the alleged 5 percent in the Bofors case to 16percent in the recent MI-17 helicopters case.

The fact is that the government simplydoes not know how to handle this sensi-tive issue and remains indecisive. Thoughit is convinced that agent involvement isinevitable, it considers it politically unwise to allow them to operate officially,especially when the next general electionsare at hand.

A historical perspectiveBEFORE 1990, almost all defence dealswere carried out with the erstwhile SovietUnion on a ‘government to government’basis. Agents had no role to play. Some reports did appear in the press allegingkickbacks and underhand dealings, butwere never substantiated as both India andthe Soviet Union kept the deals underwraps. Two major deals with Westerncountries—HDW submarines and Boforsguns—came under severe attack for the alleged part played by agents. Both companies had to be banned from doingbusiness with India.

After the breakup of the Soviet Union,India had to diversify procurementsources. A large number of new companiesfrom different nations appeared on thescene. Expectedly, agents of different huesalso mushroomed, promising lucrativecontracts through their contacts. Intenseturf battles erupted among agents trying tograb the biggest slice of business pie. At thesame time increased media coverage intensified public interest in defence deals;all major deals became subject to closescrutiny, and many elicited critical comments. The government drew flak forits inability to curb or regulate the function-ing of agents. It has now been vacillatingfor three decades over the decision to allowor disallow agents.

In accordance with the recommenda-tions made in the 160th Report of the PublicAccounts Committee (1974-75), an Inter-Ministerial Working Group was setup in June 1975 to examine the role ofagents in all government purchases. The

Director, General Revenue Intelligence, was its convener.The Working Group’s recom-mendations, as accepted by thegovernment, were notified bythe Department of Supply on19 July 1976. The Ministry of Finance (Department of Expenditure) subsequentlydisseminated exhaustive policy guidelinestitled “Indian Agents of Foreign Suppli-

ers—Policy on” in January1989. The basic thrust of thepolicy was to ensure that allmiddlemen were registered,were paid commissions in Indian currency, and were

duly taxed on all such income.As these instructions were primarily

applicable to civil imports, the MoD issuedsupplementary instructions on 17 April

50

POLICY ISSUES

Denel’s Skua High-Speed Target Drone atthe Africa Aerospaceand Defence show inPretoria in 2004

DSIDECEMBER 2008

1989 in respect of defence purchases, aimingto closely monitor and regulate the functioning of defence agents. However, asagents continued to provoke strident criticism for alleged corrupt practices in anumber of deals, the government decidedto ban them in early 2001 and take a freshlook at the policy.

A thorough policy review was therefore undertaken with inputs from

the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC)and the Comptroller and Auditor Generalof India. The CVC strongly recommendedthat defence agents be officially permittedand registered to regulate their function-ing, initiate transparency and promoteprobity. Appreciating the fact that agentsdo perform useful functions, the MoD decided to allow them, albeit with stricterregulation. Detailed guidelines were

issued in November 2001. According to the policy guidelines, a

foreign vendor can appoint an agent whois paid a retainer, or reimbursed his expenses, or paid a commission, or a combi-nation of these, on the completion of aspecified obligation. It must be an open anddeclared appointment. A foreign firm wishing to appoint an Indian agent has toformally inform the MoD and furnish allthe details of the business entity to be engaged, its previous professional background, the nature of its business sinceestablishment, the details of all bankers andcopies of all agreements with the principal.The MoD reserves the right to grant accred-itation to an agent considered acceptable.

Furthermore, a foreign vendor can makeonly openly declared payments to his agentas per the contract terms governing the nature of services rendered and the payablecommission. The scale of payable commis-sions must follow the guidelines approvedfrom time to time by the MoD. All particularsrelating to the agency commission must bereported to the Enforcement Directorateand other agencies, to prevent foreign exchange leakage and tax evasion.

Though this new policy was issued in2001, it has been a total failure. No agenthas come forward to register, because mostfeel that the required information is too invasive, and could be used by officialagencies to harass them. Once in the open,they would lose the shield of anonymityforever, and they fear that exposure willmake them vulnerable to extortion frompolitical parties and the underworld.

