Bh Us 04 Acquisti

8/12/2019 Bh Us 04 Acquisti

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Privacy, Economics,

and Immediate Gratification:Why Protecting Privacy is Easy,

But Selling It is Not

Alessandro Acquisti

Heinz School, Carnegie Mellon UniversityPGuardian Technologies, Inc.

acquistiandre!.c"u.edu


2/73

Why do we have great privacy enhancing

technologies that almost no!ody uses"

Why do so many people claim to !e concerned

a!out privacy# and then do little to protect it"


3/73

It$s the economy, stupid%

# Privacy is an econo"ic $ro%le"&

# & even !hen $rivacy issues do not have directecono"ic inter$retation

# Privacy is a%out trade'o((s) $ros*cons o(revealing*accessing $ersonal in(or"ation&

+ or individuals

+ or organizations# & and trade'o((s are the real" o( econo"ics


4/73

Agenda

-. Privacy and the cono"y * cono"ics andPrivacy

/. So Many 0$en 1uestions, So 2ittle Ti"e

3. Privacy and 4ationality) Alternative 5$lanationsand Preli"inary Survey 4esults


5/73

1. Privacy and the EconomyEconomics and Privacy


6/73

Privacy and the econo"y

6I a" under no "oral or other 0%ligation, to $u%lish to the 7orld, ho!

"uch "y 5$enses and "y Inco"es a"ount to yearly. 8&9

:issi"ulation is a %ranch o( 7isdo".;

# 7arren and Brandeis, -D

# 6ranElin Mills lour; girl, -D-=llis S"ith 8/DDD9@

# SSFs, -3

# 4etail Credit Co., T47

# qui(a5, 5$erian

# A"azon, 4eal Audio, eToys, /DDDs


7/73

Privacyand the roaring dot co" days

&'ost commercial health(

care We! sites lure

consumers with free medical

information, then sell data on

them to third parties in waysthat threaten the consumer)s

privacy*

MarE S"ith, e%ruary -, /DDD

&It is surprising how recently

changes in law and technology

have !een permitted to

undermine sanctuaries of privacy

that +mericans have long taen

for granted*

-Suddenly, shopping that had

once seemed anonymous was

!eing archived in personally

identifia!le dossiers-

FT Magazine, A$ril 3D, /DDD

-In the !acground, advertising

services are !uilding profiles of

where people !rowse, what they

!uy, how they thin, and who

they are-

-.or a!out / cents, some

medical data sites will sell you

your neigh!or)s history of urinary

tract infections It will get worse*

Business7eeE, March /D, /DDD


8/73

And then&

#&0he overall B12 maret opportunity shouldreach 3456BN in transaction volume !y 1664*

#Actually&

Sources) orrester 4esearch and I:C, circa /DD-

Glo%al 'Co""erce Transaction olu"e =JBF@

0

100

200

300

400

500

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004


9/73

Ho! the maretreacted

#cono"ic challenges $ushed "erchantsto!ards "ore intrusive $olicies)

&0his policy may change from time to time

so please chec !ac periodically*

78ahoo% Privacy Policy, circa 1669

:ata MarEeting :ata eiling


10/73

0echnology) The case o( the incredi%lyshrinEing anony"ous $ay"ents "arEet

Cy%ersource

Cyota, 0r%isco"

ullyIdenti(ied

Protected(ro"

Merchants

Protected (ro"Merchants and

Credit CardIssuers

Protected (ro"Merchants, CreditCard Issuers, and

Shi$$ers

i$rivacy

PrivateBuy

Pay$al, Ache5

Cash, PGuardian

From whom is the information anonymized

W

hatinformationisanonymized


11/73

And the ;awK

# Fational Loo re(uses to release a deceased

gira((es "edical records on grounds that it

!ould violate the ani"als right to $rivacy

=Politech, May /DD/@

# An+nimal Privacy Entitlement +ctK

# FoN A Patriot +ct instead


12/73

7hat a%out econo"icsK

# Posner =-D@

+ Privacy as conceal"ent o( in(or"ation< focus

+ Privacy as quiet< little economic relevance

+ Privacy as (reedo"< no economic relevance


13/73

cono"ics and $rivacy

# Fo!)

+ Privacy as conceal"ent o( in(or"ation ' yes

+ Privacy as quiet ' yes

+ Privacy as (reedo" + yesN

# ven !hen $rivacy intrusions have no i""ediate econo"ic

relevance, i""aterial di"ensions o( $rivacy still i"$act the

!ell'%eing o( the individual

# cono"ics o( ha$$iness and !ell'%eing


14/73

The evolutiono( the economics of privacy

# arly -Ds

+ Chicago school vs. %roader vie!s o( $rivacy

# Mid -Ds

+ The IT e5$losion) arian, Foa", 2audon, ClarEe

# A(ter /DD-

+ The Internet) $ersonalization and dyna"ic %ehavior

+ Modeling) $rice discri"ination, in(or"ation andco"$etition, costs o( accessing custo"ers

+ "$irical studies) surveys and e5$eri"ents

+ cono"ics o( =$ersonal@ in(or"ation security

=Anderson, arian, 7IS@


15/73

The early days) Stigler

# Peculiar relation %et!een 6o!nershi$; and $rivacy+ In(or"ation a%out so"e%ody "ay have %een costly

acquired %y other $eo$le

# ree e5change o( in(or"ation !ill lead to desira%leresults regardless o( o!nershi$+ I( I a" a good de%tor, I !ant this in(or"ation to %e

Eno!nO i( I a" a %ad de%tor, I !ant to Eee$ it secret

+ Su$$ose I a" a %ad de%tor) then, !hether I do notreveal in(or"ation or in(or"ation a%out "e is re$orted,I !ill $ay higher rates


16/73

The early days) Posner

# Privacy as conceal"ent o( in(or"ation+ Individuals !ith %ad traits =e.g., $oor e"$loyees@ have

an interest in hiding the"

+ Individuals !ith good traits have an interest in sho!ingthe"

+ 4educing in(or"ation availa%le to 6%uyers; in this"arEet =e"$loyers@ reduces e((iciency

# 5tends argu"ent to non'"arEet %ehavior+ .g., "arriage

# Costs o( conceal"ent %orne %y others+ .g., !hen $rivacy o( se5'o((enders is $rotected

# Privacy is re'distri%utive and reduces e((iciency


17/73

The "id -Ds) Foa"

# 7ith no transaction costs in trading ornegotiation, initial assign"ent o( $rivacy rights isar%itrary (ro" vie!$oint o( econo"ic e((iciency

+ ncry$tion# 6The e5istence o( encry$tion "ay largely deter"ine !ho has to

$ay !ho", not !hether so"ething !ill ha$$en.;

# ncry$tion "aEes other $arties $ay

# 4edistri%utes !ealth to consu"ers

# :i((iculties

+ Inco"$lete in(or"ation

+ Hu"an right

+ Burden on $oor


18/73

The "id -Ds) arian

# Consu"ers rationally !ant certain Einds o( in(or"ation to%e availa%le to $roducers, not other Einds+ .g., consu"er !ants seller to Eno! !hat goods she liEes, %ut

not how"uch she liEes the"

# Annoyances co"es (ro" too little in(or"ation %eingshared+ .g., tele'"arEeters o((ering $roducts I do not !ant

# E=ternalities derive (ro" secondary use o( in(or"ation

# :e(ine $ro$erty rights in $rivate in(or"ation in !ays thatallo! consu"ers to retain control over ho! in(or"ationa%out the" is used+ .g., ti"ed contracts