Many attribute the policy’s failure to itsharsh tone, which conveys the impressionthat the government sees agents as a neces-sary evil that must be kept on a tight leash.The policy is generally felt to be too intrusive,and many of its provisions unwarranted.

Defence Procurement Proceduredisallows agentsALTHOUGH the policy allowing agentshas not been formally rescinded, the newdefence procurement procedure effectivelyrules out any role for agents. In addition tothe ‘Pre-Contract Integrity Pact’ forschemes exceeding Rs 100 crore, all vendorshave to promise not to offer bribes, and todisclose all contract-related paymentsmade to anybody, including agents andother middlemen. Every vendor must givean undertaking that he has not given, offered or promised to give, directly or indi-rectly any gift, consideration, reward,

51

DSI DECEMBER 2008

commission, fees brokerage or inducementto any person in service of the buyer or otherwise in procuring the contract.

Every vendor also has to authenticateand declare to the government that theseller is the original manufacturer of thestores referred to in the contract, and hasnot engaged any individual or firm, Indianor foreign, to intercede on its behalf to secure the contract. The vendor has to confirm that no amount has been paid orpromised to any such individual or firm inrespect of any such intercession, facilitationor recommendation.

The Defence Procurement Procedurealso lays down a methodology for penalis-ing defaulting vendors. If the governmentis satisfied that a vendor has engaged anagent or paid a commission or influencedany person to obtain the contract, the vendor has to provide the necessary information and/or inspection of the relevant financial documents and informa-tion. The government reserves the right todemand a refund or cancel the contract,and may even debar the vendor for a minimum period of five years.

Functions performed by agentsALTHOUGH they are much maligned,agents are not just ubiquitous but indis-pensible in international trade, becausethey carry out many useful functions.Their basic role is to bring buyers and sellerstogether, assist in negotiations and providepost-contract services. Agents carry outmultifarious tasks for Indian defence procurements, as discussed below.

IInnppuuttss ttoo sseerrvviiccee hheeaaddqquuaarrtteerrssCompetent agents can be of immense assistance to the Service Headquarters(SHQ) at the initial stages of a procure-ment proposal. Their inputs on the latesttechnological advancements in theworld facilitate the formulation of pragmatic Qualitative Requirements.They provide the details of well-knownmanufacturers in India and abroad, thusenabling proposals from a maximumnumber of vendors and increasing competition. And their inputs regardingthe indicative costs of proposed acquisi-tions help the SHQ to create realisticbudgetary provisions at the outset, elim-inating the need to revise allocations.

AAssssiissttaannccee dduurriinngg tthhee tteecchhnniiccaall eevvaalluuaattiioonn pprroocceessss Agents can expeditiously answer queries

raised by the Technical Evaluation Committee during a paper evaluation oftechnical proposals, since they are in immediate communication with the vendor. Also, field trials in India are carried out over varying terrain and climatic conditions, and agents are invaluable to foreign suppliers relying onlocal help to import, maintain, transportand position their equipment for trials asper the given schedule.

FFaacciilliittaattiinngg ccoommmmeerrcciiaall nneeggoottiiaattiioonnssDetermining the reasonable and fair costof equipment is a highly complex and arduous task, and has to be done well before commercial proposals are opened.Different agents’ inputs assist thisprocess, and help resolve irksome issuesthat crop up during protracted contrac-

52

POLICY ISSUES

Agents are not justubiquitous but

indispensible ininternational trade. The

government is convincedthat their involvement is

inevitable, but considers itpolitically unwise to allowthem to operate officially

”

DSIDECEMBER 2008

tual discussions, paving the way for amutually acceptable contract.

LLiiffeettiimmee ssuuppppoorrtt ffoorr eeqquuiippmmeennttAgents enhance the quality of after-salessupport. It is much easier to contact an Indian agency for engineering support andback-up service. Agents can also greatlyhelp to resolve performance and warrantyissues. Significantly, local agents have a permanent interest in performing well, tocreate future business opportunities.