+ .g., "aEe it costly to access certain digital in(or"ation


19/73

/DD- and a(ter) A ne! interestin the econo"ics o( $rivacy

# Calzolari and Pavan =/DD-@

# Taylor =/DD-@

# Acquisti and arian =/DD-@

# &


20/73

0$ti"al $rivacy $olicies

# Calzolari and Pavan =/DD-@

# Contracting environ"ents !here t!o 6$rinci$als; =e.g.,

sellers@ sequentially interact !ith a co""on 6agent; =e.g.,

%uyer@

+ irst seller releases in(or"ation that is correlated !ith agents

ty$e

# 7el(are e((ects o( $rivacy'$rotecting la!s that $reventin(or"ation disclosure on consu"ers sho$$ing activity

+ In(or"ation trans"ission %et!een t!o vendors "ay result in

!el(are increase

+ 4educes =e5$ected@ distortions


21/73

Custo"er $rivacy

# Taylor =/DD-@

# alue o( custo"er in(or"ation derives (ro" a%ility o(

(ir"s to identi(y individual consu"ers and charge the"

$ersonalized $rices# Considers t!o settings) anony"ity regi"e and recognition

regi"e

# 7el(are co"$arisons de$end critically on !hether

consu"ers antici$ate sale o( the list+ I( consu"ers do not (oresee sale o( their data, (ir"s have

incentives to charge higher $rices

+ I( consu"ers antici$ate sale o( list, this results in lo!er $rices

than !ould $revail under the anony"ity regi"e


22/73

Inducing custo"ers to try ne! goods

# Acquisti and arian =/DD-@

# CooEies'liEe technology vs. anony"izing technology

# 1uestions

+ 7ill cooEies'liEe technology %ring "ore $ro(itsK

+ 7ill %uyers use the anony"izing technologyK

# 4esults

+ Fo larger $ro(its (ro" cooEies'liEe technology&

+ & unless so"ething "ore is o((ered

+ Enhancedservices %ased on gathered in(or"ation

+ Anony"izing technologies could "aEe society !orse o((


23/73

Su""arizing results

# Allo!ing (ir"s to use cooEies can"aEe

custo"ers and society %etter o((

# Sharing in(or"ation %et!een sellers reduces6distortions;

# 7ith 6strategic; custo"ers, (ir"s %etter o((

res$ecting custo"ers $rivacy

# So, where is the pro!lem"


24/73

0(('line vs. on'line identities

# >n(line identity# Carries in(or"ation a%out an individuals tastes, her $urchase

history, etc. =e.g., A"azon account@

# >ff(line identity# The $ersistent identity o( an individual, as revealed %y

identi(iers such as credit card nu"%ers and social security

nu"%ers

# 0he pro!lem: ;ined on(line?off(line identities# :i((erent needs

# 5ternalities

# 0echnology can separate them Why is this not happening"


25/73

2. So Many !en "#estions$ So %itt&e 'ime


26/73

0$en questions

-. Is too "uch $rivacy %ad (or youK

/. :o you really have zero $rivacyK

3. 7hat are the costs o( $rivacyK

. 7ho should $rotect your $rivacyK

. :o $eo$le really care a%out $rivacyK


27/73

Is too "uch $rivacy %ad (or youK

or, too much privacy can act against the interests

of society or the individual

# cono"ics says)

+ More sharing o( on'line identity in(or"ation is good)"arEet la!s can allo! the right a"ount o(in(or"ation to %e shared

+ But, this is notin contradiction !ith $rotection o(

$rivacy =o(('line identity@

+ Pro!lem: linages and trails shrins the anonymityset 7@aneAis and Serantov C1661D 0hen:


28/73

:o you really have zero $rivacyK

&Get over it: 8ou already have Aero privacy*

or, the loss of control on personal information is

simply unavoida!le in our networed society

# But in(or"ation technology can also)

# ither linE or unlinE on'line and o(('line identities

# 0r "aEe linEages di((icult =e.g., S!eeney 8/DD/9@


29/73

:o you really have zero $rivacyK

# In al"ost every conceiva%le on'line and o(('linescenario, !e have develo$ed tools and "ethodsto adequately $rotect $rivacy

+Anony"ous $ay"ents =e.g., Chau" 8-/9@+Anony"ous %ro!sing =e.g., Goldschlag et al8-9@

+ Private $re(erences =e.g., Canny 8/DD/9@

+ 4e'"ailers =e.g., Chau" 8--9@

+ =Good@ electronic voting =e.g.,


30/73

And yet&.