FFuullffiilllliinngg ooffffsseett oobblliiggaattiioonnssAs per the procurement policy, all contractswith an indicative value greater than Rs 300crore must have associated offset obligationsas per the quantum decided by the DefenceAcquisition Council. Foreign vendors needto identify suitable fields and reliable Indian

partners to dis-charge their offsetobligations. Agentsprovide the neces-sary details to

foreign vendors, and facilitate tie ups.

FFaacciilliittaattiinngg FFDDIIThe government threw the defence indus-try open to the private sector in May 2001,permitting 100 per cent equity with a maxi-mum 26 per cent Foreign Direct Investment(FDI) component. Guidelines to licence armsand ammunition production were subse-quently issued in January 2002. It is well-nighimpossible for a prospective foreign investorto spot lucrative business opportunities with-out agents to do ground-level scouting work.

PPrroovviiddiinngg aaddmmiinniissttrraattiivvee sseerrvviicceessAgents assist foreign vendors in makinglodging and travel arrangements in India,and guide them through the Indian procurement regime, policies, structures andprocedures.

Recommended policy STRANGELY, India faces problems withagents only in defence procurement; allother government departments regularly deal with agents without any apparent difficulties. The functioning ofagents has been duly regulated, and theyhave been receiving legitimate com-missions. When the Finance Ministry issuedpolicy guidelines in April 1989, its principalthrust was to conserve precious foreign exchange and prevent tax evasion; the con-duct of agents was never an issue. On theother hand, the MoD’s instructions arewholly directed towards disciplining andregulating agents.

By repeatedly blaming agents for all theills that plague defence procurements, thegovernment conveys the impression thatprocurement functionaries are predisposedto corruption and cannot be checked, andthat, therefore, the only way to ensure probity is to keep functionaries from temp-tation by disallowing agents. In other words,the government is forced to ban agents because it distrusts its own functionaries.

Agents will continue to thrive whether ornot the government approves of them. Ifthey are banned they will remain clandes-tine and unmonitored, earning commissionsin black money which will be stashed in for-eign banks and will evade all taxes. Covertfunctioning always corrupts the environ-ment. It is, therefore, prudent to legitimise

agents, albeit with reasonable safeguards in place. Ex-Chief Vigilance Com-missioner N Vittal is of the view that insteadof banning agents, it is better to recognisethem under clear-cut principles and rules.

To start with, the government mustchange its basic approach and treat agents asnormal businessmen who perform useful functions, instead of as suspiciouscharacters. Agents are in business to makemoney, a fact that cannot be disputed or heldagainst them. Promoting the products oftheir principals does not make them unethical and ignoble. Their knowledgeshould be exploited for the country’s goodrather than shunned. Agents also provide aneffective interface between suppliers and the MoD.

The MoD should simplify the registrationprocedure, ideally following the same pro-cedure as in other government departments.There is no reason to single out defence pro-curements. The policy should encourageopen registration by being less intrusive, andby respecting professional privacy and economic confidentiality. There is no need torequire the details of an agent’s past businessactivities, other professional dealings and financial profile, or even the details of his Indian and foreign bankers.

Finally, the government must adopt along-term policy to instil confidence in theenvironment. Most agents want to workwith the MoD in an open and transparentmanner but are wary of losing their protective shield of obscurity; they fear thatthe current trend of investigating all defencedeals negotiated by previous regimes willunnecessarily drag them into rancorous in-quisitions and protracted court cases. Politicalwitch-hunts are the biggest deterrent for theovert and legitimate functioning of agents.

Major General (Retd) Mrinal Suman,AVSM, VSM, PhD is a highly qualified and experienced officer. After acquiring a B Tech de-gree, he earned an MAin Public Administrationand an MSc in Defence Studies. His academicpursuits culminated in a Doctorate in PublicAdministration. General Suman was closely associated with the evolution and promulgationof the new defence procurement mechanism. Today, he is considered the foremost expert onvarious aspects of India’s defence procurementregime and offsets. He is often consulted by pol-icy makers and the Parliamentary Committee onDefence and is regularly invited to address vari-ous industrial chambers. He heads the DefenceTechnical Assessment and Advisory Service ofCII. The General is a prolific writer, publishingarticles regularly in a large number of journals.

53

Minister of State forDefence Production,Rao Inderjit Singh,speaks to the press

DSI DECEMBER 2008

54

PHOTO FEATURE

RANSOM

DSIDECEMBER 2008

55

NOTE

Nov. 9, 2008, thecrew of themerchant vesselMV Faina stand onthe deck after aU.S. Navy requestto check on theirhealth and welfare.The Belize-flaggedcargo ship ownedand operated byKaalbye Shipping,Ukraine, wasseized by piratesSept. 25 andforced to proceedto anchorage offthe Somali Coast.The ship is carryinga cargo ofUkrainian T-72tanks and relatedmilitary equipment U.S. Navy photo/JasonR. Zalasky

After INS Tabar defended two merchant vesselsagainst pirate attack, the Indian Navy is seeking aUN-mandated international anti-piracyoperation in the Gulf of Aden. No single nationcan indefinitely deploy its assets in the region.

DSI DECEMBER 2008 PHOTO FEATURE

56

Confiscated weapons lie onthe deck of guided missile

cruiser USS Cape St. George(CG 71) following an early-morning engagement with

suspected pirates U.S. Navy photo

Members of a U.S. Navy rescue and assistance team provide humanitarian andmedical assistance to the crew of the Taiwanese-flagged fishing trawler ChingFong Hwa. The vessel had been seized by pirates off the coast of Somalia in earlyMay 2007 and was released Nov. 5, 2007 with U.S. Navy assistanceU.S. Navy photo

DSIDECEMBER 2008

57

A suspected pirate “mothership” turned out to be the Kiribati-flagged Thai-owned FV Ekawat Nava 5 with a crew of 15 Thaisand a Cambodian, transporting fishing equipment from Omanto Yemen. The ship was apparently in the process of beinghijacked when the pirates threatened and then fired on anIndian naval vessel. The INS Tabar fired back in self-defence,sinking the ship. The Gulf of Aden has become a hotspot forpiracy by mainly Somalian pirates

Ships assigned to Combined Task Force One FiveZero. The multinational Combined Task Force was

established to monitor, inspect, board, and stopsuspect shipping to pursue the war on piracy

58

DSI DECEMBER 2008

Dassault offersfull technologytransfer for Rafale THE French government has cleared fulltechnology transfer for Dassault’s Rafalecombat jet, one of the six contenders for theIndian Air Force’s (IAF) 126 multi-rolemedium range combat aircraft (MMRCA)tender, which is estimated to be eventuallyworth at least $11 billion over its lifetime.

Briefing Indian media representatives atDassault Aviation’s Paris headquarters, senior vice president for military sales JPHPChabriol, said, “When we talk about technol-ogy transfer, we mean full technology transferand not in bits and pieces.

“The way we work, we first have to obtainclearance of the government before puttingin our proposal. If we win the order, we can be-gin work on transferring technology from dayone—unlike our competition,” he added.

Critically for India, the transfer-of-technol-ogy (ToT) would include that of state-of-the-art Active Electronically Scanned Array(AESA) radar that would provide the Rafalethe ability to also function as a close battle-field support airborne warning and controlsystem (AWACS), apart from its designedfunction as a fighter. The AESA radar ToT willalso include transfer of software source code,according to Chabriol.

This is extremely important to India, or anycountry that seeks ToT of sensitive equip-ment, as lack of access to the source codewould prevent re-programming radars or anysensitive equipment the way it wishes.

The AESA radar on offer from Dassault isstill under development by French aerospacegiant Thales, and should be integrated with

the aircraft by 2012, which is roughly when theselected aircraft from the MMRCA tender isexpected to enter IAF service.

Two other competing fighters, Boeing’sF/A-18 Super Hornet and the European conglomerate Eurofighter’s Typhoon, are alsobeing made available with AESA radars,though with the provision that ToT for thisequipment will be dependent on the decisionof their respective governments.