# cono"ic argu"ents sho! that trade'o((s %et!eensharingandprotecting$ersonal in(or"ation "ay %ereconciled

#Technology coulddo it

#So, !hy econ Q technology did notdo itK

# Solve the (ollo!ing equation).ind aprivacycom!ination convenientfor customers

7eg Bo!,profita!lefor vendors 7eg +maAoncom,

advantageousfor other e=isting players 7eg credit card

networs, non replica!le!y competitors


31/73

7ho should $rotect your $rivacyK

# Sel('regulationK

+ ails under $ressure

# Policy*legislationK

+ U vs. US

+ Sa"uelson =/DD3@) The social costs o( con(using$rivacy $olicies

# Individual res$onsi%ilityK+ Can individuals $rotect the"selvesK

+ Should theyK


32/73

Phrasing the $olicy de%ateK

It is true that there are potential costs of using Gmail for

email storage C#D 0he uestion is whether consumers

should have the right to make that choice and

balance the tradeoffs, or whether it will !epreemptively denied to them !y privacy fundamentalists

out to deny consumers that choice

'' :eclan McCullagh =/DD@

# Can consu"ers really "aEe the choice that %est servestheir o!n interestsK


33/73

Privacy attitudes&

# Attitudes) usage+ To$ reason (or not going online =Harris@

+ >R !ould increase Internet usage given "ore $rivacy

=Harris@

# Attitudes) sho$$ing+ J- %illion in lost e'tail sales =3R !ould sho$ "ore online !ith guarantee (or $rivacy

=Harris@

# ="ost o( the a%ove is /DD- data&@


34/73

& versus $rivacy %ehavior

# Behavior

+ Anecdotic evidence

# :FA (or BigMac

+ 5$eri"ents# S$ieEer"ann, GrossElags, and Berendt =/DD-@) $rivacy

6advocates; Q ca"eras

+ veryday e5a"$les

# :ot co" death%ed# A%undance o( in(or"ation sharing


35/73

5$lanations

# Syverson =/DD3@

+ 64ational, a(ter all; e5$lanation

# ShostacE =/DD3@

+ 67hen it "atters; e5$lanation

# Hu%er"an =/DD@

+ 6Privacy and deviance; e5$lanation

# +re there other e=planations"


36/73

3. Privacy and (ationa&ity)

*&ternative E+!&anations

and Pre&iminary S#rvey (es#&ts


37/73

Personal in(or"ationis a very $eculiar econo"ic good

# Asy""etric in(or"ation

+ Individual does not Eno! ho!, ho! o(ten, (or ho! longher in(or"ation !ill %e used

+ Intrusions invisi%le and u%iquitous+ 5ternalities and "oral hazard

# 5'$ost

+ alue uncertainty

+ ee$s on a((ecting individual a(ter transaction

+ I"agine) lu"$ su" vs. negative annuity


38/73


# Conte5t'de$endent =states o( the !orld@

+Anony"ity sets

+ 4eco"%inant gro!th

+ S!eeney =/DD/@) >R o( A"ericans uniquelyidenti(ia%le (ro" LIP code, %irth date, and se5

# Su%ective

+ 67illingness to $ay; a((ected %y considerations %eyondtraditional "arEet reasoning