Earlier statements from manufacturers ofAESA radars have said that transfer ofsource code is not on the cards. Since sourcecode enables programming of the radar, it implies that the IAF would have to specifymission parameters to foreign manufactur-ers to configure their radar.

“This is not an issue with us. We will notonly fully transfer the technology for theAESA radar, but also provide the softwaresource code so that that the IAF can pro-gramme it in the way it wishes to,” Chabriolinformed journalists.

Apart from the Rafale, the F/A-18 and theTyphoon, other MMRCA contenders are theLockheed Martin F-16, Saab Gripen and the MiG-35.

The technical bids for the MMRCA tenderare currently being evaluated, after which allsix aircraft will be put through a rigorous test-ing process at Bangalore, Jaisalmer and Leh.

The MMRCA tender is meant to raise theIAF’s squadron strength to at least 39, fromthe current depleted level of 32.

The Gripen is powered by a US engine and has other US components, and the Eurofighter also has quite a few Americanparts, so these companies would first have toseek the US government’s approval. In thecase of the F-18, not only government approval but also Congressional approval isnecessary.

Published in Domain-b.com

An update onmilitary policy

RAFALE is atwin-jet combataircraft capable ofcarrying out awide range ofshort- and long-range missions,including groundand sea attack, airdefence and airsuperiority,reconnaissance,and high-accuracystrike or nuclearstrike deterrencede

fenc

etal

k

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DSI DECEMBER 2008

Five firms in fray forcopter deal FIVE global helicopter majors are in the fray to sell India 197multi-role, light helicopters in a deal worth Rs 3,000 crore. Euro-copter, a subsidiary of the European Aeronautic Defence andSpace company with its AS 550 Fennec; Bell Helicopters, offer-ing the Bell 407; Russia’s Kamov for its Ka-226; the Franco Italianconsortium’s Agusta which is prepared to offer either theAgusta A109 Power or the A 119 Koala; and McDonnell Dou-glas Helicopter Systems offering the MD 520N, have been givenuntil December 19 to submit proposals.

Weighing less than three tonnes when armed, these multi-role, light turbine helicopters will replace the 1970s vintage Chetak and Cheetah helicopters operated by the ArmyAviation Corps and the Air Force.

They will undertake tasks such as reconnaissance and observation, casualty evacuation, electronic warfare, escortduties, anti-insurgency operations and injecting and extricatingpersonnel from the battlefield.

Of the 197 helicopters which are to be bought in a fly awaycondition and via knock down kits, 133 are for the Army, while64 will be delivered to the Air Force.

The helicopter deal is part of a mega-modernisation programme which will see the Army eventually receiving 197helicopters and the Air Force getting 188.

The deal also includes an offset clause, under which the vendor must source defence-related goods and services to thevalue of 50 per cent of the deal from Indian companies.

The process—including discussions on offset proposals, technical evaluation, short-listing by the Defence Ministry, hotweather and winter trails—is expected to be complete by themiddle of 2010.

Published in The Hindu

BREAKING with tradition, the Indian govern-ment has allowed the Aeronautical DevelopmentEstablishment (ADE) to co-opt a partner from Indian industry who will join in the developmentand production of the Rs 1,000 crore indigenous,medium-altitude, long endurance, unmannedaerial vehicle (UAV) programme, Rustom.

Traditionally, laboratories under the DefenceResearch and Development Organisation(DRDO) umbrella develop a product or system,build a prototype, prove it in field trials and thentransfer the technology to a production agency.This sequential approach has seen time delays in

making the system operational, poor productmanagement, and even obsolescence. TheDRDO is therefore exploring ways to move to aregime of concurrent engineering practices,where initial design efforts also take into consideration production issues, with the production agency participating in the develop-ment of the system right from the design stage,and concurrently developing the necessary infrastructure and expertise for the product andproduct support. The Rustom programme is the first of this exploration and could become atrendsetter for future projects.

Confirming the government’s decision to allow the development of the Rustom in associa-tion with a production agency-cum-developmentpartner (PADP), P.S. Krishnan, Director ADE,said that requests for proposals (RFP) wouldshortly be issued to four vendors: Tata, Larsenand Toubro, Godrej and Hindustan AeronauticsLimited-Bharat Electronics (joint bid).