39/73


# Both $rivate and $u%lic good as$ects

+As in(or"ation, it is non rival and non e5cluda%le

+ et the "ore other $arties use that $ersonal

in(or"ation, the higher the risEs (or original data o!ner# Buy vs. sell

+ Individuals value di((erentlyprotectionand sale o(sa"e $iece o( in(or"ation

# 2iEe insurance, %ut&


40/73

& "ay%e %ecause&

# & $rivacy issues actually originate (ro" twodi((erent "arEets

+ MarEet (or $ersonal in(or"ation

+ MarEet (or $rivacy# 4elated, %ut not identical

# Con(usion leads to inconsistencies

+ :i((erent rules, attitudes, considerations

# Pu%lic vs. $rivate

# Selling vs. %uying

# S$eci(ic vs. generic

# alue (or other $eo$le vs. da"age to onesel(

# 2u"$ su" vs. negative annuity


41/73

Privacy and rationality

# Traditional econo"ic vie!) (or!ard looEing agent,utility "a5i"izer, %ayesian u$dater, $er(ectlyin(or"ed

+ Both in theoretical !orEs on $rivacy+And in e"$irical studies


42/73

et) $rivacy trade'o((s

# Protect)

+ I""ediate costs or loss o( i""ediate %ene(its

+ uture =uncertain@ %ene(its

# :o not $rotect)+ I""ediate %ene(its

+ uture =uncertain@ costs


43/73

7hy is this $ro%le"aticK

# Inco"$lete in(or"ation

# Bounded rationality

# Psychological*%ehavioral distortions

+ Co"$lacency to!ards large risEs

+ Ina%ility to deal !ith $rolonged accu"ulation o( s"allrisEs

+ Coherent ar%itrariness+ Hy$er%olic discounting

# 0heory: +cuisti +2' E2 64

# Empirical approach: +cuisti and Grosslags WEIS 64


44/73

I""ediate grati(ication&


45/73

Hy$er%olic discounting

S ti


46/73

Survey ti"evs. decision ti"e

Ti i t


47/73

Ti"e consistencyvs. ti"e inconsistency

S hi ti t d


48/73

So$histicatedvs. nave


49/73

Consequences

# 4ationality "odel not a$$ro$riate to descri%e individual$rivacy %ehavior

# Ti"e inconsistencies lead to under $rotection and

over release o( $ersonal in(or"ation# Genuinely $rivacy concerned individuals "ay end u$

not $rotecting their $rivacy

# Also so$histicated users !ill not $rotect the"selves

against risEs# 2arge risEs accu"ulate through s"all ste$s

# Fot Eno!ing the risE is notthe issue


50/73

Survey and e5$eri"ent

# Phase 0ne) $ilot

# Phase T!o) V-DD questions, -- su%ects (ro" CMU list

# Paid, online survey =CMU BerE"an und@

# Goals+ Contrast three sets o( data

# Privacy attitudes

# Privacy !ehavior

# 'aret characteristics and psychological distortions

+ Test rationality assu"$tion

+ 5$lain %ehavior and dichoto"y

# Phase Three) e5$eri"ent


51/73

1uestions

-. :e"ogra$hics and IT usage

/. no!ledge o( $rivacy risEs

3. no!ledge o( $rotection

. Attitudes to!ards $rivacy =generic@

. Attitudes to!ards $rivacy =s$eci(ic@

?. 4isE neutrality*aversion =un(ra"ed@

>. Strategic*unstrategic %ehavior =un(ra"ed@

. Hy$er%olic discounting =un(ra"ed@

. Buy and sell value (or sa"e $iece o( in(or"ation

-D. Behavior, $ast) 6Sell; %ehavior =i.e., give a!ay in(or"ation@

--. Behavior, $ast) 6Buy; %ehavior =i.e., $rotect in(or"ation@


52/73

:e"ogra$hics

# Age) -' =average) /@

# ducation) "ostly college educated

# Household inco"e) (ro" W-E to -/DEX# Fationalities) USA 3R

#


53/73

Privacy attitudes=e5cer$ts@

How important is privacy to you?

1 - Veryimportant

73 (60.33%)

2 31 (25.62%)

3 (7.!!%)! - "ome#owimportant

5 (!.13%)

5 2 (1.65%)

6 1 (0.$3%)

7 - otimportant at a&&

0 (0.00%)

P i ttit d


54/73


'o you t#in you #ave enou# privacy in to*ay+ssociety?

,es 32 (26.$%)

o $7 (73.11%)

How concerne* are you aout t#reats to your persona&privacy in to*ays in/ormation society?

1 - Very muc# !! (36.36%)

2 21 (17.36%)

3 2! (1.$3%)

! - "ome#ow 1 (15.70%)5 10 ($.26%)

6 2 (1.65%)

7 - ot at a&& 1 (0.$3%)

P i ttit d


55/73


Has your concern aout t#reats to your persona&

privacy c#ane* in t#e &ast 2! mont#s?

1 - uc# more

concerne*31 (25.62%)

2 22 (1$.1$%)3 26 (21.!%)

! - o c#anes !1 (33.$$%)

5 1 (0.$3%)

6 0 (0.00%)

7 - uc# &ess

concerne* 0 (0.00%)

l d ( i i E


56/73

no!ledge o( $rivacy risEs=e5cer$ts@

#en you are re&easin persona& in/ormation *urin anecommerce transaction #ow &ie&y *o you consi*er t#e

/o&&owin outcomes?

ttempts to vary price *urin your ne4t purc#ase ase* onyour co&&ecte* *ata

1 - Very &ie&y 16 (13.22%)

2 - uite &ie&y 16 (13.22%)

3 - "omew#at&ie&y

31 (25.62%)

! - it un&ie&y 3! (2$.10%)

5 - Very un&ie&y 1$ (1!.$$%)

#ave no i*ea 6 (!.6%)

se /or maretin purposes (e.. a*vertisin emai&s)

1 - Very &ie&y $2 (67.77%)

2 - uite &ie&y 1 (15.70%)

3 - "omew#at&ie&y

13 (10.7!%)

! - it un&ie&y 3 (2.!$%)

5 - Very un&ie&y 2 (1.65%)

l d ( i i E


57/73


How &ie&y *o you consi*er t#e possii&ity t#at a 3r* party canmonitor some *etai&s o/ t#e /o&&owin activities you may enae

in?

sin a /i&e s#arin c&ient (e.. 8a9aa)

1 - Very &ie&y 70 (57.$5%)

2 - uite &ie&y 22 (1$.1$%)

3 - "omew#at &ie&y 12 (.2%)

! - it un&ie&y 7 (5.7%)

5 - Very un&ie&y 6 (!.6%)

#ave no i*ea ! (3.31%)

ritin a te4t memo to yourse&/ on a computer connecte* to t#e

nternet in your orani9ation

1 - Very &ie&y 21 (17.36%)

2 - uite &ie&y 15 (12.!0%)

3 - "omew#at &ie&y 26 (21.!%)

! - it un&ie&y 3! (2$.10%)

5 - Very un&ie&y 20 (16.53%) #ave no i*ea 5 !.13%

l d ( i i E


58/73


'o you now w#at :c#e&on is?

,es 15 (12.50%)

o 105 ($7.50%)

'o you now w#at ;arnivore is?

,es 32 (26.$%)

o $7 (73.11%)

'o you now w#at


59/73


,ou #ave comp&ete* a cre*it car*

purc#ase wit# an on&ine merc#ant.

=esi*es you an* t#e merc#antwesite w#o #as *ata aoutpartso/

your transaction?

oo*y> 36.!%;re*it car* company> 1$.7%Hacers> 15%

Nobody, assuming an SSL transaction, withoutwhich I would not commit an online transaction

using my credit card

Privacy Eno!ledge and


60/73

Privacy Eno!ledge andovercon(idence =e5cer$ts@

Can you estimate an interval for which you are95% sure that it contains the number thatcorrectly answers the following questions?