The chosen PADP will also have a financialstake in the Rustom project. While proposalsfrom the vendors are expected by February, theentire selection process could take 18 months.The users (the armed forces) will also be askedto take a financial stake. In order to allay appre-hensions that orders may not be placed, the government might also guarantee that a specificnumber of Rustoms will be bought.

Published in The Hindu

defencetalk

Several militaryversions of theHirundo A109have beendeveloped forarmy, naval, andpatrol use

Government to allow industryparticipation in indigenous UAV project

DSI DECEMBER 2008

62

defencetalk

India reopens anotherairbase along Pak, Chinaborder ON November 4 2008, India reopened the Fuk Che airbase in theLadakh region of Jammu and Kashmir, close to both the Chineseand Pakistani borders, to operate larger military aircraft.

The reopening of Fuk Che, close to Aksai Chin and SiachenGlacier, was formalised with the landing of the IAF’s An-32transport aircraft for the first time after several years, marking ashift in the airbase’s operational profile.

Sources said the airbase currently has no equipment or facilityto accommodate large transport aircraft or fighter jets. Fuk Chewas made operational in line with the IAF’s recent policy of making all available Advanced Landing Grounds (ALG) in high-altitude areas operational along the China and Pakistan borders.

With its reopening, the country has made available a secondairbase that was not in active use for military aircraft. This May,the IAF had reopened the Daulat Beg Oldi ALG with the landingof another An-32 aircraft carrying the Western Air Commandchief Air Marshal P K Barbora.

In fact, it was Barbora who had announced on the eve of thisyear’s Air Force Day on October 8 that the IAF planned to reopenmore ALGs in Jammu and Kashmir close to Pakistan and China.

Published in Zeenews.com

Jupiter effects radarintegration for IAF JUPITER Strategic Technologies, a software product firmowned by Member of Parliament Rajeev Chandrasekhar, hasimplemented a Pilot Integrated Air Command and Control Sys-tem for the Indian Air Force at its base in Thiruvananthapuram.

According to an official statement from Jupiter, this systemintegrates the radar pictures of the IAF, Navy and the civilradars in the Southern Peninsula through multi-radar data fusion software, and presents the air situation picture of thepeninsula in real time at headquarters.“Indian military, IAF,Navy and civil radars have been integrated in real time. This is aleap in indigenous capability,” the statement added.

According to Jupiter officials, the Sound Multi Sensor Algo-rithm provides unambiguous tracking of aircraft. The system

also provides facilities to support air defence functions like automatic surveillance, identification, threat evaluation, inter-ception and recovery. The system will increase the operationalpreparedness of the Southern Air Command and help optimisethe use of air defence resources, an official from Jupiter said.

Detailing the advantages of this solution, the official saidthat the system would give the IAF a bird’s eye view of the airspace in the entire southern theatre. “The coverage extendsfrom the Bay of Bengal to the Arabian Sea, the Indian Oceanand the major part of Sri Lanka. With this system the IAF willbe able to monitor all civil and military air movements, and avoidcivil aircraft straying into unauthorised air space like the Purulia incident which happened a few years ago,” he noted.

The statement further noted that this system is ideally suitedto help implement Southern Air Command's ‘Flexi Air Space’concept in which civil and military aviation coexist. The systemalso provides for the integration of more radars in the future.

Published in Business Standard

THE AN-32 isbasically a re-engined An-26.It is designed towithstand adverseweatherconditions betterthan the standardAn-26. The highplacement of theengine nacellesabove the wingallow for largerdiameterairscrews, whichare driven by 5100hp rated AI-20turbopropengines, almosttwice the power ofthe An-26’s AI-24 powerplants

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64

defencetalk

IISc has idea forbetter missilesTHE Indian Institute of Science’s (IISc) newpiece of research on reducing the drag experi-enced by flying objects and helping them flylonger, is finding its way into India’s missile establishment. Scientists at DRDO are excited,and the organisation is planning to “apply thefindings” in a major way to its missile researchand production programmes.