Example: Occurrences of identity theft in the US in 2003

Solution: lower bound 0.5 illion !complaints with "#$%& less

conser'ati'e estimates: (0 illion

Rational Overconfident Missing3!9% 5"!3% #!9%


61/73


62/73

no ledge o( $ri ac $rotection


63/73

no!ledge o( $rivacy $rotection=e5cer$ts@

# Privacy la!)

+ 54F cannot uote a law or descri!e it

# 0C: air in(or"ation $rinci$les)

+ HF !elieve they include *litigation against wrongful !ehavior*

# Goal) %ro!se anony"ously

+ 59F would not now how

# Goal) %ro!se the Internet !ith !arnings i( a

!e%site has an inco"$ati%le $rivacy $olicy

+ JF would not now how 7!ut most use IE


64/73


65/73

6Buy; %ehavior

# >R ado$ted so"e strategyor technologyorother!ise tooE so"e $articular actionto $rotecttheir $rivacy

+ ncry$tion, PGP+ :o'not'call list

+ Interru$t $urchase

+ Provide (aEe in(or"ation

+ 8&9# Ho!ever, !hen you looE at details, $ercentages go

do!n&+ R encry$t e"ails regularly

+ Si"ilar results (or shredders, do'not'call lists, caller'I:s, etc.


66/73

6Sell; %ehavior

S =in decreasing order@)

# ull na"e

# "ail address

# Ho"e address

# Phone nu"%er

#


67/73

Attitudes*%ehavior dichoto"y=e5cer$ts@

Have a

&oya&tycar* ave

correct in/o

Have acar*

ave/ae

in/o

'on+t#ave a

car*Cow concern #!##% "!$#% "!$#%

e*ium concern "!$#% 3!3#% #!##%Hi# concern "!$#% 3!3#% #!##%

4ecall o( $ast %ehavior


68/73

4ecall o( $ast %ehavior=e5cer$ts@

Have a&oya&ty

car* avecorrect

in/o

Have acar*ave/ae

in/o

'on+t#ave a

car*,es #ave iveni*entity *ata #!##% #!##% #!##%o #ave not iveni*entity *ata "!$#% "!##% 3!3#%


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6Buy; vs. 6sell; $rice

s Dse&&D price #i#er or &ower t#ane4pecte* &oss?

(ell ) e*+ected loss $!'3%

,*+ected loss ) sell $!5"%

Missing !#%

s DuyD price #i#er or &ower t#ane4pecte* &oss?

-uy ) e*+ected loss 39!5#%

,*+ected loss ) -uy 3"!3%

Missing '!3$%

So !ho should $rotect your


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So... !ho should $rotect your$rivacyK

'o you t#in t#at privacy s#ou&* e protecte* y>

Iovernment(t#rou#&eis&ation)

65 (53.72%)

:ac# user y#erse&/

(t#rou#tec#no&oy)

1$ (1!.$$%)

;ompanies an*in*ustry(t#rou# se&/-reu&ation)

1 (0.$3%)

:veryo*y(warrante*

natura&&yt#rou#e#aviora&norms)

37 (30.5$%)

oo*y (s#ou&*not eespecia&&yprotecte*)

0 (0.00%)


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Assorted conclusions

# Theory+ Ti"e inconsistencies "ay lead to under'$rotection and over'release

o( $ersonal in(or"ation

+ Genuinely $rivacy concerned individuals "ay end u$ not $rotectingtheir $rivacy

# vidence+ vidence o( overcon(idence, incorrect assess"ent o( o!n %ehavior,

inco"$lete in(or"ation a%out risEs and $rotection, %uy*selldichoto"y

+ 4ationality "odel not a$$ro$riate to descri%e individual $rivacy

%ehavior# I"$lications+ Privacy easier to $rotect than to sell

+ Sel('regulation alone, or reliance on technology and userres$onsi%ility alone, !ill not!orE

Bh Us 04 Acquisti

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