The IISc research, published in the journalPhysics of Fluids, has made an impact on India’sdefence think tanks, with many discussing theimplications. Scientists told TOI that DRDOheads are “excited” and that the new research“will be used in future vehicles”.

The research suggests that coating the nose

portion of a missile or launch vehicle with a thinlayer of material such as chromium, will reducedrag or atmospheric resistance, enabling fasterand longer flight.

How does this happen? The metal coatingevaporates due to the heating of the missile’snose during its hypersonic flight. Then the evaporated metal particles in atomic form reactexothermically with oxygen atoms surroundingthe body, to release additional heat. Lastly, theair in the front of the missile gets heated up and,in turn, reduces drag by up to 47 percent.

DRDO scientists say that this new methodcontrols the overall aerodynamic drag of the vehicle and enhances the efficiency of hyper-sonic flight, without spending additional energyor having to fit anything extra on the nose of themissile or rocket. The new technology also costsnothing. Officials say once the chromium mixcoating is prepared, it can be applied even by

“the man on the street”. Three factors have persuaded the DRDO to

take the research seriously: a radical cut in thecosts of enhancing missile range; not needingadditional devices to enhance that range; and noneed to import material or know-how. Adding devices would have meant changes in existingmissile structure, which can now be avoided.“We are very much into the research findings,”an official said.

DRDO scientists are also of the view that thechromium coat can be applied to existing stock-pile of missiles (Agni), which makes the methodmore relevant and attractive.

Coming from an Indian research institute atno cost, and to a critical sector like defencewhich is in urgent need of indigenous intellec-tual property, it is a shot in the arm for both theIISc and the DRDO.

Published in Times of India

Defending India: Anageing naval fleet,obsolete equipmentIF YOU thought Indian airspace was impregnable, or that thecountry had enough submarines to take a fight to enemy shores,think again. The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) hasnow punched big holes in these two critical defence areas.

Over the last three years, journalists have highlighted the gaping holes in the country’s air defence coverage—which isparticularly alarming over central and peninsular India—as wellas the fast dwindling strength of its underwater combat fleet,with projections showing that the Navy will be left with only eightto nine of its present 16 diesel-electric submarines by 2012.

In its reports tabled in Parliament, CAGblasted the government for lapses on thesevery aspects after reviewing the functioning ofADGES (air defence ground environment system) in the IAF and the operational avail-ability of submarines in the Navy.

For instance, India at present has only 10Russian Kilo-class, four German HDW andtwo virtually obsolete Foxtrot submarines,none of them nuclear powered, compared toChina’s 57 attack submarines, a dozen of themnuclear.

It gets worse. CAG holds that the opera-tional availability of Indian submarines is aslow as 48 percent due to an aging fleet and prolonged refit schedules. This means that ifIndia goes to war at present, it will have to makedo with only seven to eight submarines, evenfewer than Pakistan’s dozen or so which include three spanking new French Agosta-90Bvessels.

“With serious slippages in the inductionplan, the Navy is left with an aging fleet withmore than 50 percent of its submarines having

completed 75 percent of their operational life. Some have already outlived their maximum service life,” said the CAG. Theongoing Rs 18,798 crore project to construct six French Scorpene killer submarines at Mazagon Docks, which will deliver one submarine per year from 2012 onwards, was approved by the government rather late in the day.

The story of multi-layered ADGES, an integrated network ofsurveillance radars, air defence control centres, air and missilebases tasked with protection, is equally shocking. The CAGholds that the very “eyes” of the network, in the shape of air defence radars, are in bad shape, with obsolete equipment andoutdated plans.

In terms of both available numbers and operational efficiency, all three types of radar—high-power, medium-powerand low-level transportable—are inadequate to providing gap-free air defence cover.

Published in Times of India

ADMIRAL WUSHENGLI ,commanderPeople’s RepublicArmy (Navy) withChief of NavalStaff AdmiralSureesh Mehta atSouth Block. Indiaand China haveexchanged visitsin a milestonedefencecooperationeffort.